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CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS

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CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS

BY

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WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

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TO
MY MOTHER

PREFACE

To many, the results of the French elections of November 16, 1919, came as a welcome surprise. An American observer in Paris who had perhaps taken but a casual interest in French domestic problems would have been convinced, upon visiting the Palais Bourbon, that France was on the verge of being engulfed in a tidal wave of Bolshevism from the Russian deep. He would have heard aghast, the Extreme Left, led by the grandson of Karl Marx, Jean Longuet, shrieking its defiance at all things bourgeois. Possibly to his dismay, he would also have heard the thunderous stamping of feet by which the Socialists drowned the sound of the huge silver bell, through insistent ringing of which the President of the Chamber bravely struggled to maintain order. To the Americans at home the situation must have appeared no less ominous. Judged by the press reports, the tumult arising from the First of May celebrations, and the Socialist vituperations against the Peace Conference, surely gave cause for grave foreboding.

But a deeper knowledge of the currents which underlie the surface of the political waters in France belied any such catastrophe as the "storm prophets" had predicted. Those currents were deep; they were silent. Indeed, to their depth they owed their relentless power and their persistence in their normal course.

The strongest of these forces was the sterling character of the French people themselves. Only a very superficial estimate of national temperament will judge the French to be excitable, unpractical and unstable. Although the history of France has been marked by whirlwinds in which the nation has been blown hither

and thither by the gust of every fresh political doctrine, French character possesses at least three qualities of impregnable strength.

The first of these is a personal attachment to property, whether a farm or a wine shop, which no gilded theory of Communism can shake. This attachment is nearly universal, for it is based upon the small holdings of 20,000,000 peasants and *petit bourgeois*. Moreover, the sentiment embodied in the *Code Napoléon* has been and is likely to remain the breakwater protecting the Republic against the lashing waves of the *"Internationale."* This great legal monument has given to France a scheme of social and economic principles which has exalted individualism and encouraged an almost devout attachment to property.

The second characteristic is a respect for authority. To us Americans who were recently in France, and to all Americans accustomed lightly to regard constituted power, the innate obedience and discipline of the French was something to be wondered at. It was first noticeable at the very gates of the city, where French farmers complacently allowed gendarmes to search their vehicles for objects upon which to levy the time-revered and superlatively irritating *octroi* tax. It appeared again amidst the solemnity of public bodies, whether at the Chamber of Deputies or the Hôtel de Ville, where chamberlains and attendants, girt about with great sashes and clanking swords, rendered due homage to officials whom they served. Even in the Chamber of Deputies, where members were allowed the greatest license, those who constituted the crowd filling the visitors' gallery were kept in docile submission by elaborately uniformed and decorated guards who did not hesitate to eject those who might attempt too boisterously to join in the Chamber's levity.

At the universities, this characteristic love of ceremonial and order was yet more noticeable—doubly

so in contrast to American institutions of learning. French professors invariably deliver their lectures wearing their academic gowns; they are followed into class by an attendant who carries the lecturer's notes and deposits them respectfully upon his desk. At the professor's entrance, his class rises and maintains a restrained silence until he has taken his seat; and when he leaves at the close of the hour, they again dutifully stand until he has left the room. One must not altogether scoff at these niceties. They may be an inheritance from the Monarchy and the Empire, observed under the Republic to give it an added discipline which the force of kings formerly imposed. They may be a reflection of the ceremonialism dear to the Catholic Church—last vestiges of the union of Rome with the State. But whatever their causes. they apparently oppose one of the staunchest obctacles to any elements endeavoring to snatch authority from those in whom it has been legally vested.

Finally, the French possess a civic spirit which amounts to more than enthusiasm, is wider than patriotism and different from religious zeal. It is a wholesouled devotion to the cause each man feels is his own, yet at the same time extending beyond worship at particularistic shrines and uniting before the altar of *La Patrie.* The difference between French and American temperament was illustrated on the night of the armistice. *Poilus* and *midinettes* forgot their cherished cynicism to join in singing, with a genuine spirit of thankfulness, the "Marseillaise." How could such as they understand the Americans, who, on the other hand, serpentined along the *rues* and *boulevards,* singing, not the "Star Spangled Banner," but "Hail, Hail, the Gang's All Here!" America cheered at the finishing of a dirty job and went out to celebrate. France thanked Providence for winning a Crusade.

The passionate devotion to *La Patrie* allows the ship

of state to drift on the swells, but always within the limits which the length of this spiritual anchor chain imposes. Whether it be found in the street song of "Conspuez Guillaume," which French students shouted day after day during the first weeks of the armistice, or in some Catholic *Te Deum*, a devout and enthusiastic nationalism, completely submerging class selfishness, is the dominant trait in French character to-day. France, in spite of the fact that Paris has ever been a fecund breeding ground for new creeds and theories of social and moral destruction, is nevertheless the most conservative country in the world.

There are some singular misconceptions in America as to the nature of French political organizations. Textbooks, when they can be persuaded to deal with the subject, often assert that in reality French political parties do not exist. Organizations spring up in the cool of the night, only to have the burning sun of a new political faction wither them away on the following day. But although France does not have the two-party system as it exists in England and America, I have tried to point out what are the lasting and the continuous features in French political organization and to prove that party multiplicity is not due entirely to an undisciplined resentment to control, but has causes which, if existing in any other country, would produce identical effects. Also I have tried to show that, although some parliamentary *groups* may be transient and unstable, French *parties* possess an organization and a personnel which are well defined.

I may have burdened the reader with wearisome details, but I have felt these necessary to show the elements of organization and the differences in the doctrines of present political groupings. The first part of the book may perhaps be described as a study of the political forces of France. Along with the political parties, I have included the French Press, for it pos-

sesses distinctively political characteristics and it assumes an aggressive political leadership.

The second portion of the book may be called a study of the movements for political reform. Under this heading I have discussed the recent electoral bill which has offset the predominance of the Radical and Socialist vote in the Chamber of Deputies, a predominance to which, hitherto, they were not wholly entitled. The demand for constitutional reform—including decentralization of government administration—is most insistent. I have attempted to show the causes of these demands and also the likelihood of the adoption of the proposed remedies. Of special interest to Americans should be the attempt to do away with the present system of parliamentary government and to substitute for it a government modeled upon that of the United States, in which the President plays a more prominent rôle. Likewise, the question of the demand for experts in administration, and even for professional representation in political bodies, that is to say, legislatures composed of business men to supplement, if not entirely to replace, political assemblies, should be of added value, in view of our own problems.

The policy of the French Government during the past war has also been touched upon, notably, the questions raised by the state of siege, the censorship, the State control of nearly every phase of industrial life, the prohibition of importations, and the "consortium" policy followed up to and throughout the armistice. Americans who have witnessed the gradual development of the power of their President should also be interested in the exactly opposite phenomenon noticeable in France, *viz.*, the increasing dominance of French legislative authority.

It has been impossible to separate completely a consideration of political forces from the study of the various movements of reform. Indeed the *raison d'être*

of many of the political parties is, logically, to bring about these reforms. The latter questions all figured more or less prominently in the November elections.

Many people believed that the issues of this election lay between those who sanctioned the war and those who opposed it. The Unified Socialists were the principal opposition. Personal antagonism to M. Clemenceau, partly arising from a faction within his own party, led by M. Franklin Bouillon, also played a part.

The issue of Bolshevism was of even more importance. The Unified Socialist party in its Easter congress definitely pledged itself, as we shall see, to work for the inauguration of a Soviet form of government and the complete establishment of proletariat control. The issue which they brought before the voters was therefore clear-cut. The temper of the French people again proved its conservatism and its loyalty by an overwhelming defeat of such extremists as Jean Longuet, Jacques Sadoul, Raffen-Dugens, and Brizon, who had insistently preached the Social Revolution. Their hopes of bringing about the revolution through peaceful means have been sadly disappointed. Whether or not this failure will dampen their efforts to achieve a *coup de poing* for the same end, is another question.

But the third issue in the French election, one obscured by the two larger issues, yet of equal importance in the eyes of many electors, was the question of principle involved in the opposition of State Socialism and individual initiative. This issue I have tried to outline in a chapter on the "French Bureaucracy and State Socialism," and to show how the war has accelerated the participation of the Government in industrial activities which have hitherto been reserved to individual effort. The French Radical party—which has maintained the balance of power in the French Chamber since the beginning of the century—is definitely pledged to Collectivism. Its program is to take over all public services

and all industrial enterprises when the latter become sufficiently organized to permit the experiment, at least, of State operation.

This tendency, differing widely from the pure Marxism preached by the Unified party, which demands a complete *bouleversement* of the present order and the directorate of the proletariat, conflicts with the sturdy individualism which is one of the most distinctive traits of the French people. The existence of State Socialism in France is partly accounted for by the fact that nearly all of the public services owe their origin to the State and not to individuals, as in America. The adventures of American private initiative in the development of virgin resources have no counterpart in French history. Furthermore, the French character is conservative, while the American character is sanguine and given to "plunging." A Frenchman does not often possess that large share of imagination and business capacity which has made American "steel kings."

Again, the Radical party has been maintained in power upon issues other than economic, such as anti-clericalism. Their collectivist program has been partly imposed by the strength of their own position. The war, which so exaggerated the Statist tendency, placed the issue squarely before the French public. Measures taken permanently to fasten this incubus upon France were legalized by a Parliament and a Ministry whose mandate had been extra-legally prolonged and which owed its election to other issues. Business elements, such as the Union of Economic Interests, and all of the Conservative and Centrist parties proclaimed against a further injection of State effort into industry. It became certain that the issue would come up before the elections for settlement. Signs of this discontent were evidenced by the fall of Victor Boret, Minister of Agriculture, in July, 1919. The elections apparently placed the seal of disapproval on the Government's anti-individ-

ualistic program by the defeat of five members of the Government, two of whom, at least, M. Clémentel, Minister of Commerce, and M. Morel, Undersecretary of the Liquidation of War Supplies, were directly responsible for many of the more radical features of the policy. Finally, the reduction of the Radical representatives by a hundred at the last election seemed to have been caused partly by their over-insistence upon policies of State Socialism.

The last part of this book deals with French opinion as it was expressed toward the peace settlement. Originally, France demanded terms of peace which would either erect the Rheinish provinces into a buffer state or annex them to France. She also asked for military guarantees which would supply the only security of which the "old diplomacy" was capable. America's insistence on a League of Nations, however, led to the abandonment of many of the old theories of "guarantees," and to the formal adoption of the policy of a League of Nations as furnishing the only means (1) of providing permanent international security and (2) of enforcing well-defined rules of justice.

It has often been said that at no time was France convinced of the efficacy and the practicability of a League of Nations, but that her only trust was in a permanent alliance of her present allies. However, this assertion is open to grave doubt. During the early weeks of the Peace Conference, there was abundant evidence that French opinion had been whole-heartedly won over to the League of Nations and that it was exerting itself toward the creation of a League which would *actually* provide guarantees. To secure this end her representatives at the Peace Table advanced some very definite proposals. The first of these was for the pooling of that part of the war debt of the Allies which the indemnity could not pay. France believed that if the Allies were sincere in their repeated declarations that

she had saved the world from ruin, they would agree to apportion equally among themselves the material charges of the war. The second measure to vitalize the League was the proposal to create an international police force, subject to the direction of an international executive. This force would be immediately available for the suppression of illegal international disorder. France did not wish to be placed in the position of fearfully waiting for months—perhaps even years—until her former Allies should decide whether or not to aid her again. These suggestions were both rejected by the Peace Conference, principally because of American opposition. Doubtlessly, President Wilson and his advisors favored them in modified form; but the opposition in the United States had already shown itself so opposed to the creation of any league imposing definite responsibilities upon America that they believed an extension of its powers would mean its total rejection.

The refusal of the Conference, at America's instigation, to create an efficient—in the military sense—league was largely responsible for the exaggeration of French demands based upon the policies of a discredited diplomacy. When some of these demands were in turn rejected (such as the annexation of the left bank of the Rhine), the most violent protests were made by public opinion. These protests were very natural. The League of Nations was acceptable to France only upon the assumption of providing an equally secure guarantee of safety. This substituted promise of guarantees prevented the annexation of the Rhine, which at least seemed to offer temporary security against German aggression. But the final form of the League did not live up to its promised remedies. It offered no positive military guarantee commensurate with the policy it supplanted. Consequently, France felt that her safety had been jeopardized for the empty satisfaction of realizing

an ideal which America urged in form yet now refused to adopt in fact. It is needless to say that the treatment which the United States Senate accorded the Treaty aroused a further skepticism among Frenchmen as to the real worth of a League of Nations.

The obligations accumulated in the writing of this book are many. My first is due to the Government of the United States. To one who holds Tennyson's "do or die" conception of a soldier, it may seem rather audacious of an enlisted man in the American Expeditionary Forces to have departed beyond the customary fields of guard mount and "K. P." But, at any rate, I am grateful for having had the opportunity to go to France, to do what little I did, and when it was over, to spend four delightful months at the French University of Grenoble. I was there fortunate to find myself in the very heart of France, not the France of Paris, but the France of the Provinces.

I wish to thank the different political organizations in Paris who, by means of personal interviews or through correspondence, very graciously accorded me whatever information I desired.

To Monsieur Chastenet, the editor of the *Droit du Peuple* of Grenoble, a fiery Bolshevik and a late candidate for the Chamber of Deputies, I also owe my thanks. His amiability and kindly spirit somewhat dissipated, I must confess, my natural bourgeois terror of the class struggle and its missionaries.

On the other hand, to Paul Bozon-Verduraz, likewise of Grenoble, a modern knight upholding the ideals of medieval kingship, a sturdy follower of Philippe VIII, I owe much inspiration. Through him, my confidence in republics has been rudely shaken and my prejudices against the doctrine of Divine Right somewhat removed.

Finally, to Madame J. Fournier I am greatly indebted. From the aloof colonial vantage point of Morocco, she

is able to pass serene judgment upon all the works of human frailty—political and otherwise. To her nothing can be perfect. Although the Republic has its vices, it governs France "pretty well,—just as it is."

Space does not permit me to name the many friends in America who have given assistance and encouragement in the writing of this book. But I am under especial obligation to Professors Edward S. Corwin, Henry R. Shipman, and Philip Marshall Brown of Princeton University; to Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes of Columbia; to W. P. Cresson and C. L. Barrett. I also am greatly indebted to Stoddard Dewey, Henry Adams Gibbons, and Wm. Morton Fullerton for the kindly interest they have shown in, and the advice they have given upon, a subject concerning which they have a much more profound knowledge than the author.

RAYMOND LESLIE BUELL

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INTRODUCTION

One hundred and forty-two years ago the proud French Monarchy of the Old World came to the active military and naval assistance of thirteen obscure colonies that were struggling in the New World for their freedom and independence. One hundred and thirty-one years ago these colonies put into effect the Constitution of the United States and set up the federal, republican government under which they have since prospered and expanded and grown powerful; and in the same year was inaugurated in France the Great Revolution which, amid terrors and travail, was destined to uproot the hoary traditions and habitual abuses of the old Bourbon monarchy and to plant in European soil the fructifying seeds of modern and contemporary France. No wonder that for more than a century a potent sympathy has existed between the French nation and the people of the United States.

Since the schism of the English-speaking peoples in the eighteenth century, the development of the United States has been, in certain respects, more akin to that of France than to that of England. Present-day France is a country of farmers and business men and laborers, quite devoid of a privileged, land-owning nobility and of a state-supported ecclesiastical establishment; she is a country without a king, a country in which republican institutions and thoroughly democratic practices and the spirit of social equality have taken firm root, a country which has repeatedly been stirred by sincere altruism and lofty idealism. What truer description could be given of outstanding national traits of us Americans?

Despite the community of major interests and ideals,

there are certain obvious though minor differences between the United States and France. The latter, politically speaking, is a highly centralized state, while the former is a decentralized federation of autonomous commonwealths. Government in the United States is carried on alternately by two well-organized political parties, while in France the existence of multifarious and transitory political groups gives to French public life an appearance of the gravest and most alarming instability of governments and even of policies. Moreover, the French nation is as homogeneous and as long established as the American people are heterogeneous and recently come together, a contrast which accounts in part for the fact that patriotism has more often produced chauvinism among the former than among the latter, and likewise for the fact that the former have been more handicapped, perhaps more victimized, than the latter by tradition and antique usage. Certainly the problems of the appropriate relations between Church and State have harassed Americans less than Frenchmen, and, on the whole their solution has been happier and more just in the United States than in France. Besides it should be noted that France is a relatively small country whose boundaries have always been exposed to attack by powerful neighbors, and that both in 1814-1815 and in 1871 her capital city was captured by military foes. To Americans, inhabiting the richest and widest portion of an isolated continent and never menaced by numerous or greedy neighbors, what has been represented by the French to be merely precautionary has too often appeared to be selfish and glaringly vindictive.

It is the façade of a temple that first arrests the eye—and a façade is not necessarily the index of the beauties and familiarities of the temple's interior. If the average American, before the late war, could have pressed past the obvious external strangeness of France and gotten into the mind and soul of the French people, he would

have found much the same temple as he had reared at home and much the same sort of worship as he himself paid, albeit in a different language and with some variations in detail, to the spirit of liberty and equality and human brotherhood. But before the war, the average American stopped short at the façade: he was alienated by the strange language and deceived by writers and critics who unsympathetically stressed what was peculiar to the French rather than what was common to French and Americans; his traditional morality was shocked by the "realism" in French literature and art—the "realism" that was typically unrevealing of the truest and deepest aspirations of the French people; and he came to believe, while he continued to do sentimental homage to the land of a Lafayette and a Rochambeau, that contemporary Frenchmen were degenerate descendants of illustrious sires.

The Great War has given us a new perspective. "Degenerate" people could not fight as unflinchingly and as heroically as did the French during the past five years. To put it mildly, France and the French people surprised and astonished us Americans. And on the other hand, the United States availed herself of a supreme opportunity to repay with interest the debt she owed France since the days of '76. At Montdidier, at Château-Thierry, in the Belleau Woods. at St. Mihiel, in the Argonne, and on the Somme, was consecrated anew the Franco-American entente.

That the newer perspective may not be lost, that the recently hallowed entente may not be destroyed, is a hope which will be realized only if on both sides of the Atlantic there is a systematic and sympathetic interpretation of one people to the other. Vague rhetorical sentimentalizing will not suffice. There must be sound study and understanding; there must be adequate and unprejudiced presentation of all phases of national life —political, social, economic and cultural.

INTRODUCTION

Among the hundreds of thousands of young Americans who journeyed to France in 1917-1918 as modern knights and crusaders in the cause of democracy and international solidarity were a goodly number who pondered the meaning of the Great War and who in their camps or on furloughs or even in the trenches studied France and the French people freshly and at close range and without the prejudice of bookish professors or pedantic publicists. To the goodly number belongs the author of this book, Mr. Raymond L. Buell.

Mr. Buell utilized to the full his military experience in France. With amazing insight and perseverance he collected first-hand a vast amount of reliable information concerning contemporary French politics—the conditions which have shaped them, and the direction toward which they tend. And with no little skill and literary ability has he incorporated his information in this volume. If one wishes to know about the political groups in France, about the French parliamentary system, about the last elections, about the most recent phases of French socialism and syndicalism, about current agitations for woman suffrage, for constitutional amendment, for proportional and professional representation, one will read this book. Furthermore, if one desires to obtain an idea of what the bulk of the French people themselves think of the Peace Treaty, of the League of Nations, of President Wilson, and of American idealism in general, one will do well to study this volume. The volume is interesting, but it is neither dogmatic nor sentimental. It describes and analyzes; it never flatters or scolds. In its tone as well as in its content, it occupies a unique position among American commentaries on political France; it forms a vital contribution to a sound and lasting accord between the first Republic of the Old World and the first Republic of the New.

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS

La politique, c'est notre sang, notre argent, notre honneur.

—LE DUC D'AUDIFFRET PASQUIER

CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS

CHAPTER I

PARTY PHILOSOPHIES

Pour rester unis, le véritable moyen est de rester distincts.
JULES FERRY.

I

The system of party government in France, if indeed it can be characterized by such a term, is perhaps the most interesting and baffling feature of French political organization. Semi-organized, sporadic, over-numerous, these parties follow out an uncertain existence, each drawing its support from a devoted following. Their characteristic of multiplicity is usually attributed to the French type of mind which is unwilling to compromise and associate differing shades of thought. The greatest diversity of opinion exists upon every political subject; and each element feels that it must seek representation in a "group," which, despite its fluctuating and dissolving composition, continually puts forward its candidates upon a complete program and doctrine. An undisciplined independence of political beliefs is thus one of the causes of the multiplicity of French parties—an independence which does not allow Frenchmen to be

bound by caucuses, and at the same time precludes political opportunism.

This individualism a French author accounts for in these words:

> It is said that Frenchmen are rebels to association. That is true. Unfortunately in our divisions and in our quarrels our chief desire is not to do as our neighbors. You say White, I say Black; you go to the Left, I go to the Right. Is not this our temperament? At all times we are seeking to find the things which separate us, rather than a common ground. We form a party, we divide ourselves into factions which fight each other and detest each other reciprocally. We are united before an immense peril, but only when necessity constrains us. . . .
>
> Circumstances have aggravated this natural defect. At the head of these, we may place, first, the existence of a government ordinarily without authority; secondly, our resistance to all sanction—our unacknowledged quest for a "comfortable" life where every one may take his ease and do only what pleases him; thirdly, our false pride of equality which in reality makes us hostile to superiority and to talent. Finally, there is the insufficiency of our moral education which develops a sentiment of personal dignity and aspirations for independence without giving as a counterbalance, the spirit of sacrifice and of submission to authority. It is very well to drive superstitution from our schools and to abolish old ideas which do not accord with progress, but nothing can be gained by suppressing even these if they are not replaced by some equivalent. If the principle of authority or of subordination of all to the common good is no longer understood as it was formerly, its value is not less apparent. In the spirit of our present institutions, obedience is voluntary; nevertheless, it must be obtained or we will play into the hands of the reactionaries who lie in wait for us.[1]

[1] Lysis, *Vers la Démocratie Nouvelle* 144.

Pointing out the motives which inspire French voters, another writer adds:

It cannot be denied that the clearly individualistic and independent spirit of the Frenchman adapts itself with difficulty to the rigorous discipline of British parties. And in fact, by observing the results of an election, it will be noted that at present a deputy who is elected does not often obtain the entire number of the votes of his political sympathizers. On the contrary, he receives votes of electors who, although not supporting his ideas, nevertheless give him their votes from considerations bearing upon his person, his family, his situation, his past, and the services which he has rendered. . . . They vote for an individual and not for an idea or a program. If this were general, it would make any party régime impossible.[2]

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[2] Léon Jacques, *Les Partis Politiques sous la III République*, 451. One of the best descriptions of the temperament of the French people was portrayed by Alexis de Tocqueville many years ago: "When I examine that nation in itself, I cannot help thinking it is more extraordinary than any of the events of its history. Did there ever appear on the earth another nation so fertile in contrasts, so extreme in its acts—more under the dominion of feeling, less ruled by principle; always better or worse than was anticipated—now below the level of humanity, now far above; a people so unchangeable in its leading features that it may be recognized by portraits drawn two or three thousand years ago, and yet so fickle in its daily opinions and tastes that it becomes at last a mystery to itself, and is as much astonished as strangers at the sight of what it has done; naturally fond of home and routine, yet, once driven forth and forced to adopt new customs, ready to carry principles to any lengths and to dare anything; indocile by disposition, but better pleased with the arbitrary and even violent rule of a sovereign than with a free and regular government under its chief citizens; now fixed in hostility to subjection of any kind, now so passionately wedded to servitude that nations made to serve cannot vie with it; led by a thread so long as no word of resistance is spoken, wholly ungovernable when the standard of revolt has been raised—thus always deceiving its masters, who fear it too much or too little; never so free that it cannot be subjugated, nor so kept down that it cannot break the yoke; qualified for every pursuit, but excelling in nothing but war; more prone to worship chance, force, success, éclat, noise, than real glory; endowed with more heroism than

This French attitude is not wholly a weakness for, although a lack of party discipline may be a civic defect, one of its chief causes—the vigor of political thought—is a virtue. Theoretically a party régime necessitates a minimum of political issues, or at least their reduction to two broad categories, each one of which some party supports. But as a matter of fact, the complexity of modern political life, when accompanied by a keen interest in its problems, makes this simplification almost impossible. Furthermore, as noted above, the Frenchman in his attitude toward political issues does not seek a solution of each limited in itself; but he molds these immediate issues into a larger philosophy, be it political, religious, or economic. He is not content with the solution of single and isolated problems. He will only be satisfied by working for the complete attainment of his ideal. It is upon this ideal that his party rests. Party programs are really unchanging doctrines—expounding philosophies which more than fill the theoretical omissions of the Constitution of 1875. Upon immediate issues they are often vague, but their real purpose, at least, attempts to be logically homogeneous.

Among other factors which account for party diversity

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virtue, more genius than common sense; better adapted for the conception of grand designs than the accomplishment of great enterprises; the most brilliant and the most dangerous nation of Europe, and the one that is surest to inspire admiration, hatred, terror, or pity, but never indifference?''

De Tocqueville, *The Old Régime and the Revolution* (translation by John Bonner) 253, 254.

Guy de Maupassant's characterization of the French people is of equal interest (see his short story *The Horla*):

''The populace is an imbecile flock of sheep, now stupidly patient, and now in ferocious revolt. Say to it: 'Amuse yourself,' and it amuses itself. Say to it: 'Go and fight with your neighbor,' and it goes and fights. Say to it: 'Vote for the Emperor,' and it votes for the Emperor, and then say to it: 'Vote for the Republic,' and it votes for the Republic.''

and which are perhaps even more tangible than this tendency of mind just noted, are certain historical issues, peculiar to France. These have been either long since solved or else never arose in other countries possessing a similar form of government. The Monarchy presents the first of these issues. France has not had to choose merely between the Monarchy and the Republic, but between three different sorts of Monarchy and the Republic. These divisions were illustrated in the National Assembly of 1871-1875 where the Legitimist party, led by the Count of Chambord and supported by the more reactionary landlords, officers, and churchmen, stood for the unrestricted restoration of the Bourbons to the throne. They wished to govern the country "absolutely" and under the *drapeau blanc*. The second division was formed by the Bonapartist party, or the Imperialists; under the leadership of Prince Jerome and Rouher, they endeavored to restore Napoleon III, who had sought refuge in England. His sole claim to the throne rested on "the will of the people." The death of the ex-emperor in 1873 upset the immediate plans of the Bonapartists; but under the leadership of the Empress Eugénie, they placed their hopes in her son, the Prince Imperial.[3] The third division, the Orleanist party, wished to restore the line of Louis Philippe; they were loud in their promises to govern constitutionally and liberally. The Count of Paris was the candidate of this party for the throne.[4]

Aside from the Monarchist issue, Clericalism has

[3] The Prince Imperial, son of Napoleon III, joined the British expedition to Zululand, in 1879, where he met his death (June 1).

[4] The history of the struggle of these factions may be found in detail in G. Hanotaux, *Contemporary France*, ii. Jacques, *op. cit.*, 90-169, also gives a good summary of the Assembly period.

caused party divisions. In the period following the War of 1870, and for some fifteen or twenty years thereafter, the Catholic cause was completely associated with that of the Monarchy. The Count of Chambord declared himself in favor of the restoration of the Pope's temporal power. Since then, the Catholic interests have been openly espoused by the Orleanists. But the Republic created a division. Its establishment on a firm basis, despite Catholic and monarchial opposition, finally led Leo XIII, a skilled politician as well as a learned priest, to issue the famous Encyclical letter, *"Inter innumeras sollicitudines"* (tenth of February, 1892). It besought Catholics not to judge the Republic by the irreligious character of its government, and explained that a distinction must be drawn between the form of the government, which should be accepted, and its laws, which should be improved.[5] The policy enunciated in this letter, known as *Ralliement*, gave rise to a Catholic party, known as the *Conservateurs Ralliés*, which pledged its support to the Republic.[6] This policy was

[5] The early Catholic attitude toward the Third Republic and democracy in general, was illustrated by the following words of M. de Mun, one of the founders of the Liberal Action party:

"The Revolution is neither an act nor a fact, it is a political doctrine, which pretends to found society upon the will of man instead of founding it upon the will of God, which places the sovereignty of human reason in place of divine law. This is the Revolution, the rest is nothing, or rather all the rest results from it, from this proud revolt from whence the modern State has emerged, the State which has taken the place of all, the State which has become your God and which we (the Catholics) refuse to adore with you. The counter-revolution is the contrary principle; it is the doctrine which makes society rest upon Christian law! . . ." From a speech in the Chamber of Deputies, November, 1878, quoted in Debidour, *Rapports de l'Eglise et de l'Etat en France de 1789-1870*, 633.

[6] A good account of the origin of the "Ralliés" will be found in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, vi, 177, under "France." On May 6, 1892, Leo XIII wrote to the French cardinals:

also later expressed in the movements represented by the parties of the *Action Libérale Populaire*, the *Sillon*, and the *Jeune République*. But the Monarchist Catholics vigorously protested against any policy of concession, asserting that the Republic and the Church were organically antagonistic.[7]

A third cause for party division has been Socialism, which had its birth in France and received its political baptism in 1848. Succeeding years gave rise to two differing tendencies in this doctrine: the tendency of Reform versus the tendency of Revolution. The latter, of Marxian origin, has largely controlled the French Socialist party; but the first, which is directed toward participation in bourgeois governments and the improvement of bourgeois society, has led to the creation of an independent Socialist party. Both tendencies have at one time or another given rise to half a dozen Socialist party divisions.

Finally, the supporters of the Republic have divided themselves into first, the Conservatives, headed originally by Thiers, and standing for a conservative Republic in which the people would have little participation; second, the Liberals or Radicals, at first headed by Gambetta, then by Clemenceau, and standing for popular government and collective reforms. Both of these divisions

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"Accept the Republic, that is to say, the power now constituted and existing among you,—respect it. As representing the power coming from God, submit to it."

E. Zévort, *Histoire de la Troisième République*, iv, 171.

[7] For the Monarchist view upon the "Ralliés", see Charles Maurras *La Politique religieuse*, 345. Many writers, aside from the Monarchists, question the success of the policy of *ralliement*. M. Paul Sabatier says, "The policy of Leo XIII, far from bringing about a reconciliation between the Church and Democracy, had quite the opposite result. It made their incompatibility more conspicuous." *Disestablishment in France*, 60.

have been united in the defense of the Republic against the Monarchists; but they have differed widely concerning the conception of the character of Republicanism and the powers to be given to its government.

These tendencies have been very potent in French party history. They are based upon differences which cannot be charged merely to fickleness of mind or to a frivolous resistance to authority. They have formed very natural bases for party divisions, and it is difficult to see how, under similar circumstances, even England or the United States could have avoided party multiplicity.

II

The history of modern party organization begins about 1900. In 1898 a "Comité d'Action Française" announced the birth of the "Ligue de la Patrie Française." Becoming more mature in its program, it proclaimed its Royalist (Orleanist) aspirations in 1905 under the changed title of the "Ligue d'Action Française." In 1899 a group was formed in the Chamber of Deputies under the name of the "Action Libérale Populaire." In 1901 the Republican Radical and Radical Socialist party was founded. In 1902 the Democratic Republican Alliance was likewise created. In the same year, the *Sillon* announced itself. In 1905 the Socialist groups became united and took the name of the "French Section of the International Workingmen's Association." Soon after, in 1906, the moderate Republicans organized the Republican Federation. Finally, in July, 1911, the Socialists who had refused to adhere to the pact of Amsterdam of 1904, formed the Republican Socialist party, which during the war took the name of the National Socialist party. In the same year,

1911, the Democratic Republican Alliance changed itself into the Democratic Republican party.

Dividing the parties according to their doctrines and according to the manner in which they sit in Parliament [8] they may be classified as the *Right,* composed of: (1) the Monarchists, in turn divided into (*a*) the Orleanists, (*b*) the Bonapartists; (2) the Nationalists, including the so-called *plébiscitaires* and conservatives, differing little from the Monarchists; (3) the Liberal Action party or Catholic Republicans; the *Center,* composed of (1) the Moderate or Progressist Republicans, whose party is the Republican Federation; (2) the Republican Democratic party or Alliance; the *Left,* composed of (1) the Radical Socialist party; (2) the Republican Socialist party; (3) the Unified Socialist party.

Of these parties, at least seven are strong enough to warrant a discussion of their doctrines, organization, and strength.

Two of the three aspirants to the French throne have been virtually eliminated from among the Royalists. The death of the Count of Chambord in 1883 left no heir to the Legitimist or elder Bourbon line, and the succession passed to the Count of Paris, the grandson of Louis Philippe, of the younger Bourbon or Orleanist line. Although the Emperor, Napoleon I, has no direct male descendants living, the line established by his brother Jerome, is now represented by Prince Victor Napoleon, the acknowledged candidate of the Bonapartists for the French throne. Before the war he found refuge in Brussels, where he married the third daugh-

[8] To avoid confusion, it must be stated that this classification is not by parliamentary groups, but by outside party organizations. Thus the Right contains only two groups, but three or four parties.

ter of Leopold I, the former king of Belgium. As he was born in 1862, age will soon eliminate his suitability for the throne, while his only direct descendants are a daughter born in 1912 and a son born in 1914—the latter are rather unpromising candidates for the succession.[9]

Victor Napoleon is a son of Prince Napoleon (Napoleon-Joseph-Charles-Paul Bonaparte). The latter was the son of the ex-King Jerome, and was known for the part he played in the movement for Italian unity. Napoleon III is said to have urged a plan of Italian confederation as opposed to Cavour's plan of a united Italy, in order to give the Prince the throne of one of the minor states, probably of Tuscany. The marriage of the Prince (who was a cousin of Napoleon III) with the daughter of Victor Emmanuel II, king of Sardinia, sealed the Franco-Piedmontese alliance in the war against Austria for Italian unity. From this union two children were born, Victor and Louis. The Prince was expelled from French territory in 1872 by order of Thiers. He was never popular even among Bonapartists, although he attempted to assume the leadership of the Bonapartist party. The ex-Empress Eugénie was bitterly opposed to him for fear he would usurp the rights of her son who was born in 1856. The majority of the party supported Victor, the Prince's son, as the Bonapartist pretender, even while the Prince was alive.

In 1911, the Bonapartists, through a *Comité politique plébiscitaire*, published a program calling for a Bonapartist Republic. They also took a small part in the elections of 1914. A majority of the Independent group

[9] The Baroness Adolphe de Rothschild is reported to have described Victor Napoleon as "an eaglet whose whole life is spent in molting." E. A. Vizetelly, *Republican France*, 185.

in the Chamber of 1914 were Bonapartists, among them being some brilliant men, such as Fernand Engerand. In the elections of 1919, many Bonapartists appeared on the tickets of the Republican *Bloc*. Prince Murat was elected to the Chamber from the provinces.

L'Ordre Public, established in the winter of 1919, is strongly suspected of being a Bonapartist newspaper. But despite the distinguished men connected with the movement, the Bonapartists have ceased to figure among the Republic's disturbers.

The Monarchist movement in France, on account of the death of the Count of Chambord and of the feebleness of the Bonapartist heir and following, is now led by the Orleanists through the organization known as the *Ligue d'Action Française*. The Orleanist candidate for the throne is the Duke of Orleans, Philippe VIII. He acquired this title and became chief of the Orleans house in 1894 at the death of his father, the Count of Paris.[10] The Duke was born in England in 1869, was partly educated in France, but was exiled shortly after the establishment of the Third Republic, by a law passed in 1886. In 1890 he made a great show of patriotism by entering France despite the decree of banishment against him, and presenting himself for the military service to which every French youth is subject. As a result, he was tried by the government and imprisoned for four months. After being freed, he went to America and visited the battlefields of the Civil War upon which his ancestors, his father and the Prince of Joinville, had fought. In 1905, 1907, and 1909 he undertook three voyages to the Arctic regions. Before the war he lived in Belgium.

[10] The Count of Paris was a grandson of Louis Philippe. He wrote a six-volume history of the American Civil War and a work on the English trades unions.

Upon its outbreak he tried to enlist in the French army, but M. Viviani, then President of the Council, refused the request because of the law of banishment. He suggested, however, that the Duke apply for admittance in the armies of the other Allies. A similar request addressed to the King of England, of Belgium, and to the Emperor of Russia, was also refused. Consequently the Duke of Orleans had no opportunity to show his military prowess, and, as his opponents feared, to establish a dangerous prestige.

Although the Orleanists describe their candidate, the Prince, as "an energetic and resolute man, of prompt spirit and sure judgment," [11] his enemies call him "Philippe the Red Nosed," because of his fondness for strong liquors. Socialists point to his marriage with Maria Dorothea Amelia [12] the daughter of Archduke Joseph, cousin of the former Emperor of Austria, as proof of the inconsistency of the party's vaunted patriotism. Generally it is believed that the Prince has none of the outstanding qualities necessary in a man who could overcome the present régime by personal force.

The philosophical justification of the Royalist position is set forth in a very talented book by Georges Valois, *L'Homme qui vient*. M. Valois attributes the pernicious theories of the Revolution to "the three great criminals, the three great impostors, Fathers of Lies, who have turned our intelligence, at the end of the nineteenth century, against our welfare: Jean Jacques Rousseau, the false Man of Nature; Immanuel Kant, the false Man of Duty; and Karl Marx, the false Man of Necessity." [13]

[11] *Almanach de l'Action Française* for 1919, 46.

[12] The Duke has no children. Upon his death the headship of the House of Orleans will pass to his brother, Ferdinand, Duke of Montpensier.

[13] *L'Homme qui vient*, preface, x.

The doctrine of the Monarchy itself is completely embodied in the *Enquête sur la Monarchie,* a compendium of Monarchist opinion, edited by Charles Maurras, and containing interviews with the Duke of Orleans, and such men as Sully-Prudhomme, Paul Bourget, Jules Lemaître, Jacques Bainville, Henri Bordeaux, and Henri Vaugeois, all of whom expound some phase of the Monarchist program.

After first condemning the Republican régime as based on false principles and maintained by Jews, Masons, Protestants, and *Métèques,*[14] a régime from which real Frenchmen are excluded, it offers, as the one redemption of France, the kingship based on the following principles:

> The monarchy must be traditional. . . . The monarchy must be hereditary . . . the monarchy must be anti-parliamentarian . . . in favor of a nominative, personal, and responsible government. . . . The monarchy must be decentralized.[15]

Holding high the principle of integral nationalism, the monarchists offer a program containing definite political and religious changes. When the kingship is established, Parliament will be supplanted by an assembly of professional interests of practically no political power. The framing of laws will be entrusted to a body of experts directed by the King. Political parties will have no reason to exist, and the King will direct every national affair. Decentralization of administration through regionalism[16] will overcome the abuses of Republican administration.

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[14] *Métèque*—a class of foreigners exploiting the government for their own ends.

[15] *Enquête sur la Monarchie,* 182.

[16] See Chapter XII.

The religious program of the Orleanists is frankly reactionary. It gives to the Catholic Church a "manifest privilege over other confessions" because of its historic and national rights. In the economic field, the hours of labor will be unrestricted for adults, any limitation being a "reflection on their dignity." Labor, however, will be protected from all disorders; and the King will organize both labor and capital into offsetting and collaborating bodies. Generally speaking the King will be absolute; in this respect the Orleanists have departed from their liberal and constitutionalist tendencies exhibited in the policies upheld in the National Assembly of 1871-1875.

The Royalist plans for the restoration of the Monarchy, set forth in the last chapter of the *Enquête*, are of interest: "The Monarchy must be set up just as all the governments of the world have been established since the world has been the world: by force."[17] Such a restoration would not be opposed by the country. "A vigorous solution would not be unpopular. It would even be extremely popular. He who said: 'France loves the sword,' has uttered a great truth."

At the beginning of the war the Duke of Orleans urged his adherents to support the national defense, and throughout its course the French Royalists were the most vigorous defenders of the Fatherland. Although they have been charged with plotting to restore the king, they have never been accused of pro-Germanism. In fact, hatred of Germany is an essential element in their nationalism. By means of the vigorous campaigns of *L'Action Française*, the official paper of the party, edited

[17] *Enquête*, 499.

by Charles Maurras and Léon Daudet, many traitors and pseudo-traitors have been exposed.[18]

Although the Orleanists profess to disdain ordinary parliamentary tactics, they possess a remarkably complete organization. The *Ligue,* whose center is in Paris, has sections in most of the larger cities of the provinces. The younger Royalists are formed into the auxiliary organizations of the *Camelots du Roi* and the *Etudiants de l'Action Française,* while the Royalist women and girls are similarly grouped. Members of the League must sign a pledge ending in these words: "I associate myself in the work of monarchical restoration. I promise to serve it by every means." Each must pay minimum dues of three francs a year.

The intellectual activity of the League is not only carried on by the daily journal, *L'Action Française,* but by an Institute in which courses are given upon the problems which the monarchy will have to solve. In addition there is a Review, which likewise studies these problems (suspended during the war), an annual Almanac, and a publishing house, the *Nouvelle Librairie Nationale,* which issues books of Royalist sympathies.

The list of the adherents to this party is not published. Naturally it is not large, although they claim to have doubled their number during the war. The old nobility, residing chiefly in Touraine and the Midi, is its chief support.

There is little likelihood of the Restoration. The many admirers of Charles Maurras, the leader of the party, do not necessarily adopt his Royalist theories. It is his patriotism, scholarship, and vigor which attract them. The party is not completely reactionary, as its decentral-

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[18] See pp. 273, 274, 277.

ization and its labor platforms suggest. The incompatibility of its doctrines with modern tendencies, was completely illustrated during the Peace Conference. But despite this, the French Royalist movement offers a unique and interesting feature of French politics. The remote probability of their success permits a certain respect for Royalists by Republicans. Their sincerity, their love for *La Patrie,* and their unmistakable, if misdirected desire to serve and advance the land of their birth are traits which all parties might emulate.

Closely akin to the Royalists may be placed the *Ligue des Patriotes,* an organization purely nationalist in purpose. This League was founded in 1882; and, under the leadership of its first two presidents, Henri Martin and Anatole de la Forge, it limited its activities to the urging of patriotic and military education. But after 1885, when Paul Déroulède became its head, it turned into an active, jingoist organization, which urged the return to France of all territory hitherto forcibly taken from it—especially Alsace and Lorraine. It strove to awaken the idea of *La Revanche,* by preaching against the dissipation of national effort in colonial enterprise. In 1889 the League was suppressed for its support of General Boulanger, but it was soon afterward reëstablished. During the Dreyfus affair, Déroulède attempted another sensational overthrow of the Republic, but failed.[19] The League, with which the so-called *plébiscitaires* are associated in sympathy, is supposed to stand for a Republic headed by an executive of dictatorial powers. Maurice Barrès, the present head of the League, is accused by

[19] See Maurice Barrès, *Scènes et Doctrines du Nationalisme,* v, La Part de Déroulède.

For the dissolution of the *Ligue des Patriotes,* see E. Zévort, *Histoire de la Troisième République,* iv, 79.

the Royalists of not having the courage of his predecessors, while the Socialists genuinely hate him. He is particularly ridiculed by Léon Werth in *Clavel Soldat,* a novel suppressed during the war. In this book M. Barrès was represented as arising every morning to stretch his arms, and saying: "I am Joan of Arc; I am Napoleon." In another place, Clavel is sent with the army to Alsace-Lorraine, where he supposes he will find M. Barrès, gun in hand, at the crossroads to meet him, but to his well-feigned surprise, M. Barrès is nowhere to be found! As the Socialist press pointed out, his field of action lay in a Paris office, far from the battle-line! M. Barrès is naturally a strong Catholic as the Church is an essential element in his doctrine of nationalism. But his relation to the Church appears to be merely political, for, so far as his religion goes, he seems to be much more pantheist than Christian. For instance:

> The thoughts of our remote ancestors always exercise their mysterious and powerful influences on our lives. The people of the fairies and the spirits who lived in the waters, the wood and the caves, have disappeared, but in dying, they have bequeathed to the places which they loved, titles of veneration. They still guard our race with the tears of their friendship or of their terror. The centuries but little consider those who in the solitude listen to their own consciences and receive from them profound murmurs and the source of their being,—dispossessed Gods.
>
> Fantastic woods, sweet fairies of the meadows and springs, mysterious emanations of the trees! The night wind which passes across the copses! Oh, fragmentary sentiments! . . . Nature for me is filled with the essence of Gods half wasted! . . . These vanquished hosts sleep at the bottom of the lakes and in the valleys under dead leaves . . ., waiting for the people of France to awaken to their beauties.[20]

[20] From the "Grande Pitié des Eglises de France," quoted in *Le Mercure de France,* November-December, 1916.

It is in this literary style that M. Barrès urges France to rally round *la terre et les morts*, the only substitute for the kingship as a guardian of national permanency.

Apart from its insistence on the French annexation of the left bank of the Rhine and on the "Family Vote," the League, under his direction, takes little part in politics. It has buried the body of Déroulède in Alsace as a fitting tribute to his passionate struggle for the recovery of the lost provinces; and likewise, since the war it has published a beautifully illustrated work commemorating their restoration to France.

III

The Liberal Action party (the *Action Libérale Populaire*) is another organized party of the Right. It was founded in 1902 and until lately directed by MM. Piou and Mun, for the purpose of defending and securing "all the freedom essential to the life of the nation, particularly religious liberty, which is of a superior order and which to-day suffers the greatest injury."[21] In as much as it is an offspring of the "Ralliés," a religious issue naturally constitutes its principal basis. Firm in its devotion to the Republic, it insists upon freeing the Catholic Church from the anticlerical legislation passed since 1901.[22] Nevertheless it is opposed to a distinctively Catholic party in which issues of cult would be the only ones insisted upon and which would be subjected to the direction of ecclesiastical authorities. The party is intended for Catholics, but it must be open to all—

[21] Jacques, *op. cit.*, 321.

[22] It seems, however, that the anticlerical legislation has strengthened the Church's position instead of weakened it.

even those who, believing in religious freedom, are not Catholics.

In addition to this conception of religious liberty, the *A. L. P.* wishes to inaugurate a society based upon Christian principles. Although standing for an advanced program of social reform, it asserts that "the increase of salaries will remain but a powerless palliative if the soul of the people is not saved from the yoke of materialist doctrines and does not find a divine ideal. . . . The Ten Commandments and the Gospel are the great factors in true social progress. . . . The solution of the social problem lies in Christianity." [23]

Politically, the party program demands nine major reforms: A Declaration of Rights, a Constitution, a Supreme Court, election of the President by a special electoral college, professional organization and representation, proportional representation, the referendum,[24] provincial and municipal decentralization, and the granting of a definite status to government officials.

As a religious program, it declares that there can be no possible legal organization of the Church without a preliminary agreement with the Pope. It affirms the absolute right of the father and the mother of a family to form their child "in their own image and resemblance, to educate him according to their views and convictions, and to have him share their ideals in this world and their eternal hopes in the one beyond. . . ." [25] As it is the first duty of Catholic parents to oversee the education of their children, they must not be contaminated by lay education. Ideally they should be taught

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[23] Jacques, *op. cit.*, 331.

[24] The Liberal Action party is one of the few to advocate the popular review of any legislative act.

[25] Jacques, *op. cit.*, 326.

Catholic doctrines in the public schools. But as this is impossible under an anticlerical government, in a country where there are many different cults, the party advocates the proportional division of school funds, so as to enable each sect to establish its own schools to which the children of each would be sent and educated in the religious faith of their parents. From the duty of Catholic parents to send their children to Catholic schools, arises the practice generally followed by them in France even now, although the proportional division of resources never has been, and is not likely to be, achieved. To carry out its theories of religious education, the party has created the Association of the Fathers of Families, which before the war contained over 800 associations divided into seventeen federations.

The party's advocacy of *répartition proportionnelle* of school funds, of *représentation professionnelle*, and of *représentation proportionnelle*, has won for itself the name of "The party of the Three R's."

In addition to the religious program of the party, it is characterized by its interest in the amelioration of labor conditions. Believing in the moderate intervention of the State in economic questions, it stands for the regulation of the hours of work, the establishment of a minimum wage for home work, labor conciliation and arbitration, and professional and technical education. The party appeals to all classes to assist the workingmen. Under its auspices, Catholic syndicates have been organized—the so-called "free" unions—which are independent of the General Confederation of Labor, and have been brought into friendly touch with Catholic employers' organizations.[26]

[26] The Liberal Action party is one of the best organized in France. Along with a central committee established at Paris, a

Before the war this party had nearly forty federations, over 2,005 committees or groups of adherents, and 265,000 members. It appears to have lost weight in successive elections, for in 1902 it had seventy-nine representatives in the Chamber of Deputies, sixty-four in 1906, and thirty-one in 1910. In 1914, however, its numbers rose to thirty-two, while in 1919 the party was successful in electing sixty-nine deputies.

In conclusion it may be said that the *Action Libérale Populaire* presents a very powerful organization with a very definite program. Both its demands for constitutional reform and for social betterment are practicable and meritorious. Although the party's idea of liberalism is perhaps warped by its Catholic prejudices, it is one of the few parties, beyond those of strictly clerical composition, which builds its platform upon a moral and religious foundation.

The *Sillon,* now disbanded, is another Catholic Republican group. Although it never claimed to be a party, it loyally attempted to reconcile a sincere attachment to the Republic with a love for Catholicism.

"Secrétariat général" exists, subdivided into sections. The party organization is composed of (1) the committees constituted or agreed to by this central committee; such as the auxiliary groups of the *Jeunesse Libérale,* the *Jeunesse Catholique,* the Union of Free Workmen, and some unions of employers; (2) active members, paying a sum of one hundred dollars and an annual fee of at least five dollars; (3) associate members paying an annual fee of at least one franc. Women may belong to the party. The members are divided into communal, cantonal, and department committees. An effort is being made to establish a central committee in every department as the head of all party activities in that district.

Every two years the party holds a general or national Congress at which discussions are held concerning "organization," "electoral questions," and "social reform." A weekly Bulletin is issued to its active members, a quarterly Bulletin and an almanac to its associate members.

Its purpose was to bring about in France a "democratic, honest, just, and fraternal Republic." Like the *Action Libérale*, it insisted upon the fundamental importance of religious principles in society, and upon Christianity as "an incomparable source of democratic energy, since it identifies the individual and the general interest."[27] It advocated the organization and protection of both labor and capital and the extension of coöperative societies. Strangely enough it also stood for the development of communal property, which every laborer might in turn enjoy. It especially urged popular education as a means of spreading its doctrines. In 1909, however, the *Sillon*, whose advanced teachings angered certain conservative Catholics, was dissolved by order of the Pope. It was succeeded by a group called the *Jeune République*, which especially urged the referendum, proportional representation, and a protected status for government officials. It existed for the propaganda of opinion rather than for the mere election of deputies, a characteristic, it may be added, of all leagues as opposed to parties.

IV

Turning now to the parties composing the Center, we first find the Moderate or "Progressist" Republicans organized under the title of the Republican Federation. Since this was the most conservative of all the Republican parties, it practically controlled the government during the first twenty years of the Republic under the direction of such men as Ferry, Ribot and Méline. In 1898, however, the Moderates began to lose power—some of its members adhering to the "Ralliés;" while the *Bloc*,

[27] Jacques, *op. cit.*, 345.

formed by Waldeck-Rousseau, uniting the Radicals, Radical Socialists, and Socialists, secured control of the Chamber. The recent organization of this party dates from the 18th of November, 1903, when a meeting was held at which the Republican Federation was organized.[28] At that time the National Republican Association, which had been headed by M. Audiffret, the Liberal Republican Union, which had been headed by M. Barboux, and the Alliance of Progressist Republicans, which had been headed by Jules Méline, were fused into the Republican Federation. The Moderates vigorously opposed the government of M. Combes, and especially his anticlerical policy. In 1906 the party underwent a reorganization and gained new members; and in 1910 it made a net gain of thirty seats in the Chamber, a sign which the party interpreted as indicating the return of the country to its program. In 1914 it practically maintained its parliamentary strength, polling about ten per cent of the votes cast (1,810,679). Although the number of adherents is not published, it is estimated to be between 7,000 and 8,000. The party's influence is much wider than its limited membership—a statement true of all French parties.

The Moderate or Progressist Republican party is the most idealistic of the parties of the Republic. Strongly imbued with the principles of 1789, it is founded on the principles of the dignity and worth of the individual; consequently it is strongly against State Socialism, tolerant in religious matters, and liberal in its economics. Three marked divisions may be found in its ranks: the Progressists proper, to whom stability and

[28] *La Fédération Républicaine,* December, 1919, the monthly Bulletin of the Republican Federation.

immobility is the controlling doctrine; the moderates, who do not fear radicalism, and are willing to sacrifice old doctrines to regain political power; and between these two, a conciliatory group, playing the part of *juste milieu*. Composed largely of the wealthy upper classes, the party is insistent upon the rights of private property; it is vigorously opposed to state monopolies and to the socialization of the means of production. Its motto, "Progress by Order," and its watchword, "Conserve and Create," have indicated its parliamentary policy.[29]

As to political reforms, the party desires a Bill of Rights, a Supreme Court (to decide the constitutionality of laws) proportional representation and the *scrutin de liste*,[30] the representation of interests in the Senate, and the enactment of stringent laws against fraud. It also asks for administrative decentralization through an increase of the powers of departmental assemblies. As judicial measures, it asks for the reduction of *arrondissement* tribunals, for the simplification of procedure, and for the reduction of the expenses of justice. It also stands for public assistance to the old, the infirm, and the sick.[31]

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[29] For details of the Federation's Program, see *Compte Rendu du Congrès*, from 1906 to 1914, the reports of the Annual Conventions of the party.

Charles Benoist, French minister to Holland, Alexandre Ribot and Jules Méline, two former prime ministers, are prominent members of this party.

[30] See pp. 152, 153.

[31] The organization of the party is known as the "Republican Federation." It is administered by a general council of fifty members elected by itself. The council merely gives its advice, while a directing committee of twenty members proposes measures for the consideration of a bureau consisting of a president, six vice-presidents, a secretary-general and a treasurer. In each arrondissement or commune and department, either a committee, a federation, or a union, directs the party activities. In some centers, such as Lyons and Toulouse, there are regional organizations. A

In its electoral methods, the party is often willing to support candidates of other parties professing similar doctrines, if its own have no chance of success. As long as the purely progressist element of the party is in control, its prospects for electoral victories are slight; but under more advanced leadership, it would doubtless have a considerable following among the great class of "moderate" Frenchmen.

V

The "Democratic Republican Alliance" is the other great party of the parliamentary Center. It is not so conservative as the Progressists, and it is not radical. It announces its platform as "Neither Reaction nor Revolution, Neither Imprudence nor Adventure." Its part has been to reconcile the conservatism and the radicalism of the Republic.

The Alliance was the first party after the war to announce a program of reconstruction and reform. It denounced all attempts to stir up class antagonism as an invention of Teutonic imperialism, and it pleaded for the union of all parties in the task of reconstruction. It emphasized the necessity for the creation of a great Republican party, "boldly reformist as well as firmly resolved to prevent the outbursts of revolutionary or reactionary violence; this party must be strongly enough organized, numerous enough and powerful enough, to give stability and duration to the government which gains its support." [32]

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national congress closing with a banquet is held annually. The Federation has the pledged support of nearly three hundred publicists and nearly eight hundred newspapers; consequently, it exercises considerable influence.

[32] From a brochure distributed by the Alliance.

It has advocated electoral and administrative reforms, the introduction of industrial methods in the public services and decentralization; a law for the protection of government employees (including the prohibition of the right to strike); complete reparation by the State for the damages of the war; the early return to commercial liberty and the cessation of State control over industry; the confederation of representatives of industry, commerce, and agriculture to consider the economic needs of the country; technical education; the conciliation of labor and capital; the development of social insurance; measures combating the "rural exodus"; measures destined to increase the birth rate and to curtail infant mortality and alcoholism; the financial section of a League of Nations, and the reform of the taxation system.

Finally, the Alliance stands for "any measure calculated to ensure for the country general prosperity, liberty, social justice, economic advancement, intellectual renaissance and moral grandeur."[33]

The party's strength is not exactly known,[34] but it includes many of the most representative statesmen of the Republic. Among its honorary presidents have been

[33] *Ibid.*

[34] Although the Alliance was founded as early as May, 1901, by Adolphe Carnot, it was not until 1911 that it first took a prominent and independent part in French politics. M. Carnot is still its president, holding his office for life. On account of his age he attempted to resign lately, but was reëlected. He is assisted by a secretary-general, an assistant secretary and a secretary of committees, surrounded by a superior council composed of one delegate from each department, the whole forming a central executive committee. The cantons, arrondissements, and departments have their respective committees. A weekly bulletin is issued by the party while the local associations carry on, by means of circles, libraries, and social organizations, an active campaign tending to develop civic education and communal life by every means.

Emile Loubet, former President of the Republic, M. Waldeck-Rousseau, who founded the famous *Bloc,* and Joseph Mangin, one of France's prominent generals. Raymond Poincaré is vice-president of the organization. Paul Deschanel, the new President of the Republic, is also a member. In 1911 the Alliance had 140 Deputies in the Chamber—seventy-one belonging to the group of the Democratic Left, fifty to the Radical Left, and about fifteen to the Radical Socialist Left. In the Senate it had eighty members inscribed in the group of the Republican Union. In the 1914 elections it polled the highest number of votes of any party, receiving 1,564-578. In the 1919 elections 133 of its members were elected to the Chamber.

VI

The principal party of the parliamentary Left and one of the most powerful in the Republic, is the "Republican Radical and Radical Socialist Party," often known as the "Unified Radicals," the "Radical Socialists," or plainly, the "Radicals." This party, rooted in the Jacobin clubs of the Revolution and in the followers of Ledru-Rollin during the Revolution of 1848, really came to light with the dawn of the Third Republic. About 1880 a group of advanced Radicals detached themselves from the "Republicans," and because of their bitter opposition to the conservatism of Thiers and even to the opportunism of Gambetta, they soon became known in contrast with the "Opportunists," as the "Intransigeants." They stood solidly and without compromise for the absolute achievement of Republican ideals. This group increased in 1885 and 1899 until it became a factor in the elections of the latter year. In

1887 it fought for the suppression of the right of the Senate to authorize the President to dissolve the Chamber; from 1888 to 1898 it opposed the moderate Republicans, although uniting with them whenever the Republic was threatened. Thus many so-called concentration ministries contained many Radical leaders—Floquet, Brisson, Goblet, Sarrien, and Ricard. Clemenceau was one of the most destructive leaders of the group. His particular delight was the defeat of ministries, and he became known as the "Ministry Smasher." He is said to have tried to defeat twenty-three of them and to have been successful in the case of eighteen.

In 1892 many Radicals became Radical Socialists, urging collective reforms and the general betterment of labor conditions. But in 1893 the group was successful enough to elect 120 members to the Chamber. Beside them were grouped the Radical Socialists, some of whose members, notably M. Millerand, were passing over to pure Socialism. The Radical Socialists and the Socialists in this Chamber had about sixty members. Upon a strongly anticlerical, an income tax, and social reform platform, the Radicals, combining forces with the Radical Socialists, and pure Socialists, were successful enough in 1895 to establish a completely Radical ministry, headed by M. Bourgeois. In 1901 the fusion of the Radicals, the Radical Socialists, and the Socialists, was officially made. The adoption of the formula, "No enemies on the Left," led many Radicals, who were unwilling to associate with pure Socialists, to desert the party and adhere to the Democratic Alliance. But nevertheless the Radical party gained power.[35]

[35] An interesting story is told of the initial success of the reorganized Radicals shortly after 1900. There was a certain jeweler and his brother who were conducting a very successful business

The Radicals assert that they are essentially a party of the middle class, the *petite bourgeoisie,* wishing to establish a united, fraternal and social Republic in which every citizen will be rewarded upon a basis of his own labor and merit.

The party still adheres to the "Program of Nancy" adopted in 1907, which contains a complete outline of its political, economic, and social reforms. Although annual "declarations" have subsequently interpreted or modified this program, it still remains the creed of their political beliefs.

Politically, the party stands for the direct election of senators. Until 1919 it refused definitely to commit itself to proportional representation, although it has stood for the *scrutin de liste.* It also seeks certain administrative reforms, the supremacy of the Chamber of

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in Paris in a shop on the *Boulevard de la Sébastopol.* The firm grew to such an extent that its traveling salesmen carried the firm's jewelry into every part of France. At the time of the elections, the jewelers, through some sort of negotiation with the Radical chiefs, turned over their salesmen to the party as propagandist agents. They were so successful that the country returned an overwhelming majority for the Radicals and with it, the government. The Radicals, as a reward, promptly elected the jeweler to the Senate, an extraordinary step for one who had not first served in the Chamber. The gentleman is still serving very prominently in that capacity, and is very proud of his remarkable achievement.

From 1902 to 1906, the Radical party formed, with the Socialists and the moderate Radicals of the Democratic Alliance, the Bloc of the Left; in 1906 they and the Socialists won an aggregate of 400 seats; in 1910, excluding the Socialists, they had 334 seats. At the Congress of Pau in 1913 the party reorganized itself, deciding that all of its deputies must adhere to a strictly Radical group. After this, the party became known as the Unified Radicals. The elections of 1914, partly because of the bitterness of their anticlerical policy, their pacifism, and this measure of reorganization to which many deputies refused to adhere, reduced their number to 257 members. In 1919 this number was still further reduced to 143.

Deputies over the Ministry and the Senate, and the reorganization of the Judiciary.

It was, however, the anticlerical platform of the party which brought it to power and still constitutes the *sine qua non* of its existence. Although the issue is practically dead, the party is still pledged to the rigid maintenance of all anticlerical legislation, the suppression of illegally existing religious orders, and the exclusive control of education by the State.

In addition to anticlericalism, the party's support of collectivism is its principal characteristic. Although recognizing the value of private property and of individual initiative, it desires to correct the abuses of the present régime through the assumption by the State of every actually existing monopoly. The conclusions of M. Chauvin at the Congress of Dijon in 1908 still represent the party's position upon State control of industry:

1. Individual property, properly so called, arising from labor, and maintained by labor, we must conserve as sacred.
2. Individual property must give way to the general interest when the interest of the proprietor is found to be in manifest contradiction to the interest of society.
3. Finally, if for the creation or for the conservation of industrial property, where all the work and all the efforts of the proprietor have ceased to exist, and if this property is a monopoly in the possession of a single person, or if it is wealth entirely created by society or by others, this property, truly capitalistic, can and should be taken over by the State.[36]

These principles the Radicals have extended to include natural resources and industrial enterprises now dangerously centralized.

[36] Quoted by A. Charpentier in *Le Parti Radical et Radical-Socialiste à travers ses congrès*, 445.

Socially, the party "attempts to give to the proletariat the full consciousness of its rights and duties, and, with the responsibility for its action, the authority necessary to establish a more rational and just social constitution." [37] It is ready to take every legal measure to guarantee to each the product of his toil and to prevent capitalistic domination of the consumer. "Resolutely hostile to the egotistical conceptions of the school of *laissez faire,*" the party favors State intervention in the relations of capital and labor. It promises assistance to needy children, the sick, the infirm, and the old. It promises a pension to workers overcome by work or age. It has demanded the enactment of a labor code embracing laws (1) upon the employment of women and children in industry, (2) upon labor and apprenticeship contracts, (3) upon the regulation of differences between labor and capital by compulsory arbitration, (4) upon labor accidents, the risks and diseases of industry, and the responsibility of employers, (5) upon the limitation of hours of labor and a weekly rest, (6) upon the organization of government insurance in favor of every worker in industry, commerce, and agriculture against the risks of accidents, sickness, and unemployment, (7) upon mutual insurance and savings funds to improve the condition of labor, (8) upon conditions of health and hygiene in industrial and commercial establishments.

Financially the party has stood for the income tax and the suppression of the "four direct contributions"; it is also against consumption taxes, stamp and registry fees, and taxes weighing on agriculture, commerce, and small industry.

[37] Program of Nancy, a brochure distributed at party headquarters.

As an agrarian program, it urges the development of agricultural education, coöperative associations, agricultural credit, and insurance against fire, hail, frost, and the death of cattle.[38]

Many prominent men are associated with the Radicals—among them being MM. Clemenceau; Caillaux, now in disrepute; Combes and Herriot, two prominent Senators; René Renoult, former president of the Executive Committee of the party and president of the Army Commission of the Chamber; Franklin Bouillon, former head of the Foreign Affairs Commission; and Senator Léon Bourgeois, president of the Senate and a representative on the French Peace Delegation.[39]

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[38] On July 26, 1919, a *petit congrès* of the Radical party was held in Paris where a reconstruction program was drawn up. It contained little in addition to previous platforms except to urge more vigorous measures against speculators, modification of the income tax so as to exempt small salaries, and the abolition of the three-year military service law and gradual disarmament in view of the League of Nations.

[39] The organization of the Radical party is very coherent. It is based on the communal committee, upon which repose arrondissement, canton, department, and regional federations. The arrondissement and department committees are the most active. A central Executive Committee with offices in Paris directs all party activities. The members of the party in each locality form its committee. In each department, delegates of these committees meet at least once a year and choose department delegates to the Annual Congress. Since 1909 the Executive Committee has been composed of (1) all of the deputies and senators, adherents of the party, members by right; (2) delegates elected at the Congress by the department delegates. Before the war the Executive Committee contained over six hundred members. From its own members, it elects a president, sixteen vice-presidents (eight of whom must be members of Parliament), sixteen secretaries (eight of whom also must be members of Parliament), an administrative secretary-general and a treasurer,—a total of thirty-five. The president is not immediately eligible for reëlection, and this bureau is renewed, one half each year. This committee is subdivided in turn into committees on rules and discipline, finance, preparation for Congresses, propaganda, and party organization. The bureau is divided into five permanent committees: party administration, elections, propaganda, bulletin, and demands.

VII

Following the parliamentary groupings toward the Left we find the Socialist representatives, divided into the Republican Socialists and the Unified Socialists. This division is the result of events which must be briefly summarized.

The earlier groupings of the French Socialists after the banishments following the Commune, occurred at the Congress of the French Workingman's party held in 1874. Several years later the organization then formed broke up into two groups: the Marxist group, recruited in the North, and led by Jules Guesde, and the French Federation of Socialist Workingmen. This latter organization was of reformist tendencies and consequently became known as the "Possibilists." It was led by Paul Brousse. In 1890 this Federation of Socialist Workingmen split into two branches, the cause being a question of centralization of party organization. The revolutionary element became known as the "Allemanists," from the name of their leader, Allemane. The other section continued under the leadership of Brousse. Under the guidance of Guesde and Allemane, most of the divisions of the Socialist party supported Marx's advocacy of the Social Revolution in contrast with the purely French idea of progressive reform. At this time a fourth section of the Socialist following, that led by Blanqui,[40]

[40] Blanquism, M. Hanotaux describes as "the traditional party of insurrection, conspiracy, and sedition. It possessed hardly any other political conception except that of opposition to the last breath, by all means, to all governments. It was integral, republican, leveling, the adversary of social order, but neither communist, separatist, nor socialist: in fact, anarchist." *Contemporary France*, i, 164.

constituted about a quarter of their forces. In the Chamber of Deputies there were also attempts to form a Labor party. Thus at least five Socialist organizations, many of them antagonistic to each other, came into existence, each struggling for the labor vote. In addition to them, a strong group of men unassociated with parties but having collectivist doctrines, are to be noted: Millerand, Viviani, and André Lefèvre. In view of the elections of 1893 reformist elements among the Socialists and some discontented Radicals united in a "League of Revolutionary Action for the Inauguration of the Social Republic." This coalition was successful in electing fifty-five Radical Socialists, who took their seats in the Chamber at the extreme Left. Twenty-five Socialists were elected, more than half of them coming from the department of the Seine.[41]

In 1899 an effort was made to unify further the different factions, and a general Socialist committee was organized to effect a union. This combination was practically achieved when an incident arose which resulted in the withdrawal of the Guesde following. This was the noted "Millerand Case." M. Millerand had been appointed Minister of Commerce in the Waldeck-Rousseau Ministry in 1899, but as he was affiliated with the Socialist party, Guesde and Sembat insisted that it was contrary to the teachings of Karl Marx for a Socialist to collaborate in any way with a bourgeois government. In opposition to these out-and-out revolutionists, however, another group within the party, men of a reformist tendency, content with a policy of improving present society, men such as Aristide Briand, René Viviani, Paul Brousse, and Jean Jaurès, asserted Millerand's right to

[41] See P. F. Desmartres, *"La France Politique à la Veille des Scrutins;" Europe Nouvelle,* March 22, 1919.

be associated with the government. In a party congress held at Paris in 1899 ministerial participation was consented to by a vote of 818 to 634; but the International Congress held in Paris, in 1900, virtually resulted in a negation of this decision by adopting a motion (offered by Jules Guesde) to the effect that this was only to be considered a measure of expediency caused by exceptional conditions. At Bordeaux in 1903 Millerand was again justified by a party declaration for remaining a member of the Cabinet, but was censured for not following party principles in his ministerial policy.[42] The unwillingness of the party to expel Millerand led Guesde to withdraw, and, joining the Blanquists in 1901, he formed the *Parti Socialiste de France.* Soon afterward, the followers of Jaurès, who had now become the leader of the reformists, together with the independents, formed the *Parti Socialiste Français.* In 1902 the Chamber contained forty Socialist members.

In 1904 the International Socialist Congress at Amsterdam not only settled the Millerand case, but secured the definite triumph of Marxism over the purely French doctrine of "reformism." Despite the vigorous defense of the latter by Jean Jaurès, the German delegation, led by Rosa Luxemburg and Bebel, forced the Congress to adopt a resolution "rejecting in the most energetic manner revisionist attempts . . . to substitute a policy of concession to the established order for the conquest of political power through an open struggle against the bourgeoisie."[43] It pronounced itself frankly against any "party satisfied with reforming bourgeois society"; and

[42] Millerand was expelled from the Federation of the Seine in 1904.

[43] Zévaès and Prolo, *Une Campagne Politique: le Parti Républicain Socialiste,* 8.

further declared that "socialist democracy cannot accept any participation in a government of a bourgeois society."[44] M. Jaurès, though defeated, loyally accepted this decision; and upon his return to France, all his personality and great intellectual powers were exercised successfully in uniting the Revolutionary Socialist Workingmen's party, the Socialist party of France, the French Socialist party, and five autonomous Federations, into the Unified Socialist party. This union was finally consummated at the Congress of Rouen in March, 1905. The decision of Amsterdam, however, displeased not only Millerand, but also many other prominent men, such as Viviani and Briand, who refused to join the Unified party. That party now took the official name of the French Section of the International Workingmen's Association.

Beginning with the elections of 1906 the party, ostensibly at least, repudiated the *Bloc*, and pursued an independent policy even to the extent of voting against appropriation bills. Under the leadership of Jaurès, however, who was still at heart a reformist, it took an active part in urging social reforms. Because of its splendid unity and discipline, its electoral successes were astonishing. In 1910 the party elected 75 deputies; and in 1914, 101. The latter election was won upon a purely pacifist and antimilitary platform as well as upon the reassertion of a new social and financial policy. The unity of the party in the 1914 elections was so complete that only five of its candidates were defeated in the provinces, and but three in Paris. As will be seen later[45] however, this unity has been seriously disrupted

[44] *Ibid.*
[45] See p. 97.

during the war. Unless present divisions are mended, future party successes appear improbable.

Little need be said of the doctrine of the Socialist party, which in most of its outstanding features resembles that held by Socialists everywhere. The real purpose and aim of the party was set forth in the "Mutual Declaration of Socialist Organization," adopted January 13, 1905, a part of which follows:

1. The Socialist party is a party of Class which has for its object the socialization of the means of production and exchange, that is, to transform capitalistic society into a collectivist or a communist society, and for a means, the economic and political organization of the proletariat. Its object, its ideal, and the means which it employs, make the Socialist party (while pursuing the realization of immediate reforms demanded by the working-class) not a party of reform, but a party of class struggle and of revolution.

2. The representatives of the party in Parliament form an independent group opposing all the political factions of the bourgeoisie. The Socialist group in Parliament must therefore refuse to the government all the means which assure the domination of the bourgeoisie and its maintenance in power; it must consequently refuse military credits, credits for colonial conquest, secret funds, and indeed the entire budget.[46]

On one point in its doctrine, the French Unified Socialists have become frankly opportunistic and from the standpoint of pure Socialist principle, despicably so. Realizing that the doctrine of the class struggle and the socialization of property is incompatible with the ideas of the peasant population of France, whose adherence to the Socialist cause is necessary for success, the party has made exceptions to the Marxian dogma. The peasant population, comprising about 15,000,000, is

[46] *Règlement du Parti Socialiste,* issued by the National Council.

divided into so many different categories that the rough division of "capitalist" and "laborer" cannot possibly be made. There are thousands of small farmers owning their farms and at the same time working several days of the week for larger owners.[47] Owners who exclusively occupy their own places, and employ dozens of laborers—cannot be called capitalists because they themselves engage in manual labor and borrow capital. Even tenant farmers hire help and invest capital; they are evidently both capitalist and employer, employee and debtor. In short, the agricultural situation in France completely belies the doctrine of the struggle and the opposition of classes. It illustrates, on the other hand, their actual interpenetration.

The last attempt to meet this situation was made by the Administrative Commission of the party in the early summer of 1919, when a declaration was framed de-

[47] In 1882, there were 2,150,000 peasants cultivating their own lands, to the exclusion of all other work; there were 1,374,000 peasants cultivating their own lands and in addition working for some one else,—making a total number of 3,524,000, not including their families.

ILLUSTRATION OF INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF PEASANTS

	1862	1882	1892
Peasants cultivating their own land exclusively	1,812,000	2,150,000	2,199,000
Peasants working for another	1,987,000	1,374,000	1,888,000

Although figures for a later period are not available, these just cited would seem to disprove the Socialist thesis that the peasants are gradually being expropriated by and subjected to capitalism. As a matter of fact, independent proprietors are increasing in numbers, while peasants working for a landlord, etc., are decreasing. See *La Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, November 10, 1919, "*L'accroissement du nombre des paysans-propriétaires.*"

nouncing "men who are recognized by their conservative opinions," and parties "who, disguising their reactionary desires under equivocal labels," wish to antagonize the peasants against socialism. The manifest stated that the Socialist party is not the adversary of the rural masses, that it is not concerned solely with protecting the city workers to the detriment of those in the country. Socialism, it maintains, wishes "to bring back to the laborers themselves the means of production. . . . It does not struggle against the small owners who themselves produce, whether they be in the country or in the city." The Socialists not only wish to defend these small holders, but they even appear to wish to increase them.

"The Socialist party," it continues, "does not wish to rob you of your labor—which it wishes only to render more productive—but to guarantee to you its possession." The manifest concludes by outlining a program dealing with the means of agricultural reconstruction and proposing new methods in production, and projects in favor of increased salaries. But the matter of "communal ownership" of rural property is assiduously avoided.[48]

The contradiction between this concession to peasant prejudices and the principles of the party formulated in 1905 is conspicuously evident. Moreover, the peasant population of France is so conservative and individualistic, that the successes won by this abdication of principle appear too meager to justify the means employed. Indeed the Socialists must place their revolutionary hopes in the Paris mobs, the factor from which, since the days of Marcel, the Commune, and the last "First of

[48] Manifesto reported in *Le Temps,* June 1, 1919.

May," disorder in France has always been evoked. Their enemy and the source of their defeat will come from the *paysans* who have sacrificed most for *La Patrie* and who now cherish more than ever their personal share in its prosperity.[49]

Before the war the Socialist party had about eighty department federations. Its adherents in 1905 were 34,688, a number which increased to 63,000 in 1912. On account of the war this number decreased to 37,073 in 1918, although by the middle of April, 1919, it had retrieved most of its former strength—mustering 57,159

[49] In keeping with its idea of democracy, the Socialist party has no permanent president; but there is a permanent administrative commission (known as the C. P. A.) of twenty-two members, and a secretary, who is charged with the executive work of the party. These members are elected by the National Congress, an annual meeting of the party, which decides its policies. The delegates to this Congress are elected by congresses of the department federations in proportion to their dues paying members—one delegate for the first hundred members, and one for every two hundred thereafter. Between congresses the party is directed by a National Council composed of (1) the Socialist members of Parliament, (2) delegates from the department federations, (3) the administrative commission above described. This national council is the supreme body of the party when the Congress is not in session. It meets ordinarily once every two months; it is charged with the general propaganda and with executing the decision of the Congress. The Administrative Commission acts in its absence and for it. The Socialist group in the Chamber is required to submit an annual report to the party Congress and each deputy is required to pay a monthly fee of fifty dollars.

The only requirements for joining the party are the obligations to subscribe to its declaration, pay an annual fee of five cents, and belong to the labor union of the members' trade.

The party maintains a section in every commune—which holds a meeting at least once a month. These sections are administered by a commission which holds bimonthly meetings. At Paris and Lyons there are sections for every arrondissement. These sections form a federation in every department which is administered by a federal committee. There is also a Federal Council, composed of delegates of the sections, which is a deliberative body. Disputes between department federations are arbitrated by themselves, or in case of failure to reach an agreement, by an arbitrator designated by the National Council.

members. In September the membership had jumped to 104,000.[50] The party's electoral influence is naturally much larger than the number of pledged supporters indicates; the number of votes cast for Socialist candidates increased from 30,000 in 1885 to 1,200,000 in 1910, 1,400,000 in 1914, and 1,700,000 in 1919.

The history of the Unified Socialist party shows that it has been a tremendous power in French politics—for it has drawn its support from bourgeoisie as well as proletariat. In fact, few of its leaders can be classed as laboring men. MM. Bracke and Loriot, two of the most extreme Socialists, are school teachers; M. Compère-Morel is an agriculturist; M. Mistral, another prominent deputy, is a wine merchant; M. Albert Thomas is an *agrégé* of the University of Paris and is reputed to have great wealth; Marcel Sembat is a lawyer. Indeed, from the standpoint of Socialist theory this has been the party's weakness in the past. However, its pronounced tendency to move further toward the Left, under the leadership of Longuet and Loriot,[51] is rapidly alienating most of its bourgeois and moderate elements—and at the present time future electoral successes of the party are not likely to be so important as in the past.

VIII

Many Socialists, friends of Millerand, who were originally associated with the movement of 1880, prided themselves on opposing the doctrine which the German

[50] The growth of the Socialists is not as remarkable as the above figures indicate, for according to M. Hanotaux (*op. cit.*, i, 166) the International Workingmen's Association in Paris alone had between 70,000 and 80,000 members in 1870.

[51] See p. 112.

delegates forced upon the Congress of Amsterdam. These believers in progressive reform and in participation in bourgeois government did not adhere to the Unified Socialist party in 1905. Just previous to the elections of 1910 about thirty deputies, some of them elected as Republican Socialists, others as Independent Socialists, and few as Radicals, formed a group at the Chamber which took for its title the "Republican Socialist Group." On June 7, 1910, the group issued a declaration of principles:

> Resolutely and exclusively reformist, the group believes that reforms can be considered only as steps towards a more complete transformation and as degrees in the progressive inauguration of a new social order where labor will have been assured its integral rights.[52]

The Declaration outlined a gradual transformation of those industries in which capital was sufficiently concentrated, from private to state operation. It stood for collective bargaining, for the development of labor organizations, and for their participation in the profits and management of commercial enterprises. In the field of agriculture, it offered encouragement to the small individual proprietor.

Among the deputies adhering to this declaration were three prominent statesmen: A. Millerand, Paul Painlevé, and René Viviani. Aristide Briand had been elected to the Chamber by the Republican Socialist Federation of the Seine, but because he was President of the Council at the time of the organization of this group, he reserved his adhesion.

This party differs from the Unified Socialists in that it repudiates the "class struggle" and the "revolution"

[52] Zévaès and Prolo, *Une Campagne Politique*, 17.

—it stands for the maintenance of public order. Secondly, it is nationalistic. It has even stood for the three-year military service law which the "Unifiés" opposed; it has moreover always looked upon Germany as an enemy of France.

The organization of the Republican Socialists is largely patterned upon that of the Unified Socialists. As to the strength of the party, it appears to poll about one third of the votes of the Unified Socialists. In the elections of 1910 it made a gain of 140,121 votes over those cast for it in 1906. In 1914 it polled 323,326 votes. In 1906 it had twenty-nine representatives in the Chamber; in 1914, this number had increased to thirty; in 1919, it had twenty-seven.

IX

This ends the description of the French parties. In addition to these regular parties there are, however, a multitude of societies and "groupements" which pose either as new parties or reform organizations. In this manner the party of the "New Democracy" was launched in April, 1919. By November it claimed to have 25,000 adherents. It ambitiously demands efficiency in government, the exclusion of members of Parliament from office in the Ministry, the representation of trade interests, the suppression of State Socialism, the union of classes, and full religious toleration. The writings of Lysis in his organ, *La Démocratie Nouvelle,* are widely read; but the party's program causes it to be suspected of conservative designs.[53] Its following is until now largely a personal one and it is unlikely to attain the strength of its older competitors.

[53] See p. 229.

A similar movement, the League of the Rights of Man, is of interest. This organization was founded at the time of the Dreyfus affair. Although it is not a political organization in the sense of attempting to get candidates elected, it nevertheless proposes to protect every citizen "in the exercise of the rights assured him by the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789."[54] This program has taken the form of defending citizens too poor to secure counsel in the courts. The League has likewise protested against several alleged illegal processes, such as the conviction of Malvy during the war. Although largely composed of Socialists and Radicals, it is by no means revolutionary. During the peace negotiations it was practically the only organization in France, except the Socialists, to advocate a liberal peace settlement.

There are many other organizations, each urging the adoption of a specific or a general reform, such as the Civic League, the Party of the Fourth Republic, the League of Professional Representation and Regionalist Action, the League of Proportional Representation, the *Ligue des Gouvernés*, the Union of Economic Interests, the *Ligue des Hommes Libres*, the National Association for the Organization of Democracy, the Republican Union of Commerce and Industry, the Circle of the Boulevard of the Capucins, and the Union of Former Combatants—all of which illustrate the riotous and the prolific character of French politics. Many of the doctrines and activities of these organizations will be mentioned in subsequent chapters.

[54] The League of the Rights of Man has had several illustrious precursors. In 1830 the Society of the Rights of Man was organized, and during the reign of Louis Philippe it carried on an effective propaganda for the Republic. See Georges Weill, *Histoire du Parti Républicain en France*, 98-142.

From the discussion of the programs and organizations of French political parties it may also be concluded that the charge of party instability can be overexaggerated,[55] for at least seven of these parties maintain offices in Paris and sections in great numbers of the communes and departments. A majority of them exact the regular payment of dues, a practice contributing more than anything else, to the fixity of organization. Nearly all of them have annual Congresses in which local units are represented. This is a custom which American parties lack. Finally, the French parties are centers of social intercourse and of education to a much greater extent than American parties, as nearly all of them are supported by auxiliary organizations among the women and youth. In these respects the French party system, apart from its parliamentary expression, manifests many elements of continuity.

[55] Parties must always be distinguished from parliamentary groups. While the former since 1900 have been fairly continuous, the latter, as we shall see in the next chapter, are constantly changing.

CHAPTER II

PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT

Notre Parlement, institution essentielle, était, il est encore, un théâtre.—CRÉER.

I

A parliamentary, in contrast to a congressional, government, is based upon a legislative body directly elected by and responsible to the people. The Ministry or the Government is chosen from among the members of the party or parties having the majority in this legislative body. Such a government not only looks after the administrative services, as does the American executive, but it actively directs legislation. Through its members who at the same time belong to Parliament, it introduces measures and urges their passage. So important is this legislative function, that in England a measure has little chance of success unless it directly emanates from the Ministry. Although this is not so true in France, here a distinction is made between a *project* of law, introduced by the government, and a *proposition* of law, introduced by an ordinary member of Parliament. Generally, it may be said that the Ministry, under a Cabinet form of government is supreme so long as it possesses the confidence of Parliament.

But such a Ministry is always responsible to the chambers for its collective and individual acts, theoretic-

ally, both to the upper and the lower; in reality, only to the lower.[1] If defeated upon any proposition it must either resign as a body, or dissolve Parliament and call a special election. In the latter case, the people decide whether they approve the Ministry or Parliament by returning representatives favorable to the one or the other. If the same Parliament is returned the Ministry must resign and one representing the dominant opinion is appointed. If a new Parliament favorable to the old Ministry is returned, the latter continues in power. Thus responsibility of the Ministry to Parliament and to the people—and of Parliament to the people—is ideally assured.

To be completely successful, the parliamentary system of government must be founded upon strongly organized parties. If ministers are to come from a sympathetic Parliament and if they are to fall when they lose its sympathy, that is, of a majority of its members, a coherent organization, composed of two balanced and stable divisions, must exist. This division must be just flexible enough so that members outside of both (or inside, for that matter,) may throw their weight from one side to another whenever the Ministry in power loses their confidence. But the party coming into power should be strong enough to govern alone, unsupported by other groups, in order that unity and responsibility be exercised by its Ministry. In a satisfactory parliamentary government, then, there must be two large parties, nearly equally dividing the support of the nation. Such has been the experience in England; but the impossibility of such a stable and equal division in France, as we have noted in the last chapter, has

[1] For the control of the French Senate on the Ministry, see p. 225.

brought about some features in parliamentary government which may be called defects.

II

Before examining these defects we must first consider the manner in which French parties function in Parliament. On their election, by far the greater number of Deputies and Senators become associated with what is called a "parliamentary group." These groups, composed of members of like political views, are supposed, to a certain extent, to represent party organizations. But the very remarkable thing about these groups is that the majority of them have no connection with French party organizations and they are almost absolutely free from external party control. Out of the nine principal groups in the Chamber of Deputies in 1919, four were organized upon a definite party basis: The Unified Socialist, the Republican Socialist, the Radical Socialist, and the Liberal Action group. In the other five, the Radical Left, the Republicans of the Left, the Republican Radical Union, the Group of the Entente, and the Group of the Right, party lines overlapped. Although, generally speaking, each group represented a conservative or a liberal tendency, parties, as outlined in the previous chapter, were merged into different groups; strictly party men found themselves joined with complete independents in the same group; and men of antagonistic politics, such as an Orleanist and a "Rallié," sat together.

Among the members of the Right, there appears to be absolutely no relation between party organization and membership in parliamentary groups. Often this is be-

cause there is no party organization to speak of, and it is also not inconsistent with the "irresponsible" doctrines this element holds. (The Liberal Action group offers a slight exception, perhaps, for a majority of the executive committee of the party organization must be members of Parliament and the party maintains a distinct party group, insuring a certain amount of discipline and unity.) Similarly, there is little relation between the representatives of the Republican Federation in Parliament and the party organization itself, or between those of the Republican Democratic Alliance and its party organization. Indeed many of the adherents of this group belong to the Group of the Entente. In the Radical party, however, Senators and Deputies professing to be members of it, must accept at least its minimum program. They must pay their dues, assist at party congresses and adhere to the "party group." Senators and Deputies are ex officio members of the Executive Committee.[2]

Thus Radical members of Parliament can only obtain the "approval" of their party if they have formally adhered to the party's program and if they maintain the loyalty this implies throughout their term of office.

Candidates for office are selected by the department Federations. There can be only one candidate in each constituency; and no party representative or journal is allowed to oppose a Radical candidate by supporting a candidate of another party. If any Radical representa-

[2] Likewise, sixteen of the thirty-five members of the Bureau of the Executive Committee must be members of Parliament. There is a commission upon discipline which reports to the Executive Committee upon any fracture of party mandates. The latter body may impose the penalties of warning, censure, or exclusion. Such a penalty can only be imposed by a majority of two-thirds of the committee.

tive in Parliament lends his support to a candidate condemning the policy of the party, he is liable to discipline. By these means, a very close relationship exists between the Radical Socialist group in Parliament and the Executive Committee of the party. The latter, by wielding its disciplinary power, may virtually direct the parliamentary group. Although the Radical group is strongly represented in the Committee, a firm bond between party interests and members throughout the country is maintained.[3]

But the Radical party has not always maintained this control over its parliamentary members. Until just prior to the war, there was no distinct and all-inclusive Radical group in the Chamber. Although they possessed the balance of power and the majority for a long period of time, their representatives were scattered between a number of groups, each working quite independently of the other. In 1911, the Radical Left contained 113 representatives of the party, while 149 of them were inscribed in the Republican Radical Socialist group. Just before the elections of 1914, the members of the party were divided into three parliamentry groups—four belonged to the Democratic Left, and the remainder split their allegiance between the Radical Left and the Radical Socialist group. The Congress at Pau attempted to remedy this condition and to effect a general reorganization of the party by deciding that the Senators and Deputies of the party must constitute the "group" of the Radical and Radical Socialist party, and that they may not inscribe themselves in parliamentary groups

[3] These particulars will be found in the *Party Statutes and Regulations*, given in the appendix to Jacques, *op. cit.*, 484-541. See also *Douzième Congrès du Parti Républicain, Radical et Radical-Socialiste*, at Tours, a brochure, 199.

of other parties. It was also decided that the "party group" must be exclusively composed of all the Deputies of the party, and no others.[4] The concentration of forces, resulting from this decision, gave rise to the name, Unified Radicals, which characterized the party in the 1914 elections, but which in 1919 seemed to have disappeared.

The Republican Socialist party also compels candidates seeking election to sign both its declaration of principles and its program. The party representatives in Parliament constitute a part of the administrative commission of the party, and they form a unique party group. But aside from their participation in the administrative commission of the party, the members of this group are responsible only to their own department federation.

The Unified Socialist party maintains the strictest control and discipline exercised by a party over its parliamentary representatives. They form an exclusive group in the Chamber. Every candidate for office must sign a declaration promising to observe its principles and regulations and to follow the tactics of the party, and the decisions of national and international congresses. A Deputy who leaves the party is under the obligation, although it is difficult to see how the provision can be enforced, of resigning from office if the organization originally electing him, refuses him further support. The Socialist group in Parliament must present an annual report to the annual congress of the party. A collective delegation from the group forms a part of the

[4] See account of *Treizième Congrès du Parti Républicain, Radical et Radical-Socialiste,* at Pau, a brochure, 357.

National Council.[5] As previously noted, the members of the group must pay a monthly fee of 250 francs, 100 francs going to the National Council and 150 francs to the organization which bore their election expenses. If a member fails to pay this fee for three months he is read out of the party. A Socialist Deputy must consequently replenish party funds and must subject himself to direct control.

By means of an arbitral commission the Socialist party settles conflicts between members, sections, or groups. This commission, subject to appeal, may "warn" a member, temporarily suspend him from any delegation, or even exclude him entirely from the party. The parliamentary group itself is under the control of the National Council and the latter body decides how the members of the group should vote upon any questions of importance before the Chamber. The expulsion of members, because of refusal to comply with party decisions, has been frequently employed.

Department federations, following the famous example of the federation of the Seine in expelling Millerand, expelled numerous *ex-majoritaires*[6] during the summer of 1919, M. Compère-Morel being one to suffer such a fate. The organization and discipline of the Socialists has been and continues to be the great cause of Socialist successes. Similar tactics on the part of the bourgeois parties will be a necessity if they are successfully to combat the Marxian Socialists.

The Unified Socialists and the Radicals are the only parties maintaining an immediate control over their parliamentary groups—the only ones to establish a

[5] *Règlement du Parti*, brochure distributed by the National Council.

[6] For the origin of the *ex-majoritaires*, see p. 107.

firm relationship between the regular party organization and the party representatives. The other parties—notably those of the Right—exercise no such control over their representatives. Among the latter, party discipline is unknown. This is one reason for the weakness of the conservative forces in France—lack of organization. It likewise accounts for one of the weaknesses in French parliamentary government, for as English practice illustrates, there must be the closest bonds between the constituents of a party and its parliamentary representatives.

As for the groups themselves, they are regularly organized. They hold meetings resembling caucuses, except that the decisions reached cannot be enforced upon their members. As they are at liberty to resign from their group and adhere to another, discipline can be enforced only with difficulty, especially when the group member's party maintains no "party group." The groups are supposed to cast homogeneous and solid votes; but as a matter of fact, they seldom do. The only practical purpose these groups appear to serve is as a basis for the composition of the "Permanent Committees of the Chamber." At the beginning of every Chamber (that is, every four years), nineteen such "committees" or "commissions" are elected, each composed of forty-four members.[7] The different parlia-

[7] Regulation voted January 29 and February 4, 1915. These commissions are (1) General, Departmental and Communal Administration, (2) Foreign Affairs, Protectorates and Colonies, (3) Agriculture, (4) Army, (5) Social Insurance and Pensions (Prevoyance), (6) Budget, (7) Commerce and Industry, (8) Definite Accounts and Economies, (9) Tariff, (10) Education and Fine Arts, (11) Public Hygiene, (12) Civil and Criminal Legislation, (13) Fiscal Legislation, (14) Marine and War, (15) Merchant Marine, (16) Mines, (17) Posts and Telegraphs, (18) Labor, (19) Public Works, Railways and Communication Facilities.

mentary groups are proportionally represented in these commissions in the following manner: Five days before the date fixed for the nomination of these commissions, the different political groups of the Chamber must furnish to the President, for publication, a list of all their members. No representative is allowed to appear on more than one group list. Three days before the date fixed for the nomination, the groups submit to the President of the Chamber a list of candidates for these commissions, varying in number according to the strength of the groups, as indicated on the lists previously submitted. Finally, the mere submission of such a nominating list, provided it does not exceed the number of candidates to which each group is entitled, is considered equivalent to their election by the Chamber. Thus each group elects its own representatives to these commissions. In case a certain percentage of the Chamber protests the nomination of any member to a commission (as was done with the Socialist group nomination of MM. Longuet and Mayéras to the Commission for the Ratification of the Treaty), a vote is taken by the Chamber on all of the candidates. Special commissions acting for limited and specific purposes are chosen in a similar manner.[8]

In order to secure a majority in the Chamber, it is obviously necessary for a certain number of these groups, temporarily at least, to enter into combination. But be-

[8] As an example of the representation upon such a commission, the ratification commission, chosen by the Chamber, June 25th, 1919, contained sixty members, of which the Socialists originally nominated eleven; the Republican Socialists, three; the Radical-Socialists, eighteen; the Radical Left, six; the Republican Left, six; the Republican Radical Union, two; the group of the Entente, seven; Liberal Action, two; Group of the Right, one; group of "non-inscrits," one; Independents, three.

cause of their number alone, regardless of their lack of discipline and their independence of party control, such coalitions are generally of the most transient instability. Yet a new Ministry can come to power only by effecting such a combination. In the presence of such a large number of groups, it is practically impossible for one party to have a majority, although the Radicals several times have been able to. Thus, instead of a majority and a minority party consistently offsetting each other, France is governed by a group system, in which, because of the number of these groups, the majority is continually changing in composition. As a result ministries depend on no one party for support; and they can follow no strictly party policy.

Furthermore, these groups are continually shifting, disappearing, dissolving, and reappearing. Of the last two groups which formed a part of the National Assembly from 1871 to 1876, one, the Extreme Radical and Socialist Left, disappeared in 1906, and the other, the Center Left, vanished shortly after the elections of 1910. The terms, "Legitimists," "Orleanists," and "Imperialists," which figured in this Assembly, were applied to combinations which have long since been merged into the "group of the Right." This group of the Right in 1902 was known as the Reactionary group. The "Ralliés" and "Nationalists" have completely lost their significance, most of the former now adhering to the Liberal Action group, and the latter, grouped with the Right, or "Independents." The Ministerial and Radical Dissident groups of 1902 disappeared in the Chamber of 1906; and the members of both appear to have merged with the Democratic Left. Similarly, the group of the Extreme Radical and Socialist Left and that of the Independent Socialists, existing

in 1902, disappeared after 1906, while a new Parliamentary Socialist group came into being. The latter disappeared in the 1910 Chamber where a new Republican Socialist group made its début.

A similar confusion exists in the Senate where the Republican Left corresponds to the Republican Union of the Chamber of Deputies, and the Republican Union of the Senate may be compared with the Democratic Left of the lower house.

These instances will indicate the confused complication of the party machinery and the difficulties in which French parliamentarism is called upon to function. With the exception of one or two groups, there is no relationship between the parties proper and their parliamentary representatives; the latter are organized into independent, shifting groups of little discipline or homogeneity.[9] Consequently, parliamentary representatives are really free from all obligation; and there is no way to enforce their adherence to a certain program or a certain cabinet. Thus, the most essential basis of a satisfactory parliamentary government—party discipline—is absent.

III

Two general results, already implied, arise from the condition just described. The first is the instability of ministries and the inevitable lack of continuity in policy. The second is the overwhelming predominance of Parliament over the Ministry.

As no one party commands an absolute majority in

[9] M. Aristide Briand offers an example of the independence of a French Deputy. Elected by the Republican Socialist party from St. Etienne, he belongs to no parliamentary group, although the Republican Socialists are organized in one.

the French Chamber, the President of the Republic must select a man as President of the Council of Ministers (the Prime Minister), who will command the support of several parties. The dilemma of the Premier is increased by the necessity of selecting an entire cabinet from these differing, often hostile elements. In England the task of choosing a Prime Minister is comparatively simple because the leader of the party in power is generally distinguishable. But in France, on account of the reason above given, the President is allowed to use a great deal of personal discretion because no outstanding party leader can exist. There may be three or four available candidates, but because of their number, the final choice must rest with the President of the Republic alone. As a result of this condition, long intervals frequently elapse between the fall of one cabinet and the formation of another. Even when a Prime Minister is chosen, he must carry on negotiations with groups, securing their adherence by the judicious distribution of seats, and often by the creation of new ones merely to satisfy certain representations. This necessity was increased during the war when the willing collaboration of every group in the Ministry became a necessity. The Viviani Cabinet, already in power when war was declared on August 3, 1914, immediately enlarged itself to include MM. Delcassé, Ribot, Millerand, Briand, Sembat and Guesde. (The latter was given no administrative position, but was merely denominated "Minister without Portfolio." It is said that he did nothing in the Council of Ministers[10] except draw a salary and insure the So-

[10] The Council of Ministers as opposed to the Cabinet is the administrative body of ministers recognized in the Constitution; the Cabinet is the political body. The President of the Republic meets with the former but not with the latter.

cialist support of the war.) In the Briand Cabinet, which followed that of Viviani, a new device was used to secure the political representation of all parties. This was the creation of Ministers of State, of whom there were five. MM. Freycinet, Emile Combes, Léon Bourgeois, Jules Guesde and Denys Cochin occupied these new positions, the first being a Moderate, the second two, Radical Senators, the fourth, a Socialist, and the fifth, a member of the Extreme Right.

The Viviani Ministry which came to power on June 13, 1914, illustrated the difficulty of the formation of a new cabinet. On June 2, 1914, the Doumergue Cabinet resigned, and because of the increased strength of the Left, René Viviani, a Republican Socialist, was immediately asked to form a new government. It took him exactly eleven days to come to terms with the Radicals, notably upon the three-year military service law to which the Radicals were opposed. Concessions were passed back and forth unsuccessfully until June 9, when President Poincaré, despairing of Viviani's success, asked A. Ribot, a Moderate belonging to the Republican Union of the Senate, to make the attempt to form a cabinet. M. Ribot judiciously selected a cabinet from the Left and Center groups, but because of his support of the three-year law, the Unified Socialists and the Radicals overthrew him on June 12 by a vote of 306 to 262. Finally, upon June 13, Viviani succeeded in coming to terms with the Radicals, and took over the Ministry. In his cabinet were five Radicals, two Republican Socialists, three Senators from the Democratic Left, one Republican of the Left, and one member from the Radical Left. More than half of these twelve ministers had voted for the three-year law of August 7, 1913, although collectively the cabinet had come to power

pledged to overcome it. But as soon as the cabinet was firmly seated in power, it announced its firm intention to give it its support. Such a change of policies is a frequent occurrence under the French régime. Although the Unified Socialists withdrew their support, the Radicals were able to muster a majority which kept M. Viviani in power.

The attempt of M. Ribot to form a government, as above related, resulted in what was known as the One Day Government from the length of its tenure. This affords an illustration of the uncertainty and the instability of French ministries. According to figures compiled by M. Léon Muel,[11] during a period of a hundred years, from 1789 to 1890, France has had ninety-four Ministers of Justice, 117 of the Interior, ninety-nine of Foreign Affairs, ninety-nine of Finance, 109 of War, and eighty-eight of Marine. Thus the average term of office of the Ministers of Justice, Finance, and Marine, was a little over a year; that of the Ministers of the Interior and of War, a little less than a year.

From the advent of the cabinet of Jules Dufaure, on March 9, 1876 (who was the first President of the Council under the Third Republic), to the accession of the Clemenceau Ministry in November, 1917, there were fifty-six ministries—during a period covering forty-one years. In other words, a French Ministry has had an average life of less than nine months. Contrasted with the ministerial tenure in England, where from 1873 to 1914 there have only been eleven ministries, the advantages of a stable party organization can readily be seen. During the same length of time—1876 to 1917—France had five times as many ministries as England.

[11] Cited in Edmond Villey, *Les Vices de la Constitution Française*, 122.

Although both countries nominally have the same parliamentary form of government, they work quite differently in practice. Of course the essential thing about a "cabinet" government is that it holds office only so long as it maintains the sympathy of the majority of Parliament or of the country. But as already noted, while this majority in England is organized and stable, and its sympathies definitely determined and expressed, in France there can be no majority in the English sense. There are combinations, coalitions, and *blocs*, temporarily held together by a common ambition.[12] The number, the independence, the changing interests, and the lack of discipline of these groups do not long allow them to endure. When these combinations break up, it usually means that another combination will be formed, antagonistic to the Ministry—and the latter must fall. The result upon the conduct of the government is plain. An ordinary Ministry will try to perpetuate its power as long as possible. To do this, it will have to satisfy the demands of the four or five groups supporting it. But these demands are usually conflicting and they cannot be carried out to the satisfaction of all. Consequently a Ministry usually "marks time"; at least it is subjected to the temptation of temporizing. Reforms which it is pledged to enact are found impossible of realization if it wishes to remain in power. Measures demanding immediate adoption drag through successive Parliaments, their principle not being accepted because groups differ on details. This has been especially true of the income tax. Promised by the Radical party in 1906, advocated many years before, it was finally enacted in 1914. This has been true also of electoral re-

[12] For a history of these combinations, see Chapter III.

form, advocated in one form or another ever since the creation of the Third Republic, and only enacted in 1919. Unless a Ministry is courageous beyond the ordinary, it is not likely to urge reform measures which may react against the self-interest of some parliamentary group. If a strong Ministry urges them it is sooner or later bound to fall. As a result pressure for reforms does not usually come from the Government. This is true especially in matters of social and economic legislation. It comes, if at all, from independent members of Parliament outside the Ministry, and more strongly, from great, organized extra-parliamentary bodies such as the General Confederation of Labor who, by threat, have forced the passage of greatly needed measures.[13]

In fact, the weakness of the Government and the inability of Parliament to accomplish results seem to be one of the chief reasons for the strength of these outside, and purely extra-legal bodies. As far as the French Ministry is concerned, its virtual powerlessness to initiate reform legislation and its uncertain lease on life, has a strong tendency to keep the stronger men of the country out of the cabinet. But their places are greedily held by successive swarms of men who in other countries would be wholly unable to hold ministerial positions.

Criticism upon this score is often exaggerated, how-

[13] The demand of the National Association of Functionaries, for salary increases by July 21, 1919, seems to have been the only reason why Parliament provided them. Other organizations, such as the Civic League, the League of the Rights of Men, the League for Proportional Representation, the League for Regional Action have led fights for reform. The Electoral Reform Bill of July, 1919, is an instance of a great reform which was sponsored by members of Parliament, without the support of the Ministry. In fact, the Clemenceau Ministry appeared to be secretly opposed to it.

ever, for the effects of the unstable tenure of ministries is partly overcome by several offsetting institutions and practices. In the first place, the officials who directly manage the Government services and administration have been given a status, assuring them permanency in office. This has resulted largely from the demands of organizations composed of these employees. To a certain extent this has overcome the so-called "Spoils System" by which a new Government fills all positions with its camp-followers. Consequently, government administration has a permanence and a stability on which even frequent ministerial changes have little effect. The granting of a permanent status to functionaries has been further necessitated by the centralization of the French government and the vast control which it exercises over business enterprises. For example, it would be inconceivable for university professors or tobacco manufacturers to be removed upon every change in ministry. Their permanency of position has overcome what would otherwise be a hopeless and impossible situation.

Secondly, a change in ministry is not so wide-sweeping in its effect as it is in England. In the latter country, it is customary for an entirely new cabinet to take the place of the one just fallen; and the new body adopts an entirely different policy. But in France, ministers of old cabinets are usually found on new. There are always some "hold-overs," men who have had previous experience in cabinet positions. A defeat of a Government often amounts to nothing more than a ministerial shake-up. Such a defeat is usually caused by the aroused hostility of one of the four or five groups constituting its majority; and a re-formed cabinet is often changed only to the extent of containing representatives of another group to take the place of the one which has

drifted away. It is customary for a defeated Prime Minister to take a portfolio in the cabinet succeeding his own. Thus Viviani after his fall became Minister of Justice in the Briand Cabinet which succeeded him on October 29, 1915. Upon the last Clemenceau Cabinet, three members, MM. Clémentel, Claveille, and Loucheur, "held over" in the same positions from the Painlevé cabinet. The Minister of Finance, Louis Klotz, served in the same position on three previous cabinets, those of Caillaux, Poincaré, and Briand. The Minister of Commerce, M. Clémentel, held a similar position on four previous cabinets; at one time he was also Minister of Agriculture in the Barthou Ministry and Minister of Finance in the Ribot Cabinet of 1917. M. Pams, Minister of Interior, was Minister of Agriculture in the Caillaux and Poincaré Cabinets; M. Lafferre, Minister of Instruction, was Minister of Labor under the Briand Ministry of 1910; M. Leygues, Minister of Marine, was Minister of Colonies in the Sarrien Cabinet of 1906; while Stephen Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, held a like office in previous Briand (1910), Clemenceau (1906), and Barthou (1914) Cabinets. Thus a French cabinet, despite its shifting composition, is assured of members who have had previous political and ministerial experience.

Finally, the instability of French governments cannot be charged only to organic defects in the parliamentary system of the Third Republic. The whole history of France has been one of constant turmoil, one form of government forcibly turning into another,—Republic, Monarchy, and Empire, each following the other in kaleidoscopic rapidity. Since the beginning of the Revolution eleven constitutions have, at one time or another, governed France; but until the Fundamental

Laws of the Third Republic, no one of them has been in effect longer than twenty years.[14]

France has been twice an Empire, and three times a Constitutional Monarchy; she has seen the régime of three Republics. Since the death of Louis XIV only two monarchs died in the occupancy of the throne. Under the Third Republic, the first three Presidents, MM. Thiers, MacMahon and Grévy, were forced to resign; the fourth, M. Carnot, was assassinated; the fifth, Casimir-Périer, voluntarily quitted office in disgust; and the sixth, Félix Faure, died prematurely—even mysteriously. It was not until the Republic was in its thirty-sixth year that a President at last quietly laid down his office at the expiration of his term, as Loubet did in 1906. The present parliamentary system in France surely cannot be responsible for the instability of past history or for the checkered careers of its Presidents who were removed from its operation.

IV

The second defect of French parliamentary government arises in part from the first. This is the tyrannical dominance which Parliament—or the Chamber of Deputies—maintains over the Government. In England the Cabinet directs Parliament; it not only handles government administration, but it actively leads legislative work. It is nearly a free agent in the direction of the chief duties of the central government; Parliament intervenes only to hold it accountable to its trust. The French Parliament, on the other hand, shows no such

[14] For a list of these laws and constitutions, see F. R. Dareste, *Les Constitutions Modernes*, i, 1-9.

amiable disposition. It constantly interferes in the affairs of the Ministry, it dictates its policies, and continually demands explanations and defenses. Generally, it assumes a highly dictatorial attitude. The Ministry often finds itself at its absolute mercy,—not of that of a stable, reasonable majority,—but of a whimsical and often insignificant group. Patience, therefore, becomes a chief—even essential—ministerial virtue.

There are several devices by which Parliament may control the Ministry. Oral questions may be asked a Minister at the beginning of a session. They cannot be debated and the author is the only one allowed to respond to the Minister's reply. Written questions may also be submitted to the President of the Chamber; they are printed in the *Official Journal* along with the response from the proper minister within eight days. The latter, however, may declare in writing that the public interest does not allow an answer. The chief means by which Parliament lays a heavy hand on the cabinet is by the means of "interpellations." An interpellation is the act by which a member of either the Senate or the Chamber can force a minister to answer questions and generally to defend his administration. The President of the Council may even be brought to defend the entire general policy of the Government.[15] Indeed, interpella-

[15] The following is a summary of the Rules of the Chamber in regard to interpellations:

The Chamber fixes the day upon which interpellations are heard. Interpellations upon interior policies cannot be postponed more than a month.

No order of the day *motivé* upon interpellations can be presented unless it is in writing.

The order of the day *pur et simple,* if it is requested, always has priority.

If the order of the day *pur et simple* is not adopted and if it is not ordered to the bureaus, the president submits the order of the day *motivé* to the vote.

tions are seldom used merely to obtain information; they more often constitute a challenge to a debate in which all members of the Chamber and of the Ministry may participate. Originating in technical and unimportant matters, such discussions often end in the overthrow of the Government. An interpellation is made in writing and it becomes a special order of the day, the time for the debate it provokes being definitely set in advance. After such a debate—in which the interpellators may place the Minister under a grueling examination, which is limited by no restriction of time —the vote "of the order of the day" is taken. This vote usually includes an expression of confidence in the Government. For example, last June (1919), after an interpellation in which certain members of the Chamber questioned the Government as to searching certain offices, the Chamber passed the following order of the day:

> The Chamber, respecting the guiding principle of the separation of powers and confident that the Government will allow justice to follow its course in full independence, passes to the order of the day.

If the Chamber refuses to pass such a motion, "lack of confidence" is expressed and the Minister individually, if not the cabinet collectively, is bound to resign. The latter result may be avoided, if a new Minister is appointed who will conform to the Chamber's wishes.

The order of the day *pur et simple* is a vote which neither censures nor praises the Government, but which proceeds to the other business of the Assembly without comment.

The order of the day *motivé* expresses a definite opinion upon the interpellation; i.e., it either exonerates or condemns the government policy under debate.

See *Règlements de la Chambre des Députés*, Chapter VI, Articles 39-46, quoted in Moreau et Delpech, *Les Règlements des Assemblées Législatives*.

The Chamber, however, may vote the "order of the day" with no mention of confidence. This novel proceeding in the French system has often raised questions as to its exact status. For instance, on the 18th of July, 1919, after listening unfavorably to the Minister of Agriculture (M. Boret) in a defense of the economic policy of the Government,[16] the Chamber of Deputies passed the following resolution:

> The Chamber, believing that the price of living has diminished one half in Belgium since the month of January, 1919;
> That the price of living has diminished one quarter in England since the armistice;
> That it has not ceased to increase in France since that date, and judges this result to be due to the economic policy of the government;
> Passes to the order of the day.

Although perhaps it was the intention of the Chamber that the Minister of Agriculture should resign, the resolution contained no word of confidence or lack of confidence. In the minds of many, there was a question whether the Minister was under the obligation to resign and whether it was the intention of the Chamber that he should do so or whether it merely desired to bring about the change of his policy. But whether or not the Chamber directly expresses lack of confidence, such a motion clearly indicates that the Minister does not have its approval. In connection with this incident, the Unified Socialists asserted that this vote should be interpreted to mean that the whole Clemenceau Ministry had fallen. But such a contention in French practice was inadmissible, although it would perhaps be valid in England.

The whole system of interpellation is subject to the greatest criticism. Its use and abuse are too frequent;

[16] See p. 326.

its causes are so superficial that the mere debating of them is often a waste of time. The public, indeed, regards them rather facetiously, for every Friday (the principal day set for interpellations) Parisians throng the Chamber to enjoy the spectacle and do their best to assist the opposition in unseating a ministry![17] The frequency of these interpellations is illustrated by the two years' tenure of the Méline Ministry in which there were 218 interpellations, one about every two days. The Socialists became so obnoxious in introducing interpellations under the Clemenceau Government that during the war the latter actually refused to consider most of them, moving for adjournment *sine die* on the ground that the national defense would not allow public discussion,—a practice which led the Socialists to brand the Clemenceau Ministry as the *sine die* Government. During the armistice, this device was especially abused; every week, two or three interpellations would be filed upon the Government's financial policy, the evacuation of troops from Russia, the Government's attitude toward strikes, and the debates at the Peace Conference. By these means the Government is kept in a continual state of belligerent defense; and an enormous amount of the time of its ministers is wasted in discussion which ordinarily adds no light, and which clears up no misunderstandings. The Socialists, who make the greatest number of these interpellations (although they constitute but a sixth of the Chamber) are already fixed in their opinions. They intentionally pursue an obstructionist policy to which the interpellation is readily adaptable. If the interpellation would be utilized as is the "question" or the vote of confidence in England, the Chamber and

[17] This pastime, along with others, was largely foregone during the war.

the Government could coöperate with and clearly understand each other. As it now stands, however, it is a political discouragement to the Ministry and a tremendous and largely useless handicap to its administrative duties.

V

By a decree of September 3, 1914, the extraordinary session of the French Parliament, called August 4 on account of the German declaration of war, was closed; and another session was not convoked until December 22, 1914. During the interval between these two sessions, the Government exercised both executive and legislative functions; under the powers granted to it by the laws establishing the state of siege, it exercised great powers, and, by means of its decrees, it virtually and repeatedly enacted legislation.

In accordance with the law of July 16, 1875, the Chambers were again convoked on the second Tuesday, that is, the 12th of January, 1915, by the President of the Republic. According to this constitutional provision, the Chambers must remain in session at least five months.[18] Thereafter the President of the Republic may close the session and call an extraordinary session whenever he may wish during the remainder of the year. But in the course of the year 1915, the Government, without any other official declaration, made it known to the press [19] that during the period of hostilities it would not use its right of closing Parliament. As a result, since the beginning of 1915 and until the end of the war Parliament in the fall of 1919, the Chambers sat

[18] See Art. 2 of the law of July 16, 1875.
[19] See L. Duguit, *Manuel de Droit Constitutionnel*, 203.

in a permanent session. Recesses were frequently taken, it is true; but all adjournments were made by the Chambers themselves. Parliament in this manner took over a power which the Ministry in a parliamentary government usually exercises.

This war practice was the outgrowth of another French practice which marks a difference from that followed in England. Under a parliamentary government, the Ministry may in times of dispute dissolve Parliament, order a general election, obtain a majority and remain in power, or vice versa. Such an occurrence was illustrated in the special elections in England in 1910. In France the President of the Republic enjoys this theoretical right of dissolution of the Chamber—a right which differs from that of closing the ordinary sessions of Parliament above described. It may be exercised at any time, but it must have the assent of the Senate, another difference from the British practice. But a more essential factor is that the President has never exercised this right since 1877 when MacMahon used it in an attempt to secure an anti-Republican majority. The abuse of this power was so evident that its exercise has since been held in disfavor. As a result, a French Ministry has no recourse to the people in a conflict with Parliament. There is, therefore, no means of knowing if it is pursuant to the will of the people rather than to the mere will of Parliament that a certain Ministry is caused to fall. This distinction is vital because it makes the French Parliament absolutely supreme, in contrast to the American Congress which has no control over the composition of the Executive once the latter is established,[20] and it is more powerful than the British Parlia-

[20] Except by impeachment, etc.

ment, which is responsible to the people like the Cabinet itself. The French Parliament is kept within bounds by the multiplicity and contradiction of its own components. If these components were ever fused into one mind under a powerful leader, there would be no limits to the usurpation of powers by Parliament.

Two other instances will illustrate the growth of parliamentary power during the war. One of these was the utilization of the Permanent Committees of both the Senate and the Chamber in assisting and supervising the Government in military and industrial preparations; the other is by the exercise of the power arising from decisions reached in secret sessions.

Commissions of Inquiry have always been used by Parliament to investigate the acts of a Government when an interpellation would divulge secrets of state. But until the passage of a law on the 23rd of March, 1914, (after the scandalous "Rochette affair") the Chamber had no general right to summon witnesses to appear before it, although it could call Government officials. Now, however, this right has been granted and Commissions of Inquiry (such as the Commission of Metallurgy at present investigating the alleged intervention of the Committee of Forges in the operations of the army) actively search out the administrative activities of the Government in a manner far more efficient than the method of interpellations.

The Government's refusal to give the Chamber information concerning army operations in 1915 and the early months of 1916 was very irritating to the members of that body. Especially upon matters such as Balkan diplomacy, the High Command, the removal of General Joffre, and the independence of the General Staff, did the Deputies wish to be informed. The Government's

refusal to divulge this information was upon the ground that such public discussion in Parliament would aid the enemy.

To overcome this difficulty and to assure parliamentary supremacy, the Unified Socialist group introduced a bill into the Chamber which provided for the nomination of a special commission charged with investigating all questions bearing upon national defense in the zone of the armies as well as in the zone of the interior. Another proposition supported by the same party provided for the creation of an "organism" composed of Senate and Chamber delegates with the same powers as that of the commission above. Both of these propositions were defeated upon the 9th of February, 1916.

This idea, however, made great progress in the Chamber, and upon June 22, 1916, by a vote of 444 to 80, it adopted an "order of the day," a portion of which read as follows: "The Chamber decides to institute and organize a direct delegation which will undertake, with the coöperation of the Government, to exercise the effective and immediate control *in situ* of all the services whose function it is to supply the needs of the army."[21]

This bill, providing for a new organ of government, which might interfere directly with every phase of army operations—excepting perhaps the actual disposition of troops in combat, met with the greatest resistance from the Government. After an eloquent discourse from the President of the Council, on the 20th of July, 1916, this bill was abandoned. But on the 27th, a proposition introduced by M. Chaumet was passed by a vote of 269

[21] For a more detailed discussion of the work of the "Government of Bordeaux," the régime of decrees, and the eventual establishment of parliamentary control over war ministries, see *L'Œuvre de Guerre du Parlement*, par un Républicain, published in *"Le Fait de la Semaine"* series, Librairie Grasset.

to 200, which placed on the "permanent commissions of the Chamber" the control of the government in regard to the conduct of the war. This control, according to the bill, the commissions already exercised. The only addition it made was to require the commissions to make a quarterly report to the Chamber. Thereafter the commissions took a considerable part in all questions dealing with army supplies. It was due to the activities of the Senate Committee on the Army that the Undersecretary of Aviation resigned. The commissions also succeeded in securing the resignation of a Minister of War who cherished superannuated doctrines upon artillery. Later they also brought about the creation of the Undersecretaryship of Munitions. They even succeeded in speeding up the inertia of other government services,—the reorganization of the health service and an adequate supply of artillery, munitions, and machine guns being attributed to them.[22] Although strictly limited in the exercise of their powers, the French commissions appear to have functioned very successfully.

The original decision of the Chamber to constitute a "direct delegation" was taken in secret session. These secret sessions were themselves an innovation which Parliament forced upon the Government for the same reason as it forced the commission jurisdiction. The Constitutional law of July 16, 1875, provided that each Chamber might go into "secret committee" at the request of a certain number of members, to be fixed by the house regulations. This right, however, like that of dissolution, had never been exercised. But finally, in order to obtain a more intimate knowledge of the conduct of the war and to exercise more fully the right

[22] See Joseph Barthélemy, *Démocratie et Politique Etrangère*, 335.

of interpellation, both the Senate and the Chamber, overcoming old precedents, decided to constitute themselves into "secret committees" in the spring of 1916. In June, the Chamber held seven such sessions. Throughout the year it held ten others,—both series followed by votes of confidence in the Briand Ministry. On January 26, 1917, another secret session was held to discuss affairs in Greece, and upon the 28th a new vote of confidence was given to the Briand Ministry. Upon the 14th of March, 1917, the Chamber in secret session discussed an interpellation upon the aircraft service; and as a result of an incident following this session, General Lyautey, Minister of War, resigned. This resignation finally brought about the fall of the Briand Cabinet. Similarly, the Senate held secret sessions, interpellating the Government upon its conduct of the war. Neither assembly emitted votes of confidence within their so-called secret committees; they were always voted upon in public session.[23]

On the part of the executive, an attempt was made by the Briand Ministry on the 14th of December, 1916, to arrogate distinctly legislative powers. The project of law laid before the Chamber at that time would give it power virtually to legislate by decree. Promptness, it was urged, necessitated immediate action which the slow processes of legislation could not give. This suggestion raised such a storm of protest, however, that the bill was not pressed, although the Chamber, upon agreement with the Ministry, enacted a law providing for emergency legislation. The bill stipulated that in time of war the Government might introduce a law with a declaration that its enactment was immediately neces-

[23] *L'Œuvre de Guerre du Parlement,* 46-61.

sary. The Chamber then fixed the maximum delay, at the most not to exceed five days after the "deposit" of the project, in which it must be discussed.[24]

Aside from the extraordinary powers exercised by the Government under the rights granted by the declaration of the State of Siege, the Chambers have suffered a diminution of control in only one respect. Ordinarily one of the most sweeping and detailed methods of control over the Government has been by the annual voting of the budget. By the discussion of the different ministerial requests, by refusing to vote certain items, etc., the Chambers could virtually dictate Government policies. But during the war no regular budget was voted, and the Chambers merely granted *en bloc* the credits which the Government asked. This was done by what is known as the *douzièmes provisoires.* The financial year in France commences the 1st of January and ends the 31st of December. This requires that the budget, in peace time, be voted and promulgated not later than December 31st. But it frequently happens that Parliament does not vote the budget by that time, although without it, the Government cannot raise taxes or pay expenses. To overcome this difficulty, it has become customary to grant the Government provisional authority to raise taxes and make expenditures necessary to the operation of the public services during a period of one, two or three months, as the case may be. (As the amount of this expense is estimated by the month, or by

[24] Discussion upon the bill is limited to the *rapporteur* of the commission and to a speaker chosen by the minority of the commission, except when a Minister speaks. Upon amendments only the Government, the president and the *rapporteur* of the commission and the author of the amendment may speak. Under no circumstance can an orator other than those of the Government or of the commission have the floor more than once every quarter of an hour. Duguit, *op. cit.,* 436, 518.

a twelfth of the year's total, the system is called the *douzièmes provisoires.*) This system was employed during the war, credits being granted every three months. An annual budget was impossible because no one knew what war expenditures, etc., would be. But it resulted that Parliament, in not debating and voting the budget chapter by chapter as was its previous practice, lost one of its most effective means of ministerial control. The end of the war and the possibility of again accurately estimating necessary expenditures will undoubtedly bring back the old system.

Taken as a whole, through the systems of interpellation, permanent sessions, the war commissions and the secret committees, the Chamber of Deputies as well as the Senate, has increased its power over the executive branch of the government during the last five years. Such an increase is opposed to the evolution of executive power which war activities elsewhere produced. Ordinarily, increased legislative power may be considered a sure defense against those who might overturn the Government for personal interests. But in the French Chamber, whose power is based on changing, independent, and even rebellious groups, many regard recent events as a sign of increased impotency of the French executive and a tyrannical usurpation of legislative authority.

The importance of the intrusion which the French Parliament has theoretically made into the province of executive power may, however, be exaggerated. The fact yet remains that the personal equation in French politics may still override the processes of parliamentary machinery. As long as the French party system continues as it is, political leaders, who naturally occupy Cabinet positions, will always enjoy greater personal in-

fluence than in countries where party discipline mechanically organizes and directs party activity. The influence which M. Clemenceau maintained over the French Chamber during a time when public opinion was severely critical was extraordinary. In debates on ministerial policies, such as the censorship, which when considered individually different parliamentary groups had roundly condemned, M. Clemenceau won sweeping majorities.[25]

This inconsistency illustrates a weakness in the present system of parliamentary government: Parliament often refuses to press an isolated reform in the face of ministerial opposition if it believes that a Ministry whose continuance in power is necessary for the solution of more important problems, will resign on account of its passage. In the case of the Clemenceau Ministry, there is little question that a majority of the Chamber opposed the maintenance of the state of siege and the censorship during the armistice, the prohibition of importations, and even the Government's reconstruction policy. But the primordial necessity which faced Parliament was the belief that Clemenceau and no one else could secure a peace settlement which would guarantee France against future invasion. Consequently, when the Prime Minister appeared before the Chamber and made any consideration of Government policies to which the Chamber objected, a matter of confidence upon which the Ministry would resign if the Chamber voted against it, complaints were hushed up or parliamentary grumblings vented on lobby walls.

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[25] This statement is somewhat inconsistent with that made in the first of this chapter in regard to Parliamentary domination. But the lack of party discipline allows dominant personalities to gain an ascendancy which for a time may offset group control.

From another standpoint, the personal element in the French political situation prevents an undue arrogance of parliamentary power. In England and in the United States, parties are nationalized. The organization of each party supports candidates, often with no expense to themselves, with the aid of a vast machinery and upon a party platform. It is not for the candidate so much as the principles for which the candidate stands, that ballots are cast; he is a brick in the wall for which his party supplies the mortar. In France, on the contrary, party organizations do not have the inherent strength or the discipline to select a candidate or to provide him with the support necessary for his election. A French candidate is largely dependent upon his immediate constituency for his election and continuance in office. Upon their favor he stands or falls, unsupported by the backing which American or British parties afford their representatives. As a result, French elections usually turn upon personalities; and a French Deputy, and even a Senator, continually keeps his ear to the ground in an endeavor to follow the opinions of those upon whom his reëlection is dependent. A desire for reëlection is as keen among Frenchmen as it is among Americans. Their utter dependence upon their political constituencies keeps their parliamentary activities within bounds established by public opinion.

CHAPTER III

THE "BLOC" AND THE SACRED UNION

La France sera héroïquement défendue par tous ses fils, dont rien ne brisera devant l'ennemi l'union sacrée.—
RAYMOND POINCARÉ.

I

As pointed out in the last chapter, the large number of political groupings in the Chamber necessitates their frequent, though often temporary, combination in order to assure and maintain a ministerial majority. A discussion of past combinations and of the complete union of political parties which the war exacted, may indicate the efforts which have been made to improve and facilitate the processes of French party government.

After the elections of 1885 there were three general groupings in the Chambers,—the Conservatives, the Republicans (Opportunists), and the Radicals (Intransigeants). As no one of the three was capable of mustering a majority alone, combinations became necessary. When the two Republican groups, the Opportunists and the Intransigeants, united their efforts to offset the Conservative or Monarchist group, such a combination was known as "Republican concentration." When one of the Republican groups united with the group of the Right, it became known as a union of "pacification." Until 1898 parliamentary government was generally car-

ried on by the two policies or expedients of "concentration" or "pacification."

The first "Concentration Cabinet" was formed by Henri Brisson, a Radical, in April, 1885. It contained elements from all the Moderate and Radical groups,—despite the hatred which already showed itself between the *Union des Gauches*, led by Gambetta and Ferry, and the Radicals properly so-called. The Rouvier Ministry, formed in 1887, was the first "Pacification Ministry." In the following years, attempts were made to form exclusively party cabinets, but without success until the Bourgeois Ministry of 1895-1896 came into power upon a purely Radical platform of social and financial reform. Forced to resign because of its policy in Madagascar, in turn it was succeeded by a nearly homogeneous cabinet of Moderate Republicans under Méline. These instances aroused the hope that France might at last settle down to a stable system of two-party government. But this belief, partly founded on the elimination of the Monarchist-Clerical element from all serious participation in the Government after its discreditable support of General Boulanger, was in the end thwarted by this very element itself. The Dreyfus[1] case, reawakening a fear of Clericalism, resulted in the fusion of the groups of the Left in the famous *Bloc*.[2] The elections of 1898 returned about 250 deputies divided among the Radicals, the Radical Socialists, and the Socialists. With

[1] See p. 234.

[2] The name of the *Bloc* is said to have been invented by Clemenceau in 1891. A play, by the name of *Thermidor*, written by Sardou, in which Robespierre played the lead, was forbidden, after one performance at the Comédie Française. M. Clemenceau upheld this suppression of the play in Parliament, saying, "The First Revolution is a 'bloc,' which you must take or leave." The name still lives in French politics. See Jerrold, *France Today*, 103, note.

the aid of the Liberal Republicans (who soon formed the Democratic Republican Alliance) these groups effected an alliance which controlled the Government at least until 1906. Originally under the leadership of Waldeck-Rousseau, President of the Council from 1899 to 1902, this *Bloc* accomplished the separation of the Church and State by passing the Associations law of 1901, and by abrogating the Concordat in 1905, which in turn was supplemented by the law of 1907.

The policy of the *Bloc* was vindicated in the elections of April, 1902, when 321 adherents were returned, the opposition electing only 268. It was in this year that the line between *Conservatism,* represented by the Monarchists, Nationalists, and Liberal Catholics, *Progressism,* represented by the remnants of the Moderate Left of the Assembly of 1871, and a portion of the Republican Union which followed Gambetta, and *Reformism,* represented by the Radicals and Radical Socialists, the Democratic Republican Alliance and the independent Socialists,—became clearly drawn. Reformism constituted the *Bloc;* while Conservatism and Progressism were its deadly enemies.

The *Bloc* maintained a government of the Left through the Ministry of Emile Combes, a Radical (1902-1905), through the Rouvier Ministry (1905-1906), and through the Sarrien Ministry, which came to power in March, 1906. The program adopted by the Socialist Congress at Amsterdam in 1904 caused the Radicals to fear that the Socialists might be obliged to withdraw from the *Bloc.* But although they officially refused to allow their members to become cabinet ministers, and even to coöperate with reformist parties, in reality, under the leadership of Jaurès, they supported Radical measures of reform. The election of 1906 increased the

combined power of the Left, its seats rising to 375; the Progressists were reduced one half, while the Reactionaries maintained their numbers. The entire Right was able to muster only 140 votes.

In October, 1906, Georges Clemenceau took over the leadership of the Sarrien Ministry. He was himself responsible for the first real break in the *Bloc*. Of a dictatorial and independent character, he relied upon the Radicals alone; and although his achievements were reformist, they were apparently accomplished without seeking the active coöperation either of the Republicans of the Alliance or of the Socialists. In fact, the first event of the new Minister's reign was his acrimonious debate with Jaurès upon Socialism in the Chamber. He further antagonized the Socialists by refusing to allow Government officials to form syndicates and adhere to the General Confederation of Labor.[3] Likewise, the wholesale discharge of the postal employees (who struck in March, 1909) offended the labor vote. The Briand Ministry, coming into power in 1909, included, in addition to the Premier, men of distinctly socialistic tendencies. In spite of this fact, they nevertheless came in conflict with the Unified Socialists. This became apparent as the result of the Government's action in suppressing a nation-wide railway strike in the autumn of 1910, by mobilizing the employees subject to military service, and making them operate the roads under a military régime. Opposition from the Socialists was so intense that in 1911 Briand was forced to resign.

In 1910 the Dreyfus incident had become ancient history, and the questions of anticlericalism and the reorganization of the army had been solved to the satis-

[3] See p. 350.

faction of the Radicals. The purposes for which the *Bloc* had been formed had thus been achieved, while new issues were arising, such as the income tax, proportional representation, and militarism, upon which not only the parties of the *Bloc* but divisions in them could not agree. Moreover, the members of the Democratic Republican Alliance felt that the anticlerical movement had now gone far enough and that a policy of conciliation should be undertaken. This attitude was especially objectionable to the Combists of the Radical party, who believed that their future successes depended upon the maintenance of clerical issues. There were thus many reasons for the disintegration of the *Bloc* when the elections of April-May, 1910, divided it further. The new Chamber was composed as follows: Right, 19; Liberal Action, 34; Progressists, 76; Democratic Left, 73; Radical Left, 112; Radical Socialists, 149; Independent Socialists, 30; Unified Socialists, 75; Independents, 20.[4]

The Ministry of Joseph Caillaux, which came to power in 1911, did much to discredit the Radical party with the country and to shake its confidence in the old *Bloc*—now fast disappearing so far as it represented any common feeling between the parties of the Left. Caillaux, having defeated Clemenceau for the Radical leadership, aimed to follow a policy of pacification toward Germany. He also stood for the maintenance of the two-year military service law, adopted by the Rouvier Ministry, in place of the old three-year service law, a measure which those who feared German armament were now trying to reënact. The questionable financial dealings of M. Caillaux, especially his speculations on the Bourse, com-

[4] Election figures for 1910 vary greatly according to sources. The above are taken from the *Annual Register* (London) for 1910, 289.

pleted the formidable list of charges against him, resulting in the downfall of his Ministry and the retirement of the Radical party from power. On January 13, 1912, M. Raymond Poincaré became President of the Council. A member of the Democratic Republican Alliance, he brought into being a cabinet of moderate tendencies. By this time not only the homogeneity but the numerical force of the *Bloc* had been overcome, and new groupings and combinations were in the process of formation.

II

Before discussing the new groupings, however, the interior relations of the members of the *Bloc* must be reviewed in order to understand to what extent they were willing to bring about real party combinations.

This *Bloc* had actually been formed in 1901 at the first Congress of the Radical and Radical Socialist party, where a union between all Socialists was organized, and where the slogan, *Pas d'ennemis à gauche*, was adopted, and indeed continued as a party motto until very recent times.

Thus in the Radical Congress of 1904, M. Debierre secured the adoption of a motion affirming "the necessity of alliances with other parties of the Left . . . during the elections."[5] None the less he asserted the complete independence of the Radical program. This motion showed that the contemplated alliances were not to be considered as fusions, but merely as opportunistic combinations. The French electoral system lent itself quite readily to such temporary junctures. Elections to the Chamber are decided by an absolute majority vote.

[5] Quoted in Charpentier, *Le Parti Radical et Radical-Socialiste*, 428.

If no candidate received a majority of all the votes cast, a supplementary election must be held two weeks later at which the same candidates may present themselves and where their fate is decided by a simple plurality.[6] Now under this system, every party usually ran a candidate in every arrondissement during the first balloting. In case no party candidate received a majority, combinations between parties for the second election were ordinarily effected. It was by this method that the *Bloc* secured the return of its candidates, Radicals voting with Socialists or with Alliance Republicans upon the second ballot.

Despite the decision taken at Amsterdam, the Radicals did not give up the hope of Socialist support.[7]

However, the antipatriotic preaching of Gustave Hervé, actually urging soldiers to desert, caused the Congress of Radicals held at Nancy in 1907 to declare that although the *Bloc* must continue, the members of the party would refuse "their votes to any candidate who advocates the disorganization of the armies of the Republic, either by desertion in time of peace, or by insurrection and the general strikes in the face of the enemy. . . ."[8]

This motion was a direct attack upon the entire Socialist party program because at its Congress of Limoges in November, 1906, it had voted to prevent the outbreak of war "by every means, from parliamentary intervention, public agitation, and popular manifestations, to the general workingmen's strike and insurrection."[9] But the Radical Congress held at Dijon in 1908, while

[6] This system has been changed by the Electoral law of 1919. See pp. 165-169.

[7] See Charpentier, *op. cit.*, 430.

[8] *Ibid.*, 432.

[9] Alexandre Zévaès, *Le Parti Socialiste Unifié et La Guerre*, 13.

repudiating any alliances with the progressist or liberal parties, declared "itself ready to reconstruct the old *Bloc* of the Left in order to realize social and economic reforms." This olive branch not being accepted by the Socialists (whose Marxist tendencies, on the contrary, continued to develop), the Radicals at the Congress of Nîmes (1911) decided to postpone the matter of their future relationship with them for a year. This decision was taken in order to conciliate and compromise the element who wished to repudiate all relations with the Socialist party (when the latter had refused to vote confidence in the Monis Government, simply because it was a "bourgeois" government). Many Radicals, however, still felt the necessity of Socialist coöperation. Thus, while the rupture between the Radicals and the Socialists was not quite complete, the hearty understanding existing between the two parties in 1901 certainly continued no longer in 1911.

The union between the Democratic Republican Alliance and the Radicals, which constituted the other part of the *Bloc*, experienced a similar evolution. Between 1901 and 1910, both parties acted in complete accord, and it even appears that until 1911 these liberal Republicans were regarded as the right wing of the Radical party. Consequently the definite constitution of a Democratic Republican party by the Alliance in 1911 somewhat antagonized the Radicals, especially as many of them belonged both to the Alliance and to their own party at the same time. Moreover, the Radicals in 1910 had formally disapproved these double affiliations and at the Congress in Rouen it was decided that the reactionary peril having been removed, each party should devote itself to its own organization and platform. The Alliance received the decision that Radicals could no

longer be affiliated with their organization with some resentment, which later led to a complete separation of the two.

Lastly, the Republican Socialists did not maintain wholly cordial relationships with the Radicals, although before 1911 they acted in coöperation with them and formed part of the *Bloc*. At a congress of the party held in Toulouse in 1911, the Radicals were declared to be solely a party of anticlericalism; while the Unified Socialists were condemned as exponents of direct action and antimilitarism, neither of which the Republican Socialists could support. In June, 1912, when the Radicals attempted to form an alliance with the Republican Socialists in the Paris municipal elections, the later replied that while they would support the Radical clerical program, they exclusively reserved entire freedom upon all other questions.

III

Such were the respective attitudes of the parties of the Left at the time of the accession of the Poincaré Ministry in 1912. Although it was a Moderate Ministry, it contained such Radicals as Léon Bourgeois, Pams and Steeg upon it. Despite this the Radical Congress at Tours, October, 1912, expressed a deep resentment toward the Democratic Alliance of which M. Poincaré was a member, accusing it of voting for clerical candidates in the Chateaudun, Apt, and Haut-Rhin.[10] Meanwhile Aristide Briand was urging the policy of pacification towards the Church and the union of the moderate

[10] See *Douzième Congrès du Parti Républicain, Radical et Radical-Socialiste*, Tours, brochure, 21.

elements into a single party. His efforts were also repudiated by the Congress of Tours which condemned what it termed "an intolerable policy of pacification." Upon the election to the Presidency of Raymond Poincaré over Jules Pams, the Radical candidate, M. Briand, a bitter opponent of the Radicals, was made Premier. At his fall upon the issue of electoral reform in March, 1913, another Republican of the Alliance succeeded him, Louis Barthou. Thus three successive ministries were headed by anti-Radical men. M. Barthou's Cabinet was especially attacked by the Radicals because it contained a Progressist Republican, M. Thierry. When Charles Dumont, one of the vice-presidents of the Radical party bureau, was asked to join the Barthou Ministry, the officers of the Executive Committee vigorously protested against Radical participation in any other but a strictly Left Ministry.

Beginning with the Poincaré Cabinet and continuing through the Barthou Ministry, there was a movement to unite all the moderate elements of the Chamber in order to appease certain antagonistic elements in the Republic, especially the Catholics. One of these attempts was known as the *Entente Démocratique et Sociale*, organized in the Chamber by M. Maginot, with the object of combining the deputies in a "Center group," completely independent of other political combinations. This group later came to be known as the *Centre Gauche*, and included members of both the Radical and Independent Socialist parties. This grouping soon was vigorously attacked by the Executive Committee of the Radical party; and as the result of a letter written on the 18th of June, 1913, it succeeded in securing the withdrawal of eight Radicals from this combination.

Both of these developments, i.e., Radical participa-

tion in a Cabinet which included a Progressist Republican and Radical adherence to a group based upon a policy of conciliation, were condemned by the Congress of Pau, in October, 1913, as throwing the Republic back into the hands of the Clericals. The fundamental importance in a democracy of "distinct parties, conflicting in their ideas, opposing program to program," was emphasized.[11]

The month following the Congress (in December, 1913), M. Aristide Briand, in a famous speech at St. Etienne, proclaimed the necessity of a Republican *entente*. He protested against socialistic attempts at revolution, strongly attacking the Radicals; he pleaded for reconciliation with the Catholics; he urged proportional representation and the three-year military law; and, finally, he denounced Joseph Caillaux in no uncertain terms.

It was about this same time that the Radicals, who now were called the "Unified Radicals," were able to win control of the Ministry, Senator Doumergue becoming its head. This Cabinet was pledged to carry out the Pau program which called for (1) the repeal of the three-year law which the Barthou Cabinet had enacted; (2) "laic defense," or further legislation to drive Catholic schools out of France; (3) an income tax. The Cabinet, however, was very opportunist; Senator Doumergue supported the three-year law and did virtually nothing with respect to laic defense; no agreement could be reached with the Senate over the inclusion of *rentes* in the income tax; and as Senator Clemenceau was hostile to proportional representation on the grounds that it would increase Catholic power, the party made no

[11] *Troizième Congrès du Parti Républicain, Radical et Radical-Socialiste*, Pau, 1913, brochure, 387.

progress with electoral reform. Finally, the activities of M. Caillaux, Minister of Finance and the acknowledged leader of the Radicals, at last became openly disreputable. He was accused of using his position not only to favor foreign banks in which he was interested, but also to forward his speculations on the Bourse. In addition, he was accused of obstructing the course of justice in the Rochette case, that of a notorious swindle involving Mexican railway stock. These factors increased hostility to the Radicals and also the demand for a great Republican and Moderate party. This demand finally culminated in the formation of a group called the Federated Parties of the Left, or simply, the Federation of the Left, upon January 14, 1914.

This group was composed of 124 members, including MM. Barthou, Baudin, Millerand, Klotz, and Bérenger. Naturally, M. Briand was its president. It included most of the "Centrist" elements, a few Radicals, and some independent Socialists. It announced a program of labor and social legislation, of parliamentary reform, and of conciliation with the Church. It denounced the Radicals for their equivocal attitude in officially protesting against the three-year law and then, when in power, of supporting it. It also criticized the vagueness of their social reform program, and their eternal pleading for "liberty" in contrast to their severe oppression of the Church.

Against the Federation of the Left, then, stood the Unified Radicals and the Unified Socialists. This was the last stage of party evolution before the outbreak of the war. Meanwhile, Jean Jaurès was manfully trying to swing the Socialists back into line, and to bring about a union of the Radicals and the Socialists. Such a restoration of the old *Bloc* would mean the con-

trol of the Chamber by the Left—without the help of the Federation of the Left—which was the bitter enemy of both Unified parties. At the Socialist Congress of Amiens, held in the latter part of January, 1914, Jaurès urged that upon second ballots, Socialists should coöperate with Radicals. In order to avoid the appearance of too flagrantly violating their cherished principles, he introduced a carefully worded resolution which reaffirmed the absolute unwillingness of the Socialist party to enter any alliance with a bourgeois party, but which suggested that upon second ballots Socialist voters might support "the candidates of other parties who most clearly and vigorously combat the three-year law, war, chauvinism, and the military-clerical combination." As this could obviously mean none other than the Caillaux Radicals, the motion met with the greatest opposition from such leaders as Allemane, Chauvin, Negre, and Le Gléo, who said that "the resolution voted at the International Congress of Amsterdam which forbade Socialists of all nations to form agreements, coalitions or *ententes* with bourgeois political parties, has been trodden under foot by the majority of the Socialist party. The majority has hypocritically concluded an illegal alliance with the most despicable and the most criminal of all political parties, the Radical party." Upon the adoption of the Jaurès motion, under the leadership of Allemane, these protestants withdrew and attempted to form a Labor party, an attempt, however, which proved unsuccessful, and the break was soon mended.

The ensuing provisional union between the two Unified parties, and the purely pacific program of both resulted in the return of a Chamber strongly Left in its tendencies as the result of the elections of the spring of

1914.[12] The Unified Radicals and the Unified Socialists, as we noted in the last chapter, were strong enough to drive the Ribot Ministry out of power, June 12, 1914, because it supported the three-year law. In the Cabinet of Viviani, who was a Republican Socialist, which followed, the names of five Unified Radicals appeared; but, in keeping with their policy, no Unified Socialists were included. Following the decision of the Viviani Government to support the three-year law, the Unified Socialists withdrew their support, and the Government was maintained by purely bourgeois parties.

Amidst the growing signs of a conflict with Germany, a congress of the Unified Socialists, held on the 16th of July, 1914, adopted the following motion:

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[12] The results of the 1914 elections were as follows:

Republican Democratic Alliance	1,564,578
Unified Radicals	1,496,058
Federation of the Left	1,396,447
Unified Socialists	1,408,114
Right and Liberal Action	1,297,712
Republican Federation	810,679
Republican Socialists	323,326

In the Chamber, the groups presented this composition (these figures differ according to sources; but those given below seem to be the average).

Radical Socialist group	172
Unified Socialist	101
Republican Socialist	30
Liberal Action	32
Republican Federation	36
Democratic Left	34
Radical Left	66
Republicans of Left	54
Republican Union	21
Right	15
"Non-inscrits" and independents	41
	602

It will be noted that the Federation of the Left maintained no distinct parliamentary group.

About seventy Radicals were also to be found divided among other groups.

Among all means employed to forestall and prevent war and to impose upon governments a recourse to arbitration, the Congress considers as particularly effective the method of a general labor strike simultaneously and internationally organized in the interested countries.

In addition to its oft-repeated refusals to vote appropriations, especially war credits, for a bourgeois government, and to act in collaboration with the Ministry of such a government, the party now reiterated its threat of a general strike in the face of imminent hostilities. It was with considerable misgiving, therefore, that the patriotic elements of the country saw war being forced upon them; and it was doubtless with considerable encouragement that Germany pushed her preparatory moves.

IV

On the 3rd of August, 1914, Germany declared war on France; and on the 4th of August, the Parliament was assembled in extraordinary session. In the Chamber of Deputies, M. Paul Deschanel pronounced a eulogy upon Jean Jaurès who had been assassinated upon the 31st of July.[13] From the grave of the man," he said, "who has perished, a martyr to his ideas, rises a thought of union; from his clay-cold lips rises a cry of hope for the fatherland, for justice, for the human conscience. Is this not the most worthy homage we can render him?" It was on the same day that M. Poincaré, President of the Republic, issued his famous call for unity in the face of danger: "France," he wrote, "will be heroically

[13] For a short discussion of the life and work of this great Socialist leader, see *Jean Jaurès*, with a preface by Pierre Renaudel, published in *"Le Fait de la Semaine"* series.

defended by all of her sons, united in the Sacred Union which nothing can break. They will stand before the enemy, bound together by a common indignation and in a common political faith."

The members of the Socialist party, joining with every other group in the Chamber, unanimously voted to accept the eighteen projects of law which the Government considered necessary to meet the circumstances. The Unified Socialists approved the credits requested by the Government. They moreover unanimously voted to declare the State of Siege, and for a law restraining the liberty of the press. Three weeks later the Viviani Cabinet was enlarged to include, not only representatives of all parties (except the Right), but the most fiery opponents of ministerial participation among the Unified Socialists,—Jules Guesde and Marcel Sembat. Thus France saw the Socialist party in this hour of national peril deserting all the principles of "bourgeois" opposition, laid down in the Congress of Amsterdam, to become completely identified with the Sacred Union, upon which the safety of France now depended.

Yet even in the face of this crisis the Socialists attempted to explain the abandonment of their Marxian tenets in a declaration published on August 28, 1914, which read as follows:

> Citizens,
>
> As the consequence of a mature deliberation and after a decision carefully arrived at, the Socialist party has authorized two of its members, our comrades, Jules Guesde and Marcel Sembat, to form part of the new government; and it has made them its delegates in the work of national defense. Every representative of the Socialist group in Parliament . . . has agreed to assume with them the grave responsibilities which they have consented to undertake.
>
> If it were only a question of readjustment within the

Ministry, if it were only a question of contributing to an old government some of the forces in which our party is so rich; even more, if it were only a question of ordinary participation in a bourgeois government, neither the consent of our friends or of ourselves would have been obtained.

It is, however, the future of the nation, the life of France which is the question to-day. The party has not hesitated. . . .

In these words the party justified its collaboration in a Ministry of the bourgeoisie, and for the first time since the organization of the party in 1905, permitted a member of the Unified Socialists to serve on such a Ministry.

Of the sincerity of the patriotism shown by the other groups there was no question. The German peril became infinitely more near and real than Monarchism, Clericalism or Combism. Every element united in the national defense; the union of French political antagonisms proved a possibility when the welding force, exercised from without, was of sufficient strength. The spectacle was now afforded of M. Ribot working side by side with the Socialists who had just turned out his Ministry, and of M. Guesde once more coöperating with his former bitterest enemies—Millerand, Viviani, and Briand—whose "heresy" had excluded them from the Socialist party.

Outside of Parliament, the same transformation united every effort in the national defense. Even Gustave Hervé exhibited a most remarkable change of heart. Originally the most rabid antimilitarist among the Socialists, a preacher of desertion and of sabotage, he now freely offered himself for enlistment in the army. Upon January 1, 1916, he changed the name of his formerly revolutionary paper, *La Guerre Sociale* to *La Victoire,*

and while carrying on an ardent campaign of criticism —exposing defects in the military administration—his policy was adopted solely for the purpose of better assuring victory. As a climax to his reformation he finally became so nationalistic that he was at last read out of the Socialist party! The General Confederation of Labor, likewise, urged its adherents (nearly a million) to fight and overcome German imperialism, as the first essential step in the achievement of social democracy. Among clerical circles, thousands of members of the excluded religious orders hurried back to France and entered the army; equally large numbers of priests joined its ranks either as chaplains or combatants.

In January, 1915, the Socialists in the Chamber—who had previously nominated a separate list of candidates for the presiding officers of the Chamber—decided to do away with this practice and unite with the other groups in an almost unanimous reëlection of M. Deschanel as President. Well might the President, in his inaugural address, enlarge upon the Sacred Union and praise the willingness of all parties to forget political antagonism in the face of a common danger! The Briand Cabinet, formed on the 29th of October, 1915, even more forcefully acknowledged the strength of this Union, for out of its twenty-two Ministers, eight were former Prime Ministers: Doumergue, Ribot, Viviani, Combes, Bourgeois, Freycinet and Méline, representing widely different shades of political opinion. One member came from the irreconcilable Right (Denys Cochin); a Socialist Minister of State (Jules Guesde), and another Socialist, as Minister of Munitions (Albert Thomas), completed a ministerial combination the like of which had never been thought possible in France.

V

While these adjustments were taking place, certain Socialist elements, secretly clinging to the old Marxist theory of the "inherent class struggle," and convinced that the war was caused as much by French as by German capitalistic exploitation, were beginning to chafe under the bonds of the Union. Fresh courage was given this group by the widespread depression which German successes brought to French morale. The Unified Socialist Federation of the Haute-Vienne in May, 1915, passed a resolution—now famous—addressed to all the federations of the party, announcing what purported to be "its criterion and its judgment upon present events." The language of this resolution, very moderate in comparison with those which followed, reproached certain members of the party for writing chauvinistic articles, and proposed that the Socialists keep a receptive ear open for "any propositions of peace, from wherever it may come." The federations of the Isère and of the Rhone approved the resolution of the Haute-Vienne; and a very strong minority in the federation of the Seine, led by Jean Longuet, the grandson of Karl Marx, also adhered to its program.[14] This resolution marked the birth of the first division in the Socialist party, the first sign of a tendency which step by step caused its withdrawal from the Sacred Union. The *majoritaires* of the party, i.e., those who held a majority in the Socialist group in Parliament, opposed the Haute-Vienne motion. They attempted to conciliate the national duty with the

[14] At a congress of the Federation, December 19, 1915, the Renaudel-Fiancette motion received 6,000 votes; while the Longuet motion received 4,000.

care of international labor interests, and they believed that Germany was completely responsible for the war. Moreover, they did not believe in the opening of international negotiations with the enemy Socialists until the war had ended, and they even opposed a discussion of peace terms until victory had been won. To insure this victory, the *majoritaires* believed in Socialist participation in the Government and in the voting of credits. The leaders of this section of the Socialists were Albert Thomas, Alexandre Varenne, and Compère-Morel.

In opposition to the *majoritaires,* the *minoritaires* arose, led by Jean Longuet, Mistral, Mayéras, and Pressemanne, who were the original supporters of the Haute-Vienne motion.[15] Although they still supported the prosecution of the war, they began little by little to question its enemy origin, attributing it to universal capitalism. They more and more insistently stigmatized the "imperialism" of the Entente, and began to demand a declaration of Peace Aims which should define the Allies' exact position. Between these two major divisions of rather indefinite principles a small Centrist group arose, attempting to conciliate both extremes. This group was led by Marcel Cachin, Pierre Renaudel, and Marcel Sembat. Of these, Cachin was of undoubtedly *minoritaire* sympathies, while Renaudel represented the *majoritaire* bent (although, because of his editorship of *L'Humanité,* the official Socialist newspaper, he attempted to remain neutral).

In July, 1915, at a meeting of the National Council, the *majoritaires* showed their preponderating desire for

[15] The dissident movement started by the Haute-Vienne federation was supported by the Limousin Deputies, whose Socialist constituents had been turned against the Government because of a number of military executions.

the continuance of the war—a determination which was voted for by an overwhelming majority. In September, however, another split occurred in the party of even more extremism than that caused by the *minoritaires.* This element, bolder and perhaps more honest than the latter, condemned capitalism outright as the cause of the war, affirming that it was waged in the interest of capitalist oppression of Labor. Pure Marxists, the adherents of this group urged the immediate opening of negotiations with the enemy Socialists to the end of stopping the war by the hitherto unsuccessful international strike, a means which now meant a refusal longer to bear arms. To this element the "class struggle" was still the fundamental issue which the war, far from belying its truth or postponing its application, had emphasized.

From the 5th to the 9th of September, 1915, at Zimmerwald, in Switzerland, this extremist element of the French Socialist party met representatives of the Italian, Roumanian, Bulgarian, German, Swedish, Norwegian, Swiss, Polish, Dutch, and Russian Socialists. They agreed to a manifesto addressed to the "Proletariat of All Nations" condemning the war, demanding an immediate peace, and proclaiming that the "national defense is not socialistic." MM. Bourderon and Merrheim signed this declaration as representatives of the French Socialists. But at the Christmas Congress of the Unified party in France (toward the end of 1915), the Zimmerwald program and the German proposals for peace were voted down by the overwhelming majority of 2,736 against 76—the *majoritaires* thus again exhibiting their supremacy. But what the *minoritaires,* particularly the extreme element who had attended the Zimmerwald conference, lacked in numbers, they made

up in enthusiasm. In the latter part of April, 1916, a second "International Congress" was held at Kienthal, another little town in Switzerland. Forty delegates attended this congress, chiefly from the official Italian Socialist party, and from the Swiss and Russian parties. Two German representatives, one of whom was the editor of *Vorwärts,* were present. The French Socialists were represented by three Deputies—MM. Blanc, Brizon and Raffin-Dugens. Their attendance indeed was a remarkably bold act because of the official position they held in a Parliament charged with the prosecution of the war. The Kienthal meeting emphasized the program adopted at the meeting of the previous autumn. Thereafter, the three French Deputies systematically voted against all war credits, and upon the 22nd of September, 1916, Raffin-Dugens aggravated this attitude and created a sensation in the Chamber by speaking of "his comrades in Germany."

The vigor of this extremist movement, and the force of the agitation which was now being carried on throughout all the Socialist federations, was shown at a meeting of the National Council of the party, held on April 9, 1916. Here the *minoritaires* were able to muster about one third of the votes. Their strength was exhibited in the Longuet-Pressemanne motion to renew international relations with the German Socialists and for the immediate discussion by the Government of peace terms with Germany; it was defeated by a vote of 1,996 against 960. The majority motion, which was finally adopted, contained many concessions to the minority. Although it demanded the liberation of Serbia and of Belgium as the *sine qua non* of peace, it made no mention of the return of Alsace-Lorraine.

Finally, the motion recommended that the other sec-

tions of the International Workingmen's party should frame principles which Socialism should exact in the peace settlement, and that they should also determine the responsibility for the war's origin.

Concerning the result of this important meeting, *Le Droit du Peuple,* a minority organ of the Federation of the Isère, said:

> Certainly, the result obtained is not that which we had desired. But it must be admitted that the minority is not a negligible quantity since it includes a third of the party. The elements which compose it are capable of deploying the greatest energy and of becoming, perhaps sooner than it is generally believed, the majority of the party.[16]

M. Chastenet, the author of these words, was a better prophet than he knew.

Gustave Hervé in *La Victoire* pointed out the moral of this vote according to his own lights:

> The gravest and the saddest thing about this decision is that the socialism of Zimmerwald which controlled only a handful of votes three months ago, has this time united a third of the party. This is surely a bad day for the national defense.[17]

Meanwhile, the *minoritaires* were gradually gaining control of whole federations, especially in the industrial centers of France, where assertions of the war's "imperialism," the impossibility of victory, and the necessity of an immediate peace, were boldly made. The National Congress of the party, held in Paris from the 24th to the 28th of December, 1916, again resulted in definite *minoritaire* increases. On a motion which expressed confidence in the parliamentary group, and stated "that no act be done by the group which would

[16] Grenoble, issue of April 12, 1916.
[17] Issue of April 10, 1916.

result in hindering the national defense," 1,595 favorable votes were cast representing the *majoritaire* element; 233 votes were cast against it, representing the Kienthalian element; but there were 1,104 abstentions, representing the *minoritaires*. Thus nearly one half (1,337) of the Congress refused directly to authorize its representatives in Parliament to continue their support of the National Defense! At the same convention, Albert Thomas was authorized to continue in office as Minister of Munitions in the Briand Cabinet; but his collaboration was to be exercised "under the responsibility of the Administrative Commission of the party." This decision, however, was barely agreed to by a vote of 1,637 against 1,372. Thus it appeared that the Socialist party was on the verge of breaking the Sacred Union, and of refusing longer to support the vigorous prosecution of the war.

The vote upon another resolution concerning international relations showed the gravity of the situation. This was a substitute for a Kienthalian motion intended to open the way for negotiations with the German Socialists and for immediate peace "at whatever price." However, the substituted motion provided for eventual negotiations subject to certain conditions. This motion received 1,537 votes while 1,407 opposed it. Measured by figures, therefore, the growth of the *minoritaires* had increased (since the vote in April when they obtained 960 as against 1,996), to a present voting strength of but a hundred less than the *majoritaires*. This certainly was a remarkable and a disconcerting evolution toward the Left. The supremacy of the *minoritaires* meant that the Sacred Union would be shattered and that the party would resume its Amsterdam program even in the face of German invasion.

In the spring of 1917 the Stockholm agitation arose. Commonly supposed to have been of Russian origin, a movement was undertaken to hold a meeting of all of its sections, Allied and Germanic, of the International Workingmen's Association. The purpose of this gathering was to define terms of peace and to bring an immediate end to the war. All the well-known arguments for such a Conference were put forward: it would prove to both the Russian and German Socialists that the Allies had no imperialistic ambitions, and that as a result, Russia would stay in the war, and the German Socialists would resist its prolongation. The Allied Governments, however, suspected the conference to be of Germanic origin, and purely defeatist in its purposes. This attitude indeed was taken at first by the French Socialist party which, at the end of April, 1917, voted not to participate in the Stockholm conference. However, agitation for participation grew with the gathering strength of the minority element, until on May 28, 1917, the French decision was changed and it was decided to go to Stockholm "to define war aims and to prepare for a full meeting of the Internationale." The not illogical refusal of the French Government to give passports to this conference naturally angered the Socialists. At its Bordeaux Congress, held in October, 1917, the party (with the remarkable exceptions of MM. Guesde, Bracke and a few others), was determined to go to Stockholm. This unanimity was itself a victory for the Kienthalians, the party now officially recognizing the legitimacy and the value of the action taken by the few extremists who had attended the conferences at Zimmerwald and Kienthal in the fall of 1915 and the spring of 1916.

In addition to the Stockholm question, the Congress

was again faced with that of ministerial participation. Albert Thomas had continued to be the Socialist representative in the Ribot Ministry, which had succeeded Briand on March 19, 1917. M. Ribot was forced to resign on September 10 and his successor, Paul Painlevé, a Republican Socialist, also retained Albert Thomas in his Cabinet. But because of the violent criticism of the *minoritaires* as to the war aims of the Government—as well as to the principle of ministerial participation, he resigned in order to preserve the unity of the party.

In the preceding Ministries (notably those of Viviani, of Briand and of Ribot), the Socialists had been represented. Consequently, the withdrawal of Socialist support from the Government was generally interpreted as the breaking up of the Sacred Union—the return to the Marxian theory of unmitigated opposition to a bourgeois government. Moreover, on account of the loss of the Socialist support on which his Government largely depended, M. Painlevé was forced to resign. He was replaced on November 13, 1917, by M. Georges Clemenceau, a vigorous Radical. Here was a man of different stamp. Accepting the Socialist challenge, he declared a relentless war on their antipatriotic maneuvers—openly declared as such; and thoroughly antagonistic toward their antipatriotism, and confident in his own powers, he successfully formed a Cabinet without their representation or support![18]

Thus, so far as the safety of the Sacred Union was concerned, the Bordeaux Congress made little difference. The Socialists now found themselves unable to reënter the Government even had they chosen so to act. But the Congress nevertheless voted a *majoritaire* motion,

[18] For a short account of M. Clemenceau's life, see Appendix A.

which declared for representation at Stockholm, for support of the war, for voting war credits, for participation in the Government,[19] and for the revision of Allied war aims. This motion was adopted by a vote of 1,552. Another motion, introduced by the *minoritaires,* was somewhat similar. It expressly favored, however, Socialist adherence to the National Defense only so long as the war continued to be a defensive war. This motion received 831 votes. The third motion, introduced by M. Brizon, representing the Kienthalians, demanded immediate peace and suggested that the Socialists should refuse to vote war credits; a motion which received 385 votes. A still more extreme group fostered another motion against war credits, which received 118 votes. The comparatively strong vote for the *majoritaires* (1,552), did not necessarily indicate a weakening of the minority; first, because the former adhered in the latter's demand for the Stockholm Conference; secondly, the minority was really divided between the supporters of the three motions—their total being 1,334 votes.

VI

After the Bordeaux Congress, the minority carried on an increased agitation against the "imperialism" of the Government. The failure of the Allies to state definitely their war aims and the success of the Bolsheviki in Russia, gave the minority some ground for the belief that a bourgeois Government could never inaugurate a policy leading to democratic peace. In the spring of 1918, the minority organized itself into a definite group, and through the columns of *Le Populaire,* edited by its

[19] Subject to certain qualifications.

leader, Jean Longuet, carried on a systematic campaign for peace. To meet the increasingly extensive and effectual activities of the *minoritaires,* the majority started a new paper, *La France Libre,* the first number appearing in July. Thus the fight between the two divisions of the Socialist party became more bitter than ever. Victory finally came to Longuet and his following at a meeting of the National Council of the party, held on the 29th and 30th of July, 1918. The minority, with the assistance of its vanguard, the Kienthalians, was at last able to muster a clear majority of votes. Upon the Longuet motion asking for a revision of war aims, definite conditions of peace upon the basis defined by the Russian Revolution, and a determined refusal to vote further military credits in case the Government persisted in refusing passports to an international conference, 1,544 votes were mustered. The Renaudel *majoritaire* motion calling in general terms for the maintenance of the war, received only 1,172 votes. To the majority now held by Longuet should be added 152 votes received by a strictly Kienthalian motion, offered by M. Loriot, the new leader of the group. Thus the element in the Socialist party which demanded the renewal of relations with the German Socialists, a peace which would not necessarily include the return of Alsace and Lorraine, and which meant the virtual recognition of the Bolsheviki, came into power. The victory was even more complete than the vote showed, for the Renaudel motion also provided for an international conference and for the refusal of war credits if the Government longer denied the issuance of passports for the delegates.

In October, 1918, the National Congress of the party definitely confirmed the lately acquired power of the old *minoritaires.* The former majority, led by Albert

Thomas, Varenne and Compère-Morel, now became known as the *ex-majoritaires*, and the new majority, led by Longuet and Mistral, became the *ex-minoritaires*. The control of *Humanité* had already passed out of the hands of Renaudel, who now belonged to the *ex-majoritaires*, and its control was placed with Marcel Cachin, a Centrist, but of minority sentiment, subject to the direction of a committee of fifteen.

Thus the Socialist party gradually had broken away from the Sacred Union in spirit, if not in fact. From a patriotism which called the war a crusade "of justice" and the national defense "the highest duty," it now turned to Marxian concepts which denounced both as of oppressive injury to the working class. Deserting its new-born nationalist conceptions, it had again returned to its theories of class consciousness and internationalism. It no longer was represented in the Ministry, and with the exception of twenty-eight *ex-majoritaires*, many of whom subsequently left the party, it refused to vote the military credits for the second quarter of 1919. By the end of the war the party had completely returned to the principles of the Congress of Amsterdam. The patriotic, nationalist elements in France were beginning to oppose the Unified Socialists not only because of their Marxian theories, but because of the domination of the party by Jean Longuet, a grandson of Karl Marx—a connection which public opinion invariably interpreted to be associated with the service of Germany.

One other event, although it occurred after the close of the war, will indicate the final severance of the Socialist party from the spirit of the Sacred Union—an event in fact which confirmed the Socialist conviction that injustice was inherent in a bourgeois régime. This

was the Villain trial. It will be recalled that Jean Jaurès, the great reformist leader of the Socialists, was assassinated on July 31, 1914, by Raoul Villain, a member of the old Sillon party and a fanatical nationalist. Arrested immediately after the act, Villain admitted his guilt. He justified himself by saying that Jaurès was a traitor who, in opposing the three-year military law, wished to deliver France to the enemy. From the legal standpoint, the case was quite clear. A murder had been committed, the murderer had been apprehended in the act, and had confessed his guilt. Although his justification was entirely irrelevant, the majority of the country believed that Jaurès was a great patriot, striving to keep France in a state of honorable peace. Villain should have been brought before the Court of Assizes within three months, tried and convicted. But the Government perhaps imprudently kept him in prison nearly five years without even a hearing. Unfortunately, French justice is not acquainted with the habeas corpus proceeding and so Villain remained in prison, as the friends of Jaurès suggested, safely protected from the trenches where otherwise he would have gone. The motives for the murder were variously interpreted. According to the prevailing opinion, Jaurès was assassinated through German instigation so as to stir up internal turmoil in France. Divided internally upon such an issue, France would the more easily succumb to a German attack. To offset this possibility, the Viviani Government issued a proclamation, condemning the "abominable attack," and urging that "all should have confidence in the law" and give in this "hour of peril the example of coolness and of union." The manifesto recalled that the country was in danger and promised that the assassin would be punished.

The probable reason for the postponement of the trial was the fear that it might stir up class dissension fatal to the national defense, if held during the war. The case finally came before the Court of Assizes on the 24th of March, 1919. The President of the Court informed the jury that the case was very simple since Villain had assumed complete responsibility for the act. But notwithstanding the admitted guilt of Villain and the testimony of the most prominent men in the Republic as to Jaurès' patriotism, the jury, after a deliberation of an hour and a half, returned a verdict of not guilty![20] At one time the procedure of French justice may have justified Alexandre Dumont's remark: "If I am ever accused of stealing the towers of Notre Dame, I am going to get out of the country." Now, however, as the trial of Mme. Caillaux for the murder of Gaston Calmette in 1914 had already showed, the contrary is apparently true.

As a strong contrast to the Villain case, a contrast which the Socialist press was not slow in pointing out, was the trial of Emile Cottin, who had attempted to assassinate M. Clemenceau, at about this same time. He only succeeded in wounding him in the shoulder; but within four weeks of the crime,[21] he was brought before a Council of War, convicted in a session of a few hours, and sentenced to death.[22] On the other hand, Villain, avowedly guilty of a worse offense, was confined fifty-one months before trial; he was then brought before a civil, not a military court, and acquitted. In the first case, the Socialists pointed out, the head of the Govern-

[20] On March 29, 1919.

[21] Cottin attacked Clemenceau on February 19, 1919; he was sentenced on March 14.

[22] President Poincaré later commuted this sentence to ten years' imprisonment, at the request of M. Clemenceau.

ment had been wounded; in the second, an opponent of the Government, a representative of the proletariat, had been killed.[23] The parallel was too obvious to pass without scathing criticism.

The Paris press, with the exception of *L'Action Française*, was unanimous in condemning the Villain verdict. But despite this empty sympathy, the Socialists and the labor elements finally judged the verdict as a case of pure class discrimination. On the 1st of April, the Union of Syndicates of the Seine declared that the "verdict of the 29th of March brutally reminds us that there is nothing in common between good sense and bourgeois justice. It leads us to a clearer vision of realities and shows the immense effort which must still be made to bring about the advent of a truly just society."

La Verité, a Socialist paper, on March 30, in an editorial entitled, "*La Parole est au Peuple*," wrote:

> Villain is acquitted.
>
> Villain is free. To-morrow he may kill whomever he wishes!
>
> The Bourgeois conscience has passed its judgment. The political master of the hour is wounded by a shot; the verdict is death. Jaurès, the master of the world's thought, is killed; it is acquittal!

Le Journal du Peuple, on the same day, wrote:

> Villain is acquitted. . . . We rejoice in this verdict. It clearly shows that there are two Frances. The France of Labor which pays with its sweat for the sloth of wealth, . . . and the France of the Bourgeoisie which does not hesitate to pardon its children when they stoop to crime.

[23] The sole justification given for the acquittal of Villain was that the Socialists would have used his conviction as a vindication of their war opposition and policy. There seems to be no reason why a jury could not have convicted Villain and at the same time condemned the war tactics of the party, if such a distinction was necessary.

Thus this verdict, whose injustice was admitted by all, gave to the growth of the *ex-minoritaire* movement, now the majority element of the Socialist party, an immense impetus. It brought countless adherents to a freshened faith in pure Marxism and it renewed the reality of the class struggle. It was the final step in the complete abandonment of the policy of opportunism inaugurated by Jaurès, which the inferior leaders who had succeeded him had vainly attempted to perpetuate during the war. Moreover, in the imperialistic demands which various delegations were making at the Peace Conference, the Socialists found new excuses to justify this return to their former creed.

From this brief review of the combinations which French parties have recently effected, it will perhaps be noted that these have always been for mere electoral purposes. Indeed none of the parties has shown any real willingness to sacrifice their doctrines or independence to form greater and more stable groupings. Roughly, these party coalitions have been directed from the beginning of the Republic till about 1899, first, against Monarchism, and secondly (from 1900 to 1912), against Clericalism. From 1912 to 1914, while no definite combination seemed realizable a division appeared to be forming upon the subject of militarism. But when the war was forced upon France, the third *Bloc* arose, including all parties, against Germanism. The next chapter will discuss probable future combinations and groupings.

CHAPTER IV

PARTY REALIGNMENTS

Nous voulons un pays plus large qu'un drapeau.—GOYARD.

I

The divisions of the Unified Socialist party into *ex-majoritaires* and *ex-minoritaires* was of serious concern to party leaders. Together with the Centrists and the Kienthalians, these divisions were upon the point of disrupting the unity of the party which Jaurès had so carefully maintained. The real differences between these four divisions, however, did not arise from the war, although the Socialist leaders generally attributed them to that overshadowing cause. But as subsequent events proved, these dissensions were caused by the fundamental difference separating the supporters of Revisionism and Revolution.

Realizing how fatal such party discords might prove to future electoral successes, a program was drawn up and presented to the Federation of the Seine, on March 31, 1919, which seriously attempted to compromise and reconcile both the majority and minority elements. This program[1] asserted that the war had but proved that the

[1] The Socialist program, quoted in part, is taken from *L'Humanité*. The accounts of the Congress are also taken from *L'Humanité*.

tenets of Socialism, which had predicted it as a result of capitalism, were true; and that it illustrated once more the fundamental principle of the class struggle by creating new wealth in the hands of a few, while at the same time increasing the miseries of Labor. Socialism, the program asserted, is the sole solution for the overwhelming problems which the war has produced; it is the only preventative of another and larger war. "International Socialism is the ultimate stage of human civilization." Strengthened by this conviction, the Socialist party "declares that the final aim of its efforts is the social revolution." Such a revolution is nothing more or less than the "substitution of a collectivist régime of production, of exchange and of consumption for the present economic régime, founded on private property, an economic order which belongs to a past period of history." The social revolution must finish the task which the French Revolution began by effacing the hereditary privileges of property and the hereditary servitudes of Labor. The program next analyzes the party's attitude toward violence.

Whether this revolution shall come "by the legal transmission of power under the pressure of universal suffrage, or by a movement of force," depends solely upon the future. "The Socialist party does not confuse revolution with violence. . . . It ardently desires that its victory be accomplished in peace. . . . But the proletariat cannot renounce any means of combat which will forward the conquest of political power; the form of the revolution will finally depend . . . upon the nature of the resistance opposed to it."

This was the first compromise contained in the program. To satisfy the new majority, led by Jean Longuet, it proclaimed the necessity and the imminence of

the revolution. At the same time it softened the fierceness of such a prophecy, doubly bold in the face of Russian and Hungarian excesses, by drawing a fine distinction between revolution and violence. Thus, if the bourgeoisie would peacefully acquiesce in the demands of the party, there would be no bloodshed—quite naturally. This empty declaration was intended to appease the moderates of the party while it pledged no one to any definite course of action. Soothing the complacency of the old *majoritaires* it palliated the revolutionary verbalism of the Left. On the other hand, it antagonized the Kienthalian group, led by Loriot, which demanded the immediate revolution, if need be by fire and sword, overturning bourgeois parliaments and substituting therefor "Councils of Workingmen."

The program also contained this significant Marxian statement: "Whatever the form which the revolution may take, the assumption of power by the proletariat will probably be followed by a period of dictatorship." But this dictatorship, meaning the exclusion of the bourgeoisie from power, will be "transitional," lasting only until a communist régime is firmly established. To minimize the terrors which such a dictatorship has caused in Russia the party urges Labor to complete its organization so it may intelligently direct society. Thus the revolution is hailed as a "supreme necessity"; but "whether its coming be near or still far off," it is the duty of the party, the "presumptive heir of the capitalist world whose wealth is made from the accumulated labor of generations," to "preserve and prepare for its heritage."

While awaiting the revolution, however, the party is urged to continue its efforts to reform present society so that the transition to a new social order will be less

difficult.[2] The party manifesto, therefore, stands for the complete organization of labor. It asks for the revision of the Constitution so that it will be based on (1) universal suffrage of both sexes, (2) direct consultation of the people, (3) right of popular initiative, (4) integral proportional representation by regions, (5) a single legislative assembly, (6) administrative decentralization, (7) refusal of legislative positions to the heads of public business enterprises, etc., (8) creation of economic Chambers, (9) reorganization upon an industrial basis of all public services and state monopolies. The manifesto also demands the complete reëstablishment of the constitutional liberties of the press, assembly, and of opinion.

Under the heading of economic reconstruction, the party condemns the penury and disorder into which a capitalist war has thrown France. Asserting that Germany will not be able to pay for the damages it has inflicted upon France, it asks that the difference be raised by (1) State seizure of excess profits, (2) conscription of fortunes, (3) a tax on capital and on increasing wealth, (4) the strict collection of the income tax, (5) the establishment of new monopolies, (6) State participation in every sufficiently centralized industry, (7) the nationalization of the railways, and all other means of river and land transportation, of the great steel factories, of water power, of refineries, of banks, of insurance, and the manufacture of alcohol. This is a much more inclusive plan of government ownership than that which the Radical party supports.

The party does not conceal the fact, however, that these measures may prove inadequate to meet the pres-

[2] As we shall see, these reforms were a direct concession to the old majority.

ent crisis. "The capitalist régime may succumb under the weight of the charges which it itself has created." What is fundamentally needed is an increase of production. To secure this end the State must not "spend less, but more and more." To bring about this increase (and under the heading of "Immediate Reforms"), the party demands that labor be made compulsory, idleness to be punished by law. It also asks that education be gratuitous, dependent not upon the means of parents but upon the child's aptitude. To insure Labor its complete share of the products of civilization, the party wishes to impose certain principles. *Concerning the organization of labor*: (1) the suppression of unemployment by means of employment bureaus, (2) increase of social insurance, (3) the protection of the health and security of workmen, (4) the reduction of hours of work, (5) a minimum income, (6) unreserved recognition of a right to organize. *Concerning agricultural labor,* the following proposals are made: (1) extension of laws of industrial labor to agriculture, (2) alleviation of the tenant system, (3) coöperative organization of small proprietors and tenants for production, sale of products, purchase of seed, machinery, and insurance. *Concerning measures of social welfare:* (1) rigorous protection of mothers and children, by the medical control of children, the creation of nurseries, school sanatoriums, and open air colonies, (2) the fusion of all education, free and compulsory, under national control, "permitting, by a series of selections and of specialization, the utilization to the best end of the social interest, of the variety of individual aptitudes." *Concerning the welfare of labor*: (1) the general expropriation of unsanitary property, (2) the creation by the communes, of a public housing service, (3) the immediate use of public funds for

the construction of healthy lodgings, (4) the organization of a public food service, (5) the public organization of leisure, by sports, theatrical representations, art, and culture.

This program, the party asserts, cannot be carried out until peace is inaugurated. As a further compromise and concession to the old majority, the program says: "Convinced that the integrity and the independence of nations are fundamental to the international organization itself, the Socialist party has unstintingly spent itself for the defense of the country." But its efforts were premised upon the acceptance of a Wilsonian peace. And the party "remains opposed to every condition of peace which exalts the decrepit forms of an exasperated nationalism, forms which will but tend to unloose the confused *mêlée* of imperialistic ambitions, protecting in every country the efforts or the revenges of reaction. . . . It also deplores the fact that the Government did not support whole-heartedly the intentions and the propositions of President Wilson."

The party denounces the practices of a secret diplomacy which "threatens to falsify the significance of peace which it forestalls." It is "ardently attached to the idea of a League of Nations, considering that it should embrace every people, equal in rights and duties —and not merely a few governments." It demands that it be provided with sanctions capable of assuring its authority. But this League of Nations, in addition to its rôle of Peacemaker, must gradually direct and regulate the economic life of the world. International legislation must supplement national reconstruction, through regulation of labor and economic competition between nations. "The League of Nations . . . is, therefore, obliged, by the very fact of its existence, to regulate the

conditions of production and of consumption suitable to each country. It must control the establishing of rates of transportation, assuring between nations . . . an equitable distribution of raw materials and of products. . . . It must facilitate by every means the exchange of food supplies, of capital and of persons. . . . In working for the coöperation of peoples, toward prosperity and peace, the League of Nations will necessarily move forward along the path of international socialism. . . ."

But now deserting at last this program of reformism, the document we are considering returns to its fundamental Marxian basis by declaring that in the end it is the revolution which "must always inspire the means, and the means must never be diverted from the end." While the outlines of a Socialist régime may be laid down under a bourgeois society, the ultimate goal of the party is the social revolution, wherein not only the government but industry, education, and culture, will be dominated by the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Finally, the program under analysis closes with this peroration:

> There will be true equality only when the sole recognized distinction between men shall be that of their social value. True justice will exist only when the sole property recognized in men will be that which arises from man's own labor; when the tithe levied by the employer upon the employee, by the proprietor of the soil upon the tenant, shall have disappeared with the form of property of which it is the direct expression. There will only be true harmony when the activity of each man shall be applied to his natural task and the commonwealth of the soil is exploited for the good of all.
>
> The Socialist party therefore calls upon all laborers to assist by their efforts in this beneficent evolution of history. It calls upon them to assist it in the work of social regeneration which is its end and object. The general interests of the nations, and those of entire civilization, are indissolubly con-

founded with our own. Heirs to the benefit of every effort of organization which has developed in the world, we must ourselves realize a program, the accomplishment of which a fallen bourgeoisie and a covetous capitalism would not even dare to attempt.

It will be noted that this program contains many finely balanced distinctions between immediate reforms and the revolution. In fact, the principles of reformism even assume a predominant position. The measures advocated, although more advanced, are practically the same in principle as those for which the Radical party stood—a program of collectivism. As such, many non-Marxian liberals could have sincerely supported them. And for this very reason they were severely attacked by the Loriot group. This group was opposed to any program attempting to improve bourgeois society. It believed that the adoption of immediate reforms and the amelioration of the economic conditions of Labor would benumb Labor's revolutionary desires. Economic content under the present régime would kill the chief stimulus which urged the revolution on. The aim of the proletariat should not be "the full stomach" alone—it should aim to seize and achieve power and work toward the entire assumption of political, social and economic activity. To secure the adoption of reforms would but weaken the impelling incentive to revolution. The increase of poverty, of misery, and of discontent was the best guarantee of the Internationale. Such was the argument of the Loriot group; from the Marxian standpoint, it was admittedly logical. Its adoption, however, would certainly have meant the destruction of the French Socialist party. Consequently, the draft of the program retained its reformist features, and the Loriot group refused its adhesion.

II

The extraordinary session of the National Congress of the Unified Socialist party was held in Paris on April 20, 21, and 22, 1919. It was called primarily to adopt this program and to settle other issues upon which the party was still divided. Mme. Saumonneau, for the Loriot group, opened the attack on the program during the first day's session of the Congress. She made the following motion, which embodied the extreme demands of the Kienthalians—largely patterned upon the ideals of the Russian Soviets:

1. The complete assumption of power by the proletariat.
2. Institution of compulsory labor.
3. Socialization of the means of production and exchange, land, industries, mines, means of transportation, under the direct management of the peasants, workmen, miners, railway men and sailors.
4. Distribution of products by coöperative societies and municipal stores under collective control.
5. Municipalization of private dwellings and of hospitals.
6. The forced transformation of the government services and their transfer to the direct management of the employees.
7. Universal disarmament as a result of the union of all the proletariat Republics in a Socialist Internationale.

A second group, led by M. Verfeuil and Paul Faure, introduced another program, containing the reforms of the original one, but more boldly demanding the revolution.

The debate upon these programs was very acrimonious—the 20th and 21st were marked by a seathing address from M. Loriot declaring a program of reforms to be "monstrous," and reproaching the party with weakness. He was followed by M. Léon Blum, speaking

in favor of the original program, who made what was considered the best speech of the convention. It was finally decided to refer the three programs to the committee on resolutions. But on the 22nd the committee reported it could reach no decision and that it had decided to have a representative of each speak before the convention, after which a vote would be taken. After this was done, the following decision was announced: For the original program, 1,394 votes; for the Verfeuil program, 296; for the Loriot program, 245. Thus the compromised measure was adopted and so far, at least, a nominal unity between the two major elements of the party had been assured.

III

However, there were certain matters of importance which this program, because of its compromised character, had omitted, and which the new majority, supported by the Kienthalians, felt should receive party sanction. Thus no declaration had been made with respect to the Russian and German revolutions, the causes of the war, participation of Socialists in bourgeois governments, party discipline, and the reconstruction of the Internationale. Consequently, two motions were made on "general policy" to supplement the program and to supply its omissions. Discussion upon these two motions, presented by the new majority and by the Loriot group, led to scenes of disorder and ill-feeling in which Renaudel, an *ex-majoritaire,* accused Longuet, the new leader of the party, of being in German pay.[3] The motion on general policy, submitted by the new majority

[3] See p. 274.

and finally adopted, declared that the war was "the direct consequence of the economic political anarchy in which the capitalist system maintains the world." It declared that events justified the present policy of the new minority and condemned the compromises which the party maintained during the first years of the war. This war, represented by the bourgeoisie as a war of Right, the party condemns as imperialistic. "The party denounces the hyprocrisy of the French Government which, after having exploited the ignorance and the credulity of the people by making them believe that it urged only a war of national defense, a war to secure the liberty of peoples to dispose of themselves, a war for the destruction of armaments, now prepares to give to the results arising from this war a purely imperialistic and capitalistic solution from which new conflicts will emerge if the international proletariat does not soon become master of his destinies."

The motion also condemned the League of Nations, as constituted by the Peace Conference. A real "League of Nations must be the international organization of the proletariat finally delivered from capitalist oppression." The conflicting policies of imperialism illustrated by the proceedings of the Peace Conference, it declared, again proved the incapability of the bourgeoisie to reorganize society upon a just basis. Consequently the revolution was more necessary than ever.

As an equitable basis of peace, "the Socialist party extends a fraternal hand to the German people. It stigmatizes the excessive pretensions which, under pretext of material reparations, tends to reduce the entire German people to slavery. . . . It greets the German revolution. . . . It likewise greets every revolution which the great shock of war has caused to arise. . . .

Its sympathies are addressed to every oppressed people without distinction, whether they be oppressed by the Central Powers or whether they still undergo the yoke of the Entente capitalists. . . . The unquestioned strengthening of the Republic of the Soviets . . . the courage and the tenacity with which the working and the peasant class of Russia are carrying on their struggles . . . prove how much the French Socialist party was right in placing confidence in the Russian Revolution and in combating the criminal intervention by which the bourgeoisie of the Allied countries have aimed and still aim to destroy it."

The motion again emphasized the declarations of the program by asserting the "inalienable right of the dispossessed class to expropriate the possessing class by means of the revolution." It affirms that the "dictatorship of the proletariat at the beginning of every triumphant revolution" is a necessity. To this end, force is also necessary.

Again recurring to the principles set forth at the convention of Amsterdam, the motion declares:

> The struggle of classes demands uncompromising opposition to bourgeois power; it condemns any participation in the exercise of this power under whatever form this may present itself; it implies the systematic refusal of military and civil credits—and the rejection of the whole budget. The absolute autonomy of the Socialist party as the political party of the working class naturally excludes all possibility of alliance or electoral coalition with a bourgeois party.

To enforce party unity, those who will not recognize these principles and who "will continue to grant credits to a bourgeois government" will be read out of the party.

Finally, the "Socialist party makes an appeal to the

revolutionary force of the proletariat, against capitalist society which is responsible for the war. It appeals for the total destruction of militarism and for the emancipation of the workingmen by the establishment of collective production and property. It intends to employ "every possible form of action" to bring about these ends.

After another bitter debate wherein the old *majoritaires* and the Sacred Union were both bitterly criticized, the Faure motion was adopted by a vote of 962; the Loriot motion, going to still further extremes, received 232. There were 789 abstentions representing the old majority who, not having a motion of their own, nevertheless refused to condemn the war as imperialistic and the Sacred Union as discreditable to the ideals of Socialism.

To carry out the motion respecting a general policy, another motion was almost unanimously adopted on electoral discipline. This declared that: (1) No one can be a party candidate without expressly adhering to its program; (2) any kind of electoral coalition in the coming general elections, with bourgeois parties, is expressly prohibited; (3) any candidates opposing this last provision will find themselves opposed by other candidates, supported by the entire party organization.

These two motions—on general policy and on electoral discipline—seemed to nullify completely the compromises which had been made in the program for the sake of the old majority. In fact, the policy of the latter during the war was expressly condemned. The party now denounced the war as being French as well as German in origin. The program which originally extolled the League of Nations, now denounced it as but another device to enchain the Labor world. The motion

emphasized the necessity of a social revolution by force; while the program alleged its peaceful advent. The motions made no mention of reforms, but they implied their uselessness by forbidding Socialist participation in a bourgeois Ministry and the voting of the budget. How could collectivistic reforms be carried out without an appropriation? The Socialists in condemning the one had to condemn both. Hence the Loriot group had really triumphed. The party program henceforth laid its emphasis upon the revolution. Despite this doctrinaire victory, the disunity which the program attempted to heal was now definitely exaggerated by these motions, condemning outright the old majority policy and its continuance. The Socialist party thus virtually rejected a policy of reconstruction, through which France might have been aided, and relapsed into the hopeless and destructive ideology of pure Marxism.

IV

The last matter of importance to come before the Congress was that of the Third Internationale. The First International Workingmen's Association was founded at London in 1864 in response to the now classic appeal terminating the Communist manifesto, "Workers of all countries, unite!"

By no means purely Socialist in its original tendencies, the eloquence of Marx gradually won it over to his doctrines until at the Congress of Brussels in 1868 it became definitely a Socialist organization. The disappearance of the First Internationale in 1873 was brought about by struggles between the Russian anarchist, Bakunin, the British Unionists who believed in the formation of labor parties, and the German Marx-

ists. The stigma which the Paris Commune fastened upon Socialism hastened the dissolution. Between 1873 and 1888 numerous attempts were made to create another "International Congress of Workingmen." Finally, in 1889, a new organization, the Second Internationale, was effected at Paris. From that date to 1914 the Internationale made great advances; thirty nations were represented in its organization and its congresses were often composed of a thousand delegates. But despite the elaborately arranged plans of this organization, it failed to stop the war in 1914 by means of an international strike. Its efforts to hold international conferences during the war also largely failed;[4] and for five years the union of its different national sections was prevented.

The close of the war and the desire to bring pressure upon the Paris Peace Conference led to the resurrection of this organization at the conference of Berne, Switzerland, which was held on the 1st of February, 1919. But in many respects, this meeting of the Second Internationale was unsatisfactory. There were only about a hundred delegates present. Neither Italy, the United States, Russia, Serbia, nor Belgium was represented. The convention was marked by disorganization and confusion, by the defense and special pleading of the German *majoritaires*, and by indecision toward Bolshevist Socialism—perhaps the most vital issue discussed.

The failure of the Second Internationale to prevent the war, its impotency during the five years of the war's progress, the half-hearted support which Labor gave to the congress of Berne, and the conservatism which developed in its steering committee gave the extremist So-

[4] The Stockholm conference was one attempt. Chapter III does not attempt to give them all—merely those affecting the Sacred Union.

cialists an incentive to organize a Third Internationale. Under the guidance of the Bolsheviki, the Third or Communist Internationale met at Moscow on March 2, 1919. Thirty-two delegates with full power to act, were present from parties or groups in Germany, Russia, Hungary, Sweden, Norway, Bulgaria, Roumania, Finland, Ukrainia, Esthonia, and Armenia; and consultative representatives were present from groups in Switzerland, Holland, Bohemia, Jugo-Slavia, France, Great Britain, Turkestan, Persia, Korea, China, and the United States.[5] M. Guilbeaux, an outcast renegade who had been condemned to death by a French Council of War, took it upon himself to act as a representative of the French party.[6]

The Third Internationale, thus formed of minority groupings principally from Russia, Italy, Switzerland, and Germany, condemned the Internationale at Berne for its impotency and for deserting the fundamental principles of Socialism—notably the principle of the social revolution. It asked the parties of all nations who could adhere to the tenets of the newly-organized Bolshevist régime, to desert the Second and adhere to the Third International Workingmen's Organization.

The French Socialist party, therefore, again found it necessary to decide where to cast its allegiance. Three views were represented at this congress. The first, held by the old majority, was for the retention of membership in the Berne Internationale as at present constituted; the second view, held by the new majority, under Longuet, was for adhesion to the old Internationale pro-

[5] A full account of this meeting will be found in the *Liberator*, July, 1919.

[6] This unauthorized representation was denounced by the Federation of the Seine, April 13, 1919, by a vote of 5,022 against 970.

vided it moved toward the Left. The third view, held by the Kienthalians (whom, in fact, the Bolsheviki had declared, were alone "advanced" enough of the French Socialists to adhere to their organization), was for adhesion to the Third Internationale.

M. Jean Longuet, in the last session of the congress, declared that the old Internationale was "mutilated and incomplete," that it had failed to prevent the war because the French *ex-majoritaires* would not agree to its assembly during the war, and that it needed the expurgation of its conservative elements and the vigorous reconstruction upon a radical basis. With such changes, the Berne Internationale, in his opinion, would be more satisfactory than that of Moscow because it already had the support of a greater number of parties. The motion which he read invited the sections not represented at the meeting at Berne, to send delegates to the next congress, with the purpose (1) to expel its conservative members, (2) to restore fully the principles of the class struggle and of the irreconcilable opposition to bourgeois parties and government, (3) to direct the Internationale toward the social revolution, following the example of Russia, Hungary, and Germany. At the same time, the French Socialist party declared itself willing to enter into "fraternal relations" with the Moscow organization.

This motion was finally adopted by a vote of 894 against 757 for the motion of the old majority, and 270 for the Loriot motion for the Third Internationale.

The congress thus took one more step toward a repudiation of the moderate policy which had controlled the party during the war. It did not immediately enter the new Internationale—which the Bolsheviki controlled—but it limited its adherence to the old Internationale

by insisting that the latter prepare for a revolution along lines which the Bolsheviki had already made effective. Thus it assured the moral dominance of Bolshevism over the old Internationale and over the policies which the French party would pursue at home.

Within three days the French Socialist party had burnt down all the bridges of nationalism and of reformism liberal well-wishers had built for it. It now centered its hopes upon the revolution. Inspired by the examples of Lenin and Bela Kun, it henceforth preached the "Red" Gospel with tireless insistency. Its task appears to be a hopeless one. The French people are extremely individualistic. Despite their theorizing, despite the fantastic projects which their ready political imaginations often devise, Frenchmen are realists. As lovers of personal independence, they cherish their small holdings, whether a vineyard or an *épicerie*. In theory, they may understand and even admit the advantages of collectivism. But these theoretical advantages are completely outweighed by the repulsion which the excesses of Russian Bolshevism have produced. The Frenchman is essentially a pragmatist; although he may admit the defects in the present form of society, he will not sacrifice certainty for uncertainty.

Revolutions generally have their causes in deep-laid political or social misery. These conditions are usually the product of years of abuse and of oppression; they are tolerated until misery makes them intolerable, or until external forces, such as military defeat, break down the oppressing power. But no such conditions can be said to exist at present in France. Although Labor has many just grievances,[7] it is by no means

[7] See pp. 244-246.

weighed down by that economic hardship which La Bruyère so forcibly described, preceding the Revolution of 1789:

> Certain wild animals, male and female, dark, pale, burned by the sun, might be seen spread over the countryside, bound to the soil which they dug and which they tilled with strange obstinacy. They had an articulate voice, and when they rose to their feet they displayed a human face; in short, they were men. At night they returned to their hovels where they lived on black bread, water and roots. They saved other men the trouble of sowing, working, and gathering for their food.

It would be hard to find the counterpart of such beings in France to-day!

There were few Frenchmen who accepted the Socialist theory that the war was a product of capitalist governments. Liberals in other countries have indeed sustained this thesis. But among Frenchmen, outside of some fifty thousand simon-pure Socialists, it had absolutely no support. To them the present economic disorder is not conceivably part of a capitalist scheme of oppression; it is the result of a war outwardly imposed. Consequently, the great majority of the nation joined as one to build up what had been torn down. A class struggle is beyond their comprehension. In the future, the nation may adopt collective methods in carrying out its reconstruction tasks, but that these methods will go to the extent of overturning the broad outlines of the existing order, is an extremely remote possibility.

V

The definite proclamation of a revolution of the Russian type as the goal of one of the most powerful polit-

ical parties in France came as a distinct shock to the other parties. The continuance of the Sacred Union had been advocated even before the close of the war by a few members of the press. The Socialist decision to abandon its moderate stand consequently gave the distinctively "bourgeois" parties another motive for continuing the policy of a *Bloc* which they had faithfully maintained during the war. As has been noted, Monarchism, Clericalism and Germanism have each in turn been the three causes powerful enough to bring about party combinations. Party combinations have been successful in overcoming all three of these dangers. But these issues having passed away, there is little possibility of another *Bloc* unless an equally threatening menace again appears. For the future, there appears to be only one outstanding danger likely to threaten the Republic: the social revolution which the Unified party is now preaching assiduously and which it hopefully expects soon to accomplish.[8] It is quite certain that every bourgeois party in the Republic, except possibly some Radicals, would combine to offset the Socialists. The fourth great *Bloc* of the Third Republic, it can confidently be said, will be against the peril of the Revolution.

Signs of this new *Bloc* soon made their appearance. As early as December, 1918, a group was formed, a Republican *entente,* upon the basis of the solidarity of classes. It was not until the summer of 1919, however—after the Socialist party had declared its intention of

[8] M. Chastenet, a Kienthalian Socialist, and editor of the Grenoble *Droit du Peuple,* told the author that the party expected the revolution within a year; and hence it made no difference to them whether the Senate killed the bill giving Government employees the right to organize or any other Labor bill. He confidently expects that within a year Parliaments will be overcome and workingmen's councils established in their place.

bringing about the "Fourth Republic"—that signs of an extended union appeared.

Some elements wished to continue the Sacred Union—including Monarchists as well as Radicals. Thus on the 18th of July the Duke of Orleans issued a manifesto which urged the continuance of the Sacred Union against the Socialist danger. About the same time, the Liberal Action party, at a banquet presided over by Jacques Piou, asked for a "national party" grouping in a *Bloc* all the patriotic elements against "every attempt at dictatorship on the part of one class." On the 8th of July at a meeting of the Democratic Republican Alliance, M. Chaumet, director of the propaganda of the Alliance, said, "The time has come to constitute a great and all-embracing Republican party in which all our different groupings may find a place."

VI

In addition to the new *Bloc* which it is certain every party of a bourgeois character in the Republic will join against the Unified Socialists, there are signs that some other and perhaps more stable and coherent party realignment is under way. The causes which brought the old parties into existence are largely disappearing. It is certain that the monarchy will never be reëstablished. If the occasion for it should conceivably arise, there is no candidate able to attract a following strong enough to seat him on the throne. The *Ligue d'Action Française* will probably outlast the lifetime of its leaders, MM. Maurras and Daudet. But signs are not wanting that in the future its criticism will be largely destructive and nationalistic. Little will be said of the kingship.

As far as the Liberal Action party is concerned, there is slight probability of the repeal of the anticlerical legislation. The Government appointment of bishops in Alsace-Lorraine aroused Catholic hopes, but this anomalous action was explained by the fact that Alsace-Lorraine has to be governed under the old Concordat until the anticlerical legislation is extended to its jurisdiction. The policy of the Government toward the Church was brought out in the Chamber of Deputies last July when Jean Bon accused it of having a secret representative at the Vatican. This, M. Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, vigorously denied, adding, "the policy of separation as now practiced in conformity to the law, satisfies the Government." The Catholic strength has been dissipated between the "Ralliés" and the Monarchists. They may unite; but it seems that the Church is losing popularity as an issue in politics, and that it is secretly satisfied with its present independence from the control which the Concordat formerly imposed. As for the social doctrines of the Liberal Action party, they find their embodiment elsewhere.

The Progressists, as already pointed out, have split into a conservative and a moderate group. There seems to be some indication that the former may unite with sympathetic elements in the Right, although both are so independent and unreasonable in holding to their antiquated doctrines that as a parliamentary force it does not appear that they will ever be effective. Similarly, it is quite possible that the moderates of the Republican Federation may unite with the Democratic Alliance. Upon this latter organization (the Democratic Alliance), the future control of French politics is probably centered. Its program is a moderate one; it is thoroughly Republican; it stands for a policy of pacification. Un-

der its present leadership, it may even prove strong enough to absorb other parties within its organization.

The Radical party, on the other hand, has passed the zenith of its career. It rode to power on the issue of clericalism. Now that this issue is dead, the party, like the *Action Libérale Populaire*, has lost its chief reason for existence. In its enforcement of the clerical laws, especially during the Ministry of M. Combes, the party was untactful and overviolent. In driving the religious orders out of France, nuns were driven into the streets, and Good Friday was deliberately chosen to remove the crosses hitherto hung in court rooms; every effort was apparently made needlessly to antagonize the Catholics. Now that this issue appears definitely settled, it would be the worst of policies to harp continually upon a past menace. Yet it is this policy which the Radicals are fatuously trying to perpetuate, and because of which they are vigorously opposed to the "pacification policy" proposed by the Democratic Alliance and M. Briand.

Secondly, the Radicals have been found guilty of the worst opportunism. The Doumergue Ministry came into power in 1913 pledged to fulfill the Pau program, calling for the repeal of the three-year military service law. Yet the Ministry supported it. As far back as 1906 the party promised the income tax, but when in power it failed to enact any such measure until the outbreak of the war made it a necessity. Upon the issue of electoral reform, the party was equally vacillating. Always opposed to the representation of minorities, it was not until 1919 that it finally agreed to the partial incorporation of this principle in the electoral reform law. Finally, the Radicals had become vague and lukewarm in regard to questions of social reform; their declaration of July, 1919, seemed merely to mark time until the

coming of some wind should point the direction of success.

Thirdly, the party is suffering from a discreditable leadership. Until the beginning of the war at least, M. Caillaux was in complete control. He alone determined its program, a principal feature of which was pacification with Germany, obviously unpopular, to say the least, in France at the present moment. Not only in his cabinet but as Minister of Finances in the Doumergue Ministry, he was guilty of shielding embezzlers, as the Rochette case proved; and he was moreover frequently and openly charged with financially profiting by his position as Minister of Finances. The murder of Gaston Calmette, editor of *Le Figaro,* by Mme. Caillaux, through fear that he would continue to reveal the personal and financial immoralities in Caillaux's life, further implicated him. His record during the war has also been discreditable. Its treasonable extent has not yet been decided; but his actions appear to have been very far from patriotic.[9]

Two other prominent Radicals, Malvy and Desclaux, have also brought the party into disrepute. Malvy, Minister of the Interior in several war cabinets, in July, 1918, was judged by the French Senate, sitting as a High Court of Justice, to have "ignored, violated, and betrayed the duties of his charge." Desclaux, who had been Caillaux's secretary when the latter was Minister of the Interior, was an army contractor who was accused of stealing army supplies. A prominent Paris dressmaker was found to have concealed the stolen goods; and upon the basis of this proof Desclaux was

[9] In the latter part of April, 1920, the French Senate voted Caillaux guilty of having had "commerce" and "correspondence" with the enemy.

sentenced to seven years of solitary confinement. And by a strange perversion of loyalty the Radical party has stood behind their former leaders to the bitter end. This statement is proved by the fact that Caillaux was again nominated by the Radicals as a candidate for the Chamber of Deputies from the Sarthe, in the elections of November, 1919. But on the refusal of the High Court of Justice to grant M. Caillaux "temporary liberty" in which to carry on his campaign, he declined the nomination.

It now appears that Clemenceau has taken the leadership of the Radicals away from Caillaux; but the latter still retains some of his old following in the Left wing of the party, the Radical Socialists proper. The division caused by this issue has not been the only one in the party. Countless other differences have arisen, nearly as serious and quite as numerous as those in the Unified Socialists. Thus an element led by Franklin Bouillon, has bitterly opposed M. Clemenceau. There are some moderate Radicals who are opposed to the extension of collectivism; there are extreme Radicals who wish to ally themselves with the Unified Socialists, despite the latter's revolutionary program. There are Radicals who stand for a peace of annexation; many others who condemn the present treaty as violating principles of justice. These countless divisions will all inevitably contribute to the weakening of a party whose ascendancy was reached several elections before the war.

But the chief of these weaknesses is the lack of leadership. Among the senators, MM. Bourgeois, Combes, and Herriot figure prominently. M. Bourgeois is a scholarly man, but not gifted with any brilliant qualities of leadership. M. Combes, it seems, has already contributed his full share to the direction of the party; only

M. Herriot, an intellectual leader, appears likely to become Prime Minister some day, although he is also deprived of the magnetism of M. Clemenceau.

As for the Republican Socialists, they have profited by their patriotism, and have won over to their doctrines many former believers in Socialism of the "*unifié*" variety, who have become dissatisfied with its "pro-Bolshevist" domination. Pure reformists, believers in collectivism, there seems to be little difference between them and the Albert Thomas *ex-majoritaire* type of *Unifiés* or the extreme Radicals. A grouping of these three elements upon a Reformist-Collectivist program, such as that urged by the British Labor party, can easily be imagined.

As for the future of the Unified Socialists, the outlook from their standpoint does not appear bright. We have already indicated the reasons why they have such small chances of bringing about a revolution "by force." This chance has still further diminished since the signature of peace. Politically, they have absolutely no prospect of winning a majority on account of the *Bloc* which will always be formed against them in the elections, a *Bloc* representing the overwhelming majority of the French people, absolutely opposed to a replica of the Russian and Hungarian experiences. The extremism of the Unified Socialist party is the natural source of its weakness, for it has hopelessly divided it into factions and deprived it of its leaders. Such men as Briand, Millerand, Viviani, and Hervé, who refused to be swept into an avowal of the revolutionary tenets which have continually controlled the party, have been excluded from its membership. The party thus has lightly cast away the only elements which can assure its success, with each step in its evolution toward the Left. This

evolution has already deserted the scholarly opportunism of Jaurès for the milk-and-water Bolshevism of Longuet. It bids fair to seek its inspiration in the iconoclasm of Loriot.

The real issue in France to-day, aside from the question of Bolshevism, is the projection of the State into industry—that is, State Socialism. This movement is not the same as the Socialism preached by the "Unifiés." It advocates no change in the direction of industry as far as the proletariat assumption of power is concerned; on the other hand, it advocates the gradual absorption of industries by the State as at present constituted. This program of collectivism or of nationalization is advocated by the Radical party and the Republican Socialists. But it is even more vigorously opposed by the Republicans of the Alliance and of the Federation. Because of this additional issue, it seems reasonable to believe that two strong bourgeois groupings will arise in France—one, probably centering around the Republican Alliance, which will oppose collectivism, and the other, grouped around the Radicals and nationalist Socialists, which will advocate collectivism. In addition to these parties, the Unified Socialists will always exist. But whenever the latter threaten the Government, it is equally certain that the two bourgeois combinations will unite to overthrow them. The Clerico-Monarchists likewise will exist—a ghostly community—until the old nobility becomes only a historical tradition.

It may be hoping too much to prophesy the elimination of all but these three major groupings in France.[10]

[10] In the first days of the 12th Chamber of Deputies (1919-1923), encouraging indications were given of the desire to eliminate and to consolidate parliamentary groups. Attempts were made by the Radicals, led by M. Herriot, to form a *Union des Gauches*, out of the two old groups of the Radical Socialists and the Re-

The final settlement and elimination of old issues may not materially affect present party alignments; the independence dear to the Frenchman and the attitude of *je m'en fiche* may prevent any serious readjustment of parties and the stabilization of the party régime.

However, it hardly need be recalled that a successful party government is not dependent upon the elimination of all but a majority and a minority party. Even in England, the home of party governments, there are four or five parties, the smallest one of which, the Irish Home Rulers, held the balance of power in Parliament for years. In the German elections of January 19, 1919, under the new Republic, six parties received a considerable number of seats. In the Italian elections of November 16, 1919, six parties polled great numbers of votes. In the Spanish elections of 1919, as many as twelve parties likewise secured a sprinkling of seats in the Cortes. Finally under the Bolshevist dictatorship in Russia, fifteen or more groupings were brave enough to express different remedies for the hierarchy which attempted to keep them silent. Thus the multiplicity of parties is not limited to France alone, or caused by any special defect of the French political mind. There is, moreover, a strong probability that the Third Republic may yet enjoy the benefits of a stable, party government. Some scholars, notably Moisei Ostrogorski, believe that party régimes in all countries will give way to temporary organizations, springing up to accomplish some reform, dissolving again upon its achievement. Although this

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publicans of the Left. Because of the vital difference between these two groups, the union naturally failed. But upon the 15th of January, 1920, a union of the group of the Republicans of the Left with the group of the Radical Left was effected. This united the forces of the Democratic Alliance into what was called the Group of the Republican Democratic Left.

tendency is visible in France (as the activities of the various electoral reform leagues show), it is not likely to do away completely with permanent parties in France, because, as noted above, party programs are really philosophies, which remain after the achievement of many of their immediate demands.

CHAPTER V

WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND THE "R. P."[1]

Beaucoup pensent qu'il vaut mieux ne rien changer.—MIDAS.

I

Purely electoral issues have induced lively discussions and important differences throughout the course of modern French history. Two revolutions—those of 1830 and 1848—were in a large part caused by them; Ministries have come to power and have fallen on their account. Universal manhood suffrage has existed in France since the time of the Constituent Assembly of May 4, 1848, a body which was elected upon that basis. Although in 1850 the principle of universal manhood suffrage was virtually abrogated for a time by requiring a three-year domicile as an electoral qualification, its full acceptance has long since ceased to make it a possible political issue in France. But lately, there has arisen a demand for a further extension of the suffrage, first, to women, and secondly, by the so-called plural or multiple vote.

French women already may vote for members of the *conseils de prud'hommes,* arbitral bodies composed equally of employers and employees, and for judges of

[1] The "R. P." is the French nickname for proportional representation (*représentation proportionnelle*).

the commerce courts. But as they do not otherwise possess the ballot, a movement has naturally arisen for its acquisition, following those in other countries. But because of the French conception of a woman's sphere in life, the French feminist movement has not yet obtained either the following, adherents, or the temper of its counterpart in America or England. To quote an eminently French opinion: "The Frenchwoman is no feminist as yet. She has little faith in the political systems devised by mere men, and thinks she wields far more power in her informal way than she could ever exert if she were an elector."[2]

This French attitude was perhaps better illustrated by the replies received during a symposium which a popular review conducted in the winter of 1918-1919. In this connection Professor Edouard Barthélemy wrote: "Political dualism in families must not be risked. A legal political dualism, in case of dissension, would certainly disintegrate the home . . ."; while M. G. Deherme, a prominent editor, expressed himself even more frankly: "The feminists are barbarians and enemies of woman, since they wish to make a beast of her by lucre and pride, degrade her in the factory, and disgrace her by the promiscuity of the street and by dissoluteness. The progress of civilization has always consisted in the increasing preëminence of persuasion and devotion over constraint, of the spiritual over the temporal, and therefore in the extension of feminine influence."[3] These arguments singularly approach those until recently heard in America.

But the feminists have two things in their favor: First, the very important part which French women played

[2] E. Saillens, *Facts about France*, 276.
[3] *Je Sais Tout*, issues of January-February, 1919.

in the war; second, their greatly needed help in the solution of moral problems. It may be true that French women did not engage in gratuitous war-work as extensively as did American or English women. They were indeed excluded (the majority of them, at least) from such a comparatively nonessential work, by the very vital necessity of maintaining the greater part of the economic system of France. 32,000 women were employed upon the railways and 684,000 in munition works; countless peasant women tilled the soil and fed their sons and husbands, engaged in the unproductive work of war. Their heroic work in sustaining the industrial processes of the country, as well as in carrying on works of mercy in the French armies,[4] earned for them the unending gratitude of the country. This experience also gave them a much needed lesson in independence, organization, and solidarity. As a result many women partially, at least, lost the customary conception of their inevitable domesticity. Moreover, the enormous demands which the task of reconstruction is making upon French women and the necessity of taking the places of men fallen in battle, are still further contributing to the movement which seeks to grant them rights commensurate with the duties they now willingly and joyously perform. Organizations such as the French Union for Woman Suffrage (having eighty departmental groups), the National Council of French Women (composed of one hundred and fifty women's associations), the French League for Women's Rights, the Women's Fraternal Union, the Society for the Improvement of the Condition of Women, and even such journals as *La Voix des Femmes* (extremely Socialistic though it be),

[4] The French Red Cross has a membership of over 25,000.

illustrate the widespread organization supporting this campaign for woman suffrage.

As for the moral problems of France, Parliament has not even attempted a serious legislative solution. Alcoholism is the first of these problems. By a decree of 1851, drinking places were subject to supervision and license by local authorities; but these restrictions were completely removed by a law passed in 1880,[5] and now in force, which provides that any person desiring to open a café, or to engage in the retailing of liquors, has only to serve a notice on the mayor of the town in which he resides.[6] Permission cannot be refused any one wishing to sell liquors, unless he has been convicted of certain serious crimes. The sale of liquor is restricted only by the power of local authorities to forbid drinking places within certain distances from schools, cemeteries, churches, hospitals, etc.,—a power which it is understood is never exercised. The effect of this law has been to increase the number of drinking places in France from 179,000 in 1872 to 1,070,451 in 1913,—one for every thirty-nine inhabitants. Despite the worthy efforts of the *Ligue Nationale contre l'Alcoolisme*, the per capita consumption of absinthe doubled between 1907 and 1911, and the consumption of 100 per cent alcohol tripled between 1830 and 1912.

Parliamentary efforts to control this ever-growing evil have almost always failed, largely because of the wine-merchant element within the legislature. Aside from the prohibition of absinthe, heavy taxes on drinks, and the state monopolization of industrial alcohol during the

[5] For the decree of December 29, 1851, see A. Carpentier, *Codes et Lois pour la France, l'Algérie et les Colonies*, ii, 457. For the law of July 17, 1880, see *ibid.*, 858.

[6] Except in Paris, where notification must be filed with the prefecture of police.

war, every controlling measure has been defeated. For example, on the 14th of March, 1918, M. Siegfried asked the Chamber to prohibit, for the period of the war, the sale to consumers, on the place or to be carried away, of all drinks containing more than 18 per cent alcohol. The measure was defeated by a vote of 442 to 43, a significant majority. The Government even refused to entertain a suggestion that "drinkless days" be inaugurated as a measure of war economy.

However, Parliament, though not choosing to curtail the sale of liquors, attempted (by a law passed October 1, 1917) to punish drunkenness. It imposed a fine upon any one found in a state of "manifest drunkenness," the penalty increasing to imprisonment for three days for the second offense, and from six days to a month for the third offense, in addition to the fine. The law further deprived habitual drunkards of electoral and certain other civil rights. It prohibited shops from selling liquors to minors of less than eighteen. Any one who succeeded in getting such a minor intoxicated became liable to imprisonment from six days to a month. The law, however, has remained a dead letter, despite its moderateness. It offers a very good example of the uselessness of legislation when unsupported by public opinion.

The inability of man-composed Parliaments or municipal bodies to curtail this vice has led such men as Joseph Reinach and Senator Herriot to ask that women should be given the vote, at least in municipal and department elections, with the principal hope that they will secure the enactment of restrictive if not prohibitive laws.

This demand for moral purification has also extended to prostitution, which at present is subject to practically

no control by municipal authorities. The chief argument for woman suffrage is therefore an appeal to their moral superiority. Whether or not that moral superiority can be any more effectively exercised through the ballot than it is now through persuasion and example, is another question.

The two distinctively French arguments[7] against woman suffrage are economic and clerical. Although great numbers of women entered the war industries, they were largely compelled to do so through economic needs,—that is, by poverty. It is this class of women who want the ballot and who, it is feared, would be the only ones to use it. The women of the higher classes did not enter French industries because they were under no economic compulsion. Their patriotism exercised itself in more philanthropic and non-remunerative war work. Thus they have not experienced the same feeling of feminine solidarity as have their poorer sisters. According to the conservatives, the women of the better families of France, with few exceptions, do not want the right to vote, and would not exercise it if it were granted to them; and their neglect of the ballot would disproportionally increase the political power of the labor and Socialist vote, aided by the support of women in industry.

The anticlerical argument is substantially this: France is still nominally a Catholic nation. Although many men have come to oppose Catholic dogma and its influence, large numbers of women, because of their more emotional and religious natures, are still completely controlled by the priesthood—so the argument goes. The anticlericals fear that the priesthood will utilize its

[7] For the French argument in general against woman suffrage, see Esmein, *Droit Constitutionnel* (5th ed.), 300-304.

religious influence, as it has so frequently done before, to obtain political advantages; in other words, it is feared that the priesthood will dictate what candidates its women parishioners should vote for, under fear of displeasure of God and the Church.[8] This argument, very energetically urged in the debate on the Suffrage Bill in May, 1919, seems to be of little real value. The control of the Church over its members appears nominal, even in religious affairs; while many women of the working classes,—at least the feminists imbued with Socialist teachings,—are decidedly anti-Catholic.

The Church, one would naturally think, would be opposed to woman suffrage. Yet, possibly because of the prospect of increasing its political power, it has taken an advanced stand on the question. At a *Journée Diocésaine,* held on the 19th of February, 1919, in Paris, a report of the "Action social de la femme" was adopted, stating that if the right to vote were granted to them, women were under the moral duty of exercising it, and asking that, in the future, this duty be taught young girls by the Church.

Legislative activity for woman suffrage began in 1906 with the introduction of a bill by M. Dussausoy, granting women the ballot in municipal affairs, and in the election of general councilors. The proposition was adopted by the Commission on Universal Suffrage, but discussion was delayed during four years, finally to be dropped.

Later projects are numerous. In 1918, M. Magniex, deputy from the Somme, drew up another proposition, which granted the ballot to women in municipal, can-

[8] For this and other arguments, see three articles by Louis Narquet, on *"La Française de demain d'après sa psychologie de guerre," Revue Bleue,* Sept. 28, Oct. 12, Oct. 27, 1918.

tonal, legislative, and senatorial elections, under the same conditions as it is exercised by men. Senator Martin also advocated the unrestricted right to vote for women above twenty-five years of age. During the debate on the electoral bill in April, 1919, M. Louis Andrieux moved an amendment to include woman suffrage in the bill. Although it was defeated by a vote of 325 to 116, the Commission on Universal Suffrage promised to introduce it later as a "special measure." This promise was in part fulfilled by the introduction of the so-called Flandin bill, which granted women the limited right to participate in the election of municipal, arrondissement and general councilors. They were not, however, to vote for members of the Chamber of Deputies. This bill came up for discussion on Tuesday, May 20th, 1919. It was evidently a compromise between the Feminists and their opponents,—a compromise necessitated, the Commission urged, by Senate opposition. But this did not satisfy the Chamber, and, after vigorous arguments in support of granting the complete right of suffrage to women, from two former prime ministers, René Viviani and Aristide Briand, the Bon amendment was adopted by a vote of 329 to 95, giving the women identical suffrage rights with men. Although some believed that the opponents of suffrage had voted for the integral right in the belief that the Senate would kill the entire measure, it was generally felt that the Chamber was at least sincerely desirous of acknowledging the country's debt of gratitude to the women of France.

The measure thus passed by the Chamber was sent up to the Senate. No one seemed to expect that this body would ratify the bill. The arguments against it weighed too heavily with these conservative dignitaries. Upon

May 22 the Senate appointed a commission to examine the bill; and on the 18th of July, the Commission reported it unfavorably. It is still pending before the Upper Chamber, but there is slight chance of its passage.

On October 7, 1919, the Deputies passed a resolution urging the Senate to act on the Chamber's Woman Suffrage bill.

On the Senate's failure to act before the elections of November 16th, *L'Excelsior*, a Paris newspaper, held a mock election for the Deputies upon the 16th, in Paris, at which the women might vote. The candidates voted upon were identical with those of the general election.

II

Plural voting has been advocated under some very unique forms. On April 4, 1919, M. Roulleaux-Dugage introduced an amendment to an electoral bill under discussion, to the effect that fathers of families should be given a vote, in addition to their own, for every one of their children. He again introduced a similar proposition during the debate on woman suffrage which read:

> Any person enjoying French nationality, whatever his age or sex, possesses a right of political suffrage which is the corollary of his civil personality. The father of a family exercises the right of suffrage for himself and for all the persons legally placed under his civil authority, that is to say, for his legitimate wife and for his minor children of both sexes, legitimate or recognized.

The idea that every person, irrespective of age or of sex, is entitled to the "right of political suffrage," is indeed a novel one. But it is also pointed out that there are about 11,000,000 voters in France; over 7,000,000 of them are either bachelors or the fathers of but one or

two children; only 4,000,000 are fathers of three or more children. The first class, which represents but 16,000,000 inhabitants, has one vote for about every two persons; while the fathers of large families, representing 23,000,000 people, have less than one vote for each six persons—obviously an injustice if the premise of the argument is correct. This innovation is also urged to secure another end of the utmost importance to the country, viz., as a reward and stimulus to large families.[9]

But there is considerable doubt both as to the right

[9] The depopulation question in France is generally considered serious; with the exception of twenty-one departments, the death rate is annually in excess of the birth rate; nearly 2,000,000 out of the 11,000,000 families have no children whatever. Since 1867 the Prussian population has increased four times faster than the French.

Figures compiled by the Ministry of Labor, published in *Le Temps* for October 8, 1919, show that the depopulation crisis in France is increasing.

For the two years 1918 and 1917 mortality figures were as follows:

	1918	1917
Births	399,041	343,310
Deaths	788,616	613,148
Excess of Deaths over Births	389,575	269,838
Marriages	177,872	158,508
Divorces	8,821	5,572

The executive committee of the National Congress of Natality and Population, which held a national congress at Nancy, September 25-28, 1919, has urged the following program to overcome this crisis:

1. The Family Vote.
2. Correction of "fiscal inequalities" weighing upon heads of numerous families.
3. Allotments, premiums and gifts to families with a large number of children.
4. Campaign against poor housing and for sanitary and comfortable lodgings for large families.
5. Suppression of abortion, neo-Malthusian propaganda, and prostitution.
6. Creation of a National Office of Natality.
7. The exemption, in times of peace, of fathers of large families from military service.

of a child to the ballot (even if exercised by the father as a trustee), or as to the effect of such a measure upon increasing the size of families. To offer an additional vote as a solution of the depopulation question appears so weak that it is a wonder it is seriously considered. It is significant, however, that M. Roulleaux-Dugage's amendment nearly succeeded in passing—and was only defeated by the vote of 219 to 200. Moreover, no less than eleven societies interested in measures of reform are sponsoring the idea, in addition to many of the candidates at the recent election (November, 1919).

Still another phase of the plural voting plan is urged (for different reasons, however,) by Maurice Barrès, the president of the League of Patriots.

In an ingenious appeal to sentiment and patriotism, Maurice Barrès advocates the plural vote as a recognition and memorial of the sacrifices of the dead. For every member of a family killed upon the battlefield, he would give a "family" vote to be cast by the father, mother or widow, as the case may be. Thus he would create a "family" instead of a "father's" vote, as advocated in M. Roulleaux-Dugage's plan. The "family vote" was formulated in an amendment to the electoral bill, and was introduced by Jules Delahaye, in the Chamber of Deputies on April 19, 1919. This amendment gave the right to vote to the widows, or in their default, to the mothers of soldiers killed by the enemy; it was defeated by a vote of 375 to 113.

All of these projects of plural voting, while finding a certain following, appear to be rather fanciful as well as inconsistent with the trends of modern democracy. The progress of electoral reform, in recent times, has been away from—rather than toward—the system of plural ballots. Some of these projects introduced in

the French Chamber, projects which only a politically imaginative Frenchman can devise, illustrate the length to which the theory, so prevalent in France, of the right of representation of interests as opposed to that of the nation, can be permitted to go. That these systems of plural voting violate the simplest maxims of sovereignty, that they misrepresent and misplace the will of the nation, and that they are practically impossible of application, is, without deep study, apparent.

III

But the greatest electoral issue in France has not been so much in the extension of suffrage as in the adjustment of the methods through which suffrage is exercised and in the devising of means by which one voter may enjoy as much influence as another. The "rotten boroughs" of England, the old three-class tax-qualification system in Prussia, and the practice of "gerrymandering" in the United States, through which great numbers of voters have been deprived of their ballots, are approximated, to a much less extent, in France by a faulty method of election known as the *scrutin d'arrondissement.*

The Chamber of Deputies is elected by districts, known as arrondissements (until the law of 1919), each electing one deputy, unless its population exceeds 100,000. In the latter case a new district is formed, electing another deputy for every 100,000 or fraction thereof.[10] The vital question in France has been whether there should be a large number of small districts, such as the arrondissement, each electing a deputy, independently

[10] A new districting is made after every quinquennial census; the last law fixing these districts was of March 27, 1914, based on the census of 1911. The number of districts was set at 602. The return of Alsace and Lorraine increased the number to 626.

of the others; or whether there should be a smaller number of larger districts, such as the department, each electing several deputies on a general ticket, as Presidential electors in the United States are ordinarily chosen.

The issue has therefore been between the *scrutin d'arrondissement* and the *scrutin de liste*. The former method of election was established in 1875, although Gambetta and Ricard vigorously demanded the latter. The sturdy arguments of these Radicals, however, finally led to the adoption of the *scrutin de liste* in 1885. But it was only in use for four years.[11] In fact, at that time the ease with which General Boulanger, making use of the "multiple candidacy" privilege, threatened to win the elections, led to its hurried repeal by the Republicans. To control departmental elections was within the physical power of the Government; but to dominate arrondissement elections, so numerous were the districts, was an impossible task. From 1889 to 1919, this old arrondissement system was consequently maintained.

Despite long established usage, the *scrutin d'arrondissement* is open to some grave objections. The electoral district is so restricted in extent that the election of a deputy depends too often upon the promises he makes to local interests. He usually regards himself as the *mandataire* of a restricted and privileged district, in the service of which he neglects the wide interests of *"la nation toute entière,"* as the Constitution of 1791 defined it.

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[11] For the "organic law" of November 30, 1875, see *Les Constitutions Modernes,* i, 24. For the law of June 16, 1885, establishing the *scrutin de liste,* see *ibid.,* 35; for the law of February 13, 1889, repealing it, see *ibid.,* 36.

The restricted size of the arrondissement also makes bribery more probable. The use of money and wine has been a feature of many elections. The Chamber Commission on Universal Suffrage, as far back as 1905, in its report on the Klotz bill said that the deputy was too often nothing more than a veritable local "chargé d'affaires" at Paris. For this reason he had little time to consider propositions of law because the obligation of his arrondissement needed his exclusive attention. In regard to bribery, the commission was "struck by the increasingly preponderant part played by money in the elections. . . ." "But what," it asks, "can be said of the scandalous habit of certain districts, happily rare, where wine distributed broadcast takes the place of discussion and a program? . . . Such practices constitute a double danger: they falsify the expression of national sovereignty, and they demoralize the locality where they are practiced."

Furthermore, the arrondissement method permits the effectual control of elections by the Government. There is little question but that by bringing pressure through the *Sous-préfet* (the administrative head of the arrondissement), the Government is tempted to interfere in elections to secure its own ends.[12] The *Sous préfet* sometimes appears to be little more than the "election agent" of the Prefect, whose advancement depends upon his swinging the elections in a sense favorable to the Government. The evil of such an interference, which has long been practiced in France,[13] is tolerated because nearly every party has in turn profited by it.

[12] At least in the elections in country districts; city elections are more difficult to control.

[13] The Provisional Government during the Revolution of 1848, through Ledru-Rollin, Minister of the Interior, boldly issued writ-

But the greatest objection to the *scrutin d'arrondissement* is the undue representation this system gives certain sections of the country. According to the law, an arrondissement containing 100,000 inhabitants, *or a fraction* thereof, is entitled to choose a deputy. This provision of the law has led to the greatest injustice and inequality. For example, in two arrondissements, one containing 100,000 inhabitants and another containing 100,002 inhabitants, the first will have one deputy; and the second, after being divided, will have two. The first deputy, therefore, represents 100,000 inhabitants; the last two each represent 50,001, a manifest injustice. There are many instances bearing out this hypothesis. For further example:[14]

GROUP A

City	Names of Voters
Puget-Theniers	6,827
Gex	6,557
Briancon	6,375
Sisteron	5,973
Barcelonnette	3,443
	29,175

GROUP B

Nantes (3rd district)	37,018
Versailles (1st district)	32,506
Sarlat	32,149
Sceaux (2nd district)	32,920
	134,593

ten instructions to the departmental agents defining these duties: "Through the elections which are going to take place, you (the political agents)' hold in your hands the destinies of France." Gaston Bouniols, *Histoire de la Révolution de* 1848, 86. The government of Napoleon III interfered with elections to a greater extent perhaps than any other government before or after it. For the "official candidates," etc., see de la Gorce, *Histoire du Second Empire,* ii, 191-194.

[14] Adapted from Rapport 57, Doc. Parl., Chamb. Sess. Ord., 1907.

Thus 29,175 voters in five arrondissements (Group A) elect five deputies, one for every 5,835 voters; while 134,593 voters in four arrondissements (or districts, Group B) elect only four deputies, one for every 33,648. One vote in the A Group has, therefore, about five times the weight of one in the B Group; the town of Barcelonnette with its 3,443 voters has the same representation as the third district of Nantes, with its 37,018. In other words, a Barcelonnette voter has ten times the electoral strength of one in Nantes.

The *scrutin de liste* would in a measure overcome these inequalities. For example, in the department of the Isère there are eight arrondissements. Under the *scrutin d'arrondissement,* each arrondissement elects one deputy, separately from the others. Under the *scrutin de liste,* the whole department would elect eight deputies upon a general ticket. Hence minorities, now voiceless in the arrondissement, by combining forces throughout the department, might secure a representation. This possibility will bring many to the polls who hitherto may have stayed away because of the hopelessness of making their ballots count. Furthermore, the enlarged district would be a prerequisite to any of the schemes of proportional representation which the Chamber has favored. Under any such plan, more than one candidate would have to be elected by an electoral district. Hence a change from the arrondissement electing one candidate,—to the department (or other enlarged district) electing several candidates—is a necessity if this measure securing minority representation is to be made practicable.

In later years, the agitation for proportional representation has not only been combined with the demand for the *scrutin de liste,* but it has also been even more

insistently urged. The demand for this reform arose from causes common to all countries. Any strictly majority system, whether it be under the *scrutin d'arrondissement* or *scrutin de liste*, is really unrepresentative of the will of the nation, and virtually amounts to the rule of an organized minority. As the following table will illustrate, in every French election since 1881 the unrepresented votes have been more numerous than those who actually secured a representation:

	Voters represented by deputies elected	Voters not represented
1881	4,778,000	5,600,000
1885	3,042,000	6,000,000
1889	4,526,000	5,800,000
1893	5,513,000	5,930,000
1898	4,906,000	5,633,000
1902	5,159,000	5,818,000
1906	5,209,000	6,830,000
1910	5,300,000	6,739,000

In the vote on the law governing the Separation of the Church and State (passed July 3, 1905) the majority consisted of 341 deputies, representing 2,647,315 voters, while the total number of those registered equaled 10,967,000. The average percentage of voters represented in the total number of elections between 1876 and 1906 was 45 per cent; while 55 per cent of the electorate had no representation whatever. Even under the *scrutin de liste* method in 1885 all of the thirty-two seats in the Chamber of Deputies from the departments of the Nord and Pas-de-Calais were secured by the votes of 267,900 Conservatives, 202,000 Republicans going without representation.[15]

[15] Professor Esmein, on the other hand, says that the representation of minorities is likely to menace the very principle of authority and of political sovereignty. See his *Droit Constitutionnel* (5th ed.), 263-297.

Obviously, this condition is contrary to Mirabeau's famous dictum: "Representative assemblies should be comparable to geographical maps which reduce all the elements of the country in their proper proportions, without the more considerable elements forcing the lesser to disappear." The strong desire to remedy the existing contradiction by some system of proportional representation has been crystallized in an organized agitation which the League for Proportional Representation has insistently carried on since the beginning of the present century.

IV

Parliamentary activity respecting the adoption of the *scrutin de liste* and proportional representation began in 1905. M. Louis Buyat then deposited, in the name of the Commission on Universal Suffrage, a report upon the Klotz proposition providing for both of these measures.[16] To carry out the latter, the voter was to be given as many votes as there were places to be filled, with the liberty of casting as many of these votes as he wished for a single candidate. The Commission on Universal Suffrage of the legislature of 1906-1910, of which M. Charles Benoist was president and M. Alexandre Varenne, the *rapporteur,* combined a number of projects calling for the *scrutin de liste* and the "R. P.," as the *Représentation proportionelle* is called. Despite the opposition of the Clemenceau Ministry, the Chamber took up the discussion of the bill in October, 1909. While the debate was in progress, the Clemenceau Min-

[16] *Journal Officiel*, Doc. Parl., Chamb. Sess. Ord., 1905, 389. For an extensive treatise upon French electoral reform up to 1910, see Jules Chardon, *La Réforme Electorale en France.*

istry was voted out of office upon a foreign affairs issue and was succeeded by the Briand Ministry. The Chamber had already passed the proposed bill by sections; but on November 8, 1909, the President of the Council declared: "The immediate vote of such a drastic reform would create a grave situation, dangerous to the Republican régime." He also declared that the country had not expressed itself upon the matter. Asking for a vote of confidence, he was given it by the Chamber (by a vote of 291 against 245). Thus the whole project was for the time being rejected and the Parliament of 1906-1910 came to an end with the matter of electoral reform still pending.

But the elections of the spring of 1910 revealed an insistent and continuing demand for the reform. Out of 597 deputies elected, 271 were on record as favoring the *scrutin de liste* and proportional representation. The remainder, with the exception of thirty-five defenders of the *status quo* and about 100 "non-declarants," were all in favor of some sort of a change. It was estimated that out of 8,517,000 votes cast, the principle of electoral reform received 1,162,333 and that of the proportional representation, 4,442,800, a majority of 200,000 for the "R. P." In the face of such an expression of public opinion the Briand Ministry recognized that some reform "was necessary and just," that "it is even necessary for the future of parliamentary control, that, while reserving for the majority the preponderance which rightfully belongs to it, the minority of opinions expressed by universal suffrage should be given due consideration."[17] This was an adroit change of face and policy. The Government thereupon introduced a

[17] Duguit, *Traité de Droit Constitutionnel*, i, 385.

bill (June 30, 1910), instituting the *scrutin de liste* and the electoral quotient system of proportional representation, and extending the life of the Chamber from four to six years. While the bill was pending the Briand Ministry fell. Little progress was made in the matter under the two succeeding Ministries of Monis and Caillaux. Discussion of the bill was, however, renewed May 29, 1911. When the Poincaré Ministry came into office in the beginning of 1912, the President of the Council openly declared himself for the reform; and owing to his strong insistence, the Chamber passed a bill, comprising most of the features of the Briand measure (July 10, 1912), by a vote of 339 to 217. It was the Senate, however, which now rejected the principle of proportional representation (in its session of March 18, 1913); although on the 10th of June, 1913, it voted a substitute project establishing the *scrutin de liste*, without proportional representation. A second time (November 18, 1913), under the Barthou Ministry, the Chamber voted a project of electoral reform, including proportional representation, by a vote of 333 to 225. But the Senate's conservatism again rejected the Chamber's bill on the 10th of March, 1914.

These failures once more made electoral reform a popular issue in the general elections of April 8, 1914. As a result, 602 Deputies were elected, 320 of whom had declared themselves as favorable to the *scrutin de liste* and proportional representation, 100 who were favorable to the *scrutin de liste* and the "representation of minorities," 100 who were favorable to the *scrutin de liste* pure and simple, 40 who emitted no opinion on the subject, and finally only 40 who were categorical partisans of the existing *scrutin d'arrondissement*.

On the 2nd of July, 1914, in connection with the

Benoist proposition to establish both the *scrutin de liste* and proportional representation, the Chamber adopted the following resolution:

> The Chamber has resolved to realize an electoral reform by adopting the system of proportional representation. It asks the Commission of Universal Suffrage to prepare a bill for enactment without delay.[18]

But upon the 10th of July, the Commission of Universal Suffrage, by a vote of 20 to 13, rejected Article I of the project which M. Groussier, its *rapporteur*, submitted. Before further action could be taken, the Chamber adjourned on the 13th of July. On the 3rd of August, Germany declared war upon France, and the solution of the problem of electoral reform was necessarily postponed until the return of peace.

V

The official life of the Chamber of Deputies would have expired normally in May, 1918, but the exigencies of the war compelled the enactment of laws postponing all legislative elections until the close of hostilities.[19] Almost immediately after the signing of the armistice in November, the Paris newspapers commenced a campaign for the holding of the elections. But as a preliminary requisite, it was urged that the long-deferred question of electoral reform be given a solution, a reform which

[18] Duguit, *Manuel de Droit Constitutionnel*, 176.

[19] The first law was passed December 24, 1914; it adjourned the Senate elections of 1915 (Series B); other laws postponing elections for municipal, general and arrondissement councils, were passed April 15, 1916, and July 31, 1919. The law postponing the election of the Chamber of Deputies was passed December 31, 1917.

had been agitated since 1905, which the country had repeatedly approved and which the Chamber of Deputies on several occasions had voted to adopt.

The newspapers were insistent upon the reform, notably *Le Temps*. Most of the political parties, with the exception of the Radicals, had favored the *scrutin de liste* and proportional representation. It was of some significance, therefore, that the Radical party in February, 1919, changed from its original position to agree to the compromise measure which had just been submitted to the Chamber. Other organizations such as the Civic League urged the reform. But the Government remained noncommittal; M. Clemenceau had always vigorously opposed proportional representation for the reason that caused the Radicals generally to oppose it—from the fear that Catholic supremacy might be established. His Ministry, through M. Pams, Minister of the Interior, therefore took the position that it had not come to power on that issue and must consequently place the entire responsibility for the enactment or rejection of the bill on Parliament. As the debate subsequently proved, the Clemenceau Ministry, however, used its influence secretly to oppose the reform in question.

As a result of this agitation, M. Dessoye, on behalf of the Commission of Universal Suffrage, laid a project before the Chamber (30th of January, 1919). Frankly a compromised measure, this project called for the departmental *scrutin de liste;* it abolished second or supplementary elections (used when a candidate did not receive a majority of the votes cast at the first). It also provided that ballots be supplied and distributed at public expense, that there be one deputy for every 75,000 inhabitants or major fraction therefore, that deputies be elected by a majority vote, as formerly; but in

case no majority was maintained that the seats be disposed of by proportional representation.

The debate on the bill lasted over a month,—from March 14th to April 18th. The Commission justified the partial "proportional representation" feature of the bill as the only kind of project which the Senate would ratify. However, to the surprise of every one, this did not satisfy the Chamber. On April 8th, Article I of the proposition, "The members of the Chamber are elected by the *scrutin de liste* in a single election," was debated. After the passage of the first line, ending in *scrutin de liste,* had been discussed, M. Bracke moved an amendment substituting for the words of the next line, "in a single election," those of, "by proportional representation." This three-word amendment, rejecting the Commission's compromise and installing complete proportional representation, was adopted by a vote of 235 to 201. The next day the integral reform was again voted for by a majority of 100. Many felt that this was a move of the opponents of the reform to secure the adoption of a measure so radical that the Senate would kill it entirely. Others thought, however, that the reform had at last triumphed.

The Commission modified the remainder of the bill in accordance with the twice-expressed desire for complete proportional representation. Opponents of the reform obstructed its progress, hoping to delay discussion until after the Easter recess, which would mean postponing it indefinitely. Finally, on the 15th of April, the Chamber did another strange thing. Article XII was under discussion, containing the actual application of a complete proportional system, as amended to meet the Chamber's desire. But M. Bouffandeau, a Radical, at this point introduced an amendment which almost identically re-

produced the Commission's original project of partial proportional representation. Despite the vigorous opposition of M. Bracke, the Chamber adopted it by a vote of 235 to 177. After twice repudiating the Commission's hybrid proposition, it had returned to it. This indecision and pliability in the hands of effusive leaders, by no means increased the Chamber's prestige. But it was characteristically French.

These tactics were commented upon by a clever writer, thus:

> The Deputies are not partisans of the Dessoye system, nor of proportional representation; neither do they favor the *scrutin d'arrondissement,* with the exception of a few who have made it a matter of principle. The majority of them wish merely to be reëlected—and this is the secret of their Machiavellism. As they are good servants of the country, their desire is nothing more than patriotic![20]

Another noticeable feature of the debate was the part M. Briand took in it; espousing a reform for the defeat of which he was at one time largely responsible, he now made several spectacular addresses in its support. On the 18th of April, M. Pams, the Minister of the Interior, and M. Briand engaged in a lively tilt, in which the latter accused the Government of secretly trying to defeat the measure. After several exchanges of clever repartee, M. Briand appeared to emerge the victor.

On the 18th of April the bill, as amended, was passed in the Chamber by a vote of 287 to 138. The compromise measure, calling for the *scrutin de liste* and partial proportional representation, now went before the Senate. Fear that this body, as it had done before, would reject any measure embodying the principle of propor-

[20] Midas, in *"Sur les Gradins, dans les Couloirs," L'Europe Nouvelle,* April 19, 1919.

tional representation, was increased by the appointment on the 15th of May, of a commission headed by Senator Bérard, a vigorous defender of the *scrutin d'arrondissement.* It was composed of twenty-seven members, fourteen of whom were avowed opponents of the Chamber's bill. When the Commission finally reported back to the Senate it was found that it had gone so far as to admit in principle the *scrutin de liste* and the double election feature in case no one received a majority, while it completely rejected the principle of the representation of minorities, even the compromise plan included in the Chamber's bill. Upon the 21st of June, however, M. Paul Strauss introduced an amendment which embodied in principle the Chamber's proposition. The amended bill differed from the original one passed by the Chamber only in the matter of the public supply and distribution of ballots. The Senate believed that candidates should themselves bear this expense. It was carried by a vote of 120 against 90. Upon Thursday, June 26, this bill passed by a vote of 134 to 0. Thus, despite the prophecy of M. Delahaye that the law meant "the invasion of the Chamber by the Bolsheviki," the Senate finally ratified this long-delayed and much-desired reform.

The Chamber, upon the 4th of July, voted the first four articles of the Senate bill. On the 7th it accepted the entire proposition by a vote of 308 to 103.

The law as finally promulgated upon the 12th of July provides (Article I) that the members of the Chamber of Deputies be elected by the department *scrutin de liste.* Each department (Article II) elects one deputy for every 75,000 inhabitants of French nationality (or the major fraction thereof). Each department elects at least three deputies upon a general ticket; and until

a new census is taken, it will have the same number as it formerly elected. The department (Article III) is the electoral district. When the number of deputies to elect is greater than six, the department is to be divided. Each division will elect at least three deputies. This division will be made by law. No one can be a candidate (Article IV) in more than one district. The declarations or platforms of candidates may be collective or individual.

The tickets (Article V) will be constituted for each district by groups of candidates who sign a duly legalized declaration. A ticket cannot have a number of candidates exceeding the number of deputies to be elected in the district. Any isolated candidate is considered as forming a ticket alone; but his declaration must be signed by at least 100 voters of the district. The "tickets" (Article VI) are to be deposited at the prefecture after the opening of the electoral period—at least five days before election day. These tickets are registered by the prefect; but those carrying more than the number of deputies to be elected, or those carrying names of candidates inscribed upon another ticket, cannot be registered. A candidate inscribed on a ticket (Article VII) can only be taken off of it at his own request—which shall be made to the prefect at least three days before the election. New candidates may be inscribed (Article VIII) on any ticket at any time up to five days previous to the election. Two days before the election (Article IX) the candidates will be posted at the different places of election at the expense of the prefecture.

Any candidate (Article X) who receives the absolute majority of the votes cast is proclaimed elected. If any seats still remain, or in case no one receives an absolute

majority, the seats will be disposed of by determining, first, the electoral quotient by dividing the number of voters, deductions being made for null and blank ballots, by the number of deputies to elect. After determining the average number of votes cast for each ticket by dividing the total number of votes which the ticket received by its candidates, this average is divided by the electoral quotient to determine the number of seats which each ticket will obtain, if any.[21] A single candi-

[21] The exact working of this Electoral Reform Bill is shown by the following hypothetical election results from the district of the Rance:

Registered Voters: 72,684. Voters 63,272
Blank or Canceled Ballots 3,032
Actual Votes cast 60,240
Absolute majority 30,121
6 deputies to elect.
Quotient: 60,240÷6=10,040.

List A	*List B*	*List C*	*List D*
32,645	18,123	15,247	5,164
29,827	16,247	14,629	4,032
29,640	15,822	12,172	3,292
25,274	12,659	8,624	1,123
18,401	8,404	6,018	1,119
12,524	4,031	5,101	.....
148,311	75,286	61,791	14,730

Average number of votes for Ticket A (with six candidates): 148,311÷6=24,718.
Average for Ticket B (with six candidates): 75,286÷6=12,547.
Average for Ticket C (with six candidates): 61,791÷6=10,299.
Average for Ticket D (with five candidates): 14,730÷5=2,946.

The first candidate in Ticket A received 32,645, or more than the absolute majority of 30,121; he is therefore elected. Ticket A is further entitled to two more seats because the quotient of 10,040 goes into its average of 24,718, twice. Ticket B is entitled to one seat, because the quotient only goes into its average of 12,547 once. Ticket C is also entitled to one seat for it has an average of 10,299. Ticket D receives no seat for its average is only 2,946. One seat still remains to be disposed of;

dacy (Article XI), if it does not obtain an absolute majority, will not figure in the division of seats until the candidates belonging to other tickets and having obtained more votes than it, are proclaimed elected. In case of equality of votes (Article XII) the election goes to the oldest candidate. If a seat belongs equally to several tickets, it is given to the candidate having the most votes, or in case of equality, to the oldest. The candidate can be declared elected only if the number of his votes is superior to one half of the average number of the votes of the ticket of which he is a part. When the number of voters is not greater (Article XIII) than half of those registered or if no ticket obtains the electoral quotient, no candidate is declared elected, and a new election is called within fifteen days. If in this election, no ticket receives the electoral quotient, the seats are given to the candidates who have obtained the most votes.

A report of the election (Article XIV) of each commune is made in duplicate, one copy going to the secretary of the mayor; the other is sealed and mailed to the prefect to be turned over to the Committee on Recount (*Recensement*). This Committee (Article XV) is created in every department, meeting at the *chef-lieu* of the department, in public, sitting at the latest by the

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and according to the law, it goes to the ticket having the largest average, or A. Therefore there are elected:

Four candidates of Ticket A
32,645 (absolute majority)
29,827 (quotient)
29,640 (quotient)
25,274 (seat going to ticket having largest average)
One candidate of Ticket B
18,123 (quotient)
One candidate to Ticket C
15,247 (quotient)

Wednesday following the election. This Committee is composed of the president of the Civil Tribunal, and the four members of the General Council having served the longest, or in case of equality, being the oldest.

In case of a vacancy due to any cause (Article XVI), an election may be held within a delay of three months, except in cases when the vacancy occurs within six months before the regular time for the renewal of the Chamber. In such a case no special election will be held. The present law (Article XVIII) will apply to the departments of Algeria and to the colonies which will continue to return their present number of deputies. A later law will determine the application of the reform to Alsace and Lorraine. Previous legislation contradicting the law (Article XIX) is declared void.[22]

VI

The effect of partial proportional representation upon the composition of the Chamber and indeed its effect on French parties in general will be interesting to watch. During the debate in the Chamber it was argued that the representation of minorities could be secured only by definite party groupings. It was, moreover, held that France, especially since the Sacred Union, had no well-defined party system, and that, therefore, the proposed reform would not succeed.

[22] In the first week of March, 1920, the Commission of Universal Suffrage examined the electoral law of July 12, 1919, with a view to its amendment. By a vote of 11 to 3 it was decided not to return to the old majority system. By a vote of 10 to 1 it was decided to do away with the present partial system of partial proportional representation. It is very probable that the Commission will eventually favor an integral system of proportional representation, entirely discarding the present compromise.

All indications, however, point to the strengthening of parties by this reform. Certainly parties, which through unfortunate geographic location or dispersion of their members have hitherto been excluded from proper representation, will be strengthened. Under proportional representation, it is very probable that the Right will secure some representation from such districts, as the Sancerrois, eastern Nivernais, and the Morvan, from which the majority system has hitherto excluded it. It is believed that the possibility of making every vote effective will have the tendency to encourage minority parties, to develop their organization, and to bring party issues more into prominence.

The abolition of supplementary elections (the method hitherto employed in case no one received a majority) will do much toward breaking up party combinations and "bargains" on second ballots. As noted previously, it was through this means that the *Bloc* of the Left so long remained in power and that the Socialists and Radicals won so many electoral successes. For example, in the Gard, in the Hérault, and in the Haute-Garonne, even the conservative parties, in case their candidate was hopelessly defeated at the first election, threw their votes to Socialist candidates in the second election held two weeks later,—in order to defeat the Radicals. (Thus Louis Bernard, elected at Vigan as a Socialist by a vote of 7,125, received only the votes of his party at the first election, viz., 1,749.) In other districts, such as in the Valenciennes, the Socialists have received the help of the Radicals.

These combinations—usually undesirable from the standpoint of party integrity—proportional representation and single elections will do much to overcome. The final result of this new law may be a reduction of the

Socialist and Radical elements in the Chamber. Whatever the eventual result, France now has the assurance that its Chamber of Deputies will more nearly correspond to popular sympathies and that it will be composed of stronger and more representative forces than has before been possible.

CHAPTER VI

THE 1919 ELECTIONS[1]

Nous ne voulons pas la contre-révolution, mais le contraire de la révolution.—JOSEPH DE MAISTRE.

I

The day before the Treaty of Versailles was signed by Germany (June 27th), the Chamber of Deputies proceeded to the election of a Special Commission of Sixty to examine the Treaty. This Commission selected René Viviani as its president and M. Barthou as its *rapporteur,*—two former prime ministers. Throughout the month of July the Commission heard M. Clemenceau and other members of the French Peace Delegation in defense and in explanation of the Treaty clauses. Finally, it voted 35 to 1 to approve it; on the 5th of August M. Barthou presented his report to the Chamber.

Opposition to the Treaty came from two sources: first, the Socialists; second, the Conservatives. On the 15th of July, the National Council of the Socialist party voted, despite the protests of such high-minded men as Albert Thomas, to instruct its deputies to vote against ratification. This motion was passed by the overwhelm-

[1] The sources for this account of the French elections are: *La Presse de Paris* and *Le Temps,* for the period covered. Accounts given in *L'Europe Nouvelle, La Revue Politique et Parlementaire, La Revue des Deux Mondes, La Revue de Paris,* and personal correspondence, are also used.

ing majority of 1,420 to 54. The Socialist objection to the Treaty was based upon its "imperialistic" features. In the debates in the Chamber, Marcel Sembat attacked particularly the Danzig settlement, saying it would always be a source of irritation between France and Germany. Jean Longuet demanded the independence of Ireland, Egypt, and India. He took particular exception to the Austrian settlement which forever separated Austria from Germany, unless the Allies expressly decided otherwise.

From the other extreme opposition was nearly as strong. It was led by Louis Marin who insisted that the dominant position held by France at the end of the war, had been bartered away needlessly; and that France had not even secured adequate "guarantees" against future attacks. Maurice Barrès and Charles Benoist, conservatives, expressed their regret that the left bank of the Rhine had not been given to France, while Franklin Bouillon and Charles Chaumet were especially caustic in their denunciation of the Treaty's shortcomings.

Both M. Clemenceau and M. Tardieu vigorously defended the Treaty from the charge that it failed to safeguard France. Both pointed out that France had one of two choices before it at the Conference: an alliance with England and the United States, or the annexation of the left bank of the Rhine. The French Peace Delegation had believed that the former was by far the preferable.

But M. Barthou raised a point which it was more difficult for M. Clemenceau to answer. What guarantees did the treaty supply if the United States Senate failed to ratify the League of Nations Covenant? M. Clemenceau replied that the League of Nations and the Treaty

would function immediately after its ratification by three of the four principal powers, regardless of the United States. But a Socialist Deputy pointed out very keenly that if America rejected the Covenant, France would be left alone in a League with those who did not believe in it. Furthermore, there was no indication that America would ratify the treaty of Alliance with France if it refused to accept the Covenant. If it did reject the Covenant but ratify the treaty of Alliance, the latter could not function because it was inextricably tied up with the League of Nations. For this reason M. Barthou suggested that the Chamber should change the terms of the Alliance so as to make it completely independent of the League.

The Prime Minister, however, vigorously repulsed all suggestions as to the amendment or "reservation" of the Treaty. He made it clear that the Chamber had to reject the Treaty *ensemble* or ratify it *ensemble*, that it had to take it or leave it in the form which he presented it to them. He made this categorical position evident not only upon the Barthou suggestion as to the Alliance but also upon the Lefèvre motion demanding complete German disarmament. In an energetic speech before the Chamber, M. Clemenceau declared that he would tolerate no motion which it would be necessary to refer to the Allies for approval before the Treaty was definitely ratified. The Chamber amenably followed his direction by rejecting the Lefèvre motion, on September 30th, by a vote of 262 to 188. This was in striking contrast to the tactics employed in the United States Senate shortly afterward.

The Chamber was by no means satisfied with the Treaty from the standpoint of reparation and of mili-

tary guarantees.[2] But it came to the conclusion that the Prime Minister had produced the best possible treaty which a strange combination of circumstances had permitted. Consequently, it ratified the Treaty on the 2nd of October by the strong majority of 372 to 53. Forty-nine Unified Socialists voted against it, as also did Franklin Bouillon and Louis Marin. There were seventy-three abstentions, thirty-three of whom were Unified Socialists, including Albert Thomas and Alexandre Varenne. Eighteen Radicals and about half a dozen Conservatives refused to vote. On October 11th the Senate unanimously ratified the Treaty, and on the following day the President of the Republic promulgated its ratification.

The opposition to the Treaty therefore assumed nearly the same alignment as had the former opposition to the war; that is, it was a question of the Socialists versus the patriotic parties. The Treaty vote added another count in the indictment against the "Unifiés"; it provided one of the issues which the November election was called upon to settle. As for the conservative opponents of the Treaty, they were insignificantly few. Their opposition did not assume party dimensions; the issue created by their rejection of the Treaty was therefore largely a personal one between each conservative and his constituency. There were, then, three clear-cut issues before the voters: The first was that of Bolshevism (outlined at the Socialist Easter congress);[3] the second was that of the Clemenceau Treaty, as just indicated; the third was that of State participation in industry.[4]

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[2] See pp. 443 ff., 452 ff.
[3] See pp. 112-128.
[4] For a discussion of this issue, see pp. 302-339.

II

Two national party conventions of especial interest were held in the month of September. The first of these was held by the Unified Socialists, beginning on the 11th of September; 450 delegates, representing 104,000 members, were present. The chief purpose of this congress was primarily to effect a reconciliation of the old majority with the extremists, which the Easter congress had failed to bring about. Many of the old majority had voted for military credits in express contradiction of the decision reached at the Easter congress, and some of them had also declared their intention of voting for the Peace Treaty. The extremist elements insisted on the exclusion of these deliberate violators of party law from the party. But those more interested in winning the November elections than in purifying party ranks, cautioned a more moderate policy. In this they were successful. By a vote passed by 1,427 to 490, the Congress decided merely to censure or "blame" those who had hitherto violated party discipline. With this moral punishment, they would be allowed to remain. Consequently, the Socialist press proclaimed that party "unity" had been preserved and that the party would enter the elections with a compact front. A motion of equal significance was passed by a vote of 1,163 to 133. It forbade any coalition whatsoever of Socialist candidates with candidates of even the most advanced bourgeois parties. This obviously included the Radicals. As to the future, the party satisfied its qualms of conscience by repeating its frequently violated determination to exclude automatically any Socialist representative who again voted military credits.

The subsequent action of the Socialist Federation of the Seine completely offset this concession to the old majority and definitely disrupted the ranks of the Socialist party. The Federation voted to exclude from a Socialist ticket of candidates to the Chamber of Deputies any member of the party who refused to give the proper "revolutionary guarantees." Naturally this was unsatisfactory to the old majority. It was a poor concession which permitted them to remain within the party but which refused to allow them to be Socialist candidates for office. Unsuccessful efforts were made by Pierre Renaudel and others to change the Federation's decision; but on October 26th it reaffirmed its intention to keep the *ex-majoritaires* from its tickets in the coming elections. As a result, three elements of the "Unifiés" revolted and formed a party of their own, known as the Dissident Socialists. These elements included the old *ex-majoritaires* who had voted for military credits, some of those who had refused to vote against the Peace Treaty, and others who objected to the presence of such men as Jean Longuet and Jacques Sadoul upon a Socialist ticket. Jacques Sadoul was a former French officer who had been convicted by a council of war for desertion and for giving intelligence to the enemy. He had been sentenced to death; but so far he had escaped this fate by seeking employment with the Ukrainian Bolsheviki. About twenty-five or thirty deputies joined this organization; and it included such men as Veber, Aubriot, Groussier and Rozier. The creation of this insurgent group definitely disrupted the ranks of the Socialist party as those who had watched the growth of the differences within it, had prophesied. However, the new group did not renounce the theories of Socialism for it proclaimed its adherence to the principles laid

down in the International Congresses of Amsterdam of 1904 and of Lucerne in 1919.[5]

Upon the 21st of September the Radical party held their convention in Paris. The principal matter of deliberation was the reconstruction of the old *Bloc*. At the "petit congrès" in July, a strong element in the party had been resolutely opposed to association with the Right, and had favored a *rapprochement* with the Unified Socialists; it had demanded a revival of the old battle cry of *pas d'ennemis à gauche*. But the Bracke motion, passed at the Socialist congress in September, condemned the Radicals as much as any other party. Consequently it definitely stopped the efforts of the Radicals to align themselves with their more advanced brethren. The only other alternative before the party was to enter an alliance with bourgeois elements. The decision was finally reached to enter into an *entente* with Republican Socialists and other Republicans who believed in anticlerical legislation. With timeworn insistence, the Radicals still harped upon clericalism which to them seemed to be a greater enemy than Bolshevism. By "other Republicans," they meant the Democratic Alliance. They expressly excluded the new party of the New Democracy, and tacitly excluded the Republican Federation or Progressists. Finally, a common program for this "cartel," as it was called, was drawn up.

III

The movement for a coalition of parties against the Socialists, as noted in a previous chapter, was started

[5] April 8, 1920 (*Temps*, April 9), these elements organized a new Socialist party, drawing up a constitution, etc., and electing Paul Aubriot as president.

early in the year of 1919. The Democratic Alliance assumed from the first the leadership in this movement. But the personal hostility of M. Chaumet, who was in charge of the Alliance's propaganda, toward M. Clemenceau was somewhat damaging to the Alliance's prestige. M. Chaumet was so open in his criticism of M. Clemenceau that in September, André Tardieu and M. Ignace, both members of M. Clemenceau's Government, resigned their membership in the Democratic Alliance. The executive committee of the latter announced that M. Chaumet's opinion was not that of the party, but that it did not believe in controlling the individual opinions of its members. But despite this explanation, the party lost adherents.

On the 5th of October a meeting was called by the National Socialist party to organize a *Bloc* of all Republicans against the Unified Socialists. Adolphe Carnot, President of the Alliance, presided at this meeting. The Radicals were not represented, obviously because of the presence of elements from the Right, such as the Liberal Action party. The assemblage adopted the following motion:

> Considering that for the reconstruction of France, for the maintenance of the advances of the Republic and for the protection of all public liberties, it is necessary for every citizen to unite against Bolshevism represented by the Unified Socialist party, this gathering affirms the necessity of establishing a single Republican ticket, composed of upright, energetic and competent citizens, resolved to assure social peace by the association of Labor and Capital, by the development of economic prosperity of the country, and by the grandeur of Republican France.

The Republican Federation, or the Progressists, adhered to this newly created "Bloc National Républicain"

upon the 14th of October. Such was the beginning of the bourgeois coalition against the Socialists.

Meanwhile additional complications arose on account of Radical obstinacy. The first split arose over the "cartel" known as the National Union of Republicans, to which the Radical Congress of September 21st had agreed. The Democratic Alliance insisted that the Radicals permit the Republican Federation to join it. Many Radicals were bitterly opposed to association with these Progressists; for the original *Bloc* of 1902 had been formed expressly against them. However, in view of the Socialist peril, the moderates in the party agreed to a compromise. It was finally agreed that Adolphe Carnot, President of the Alliance, would personally stand responsible, over his signature, for every member of the Republican Federation that desired to join the "cartel." Upon these terms the Radicals promised their adherence.

Sometime in October, by a process which press dispatches refuse to reveal, this "cartel" was merged into the National *Bloc*. The latter organization had become well-organized under the Presidency of M. Carnot. The members of this *Bloc* in the department of the Seine were: The Republican Democratic Alliance, the Republican Federation, the National Republican Union (which seems to be the old "cartel"), the Federation of Republican Democrats, the Liberal Action party, the National Socialist party, the Civic League, the Democratic League of Moral and Social Action, and the Radicals.

The program of the National Republican *Bloc* called for:

(1) Energetic opposition to Bolshevism, Civil War or class dictatorship;

(2) Government and parliamentary reform to assure the separation of powers, ministerial stability, and the

employment of technical experts in the administrative services;

(3) The reorganization of public services;

(4) Short-term military service and the democratic organization of the national defense;

(5) Liberty of conscience, maintenance of local laws and the mutual respect of beliefs;

(6) Encouragement of private initiative and the association of labor and capital;

(7) The right to organize and the extension of the civil capacity of syndicates;

(8) Social reforms—development of social insurance and cheap housing;

(9) The fulfillment of engagements toward war veterans and the inhabitants of invaded regions.

IV

The French legislature came to the end of an extralegally long existence upon the 19th of October, 1919. From that time until the 16th of November, the date finally set for the legislative elections, domestic politics occupied public interest. Twenty days before the 16th, the electoral period was officially opened; after that date nominating petitions could be filed with the proper authorities. Also certain restrictions upon public assemblies and advertising were removed. Five days before the 16th the filing period came to an end.[6]

[6] One of the interesting things attendant upon French elections is the limitation on advertising. Originally (by a law of July 29, 1881), candidates might paste bills upon every kind of public building and edifice, etc., except churches. During every electoral period, the artistic monuments of the French Republic used to be marred with electoral advertisements. By a law passed in 1902, the mayors were empowered to prevent the pasting of bills on monuments and buildings of an artistic character. Another law passed in the same year prohibited any campaign

Scenes of disorder were numerous and undignified during the electoral period. The Socialists even had the audacity to break up meetings of the National *Bloc* by cat-calls of the "Social Revolution" and "Vive Lenin and the Social Republic!" At a meeting in the Passy quarter, held on November 13th, when a *Bloc* candidate, M. Evain, referred to the "wave of idleness" which was overflooding Paris, workingmen in the balcony became violent. They flung chairs and other missiles at the stage and succeeded completely in dispersing the meeting as well as breaking a few bones of those participating in it. Upon the same day an attempt was made to assassinate Georges Mandel, who had been the secretary of M. Clemenceau; and who was a candidate for the Chamber of Deputies from Bordeaux.

The elections were also featured by the alleged attempt of the Socialists to close down every newspaper in Paris, excepting their own. This was done by means of a printers' strike, and as a result practically every bourgeois paper in Paris was forced to suspend publication. The Socialists obviously hoped to get a monopoly upon publicity by this move. But they were defeated by the fusion of fifty of the Paris papers into

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advertising which made use of the colors of the French flag—red, white and blue. Finally, a sweeping reform was made by a law passed March 20, 1914, whose purpose was to establish complete equality between candidates for office, so far as advertising was concerned. This law strictly limited the amount of advertising and bill-posting to special *emplacements* set aside for that purpose by the municipal authorities. Thus each candidate or ticket was granted the same amount of space. The number of these boards set aside for advertising was strictly limited: five in communes having 500 voters or less; ten in other communes, plus one for every 3,000 voters or fraction greater than 2,000, in communes having more than 5,000 voters. Any bill posting done outside of these public bill-boards is prohibited under penalty of fine. See Duguit, *Manuel de Droit Constitutionnel,* 371-72.

one edition, known as *La Presse de Paris,* the first number of which appeared on November 11. This combination paper appeared both morning and evening. About half of it was given over to editorial expression. Each of the contributing papers alternated in writing editorials, a dozen or fifteen appearing daily. All but three of the papers which combined in *La Presse de Paris* supported the National *Bloc.* Those who opposed it were *La Démocratie Nouvelle* and *L'Action Française,* which supported their respective parties, and *La Voix Nationale,* which leaned toward the Royalists. On election day *La Presse de Paris* had a circulation of 6,000,000.

At no time during the campaign was there any doubt as to the result of the election. The Socialists themselves seemed to realize that their doctrine of the Social Revolution was completely unacceptable to the greater part of the nation. Consequently their campaign emphasized present economic distress and the necessity for immediate reform.

For example, one flaming document asked "citizens" to vote for Socialist candidates for these reasons:

In unitedly supporting, as so many of you are, the program of the Socialist party which represents your aspirations and your class interests, you not only will support candidates ready to struggle in your name:

For the Maintenance of the Eight-Hour Day and the Right to Organize;

For the Harmonizing of Political Institutions with the New Economic Necessities;

For the Taking Over, for the Benefit of the Nation, of all the Great Systems of Transport, of Insurance, of Great Steel Factories, Etc.;

For a Single Service of National Education Gratuitously Accessible at Every Stage;

For Universal Disarmament of Which the Disarmament of Germany Must be the Preface;

But you will have done much more:

You will have responded by your own progress to the progress of your brothers of labor throughout the civilized world.

You will have struck at the roots of a régime which, resting upon the antagonism of competing interests, is only able to maintain war as a permanent state.

You will have contributed to establish The True Republic in which a pretended political equality will not be condemned as a falsehood by economic inequalities.

You will have assured The Disappearance of Classes, and by this very fact, you will have established conditions of constant peace between individuals and between nations.

Such a manifesto could have emanated from the Radicals as well as from the Socialists. Uniquely Socialist theories were veiled under insignificant catchwords as "The True Republic." Demands for complete revolution, so insistently urged at party congresses, were now noticeable by their absence.[7] Moreover, many Socialist Deputies carried on their campaign upon a nationalistic platform. Despite the party's official attitude toward the war, many candidates openly supported the Allied cause. So in reality the Socialists acknowledged defeat from the beginning.

Aristide Briand, one of the most outstanding figures in French political life, played a very disappointing part in the election campaign. Naturally M. Briand has political ambitions. But at the same time he is a true patriot and an able leader. As Prime Minister upon six different occasions he has shown the highest type

[7] "As a matter of fact, Socialist deputies would obtain very few votes if they did not manage to convince the general public that they are very reasonable people, great enemies of the old practices of bloody men, and solely occupied in meditating on the philosophy of future law." Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, 107.

of statesmanship. He exhibited his great power in the conciliatory part he played in the struggle with the Church in 1905-1907. He frequently attacked the Clemenceau Ministry during the armistice, figuring prominently in the debates on electoral reform, on woman suffrage and on the eight-hour day. Despite the shadow which rests upon his last Ministry on account of the Greek fiasco, he remains a powerful leader at the Palais Bourbon.

At the end of the war M. Briand realized the necessity of organizing a great Republican party to fight social disorder and monarchical reaction. It seems that he was trying to resume the work he started with the Federation of the Left in 1914. In August, 1919, he made a speech at St. Etienne which was so widely misinterpreted that it completely deprived him of further leadership in a bourgeois coalition. In this speech he said the time had come to put an end to the Sacred Union, because it had contained both Royalists and Socialists who were avowed enemies of the Republic—now that the war was over, Republicans should rid themselves of their temporary bedfellows. Furthermore, the continuance of the Sacred Union would mean necessarily vague programs and the submersion of the real issues before the country. Therefore he favored the establishment of a great Republican party upon definite, clear-cut issues. Objecting to the principles laid down in this speech, M. Jonnart, ex-Governor General of Algeria, engaged in a lively debate with M. Briand in the columns of *Le Temps;*[8] he interpreted M. Briand's remarks as a desire to hold himself aloof from a Republican coalition against the Bolsheviki. This obviously was not M. Briand's meaning; but, neverthe-

[8] Letters published in *Le Temps,* August 25, 1919.

less, he found moderates turning away from his leadership.

The ascendancy of M. Briand was also prevented by the fact that he is a Socialist in doctrine. It will be recalled that he was one of the original members of the Republican Socialist party. Although he and his party differ completely with the Unified Socialists upon the class struggle, he believes in increased government ownership and interference in private industry. Upon October 31st he made a speech at Nantes in which he outlined his platform of political and religious reforms. *Le Temps* afterwards inquired why he did not definitely disclose his plan of economic reconstruction. Did M. Briand believe in an extension of State Socialism or did he believe in the restoration of private initiative? The natural fear that M. Briand was a collectivist deprived him of the support of those opposed to the increase of the industrial power of the State. As for the Radicals, they are M. Briand's most bitter enemy because he has preached a policy of reconciliation with the Church for many years. Naturally the Unified Socialists detest him. So this statesman found himself not socialist enough for the Socialists, not radical enough for the Radicals, and not conservative enough for the Conservatives. M. Clemenceau's popularity added to the almost tragic isolation in which M. Briand was placed. However, M. Briand proved his attachment to the National *Bloc* by refusing to run on a ticket from his home district in the Loire because it excluded members of the Democratic Alliance. But he was nominated on a ticket from the Lower Loire, and elected to the Chamber. His victory was one of personality and not of leadership. He goes back to the Chamber a free lance, and without an organized following.

V

Although every sign pointed to the overwhelming victory of the National *Bloc,* it by no means united every bourgeois party against the Socialists. The first insurgent was the Republican Committee of Commerce and Industry which, shortly after the *Bloc's* formation, refused to join it because of the presence of the Radicals. The Committee implied an unwillingness to associate itself with any party proclaiming the doctrine of State Socialism. The next faction to withdraw was the New Democracy party, headed by Lysis. This party stated with poorly feigned self-interest, since it had no representatives in the Chamber, that the *Bloc* was merely a device to secure the reëlection of deputies whose incompetence had been repeatedly proved. This party placed tickets in three out of the four districts in Paris. Among its candidates were André Chéradame and Victor Cambon. The party was successful in polling a total vote of only about 22,000, and it did not win a single seat in the Chamber.

Thirdly, the Royalists refused to join the *Bloc*—or rather, they were not invited to join it because of their avowed hostility to the Republic. Consequently *L'Action Française* placed tickets in every one of the districts in Paris—for the first time in its history. It polled about 40,000 votes, and it succeeded in electing Léon Daudet, one of the editors of *L'Action Française,* to the Chamber.

A fourth opponent to the *Bloc* was found in a few Catholics who believed that the anticlericalism of the Radicals was a greater enemy than the Bolshevism of the Socialists. Happily the majority of the Catholics did not openly harp upon the clerical issue. But *La*

Croix, the leading clerical journal, illustrated its religious bias by demanding "pas de cartel" with candidates who did not promise to work for the modification of existing clerical legislation. However, this attitude was offset by such pastoral letters as that from Mgr. Amette, archbishop of Paris, dated October 31, 1919. It advised Catholic voters that it was better to vote for candidates from whom useful service to the country could be expected, although they did not promise to satisfy Catholic demands—than for others whose platform might be more "perfect, but whose defeat would more certainly run the risk of opening the door to the enemies of religion and of social order";—a reference to the Unified Socialists.

A very interesting feature of French elections is the part played by the Catholic clergy in advising their parishioners how to vote. With few exceptions, Catholics receive pastoral letters which lay down the principles which should guide them in the exercise of their electoral duties. Many of these principles are of common morality; others are strictly clerical. The whole spirit of the letters is naturally directed toward influencing elections so that the "legitimate interests" of the Church shall not be harmed. The Catholic clergy apparently feel it a divinely imposed duty to guide political thought from a religious point of view.

The final bourgeois opponents of the *Bloc* were odds and ends of "dissident" groups. Some were opponents of M. Clemenceau, such as Gustave Tery, editor of *L'Œuvre.* Others were Radical Socialists who opposed association with the parties of the Right. Thus the Radical Socialist group of the Radical Federation of the Seine on November 24th denounced "the treason of the Radicals who, under cover of the National *Bloc,* have

become the accomplices of the worst reaction." They demanded the restoration of the old *Bloc* of the Left. Other dissidents were Republican Socialists such as Paul Painlevé, M. Clemenceau's predecessor as Prime Minister. He insisted on placing tickets in the field against those of the National *Bloc;* and he was responsible for splitting the vote of the *Bloc* in Paris between three tickets, upon which such men as General Sarrail and Professor Aulard ran. Much sympathy has been expressed in America for M. Painlevé because of his defeat (his defeat is by no means certain, for the Commission on Recount decided to refer his seat to the Chamber of Deputies, which was convened in extraordinary session on December 8 for decision). But if M. Painlevé had entered heartily into the National *Bloc* instead of doing everything he could to oppose its success, he doubtless would have been returned to the Chamber without a question.[9]

These examples will show that the bourgeoisie were by no means solidly united against the Socialists. In Paris alone, ten different tickets appeared upon the ballot. In the departments the confusion was even worse. Here party coalitions usually did not exist. Usually the Liberal Action party would run a separate ticket; sometimes it would be the Democratic Alliance and more often, the Radicals who refused to combine. Programs of the widest variance were announced by those departments in which *blocs* could be effected. Thus the Republican Union of the Isère was so conservative that it asked for the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Pope, repeal of anti-Catholic legislation, and the proportional division of school funds. These were distinc-

[9] The Chamber of Deputies declared M. Painlevé legally elected on January 23, 1920.

tively Catholic measures to which no Radical would agree.

In other words, the coalition activities in the November election completely bore out the oft-repeated accusations against the lack of French organization. These activities were totally decentralized. The National *Bloc* in Paris maintained no control over the few *blocs* established throughout the provinces. In fact, it was unable to create them in most departments on account of local disagreements among parties. So the attempt to fuse all bourgeois parties against the Unified Socialists was not so successful and the fusion was not so complete as both the French and American press reported. It was not as narrow and it did not function as well as the Sacred Union. The reason for this was quite evident: the menace of Bolshevism was by no means as real to France as the menace of Germany had been.[10] There was no fear of Bolshevist invasion. If Bolshevism should win it would be a purely moral victory, for even if Socialist majorities were returned to the Chamber, every Frenchman knew that Soviet methods would never be instituted. The bourgeois character of many of the Socialist candidates was an eloquent testimony to that.

VI

Very oddly, one of the strongest factors in bringing about the formation of the National *Bloc* was the Electoral Law of July, 1919. Under the provisions of this

[10] Voting in this election was not as heavy as it was represented to be. In the first district of Paris, for example, there were 68,000 abstentions out of 260,000 registered; in the second district, there were 53,000 abstentions out of 221,000 registered; in the third district there were 64,000 abstentions out of 254,000; and in the fourth district 102,000 abstentions out of 380,000 registered.

law, the bourgeois parties were obliged to unite, if the compact and well-disciplined organization of the Unified Socialists was not to win.

For example, if the National *Bloc* in Paris should muster 92,000 votes and if the Socialist ticket should receive 70,000, all of the *Bloc* candidates would be elected, because they all receive a majority. However, if the Republican vote should be divided between two tickets, this advantage would be overcome. Thus if the *Bloc* vote should be split between two tickets, each receiving 46,000 votes, and if the Socialists should maintain their 70,000, the Socialists would receive the majority of the seats. If there are five deputies to elect, the *Bloc* would receive all five, in the first case. In the second case, when the *Bloc* vote is divided, the Socialists would win three seats, and each of the Republican parties, one seat. In both cases the Socialist ticket poll exactly the same number of votes. But in the first case, where the Republicans are united, the Socialists would receive no seats; while in the second case, where the Republicans are divided, they (the Socialists) would win three seats —a majority of one.

When it dawned upon the bourgeois parties that such would be the result of the election law, a great clamor arose. Although they had voted for it originally, they now denounced it as another device of the Socialists to win the elections. This argument together with the *arrondissementer's* fear of losing his seat led to attempts in the Chamber to postpone the application of the electoral law until the elections of 1923. Fortunately this attempt was unsuccessful, and the maintenance of the election law became one of the greatest auxiliary factors in cementing the different factions of the bourgeois parties. In the face of a united and well-organized

opposition, such as the Unified Socialists presented, factional groupings had little hope to survive.

VII

The events of the election day itself, November 16th, may be passed over with little comment. There was no disorder; and there was a heavy vote cast.

The results were not known until the 30th of November, and even then sixteen seats had not been disposed of. The composition [11] of the new Chamber [12] may, however, be summarized as follows:

	Reelected	New	Total
Republicans of Left	55	78	133
Radical Socialists	77	66	143
Republican Socialists	18	9	27
Unified Socialists	35	33	68
Dissident Socialists	5	1	6
Progressists	34	99	133
Liberal Action	14	55	69
Conservatives	12	19	31
	250	360	610

[11] These figures are taken from *La Revue Politique et Parlementaire* for Dec. 10, 1919.

[12] In the Bas-Rhin there were 160,957 voters in 1914; in 1919, after the elimination of the German elements, there were 155,707. Of these, 130,737 voted. The fact that there were no more eliminations seems to show that the election was conducted fairly. Alsace did not return a single Socialist or Radical to the Chamber. In both Alsace and Lorraine, "patriotic" or pro-French candidates were returned, and the election was ample evidence of the desire of the provinces to return to France. See two articles in *La Revue des Deux Mondes* for December 15, 1919, on "*Le Vote de l'Alsace*," by P. Bourson, and "Le Vote de la Lorraine Liberée," by P. Braun. Alsace-Lorraine was allotted 24 seats—8 for the Moselle, 7 for the Haut-Rhin, and 2 for the Bas-Rhin by party representation.

The Chamber of 1914[13] compared with that of 1919:

	1914	1919	*Difference*
Republicans of Left	77	133	gain — 56
Radical Socialists	257	143	loss —114
Republican Socialists	30	27	loss — 3
Unified Socialists	101	68	loss — 33
Dissident Socialists	...	6	gain — 6
Progressists	36	133	gain — 97
Liberal Action	32	69	gain — 37
Conservatives	27	31	gain — 4[14]

[13] By party representation.

[14] The classification of the new Chamber by profession may also be interesting to note. It contains:

140 lawyers.
41 doctors or surgeons.
50 manufacturers.
52 proprietors.
52 agriculturists.
27 merchants.
32 professors.
44 publicists and men of letters.
5 secondary school teachers.
13 engineers.
8 judges.
5 diplomats.
4 Catholic priests (all from Alsace and Lorraine).
3 Protestant ministers.
10 avoués.
4 notaries.
4 members of the Council of State.
4 *chefs de cabinet* of the ministries.
6 druggists.
5 bankers.
3 heads of societies.
2 generals and 20 former officers (by profession).
1 vice-admiral and three naval officers.
11 former government employees.
8 employees of the public services.
16 employees of commerce or of banks, etc.
4 entrepreneurs of public works.
15 workers of different professions.
1 architect.
1 agrégé (a degree higher than a doctor of philosophy).
1 business agent.
2 aviators.

The combined loss of the four Socialist parties above, in the 1919 Chamber, is 144 seats. The gain of the parties of the Center and the Right is 194.

These figures portray three striking results.

The first was the reduction of the Unified Socialist representation from 101 to 68. On the face of it, this meant a national repudiation of the Socialist party. In reality, however, it meant quite a different thing, for the Socialists polled 300,000 more votes in 1919 than in 1914 (1919, 1,700,000; 1914, 1,400,000).[15] If this be so, how can the reduction in Socialist representatives be explained? The explanation lies not so much in the National *Bloc* as in the electoral law.

This law provided for the redistricting of France; as a result population in different districts was equalized; and whatever advantage the Socialists had held unfairly was overcome. Consequently they lost seats. On the other hand, election by the majority principle in the law of July 12 also worked against the Socialists, many of whose candidates would have been elected under a complete system of proportional representation. This is true of the fourth district of Paris, a strong labor district, where the *Bloc* ticket of fourteen candidates was elected by absolute majority over the Socialist ticket headed by Jean Longuet. Although the latter ticket polled a total of 1,576,602 votes against the 2,102,411 votes which the *Bloc* ticket received, it did not receive a single seat. The *Bloc* ticket, under the majority principle, received all fourteen. Under a system of complete proportional representation (with such a vote),

[15] In 1914, 8,700,000 votes were cast in France, exclusive of Alsace-Lorraine. In November, 1919, only 6,800,000 were cast (including Alsace Lorraine) a decrease of 1,900,000. The Socialist vote in 1914 was therefore 16 per cent of the total; while in 1919 it was 25 per cent.

the Socialists would have received six out of the fourteen seats, eight going to the *Bloc*.

Consequently it is a mistake to believe that the French Socialists have lost any real popular support during the last five years. In fact, it appears that they have gained. In a sense the nation has repudiated Socialism, for the *Bloc* holds 550 seats in the Chamber. But the nation presented no different attitude toward Socialism in 1919 than in 1914. In both elections three fourths of the 10,000,000 voters in France pronounced against it. But a solid body of Socialist votes remains intact, increased somewhat by the recent adherence of some malcontented Radicals. On the other hand, the French Socialist party has repudiated the extreme leadership which for the last several years has controlled it, for the most violent directors of the party have been defeated. Of the fourteen candidates on the Socialist ticket in the fourth district of Paris, Jean Longuet was the lowest, receiving 111,015 votes, while the highest candidate, M. Laval, received 114,147. M. Longuet consequently was defeated, and his downfall can be interpreted only as an express repudiation of his leadership. Likewise Jacques Sadoul was third lowest on the Socialist ticket in the third district. MM. Brizon and Raffin-Dugens, two of the deputies to go to Kienthal, were defeated, as was also M. Mayéras. M. Loriot was not in the Chamber. Hence it is quite evident that the extreme elements of the Socialist party must carry on their activities outside of parliamentary circles. But the Socialist vote nevertheless revealed the fact that there were still nearly 2,000,000 voters in France who were devoted to the principles of Socialism.

The second feature of the election was the reduction of the Radical representation from 257 to 143, a loss of

114. Part of this loss was also probably due to the new election law. But it appeared to be more largely caused by the policies supported by the Radical party, outlined in another chapter: their perpetuation of the anticlerical issue; their support of Caillaux and other persons charged with treason; and their insistence on State Socialism. The opinion of the country on the latter point is indicated, to some extent, by the defeat of M. Clémentel, Minister of Commerce, and author of the "Consortium" policy; of M. Morel, Undersecretary of Liquidation of War Supplies, around whom many stories of scandal in regard to the liquidation of supplies had centered, and M. Colliard, Minister of Labor, as well as two other members of the Government. The elections may be called a personal victory for M. Clemenceau; but they certainly were a defeat for M. Clemenceau's party, and also for the collectivist policy of his Government.

The third point of interest in the elections was the large gain of the Conservative parties. The Progressist representation was increased from 36 in the old Chamber to 133 in the new; the Liberal Action group was increased from 32 to 69; the Conservatives was increased from 27 to 31, 5 of the new deputies of this latter category coming from *L'Action Française*. The Republicans of the Left or the Democratic Alliance increased from 77 to 133. The total number of deputies in the new Chamber, pledged to fight against the State Socialism and extreme anticlericalism of the Radical and *Unifié* party is 366. The combined Radical, Republican Socialist, Dissident Socialist and Unified Socialist vote is only 244. So it seems that the opponents of bureaucracy will have an opportunity to reform the abuses which they have so caustically criticized.

For the first time in twenty years, France has a conservative Chamber. It is one of the most conservative in the history of the Third Republic. The Radicals and the Unified Socialists have lost the balance of power. If it lies anywhere, it is with the Democratic Alliance, to which the political leadership of the country has apparently fallen.

Apart from the purely party significance of these elections, there were many personal incidents of interest. In the district of Seine-et-Oise the Radicals entered a ticket, headed by Franklin Bouillon, M. Clemenceau's bitterest enemy, against the *Bloc* ticket, headed by André Tardieu, M. Clemenceau's warmest friend. The Radical ticket and M. Bouillon were overwhelmingly defeated. Charles Chaumet, another opponent of the Treaty of Versailles, was likewise defeated. In Paris three anarchist tickets appeared on the ballot; they received a combined vote of 121! M. Lafferre, Minister of Public Instruction, a vigorous Free-Mason, was defeated, probably on account of his fraternal attachments. René Renoult, until last fall President of the Radical party and chairman of the Army Commission of the Chamber, was also defeated.[16] Prince Murat was elected on a *Bloc* ticket from the district of Lot. General Sarrail, a compatriot of Painlevé, was defeated in Paris. His rejection may be taken as public disapproval of the political ends which he was alleged to have served during the war. On the other hand, General Castleneau, Marshal Foch's Chief of Staff, was elected. It was he who countermanded the order to evacuate Verdun; for this he certainly deserved public recognition. Four Senators who entered the campaign for seats in the Chamber of

[16] Both he and M. Clémentel were later elected to the Senate.

Deputies were elected. Among them was Edouard Herriot, the new President of the Radical party. He is in the rather novel position of being Mayor of the city of Lyons, ex-Senator from the Rhone and now a member of the Chamber. The move appears to be a bid for the Premiership.

On the 11th of January, 1920, the elections for the Senate were held. These elections are not by direct, popular vote, but by departmental electoral colleges composed of (1) the deputies from the department, (2) members of the general council, (3) members of the arrondissement councils in the department, (4) representatives from the communes likewise situated in the department.

The result of this election did not greatly modify the composition of the Senate so far as parties were concerned. Two hundred and forty seats were to be filled, 224 of which had been occupied by Senators whose terms had expired or who had died in office. Fourteen seats were allotted to Alsace and Lorraine, and two had been held by life Senators who had become deceased. According to the law passed in 1884, such seats are to be awarded to certain departments by lot at the death of their original incumbents.[17] These two places were awarded in this manner to the departments of Loiret and Loire-et-Cher.

M. Poincaré, the retiring President of the Republic, was elected to the Senate without even entering his candidacy. He was elected from the Meuse by a vote of 742 to 30. A few defeated candidates for election to the Chamber of Deputies in November, were elected to

[17] See Article III, Law of December 9, 1884, in F. R. Dareste, *Les Constitutions Modernes*, 33.

the Senate, such as MM. Clémentel, Lafferre, and de Monzie.

The results may be tabulated as follows:

	Old Senate	New	Gain	Loss
Conservatives	27	28	1	
Progressists	22	31	9	
Republicans of Left	45	68	23	
Radicals	129	106		23
Republican Socialists	1	5	4	
Unified Socialists	..	2	2	

VIII

On January 13th, 1920, the new Parliament was officially called into existence. M. Paul Deschanel was reëlected President of the Chamber of Deputies by a vote of 445 to 10.[18] In the Senate, M. Léon Bourgeois defeated the incumbent, Antonin Dubost, for the presidency of that body, by a vote of 147 to 125 (January 14th).

Although it came as a surprise to the world, the defeat of M. Clemenceau for the presidency of the Republic, was to have been expected. France perhaps would have liked to see M. Clemenceau President. His popularity with the country was immense, and it would have

[18] The following vice-presidents were elected: MM. Raoul Péret, Lefebvre du Prey, André Lefèvre, Francois Arago; secretaries: Paul Simon, Barety, Henri Aurjol, Maurisson, Joseph Barthélemy (the distinguished professor of politics), Jean Erlich, Laurent Eynac, André Payer; questors: MM. Saumande, Lenail, Duclaux-Monteil. On account of his election to the presidency of the Republic, M. Deschanel resigned his position as head of the Chamber. His place was filled by Raoul Péret, who was elected on February 12.

These sixteen officials constitute the "bureau" of the Chamber. The Bureau handles all the business routine of the legislative body; the secretaries keep the records and count the votes when there is a division: the questors have charge of the finances.

liked to confer upon him the highest honor which the Republic could bestow. Many of his enemies also wished to place M. Clemenceau in an office which would force his retirement from active politics.[19]

But the election of a French President, unlike the election of Deputies, is removed from the impress of public opinion. Chosen as he is by the National Assembly,[20] the President owes his election largely to party maneuvers and party considerations. M. Clemenceau, when forced to become a candidate for this office at his friends' behest, found himself without a party. The Radical party, to which he nominally belonged, contained his most bitter enemies. The Republican Left, which had won sweeping victories in the November elections, was opposed to the domestic policies for which M. Clemenceau stood. The Unified Socialists, whose defeatism and Bolshevism, Clemenceau had vigorously fought, naturally refused to vote for him. This factor, added to the fact that he lacks the social graces and the temperament which have characterized the French presidency, led to M. Clemenceau's defeat and to the election of Paul Deschanel.[21]

His defeat may be looked upon as an act of ingrati-

[19] The results of this election were:

M. Deschanel	734
M. Jonnart	66
M. Clemenceau	56
M. L. Bourgeois	6
M. Jacques Sadoul	1
Scattered	3
Blank and void	23
	889

[20] The National Assembly is composed of the members of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate meeting in one body.

[21] Speaking of the defeat of M. Clemenceau, one of the editors of *La Revue Politique et Parlementaire* (Feb. 10, 1920), says: "In fact, this Warwick was overthrown at the very moment

tude. He had saved France from a German victory; and he deserved well of *La Patrie*. But other great men of France, as well as of other countries, have suffered a similar fate. M. Thiers, who headed the provisional government of France from 1871 to 1873, whose tears secured the mitigation of the peace terms which Bismarck wished to impose upon France after the capitulation of Paris in January, 1871, whose diplomacy raised France's position among nations and whose statesmanship laid the foundation for its political and economic regeneration,—was forced into resignation by a political cabal. M. Clemenceau will find sympathy, as M. Thiers probably did, in the realization that in politics virtue is its own reward.

Paul Deschanel, the new President of France, is well qualified to continue the traditions of the office. A scholar, an orator, and a typical French gentleman, he will preside over the Elysée Palace with charm and equipoise. He probably will be content with the social duties with which in the past the President of the Republic has occupied himself. On the other hand, there is a possibility that he will attempt to assert executive prerogatives which hitherto have been exercised by the

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when he believed he had only to stretch forth his hand to take possession of the crown. And he was succeeded by a man who, a week before the Congress, did not even wish to be a candidate so long as his chances seemed compromised by the eternally proclaimed glory of his opponent. But scarcely a month has passed since these events have taken place, and the great Frenchman of yesterday is already forgotten. . . .

"Why was he thus removed from power? In truth, because his mistakes and his defects have been too evident for a year. *Nous n'avons plus Clemenceau: c'est injuste, mais préférable.*"

These mistakes the writer enumerates as administrative incapacity, prodigious pride, and an impulsive temperament. Although this characterization may be too severe, it was nevertheless held by many deputies who feared that Clemenceau, once elected president, might establish a dictatorship such as Boulanger attempted.

Ministry. In politics, M. Deschanel is a member of the Republican Alliance. He is a reformer of the classical school, but at the same time, a conservative who probably reflects as well as any man could, the opinions of bourgeois France.

Following parliamentary usage as well as his own inclination, M. Clemenceau resigned as President of the Council (January 18, 1920) immediately after the election of M. Deschanel as President of the Republic. On the 19th of January, M. Alexandre Millerand formed a cabinet.[22] The appointment of M. Millerand as Prime

[22] The Millerand Ministry was composed as follows:
President of the Council and Minister of Foreign affairs: Alexandre Millerand (deputy).
Minister of War: André Lefèvre (deputy).
Minister of Marine: Landry (deputy).
Minister of Justice: Gustave Lhopiteau (senator).
Minister of Finance: Francois Marsal (not a member of parliament).
Minister of the Interior: Steeg (senator).
Minister of Commerce: Isaac (deputy).
Minister of Agriculture: Henri Ricard, Agriculturist (not a member of parliament).
Minister of Public Works and Transports: Le Troequer (deputy).
Minister of Colonies: Albert Sarraut (deputy).
Minister of Public Instruction and Fine Arts: André Honnorat (deputy).
Minister of Labor: Jourdain (deputy).
Minister of Social Hygiene: J. L. Breton (deputy).
Minister of the Liberated Regions: Ogier (secretary-general of the liberated regions, not a member of Parliament).
The Nine Undersecretaries of State are:
President of the Council: Reibel (deputy).
Interior: Robert David (deputy).
Finances: E. Brousse (deputy).
Food Supply: R. Thoumyre (deputy).
Ports and Merchant Marine: Paul Bignon (deputy).
Hydraulic Power: Borrel (deputy).
Posts and Telegraphs: L. Deschamps (deputy).
Agriculture: Queuille (deputy).
Aëronautics and Aërial Transportation: P. L. Flandin (deputy).
Professional Education: Coupat (not a member of Parliament).
The Cabinet is thus composed of eighteen deputies, two senators, and four members who are not members of parliament.

Minister in some ways might have been anticipated. As Governor of Alsace-Lorraine he had made a notable record and he had been actively engaged in public life for a great many years. However, by political profession he was a Republican Socialist, intimately associated with such men as Viviani and Painlevé. Yet there was no question of his patriotism. And as he was reputed to be in favor of renewing diplomatic relations with the Vatican, he was probably acceptable to the Conservatives; at the same time, his socialistic ideas recommended him to the parties of the Left. But on the other hand, his Ministry is sure to be fraught with difficulty. He apparently has overlooked the fact that the new Chamber of Deputies is overwhelmingly Centrist in composition, for seventeen out of the twenty-four members of his Cabinet are Republican Socialists and Radicals. As such, the Cabinet certainly fails to represent the Chamber. Furthermore, the war and M. Clemenceau's Ministry have left to M. Millerand problems which will require the greatest tact and statesmanship to solve. Of these, the financial problem is perhaps the most serious. France has a national debt of 5,161 francs per head. Her budgetary demands for the year 1920 [23] exceed 17,000,000,000 francs, not including war pensions or interest charges on loans for reconstruction, while so far, means for meeting but 10,000,000,000 of these expenditures have been provided. M. Clemenceau's Minister of Finance, Louis Klotz, pinned his hopes on the German indemnity for the ultimate solution of France's difficulty. But the prospect of securing this indemnity seems to grow dimmer with succeeding days. Hence M. Millerand's task is becoming stupendous.

[23] In 1914 the budget was only 5,000,000,000. See also Appendix B.

The new Chamber of Deputies was organized into groups on January 30, 1920. Nine of them filed lists of members with the President of the Chamber. They were as follows:

Republican and Social Action	46 members
Republican Democratic Entente	183
Republican Democratic Left	93
Independents	29
"Non-inscrits"	21
Radical and Radical Socialists	86
Unified Socialists	68
Republicans of Left	61
Republican Socialists[24]	26
	613[25]

The creation of such a large number of groups (although three less than those in the 1914 Chamber) was somewhat disappointing. There seemed to be no reason why the most of them could not have coalesced into two large groups—Conservative and Liberal.

The "Independent" group still includes the Conservatives, the pure Nationalists (including the Monarchists), and a part of the old Liberal Action party, whose parliamentary group has now disappeared.

The "Republican Democratic Entente" had also existed in the old Chamber, where it had arisen from a combination of some Progressists and the right wing of the Democratic Alliance. This group now stands for a Centrist policy. In addition to the Progressists and the members of the Alliance, it contains about forty members of the former Liberal Action group. Under the

[24] It is interesting to note that Aristide Briand has finally enrolled himself with the Republican Socialists.

[25] See *Journal Officiel*, Séance du 30 janvier 1920, Chambre des Députés.

leadership of its President, M. Arago, this group seems to be genuinely and somewhat successfully attempting to unite the moderate Republicans into one organization. Its success is indicated by the fact that it is already the largest group in the Chamber.

Unfortunately, there were some Republicans, including many members of the Democratic Alliance, who refused to join the "Entente." They had formerly constituted the groups of the Republicans of the Left and the Radical Left. In the 1920 Chamber most of the members of these two groups have united into the "Republican Democratic Left." Among its prominent members are MM. André Lefèvre, Barthou, Bérard, and Boret.

Still other members of the Democratic Alliance (old Republicans of the Left) refused to unite with either of the above groups. Consequently, they formed or rather maintained the old group of the "Republicans of the Left." A few progressists and moderates, disturbed at the preponderance of the liberals in the Entente, have also joined this group. MM. Ignace, Loucheur, Tardieu, Le Trocquer, and Paul Simon are among its prominent members.

The "Action Républicaine et Sociale" is an entirely new group. It has been formed by the younger men of the Chamber, belonging to nearly every party from the Catholics to the Republican Socialists. The group desires to work without regard to party lines, and places social reform in the foremost part of its program.

The three groups of the Unified Socialists, the Radicals, and the Republican Socialists exist as they were in the 1914 Chamber.[26]

[26] See *L'Europe Nouvelle, "Sur Les Gradins, dans les Couloirs,"* February 7th and 14th, 1920, and December 27, 1919.

The question arises: what may be expected of this new Chamber? In the first place, there is slight probability that the National *Bloc* will remain intact. Its centrist and conservative elements will doubtless hold together; the Radicals proper may also adhere. But the Radical Socialists, the extreme Left of the Radical party, will unquestionably separate themselves from the *Bloc* and probably come to an understanding with the *Unifiés*. Such was the intention of the Radical Socialist group of the Radical Federation of the Seine, above quoted. But even if the eighty-six members of this group do coöperate with the Unified Socialists, the Extreme Left will only have some 130 votes to oppose to the rest of the Chamber. But the chief significance of the intention of the Radical Socialists to side with the Bolsheviki is that it marks a growing cleavage between them and the Radicals proper. The problem of unity between the Right and the Left divisions of this party has been very grave. The Radicals believed it was solved at the Pau Congress in 1913; but the National *Bloc* of 1919, and the official decision of the party to coöperate with the parties of the Right, again opened up this wound. Its existence will be fatal to future party successes, just as divisions among the Unified Socialists have decreased their strength and prestige. In neither party are there signs of recuperation. It may prove true that Radicalism will be consumed by its own children and bring upon itself an abrupt end.

Secondly, it is probable that the new Chamber will be unalterably opposed to the State Socialist policies inaugurated by the Clemenceau Government and which the Left now insistently urges. However, the Democratic Alliance and the Liberal Action party, if not the

more conservative organizations, are pledged to a platform of social reform and labor amelioration.

From the standpoint of foreign policy, the Chamber will probably support a Ministry which will restore French diplomacy upon its old basis. This will undoubtedly occur if the United States refuses to lend its aid to European affairs. If the League of Nations does not materialize and if America rejects the Alliance, the French Chamber will doubtlessly demand the annexation of the Rhine. It will support a policy which will build up a network of alliances protecting France from Germany. It will purchase these alliances with concessions in principle; i. e., it will consent to the Italian annexation of Fiume and the Polish annexation of Eastern Galicia in return for pledged support. Finally, the Chamber will stand for a policy of aggressive nationalism.

As to clericalism, the Catholics now have a fighting chance to secure the repeal of existing anticlerical legislation. Despite the assertion of Stephen Pichon last June that there was no prospect for the resumption of diplomatic relations with Rome, a recognition of the temporal authority of the Pope is by no means impossible.[27] *Le Journal des Débats* is already advocating such a recognition; and former Prime Minister Viviani and Aristide Briand are even quoted as being in favor of it. The Liberal Action party's demand for the proportional

[27] In a speech made, February 6th, 1920, Premier Millerand said that a resumption of relations with the Vatican was possible. If diplomatic relations are renewed, however, it is not probable that the separation régime in France will be altered in any way. See an article, entitled "*A propos de la politique religieuse,*" *Journal des Débats,* Edition Hebdomadaire, Feb. 6, 1920.

division of school funds and the separate maintenance of Catholic schools also may possibly be granted.

French conservatism has won the day. Upon it rests a tremendous responsibility. If it shows an ability to solve outstanding social questions, the present organization of society will undoubtedly be maintained, and the conservatives will remain in power. On the other hand, if it turns a deaf ear to genuine demands for reconstruction and if it stubbornly maintains outworn formulas, its days will be numbered. The French people may be driven in despair from one extreme of the social order to the other. Although Socialism has its vital defects it may appear to them to be superior to the "stupidity" and rock-like immobility of the present régime. This belief, which can be acquired only through generations of abuse, is the one force of sufficient strength to bring about the advent of Socialism in France. In this respect Socialism is in practically the same stage in France as it is in the United States. Its surest preventive is neither in force nor in a reign of terror; it is in a righteous policy of social reform. The French conservatives are thoroughly aware of their responsibility. They have the interest of the whole nation at heart. There is every reason to believe that they will use their opportunity to heal the burning sores with which France so long has been afflicted.

IX

The Socialist Congress, which was held at Strassburg the 25th of February, 1920, illustrated the growth of the extremist tendencies within the party. This Congress had been preceded by a meeting of the Socialists of the

Department of the Seine (February 8, 1920), at which a program, to be placed before the Strassburg convention, was discussed. The chief question of importance was that of adherence to the Third Internationale—the same subject which had caused so much debate at the Easter Congress. Three motions were introduced, calling for (1) adherence to the present Internationale, (2) reconstruction of the present or Second Internationale, (3) unconditional adherence to the Moscow or Third Internationale. The extremists had gained control of the Socialist organization of the Seine so completely that the Loriot motion demanding immediate adherence to the Bolshevist organization was adopted.

The victory of the "Ultras" in the Seine Congress presaged a severe struggle by them for the control of the Strassburg convention. Here three motions were likewise introduced. The "Reconstructionist" motion, which proclaimed, first, that none of the fundamental declarations of the Moscow Internationale were inconsistent with the essential principles of Socialism; that the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in so far as it might be utilized to assure the transition from a capitalist to a socialist régime, was the basis of every revolutionary conception; and that the creation of workingmen's councils and soviets was a legitimate method of exercising proletariat power. Thus the first part of this motion was an indorsement of the Russian Bolsheviki and their principles. Secondly, the motion provided that the French Section of the Second Internationale should withdraw immediately from the old organization, and that they should call a meeting, in coöperation with the German Independent Socialists, of the members of the Third Internationale, to effect a platform upon which they all could stand. This mo-

tion was important because it really meant the eventual adhesion of the French Socialists to the Third Internationale of Moscow. But of even greater significance, it meant that the French party must expel its members who were opposed to Bolshevist principles. This point was clearly brought out by Loriot in the debates: The Russian Socialists will not associate themselves with opponents or even lukewarm sympathizers of their doctrines.

The second motion was that introduced by the Kienthalians. It called for an unconditional and immediate adherence to the Third Internationale. It was an unabashed declaration in favor of the principles of Bolshevism and their adoption in France.

The third motion was introduced by M. Renaudel, representing the old majority, now so pitifully reduced, which had supported the prosecution of the war. This motion was for adherence to the Second Internationale, providing certain changes were made in its organization and its program.

The vote on these motions was: The Reconstructionist motion, 3,031; the Third Internationale motion, 1,622; the Second Internationale motion, 337.

Thus 4,652 votes were cast in favor of withdrawal from the old Internationale. Although the motion supported by the Longuet element (the Reconstructionist motion) had been adopted, it was a virtual victory for the Kienthalians for, as shown above, it (the Reconstructionist motion) was openly sympathetic with the Bolshevist program. Furthermore, the devoted followers of Loriot, measured by the supporters of his motion, had increased at a rate which must have been alarming to those who still hoped that the Socialists would devote themselves to the needs of the country, rather than

to the sterile expression of "fraternal" sympathies. It will be remembered that at the Easter Congress the Loriot element numbered less than a seventh of the members of the convention. At Strassburg it had increased to over one-half.

This rapid devolution toward the Left thus proceeded unhindered by the results of the November elections. The extremist leaders who now controlled the Socialist party, despite the fact that they had been defeated at the polls, profited little by the lessons of that election. Perhaps their very defeat had but increased their disregard for the will of France and their desire to inaugurate a minority rule. It is needless to add that this extremism will result only in the impairment of the unity of the party and in the diminution of its parliamentary strength.

CHAPTER VII

THE DEMAND FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION

Tant que l'idée républicaine ne se sera pas reconciliée avec l'idée autoritaire, la démocratie française restera inorganique et discutée.—HENRY LEYRET.

I

The Government of the Third Republic is perhaps the most abused and criticized in the world. This criticism does not come from foreigners dissatisfied with the manner in which the French Government fulfills its international obligations or in which it represents its people. But it comes and comes vigorously from Frenchmen themselves. There are a multitude of explanations for this. The French temperament is critical and the "demon of reforms" governs it in a tyrannical fashion. Dissatisfaction is always rampant among a few. Moreover, history has left its survivors, from the Monarchy, the Empire, and the Commune, who, through the curtain of a roseate past, magnify ancient virtues and multiply present vices. The warning of Joseph de Maistre, "Misfortune to bad governments, thrice misfortune to those who try to mend them," does not daunt their demands for political reconstruction.

The charges against the parliamentary form of government in France are the most varied. For the Royalists, Léon Daudet arraigns "this antiquated, useless,

expensive, and fatal instrument, called Parliament, an institution which can only live on civil discords which it stirs up and exploits.'' [1]

The Party of the New Democracy, although not denouncing the Republic as organically evil, attacks its present malfunctioning as responsible for the commercial and industrial ills of France as well as her political misfortunes. These reformists point to the fact that during the history of the Third Republic, France has failed to advance as a material power. Compared with Germany she has woefully and fatally lagged behind.

If France is to be thoroughly renovated after the war, the government ''must be purged on the inside of the band of adventurers and parasites who have taken possession of the Republic . . . and transformed it into an immense employment bureau . . .'' for their friends. ''To-day progress has ceased. The mockery of the clerical peril is worn out. The people are aware that what they defended was not the Republic, but very simply the privileges, positions and favors—the seats of Deputies, the profiteers of the Republic of Comrades. . . . The Republic is common property. No one any longer can think of confiscating it to his profit or to the profit of a sect, but unanimous opinion is that it must be reformed to be rendered habitable. . . .'' [2]

In addition to these somewhat far-fetched attacks, there are many who seriously believe that parliamentary government in France will always be inherently and hopelessly defective. They have no hope that the French party régime will ever approach the stability which is necessary for a satisfactory parliamentary government.

[1] *L'Action Française,* Dec. 13, 1918.
[2] *La Démocratie Nouvelle,* May 3, 1919.

But in its place they really advocate a government based on the principle of the Separation of Powers, such as exists in the United States, with an executive of fixed tenure, and independent of parliamentary control. On the other hand, many believe that the Constitution of 1875 is being violated, that its provisions have been deserted, especially in the reduction of some members of the government to impotency and the elevation of others to virtual supremacy. They therefore demand a clarification of the powers of each governmental branch, and although they are not clear as to the powers they would grant to each, they are very insistent upon elevating the power of the Executive, and making him a force coördinate with Parliament. To effect this, a new constitution really becomes necessary.

The distinction between a government based upon parliamentary responsibility and one based upon the Separation of Powers is very marked. The essentials of the former have already been noted.[3] The latter, which Montesquieu [4] popularized and which the American Government put into practice, assumes the existence of three governing departments: the legislative, the executive and the judiciary, the two former, at least, deriving their powers from the electorate. Each functions in its own sphere and limits the other by a carefully devised system of checks and balances. Thus the legislature makes the laws, but subject to the veto power of the President and the annulling power of the judiciary. The legislature itself is divided into two bodies, each of which prevents usurpation by the other. The President or executive administers the government, limited by the legislative ratification of appointments, appro-

[3] See p. 46.
[4] See Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, Book XI.

priation of funds, directions of law, and when necessary, by impeachment. The judiciary really possesses no positive powers; it merely prevents encroachments; in turn it is indirectly influenced by the appointive and financial power of the executive and the legislature. Such a system, based upon the existence of bodies of nearly equal powers, constantly offsetting each other, is directly opposed to the parliamentary theory, based on the supremacy of the legislative, from which emanates both the executive and the judiciary power.[5]

II

In point of fact, the French Constitution of 1875 does not definitely assert one or the other of these two principles. France has a Republican form of government to-day, not through choice but through circumstance. Consequently, its structure has been molded by custom and usage, even in violation of the spirit of its fundamental document. The Constituent Assembly of 1871-75 was Royalist in composition, and had no intention of bequeathing a Republic to the State. If it had not been for the obstinacy of the Count of Chambord and his insistency that "The king reigns and governs," it appears likely that the monarchy would still exist. But the National Assembly of 1871 did not represent French opinion upon this point, for it had been elected purely upon an issue of peace with Germany. The Republicans, led by Gambetta and Clemenceau, were not for peace; but, on the other hand, the Monarchists were, and the country, completely disarmed by the diplomatic and military

[5] Judiciary to the extent of itself passing on the constitutionality of laws.

stupidity of Napoleon III, was for peace, whatever the cost. Consequently a majority of Monarchists were elected to this Assembly whose original purpose was to "decide on the question, *whether the war ought to be continued, and on what conditions peace ought to be made.*"[6]

But it did not stop when this was achieved. Necessity compelled it to declare a provisional government; in August, 1871, Thiers was given the title of President; and he directed the government until he was forced to retire two years later. His successor, Marshal MacMahon, was elected for a term of seven years (law of the Septennate, November 20, 1873). Meanwhile debate continued between the Royalists, divided among themselves, and the Republicans. As the result of these divisions, and of the country's repugnance to the renewal of the monarchy, a governmental system was designed as a mere *modus vivendi*, operative only so long as neither royalist nor republican tendency became dominant. As a result, the constitution was no complete chart of governmental powers and limitations, containing individual guarantees, such as the eighteenth century philosophers had designed, or such as the American Constitution embodied.[7] On the contrary, it was composed of only five fundamental laws[8] which created

[6] G. Hanotaux, *Contemporary France*, i. 31.

[7] Many legal authorities take the position that personal liberties are still guaranteed to Frenchmen by the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789, despite the fact that the Constitution of 1875 does not renew this declaration. They hold that any law abridging these liberties would be unconstitutional. See Duguit, *op. cit.*, 220, and Esmein, *Droit Constitutionnel* (5th ed.), 499.

[8] These laws were (1) on the organization of the Senate, February 24, 1875; (2) on the Organization of the Public Powers, February 25, 1875; (3) on the Relation of Public Powers, July 16, 1875; (4) on the Election of Senators, August 3, 1875; (5)

certain public powers, and established their relationship and method of election. These laws made no direct mention of the Republic, although they did speak of the President of the Republic in defining his functions; it was not until the amendment of 1884 that "the Republican form of government" was mentioned. The Constituent Assemblies of 1791, of 1793, and of the Year III, preceded their work by a Declaration of the Rights of Man; and the Assembly of 1848 prefaced its Constitution by defining its purpose as the establishment of the Republic; but the laws of 1875 made no mention either of it or of the sovereignty of the people. They are silent upon the nature of the State, its extent and its limitations. No mention is made of even the annual budget or the judiciary.

But as is so well known, no new Constitution was devised at the end of MacMahon's Septennate in 1879. Although the accession of M. Grévy to the presidency definitely assured a Republican form of government, the Constitution originally designed as a makeshift, still remains the law of the land.

It appears that the framers of these laws of 1875 were partly inspired by the theory of parliamentary responsibility, necessary to a constitutional monarchy, and by the theory of the separation of powers, so dearly held in 1791 and in 1848. Professor Duguit denies that this latter conception influenced the Assembly. He says: "The Assembly of Versailles had too much experience

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on the Election of Deputies, November 30, 1875. Amendments have been made to these laws in 1879, 1884, 1885.

See *Les Règlements des Assemblées Législatives*, edited by Félix Moreau and Joseph Delpech, ii, France, 179-263. This work gives in addition to extracts from the Constitutional and Organic Laws, the Regulations governing the procedure and organization of the French Senate and Chamber of Deputies.

with political affairs to consider for a moment as the basis of the political legislation it was to vote, the metaphysical theory of the division of sovereignty into distinct powers. . . ."[9]

But if the Assembly was not inspired by this doctrine, it very indistinctly recognized the other. In fact, it appears to have attempted to incorporate both. The French laws of 1875 provide for a legislative body of two houses, the Chamber and the Senate. Both represent the entire nation, although the first is elected directly and the second indirectly.[10] The executive power

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[9] Léon Duguit, *Manuel de Droit Constitutionnel*, 157. However, in another place Prof. Duguit seems to contradict himself and even to confuse the essential difference between a government of parliamentary responsibility and one of separation of powers. On page 198, after mentioning the checks the Constitution of 1875 placed upon the President and the Chambers, he says, "Notwithstanding these precise provisions, France certainly does not practice the parliamentary system. The political preponderance belongs exclusively to the Parliament, and in Parliament to the Chamber of Deputies. The President of the Republic is in fact no longer considered as a representative organ of the national will, the equal of Parliament, but simply as an executive agent, a parliamentary clerk. . . . Thus without being expressly violated, the Constitution of 1875 has been deformed; it established a parliamentary régime; and up to the war we have come to a sort of an oligarchical régime where omnipotence belongs to a group of politicians who do not represent even a numerical majority of the electoral body." But the essential nature of a parliamentary régime is the subordination of the executive to it; as we shall try to point out, even the President is not the executive; the real executive being a Ministry ordinarily chosen from Parliament and virtually by Parliament itself. As long as this system is maintained, the President will always be a "parliamentary clerk." Prof. Duguit's confusion between these two types of government is general throughout France; those urging an independent and powerful President do not see that such a creation would instantly kill the theory and the practice of parliamentary responsibility.

[10] The Chamber is elected as described in the chapters preceding; the Senate originally was composed of 75 Senators chosen by the National Assembly, and 225 ordinary Senators chosen by departmental electoral colleges, formed of the deputies, general councilors, the arrondissement councilors, and one elected dele-

is vested in a President, elected every seven years by a joint session of the Chamber and the Senate, sitting as the National Assembly at Versailles.[11] Here the first contradiction of the theory of separation of powers and of parliamentary responsibility appears. Under the former theory, the President should be elected by the general electorate, directly or indirectly, in order to assure his independence from Parliament. But the French Constitution provides that he shall be elected by Parliament, thus necessarily making him dependent upon Parliament, as the theory of parliamentary responsibility would do in the case of the Ministry. But the Constitution again returns to the Separation theory by providing that he "is responsible only in case of high treason."[12] Thus in his origin he is dependent on Parliament; in the exercise of this power he is theoretically not responsible to it. But to prevent the abuse of such a fictitious independence, the Constitution further says that "the Ministers are solidarily responsible before the Chambers for the general policy of the Government, and individually for their personal acts."[13] This provision is certainly based on the theory of parliamentary responsibility. The Separation theory is again returned to by providing the President with a suspensive veto and the right of adjournment. But the obtrusion of the executive into the legislative power, in accordance with the English theory, is assured by granting him the initiative in lawmaking and the right of dissolution of the Chamber. But here again, the theory

gate from each municipal council. An amendment of 1884 abolished the life senators, and granted a greater number of delegates to the municipal councils, according to size.

[11] Article II, law of February 25, 1875.

[12] *Ibid.*, Article VI.

[13] *Ibid.*

of checks and balances bobs up by making the assent of the Senate necessary for the Chamber's dissolution.

In theory, the French Constitution granted the President, many of the powers of the executive of both a parliamentary and congressional government,[14] accentuated by the extreme centralization of government activities. If he were allowed to exercise them with the freedom of an executive under a government based on the principle of the Separation of Powers, such as the President of the United States, he would become a powerful, independent and perhaps aggressive authority. This power would be increased by the added authority in legislative affairs which the Constitution grants him. Consequently, there grew up the idea of ministerial responsibility, first used under the presidency of Marshal MacMahon; and the acts of the President have not only been controlled by his Ministry, it being necessary for some one of them to countersign presidential acts, but it has arrogated to itself nearly all of the President's theoretical powers. The President has necessarily become what the English King became when English parliamentarism asserted itself—a symbol of power with its substance held elsewhere. The French President has fared even worse than the English King. As Sir Henry Maine put it, the King of England rules but does not govern, but the President of France neither governs nor rules; he has become, as Casimir-Périer somewhat bitterly remarked after his resignation (he held the office for only 180 days), a mere master of ceremonies. He is paid a salary of $240,000, and given a spacious residence at the Elysée Palace, enabling him to enjoy a brilliant social existence. He guards the

[14] Article III, law of February 25, 1875.

hospitality of the nation toward foreigners, to a certain extent he personifies the State, and he contributes to the continuity of the government, sadly disturbed by passing cabinets. Aside from this, he is dependent on Parliament for his election and on his Ministers for the exercise of executive power.[15]

The Constitution, in creating a responsible Ministry and an irresponsible President, even though it theoretically endowed the latter with vast powers, really created two executives, both of which could not exist under either form of government. Under a government of the separation of powers, the Ministry is solely responsible to the President. Under the theory of parliamentary responsibility, the Ministry is responsible to the Parliament; this can only mean that Parliament may potentially, at least, control the acts of the Ministry. The Ministry cannot be subject to Parliament and to the President at the same time. Legally dependent upon Parliament, the Ministry is under no obligation to the President, whom it controls by the necessity of countersigning his measures. By this means, the President is bound to the Ministry and to Parliament. In sum, a strong independent President and a responsible Ministry are as inconsistent under the French Government as an absolute King and a responsible Cabinet would be

[15] The duties of the President of the Republic were eloquently described by a writer in *La Revue Politique et Parlementaire* (Feb. 10, 1920), as follows:

"M. Poincaré has given the example of seven years of disinterested service, even going to the point of abnegation. Indeed a particularly difficult task for such an intelligent man! To occupy the highest office in the Republic and to be nothing; to understand everything, to be able to say nothing, except to people who do not hear you; to see everything being done, but not to be allowed to command that something be done;—is certainly a sorrowful task, especially in these troublesome times in which the fate of the Republic is daily at stake."

under the British Government. If parliamentarism is to dominate, a strong President cannot exist.

It was very far from the intention of the framers of the French Constitution thus to reduce the President. On the contrary, as seen from his wide grant of powers, they—a monarchist majority—wished to elevate his authority. As a concession necessary to even a constitutional monarchy, a Ministry was created, responsible to Parliament.[16] But no provision was made that members of the Ministry should be chosen from members of Parliament, a custom invariably followed in England, and almost necessary to secure parliamentary control. In France, although a majority of the Ministers are usually taken from the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate, Cabinets often contain members having absolutely no connection with either legislative body.[17]

Furthermore, although the right was incorporated in the Constitution, the President, as we have seen in a previous chapter,[18] has never used the right of dissolution of the Chamber since 1877. Thus the people have been given no opportunity to pass on the merits of a parliamentary-executive struggle; and as Parliament can always overthrow a Ministry, while nothing can overthrow Parliament, the latter, until the regular elections, reigns supreme. The revival of the exercise of the right of dissolution seems to be essential if the theory of parliamentary responsibility is to be fully carried out.

[16] For a thorough description of the government of France, Poincaré's *How France Is Governed*, is of value. The latest work is Joseph Barthélemy's, *Le Gouvernement de la France*, Payot et Cie, Paris.

[17] MM. Loucheur and Claveille, on the 1917 Clemenceau Cabinet were not members of Parliament.

[18] See p. 70.

III

The weaknesses arising from these constitutional inadequacies have led to the demand for a strengthened presidency. The reformist organization, the National Association for the Organization of Democracy, headed by Probus, demands a President chosen by regional assemblies, to serve for a term of six years. This would in a measure sever his original dependence on Parliament. The association also demands that the Ministers be named by the President and be responsible *only* to him. The political program of the Party of the New Democracy likewise asks that the "President be chosen by the Chambers of Commerce and the general Councils of the country . . . who will propose laws and select his Ministers from men of worth, no matter from what circles they come."[19] The Party even demands that members of Parliament be specifically excluded from ministerial positions. The Liberal Action party asks for the extension of presidential powers, and the so-called *plébiscitaires* owe their name to a demand for his popular election; the conservative press generally deplores executive impotency and asks for the actual participation of the President in the government.

Most of these organizations demand that the President's election be taken away from Parliament and placed with the people, either by direct vote or by the creation of an electoral college, apart from Parliament. There is considerably more agitation for the latter than the former. If this change is ever effected, it will open the way for his resumption of power. But this involves

[19] This program is daily printed in *La Démocratie Nouvelle.*

a much greater problem—that of the relation of the Ministry to the President and to Parliament.

The Ministry cannot continue in a responsible relationship with Parliament if the President is to become independent. The two things are mutually inconsistent. If the President is to be independent of parliamentary control, he must be his own Prime Minister, direct Government policies himself, and act as the real head of the government. His Cabinet will assume the same responsibility as the American Cabinet assumes, an individual obligation to the President alone. This will mean the total suppression of ministerial responsibility, the fixity of ministerial tenure, the suppression of parliamentary control, in a word, the substitution of a government based on a separation of powers for the present form based on parliamentary responsibility, partial as it is.

There are at least two other reforms urged to remedy present defects, and which will complete the separation of powers in the French Government. The first of these is in strengthening the French Senate. The long term (nine years) of its members and its indirect system of election naturally make it conservative. In the spring of 1919 it defeated the Chamber's bill granting governmental officials the right to organize;[20] until recently it repeatedly rejected Chamber bills of electoral reforms;[21] it appears to have also defeated the bill for woman's suffrage. Still it feels the weight of opinion, as its passage of the eight-hour law shows. Its opposition, however, seems to be the chief source of its influence; and as it is gradually lessening, the conservative elements demand a rebirth of power. Many ask a change in the manner in which the Senate is chosen. The

[20] See p. 354.
[21] See p. 160.

Radical party has gone as far as to ask its direct election; others demand an electoral college from which deputies are eliminated. In addition to freeing it from this legislative trammel, a more active assertion of the Senate's power, especially in ministerial control, is urged. Theoretically, the French Senate has identical powers with those of the Chamber, except in the matter of money bills. The Senate, in addition, acts as a High Court of Justice. According to the Constitution, the Ministry is as much responsible to the Senate as to the Chamber. But it is very seldom that a law of any importance originates in the Senate; the Government projects are usually first introduced in the Chamber. From the legislative standpoint, the Senate acts as a mere ratifying body.

In the past the Senate has exercised some control over the Ministry. By votes of lack of confidence, refusal of credits, political opposition, or personal action, it caused the overthrow of the Tirard Cabinet in 1890, the Bourgeois Cabinet in 1896, the Caillaux Cabinet in 1912 and the Briand Cabinet in 1913. Question of confidence have been asked from it by the Dupuy Cabinet in 1899 on the question of expropriation, by the Waldeck-Rousseau Cabinet in 1900 on the law of amnesty, by the Rouvier Cabinet in 1905 on the law of separation, and by the Clemenceau Government in 1908 on the purchase of the Western railway.[22] But aside from these examples, the Senate now never attempts to overturn a Ministry, and if it were to, it is doubtful if a Ministry would resign. Despite the demand for the reassertion of the Senate's equality of powers, it is difficult to see how that body can occupy a place coördinate with the Chamber, in a

[22] These cases are cited in Leyret, *Le Gouvernement et le Parlement*, 86.

government based on parliamentary responsibility. In England the interference of the House of Lords in the legislation of the Commons has become so inconsistent that by the terms of the Parliament Act of 1911 money bills passed by the latter become effective without the consent of the Lords, and other public bills, having been passed by the Commons in three successive sessions, though rejected by the Lords in each of these sessions, likewise become effective.[23] From the parliamentary standpoint, the Senate cannot readily reflect the changing opinion of the country because of its indirect election and fixed tenure. There is no provision in the French Constitution for the dissolution of the Senate. It is not intended that it shall be a popular but a deliberative body of restraint. Although this is its virtue in a government based on the separation of powers, it is absolutely inconsistent with the parliamentary system in which the legislative body controlling the Ministry must be directly responsible to the people. In fairness, it must be added that under the French system, where the right of dissolution of the Chamber is never exercised, it is just as logical for the Senate as for the Chamber to vote a Ministry out of office on the ground of being a responsible body. However, if such a principle were admitted, a very difficult situation might arise in which the Senate would vote confidence in a Ministry, at the same time and upon the same issue as the Chamber passed a vote of lack of confidence. So long as the theory of ministerial responsibility is retained, it is difficult to see how two branches of the legislature can exercise concurrent powers.

The other reform, certainly part of the Separation

[23] For details of this Act, see F. A. Ogg, *The Governments of Europe*, 112-113.

of Powers theory, though it may not be inconsistent with Parliamentarism, is the establishment of a Supreme Court. The Constitution of 1875 overlooked the judiciary, and the Court of Cassation has never attempted to pass upon the constitutionality of laws. The only distinction between an ordinary and constitutional law is a formal one; the Presidents of the two legislative houses frequently rule upon the constitutionality of propositions placed before the Chambers.[24] If Parliament finds itself definitely obstructed by a constitutional provision, which it rarely does because the Constitution of 1875 contains few limitations, it can itself, meeting as the National Assembly and by a majority vote, amend the Constitution. Thus Parliament is the interpreting and the amending power of the Constitution. This is indeed contrary to the Separation of Powers theory, where the Constitution is interpreted by the courts and where amendments cannot be passed solely by legislative enactment.

Friends of a Supreme Court wish it to assure the metaphysical liberty which Montesquieu asserted would be destroyed "if the power of judging is not separated from the legislative and executive power. If it were joined to the legislative power, control over the life and the liberty of citizens would be arbitrary, because the judge would be the legislator. If it were joined to the executive power, the judge would have the force of an oppressor."

The New Democracy party advocates "a supreme court, composed of enlightened men, chosen for a long

[24] On April 4, 1919, President Deschanel of the Chamber ruled the Raynaud resolution asking the government to secure complete German disarmament, unconstitutional on the grounds that it interfered with Article VIII of the law of July 26, 1875, giving the President sole power in treaty negotiations.

period, watching over the constitutional laws and nullifying abusive acts of power." The Liberal Action party, to assure the guarantee of religious liberty, removed from the "caprices of parliamentary majorities," also advocates a "rigid Constitution confided, as in the United States, to the care of an independent Supreme Court."[25] The National Association for the Organization of Democracy calls for a similar reform.[26]

[25] Quoted in Jacques, *op. cit.*, 486.

[26] The attitude of the Progressist Republicans toward the present French Government may be understood from the following excerpt from their program:

"For forty years the Republic has been erected, or rather, encamped, as bad as it is, upon the ruins of the Imperial palace, itself hastily rebuilt with the rubbish of former ruins, upon a soil formed of fourteen centuries of monarchy. . . . For forty years we have followed the paradox of making a democracy live without the organs of a democracy; so although the monarchical organs have been abolished, the democratic organs have not been created and the vital functions (of government) are no longer carried out. Thus we present to the world the spectacle of a Republic in which essential liberties are not guaranteed, and where every power is overlapped and confused, without a moderating force to control, limit and divide them. In a monarchy this power exists and is naturally affirmed in the king. In a democracy, invaded by a parliament, where it is none the less necessary, this can only be done by a supreme tribunal of adjudication—from whence comes the necessity of establishing a Supreme Court.

"To be unlimited (in power) is undoubtedly one of the worst faults of parliamentary government such as we practice it; but this is not the only nor even the first defect which must be remedied. The crisis in the parliamentary régime is evident. . . . The true cause, the fundamental cause, is the fact that the balance is broken between our political institutions and our social state. This parliamentarism, so awkwardly imitated from the English, a system which suited England chiefly in the seventeenth or eighteenth century, and which is already much less suited to contemporary England, this régime which is based upon an aristocracy or at least a bourgeoisie, upon a very intelligent, moral and independent governing class, as disinterested as men can be, it is not impossible to adapt to a democracy; but it must be adapted to it. One of the great problems of the future will certainly consist in reëstablishing this lost equilibrium, in placing political institutions and particularly parliamentary institutions in harmony with the social state. . . ."

Quoted from the account of the "Congrès de 1912," under

The Supreme Court is undoubtedly an essential institution in a government of the Separation of Powers. But in a parliamentary government, it again appears to be anomalous and an interference in the will of the nation expressed through a responsible Parliament and Ministry. The place of the Supreme Court may be a question apart from that of Parliamentarism; but even as a feature in a Separatist government, it has been severely criticized. The United States has been the chief example of its use; it is indeed true that the court has exercised a tremendous power and that, as de Tocqueville said, "in the hands of the judges of the Supreme Court the peace, the prosperity, and the very existence of the Union, reposes." But it is a matter of doubt whether we have been spared any of the turpitudes in which the supposedly ill-considered action of French and English parliamentarism has resulted.

IV

If these reforms are ever inaugurated in France, they will result in the conduct of the government by an aggressive and independent President, in complete charge of the public administration; in the assertion by the Senate of powers commensurate with those of the Chamber; in a Ministry subordinate and responsible only to the President whose tenure of office will be fixed by law; in a Supreme Court to adjudge the relations of each. Such reforms will necessitate a new Constitution, and these organizations complete their demands for

Programme du Parti, brochure issued by the *Fédération Républicaine.* This part of the program is repeated in substance in 1913 and 1914.

reform by asking for the calling of a Constituent Assembly. Their adoption would mean the complete submersion of the French cabinet as it is to-day constituted as well as the position of the Prime Minister, or as he is called in France, the President of the Council. It would likewise mean that Parliament would no longer cause the fall of a Ministry. In sum, French parliamentary government would be completely overthrown. The French reformists appear to hide this result, but an examination of the implications of their demands will indicate that such an outcome would be inevitable.

Generally speaking, something is to be said for both forms of government. Theoretically, the ministerial responsibility theory is much the more democratic. The division of sovereignty among three distinct powers has no real basis. Such a conception holds that the finality of power is in the *gouvernants*, and that its exercise can be controlled only by its balanced division between them. Such a conception further looks upon the *gouvernés*, the electorate, as a ward in the charge of the *gouvernants*. Although the latter must have their powers periodically renewed, the exercise of those powers is theoretically subject to no control. But as a matter of fact, the source of all power must come from the *gouvernés* who are at the same time *gouvernants*, merely exercising a power of surveillance and control.[27] At least, such is the theory under a government of parliamentary responsibility,—that the people are supreme. Now the advantage of the Separation of Powers is that it checks hasty and harmful action on the part of a

[27] The great objection to Prof. Duguit's theory (see p. 358) is that he regards the *gouvernants*, the stronger, in permanent and irresponsible possession of power over the *gouvernés*, the weaker; in reality, the *gouvernants* are mere agents of the *gouvernés*;—by no means stronger, often weaker.

legislative body subject to no restraint. But in so far as controlling the different organs of government, it does not appear to function any better than (or as well as) a parliamentary government. As for the ill-considered acts of a single legislative body, arising from passion and from misinformation, it may be said that the increased study being given to public affairs, outside of legislative circles, in the press and at the universities, is gradually sweeping away the ignorance with which public opinion formerly might have been charged. Also, the character of men serving in legislative bodies, in the majority of cases, is inferior both as to the knowledge of affairs and in capacity of judgment to that of the men who direct public thought outside of legislative circles. The latter, in fact, usually control the decisions of Congressmen. In the last analysis, it is public opinion, the *gouvernés*, which decides. From this standpoint, a parliamentary government more surely reflects the popular will.

The conflicts between the 65th and the 66th Congresses and President Wilson have certainly illustrated the defects of a government based on the Separation of Powers theory. Opponents of the President, some of them opponents of the war, were speakers in the House of Representatives and heads of congressional committees on which the functioning of the government was dependent. Filibustering, the blocking of appropriations, and other obstructionist measures were used in the attempt to hinder the exercise of executive power. Of more international importance was the Senate opposition to the Peace Treaty. The country, through the press, business, social and religious organizations, seemed to demand the ratification of the Peace Treaty and to desire a League of Nations. But because of the

provisions of our Constitution, a minority (one-third) in one branch of the legislature, in the Senate, is able completely to block ratification. Such a situation could not long exist under a parliamentary government. If at any time a difference between the executive and the legislative powers should arise, the former would dissolve the latter, the country would decide the issue, and the power decided against would find itself out of office. In the particular case of the Treaty, under such a system, members of Congress would run for reëlection on a platform standing for the ratification of the Treaty unamended, its adoption with amendments or reservations, or its complete rejection. The decision would be with the country. Ordinarily, as suggested, these defects in America are overcome by the forces of public opinion. But under our form of government there is no legal and forcible way of making this public opinion felt, if the Senate or Congress stubbornly closes its ear to it.

Aside from the general objection to the theory of the Separation of Powers, there are others peculiar to France itself, which will work against its adoption there. We have spoken elsewhere of the centralization of power in France, the vesting of which in an independent executive would be of the greatest danger.[28] This danger is exaggerated by the fear of the reëstablishment of a popular dictatorship. Even yet, the defenders of the Republic are haunted by the chilling apparition of the Napoleonic Empire. Napoleon Bonaparte will ever be enshrined among the French Immortals even though his body may not lie within the Pantheon. His is a name to summon sentiments which the anonymity of Parliaments can never arouse. Napoleon appealed to the people. No ordinary despot, he declared:

[28] See pp. 340, 341, 373-384.

I am the emperor of the peasants, of the plebeians of France. In spite of all that has passed, you see how the people return to me. There is sympathy between us, because I am arisen from the ranks; I am different from the privileged classes.

And the French people have shown the same devotion to his descendants as they did to him; it was illustrated in the manner in which they elected Louis Bonaparte to the Assembly under the Second Republic; in the 4,000,000 majority they gave him for the Presidency over General Cavaignac; and finally in the tremendous majority of nearly 7,000,000, which approved his establishment of the Second Empire. Even though the peasants may have thought they were voting for Napoleon I, Napoleon III and his descendants still inspire a dread in the defenders of the Republic. The country and the commercial populations of France, reënforced by their disdain for petty politicians, can be readily captured by a leader of persuasive powers.

This fear has not only extended to the line of the Napoleons, but also to such others as General Boulanger who have tried to overturn the Republic. General Boulanger was Minister of War from January, 1886, to May, 1887. On account of the adoption of certain army reforms and his popularization by music-hall songs, he became associated as the leader of the movement of "revanche" against Germany. Due to the apathy of the Government toward this movement, he was very free in his criticism; and in 1887, while commanding an army corps, he was arrested for remarks made against the Government. Supported by a band of malcontents, composed largely of Orleanists, he soon attracted a great popular following; in 1888 and 1889 he was elected Deputy from several districts; and the Government mo-

mentarily feared a *coup d'état*, overturning it and establishing Boulanger as President, independent of parliamentary control; a position which it was certain he would eventually turn over to the royalty. But the General did not have the courage of his illustrious predecessors; and from fear of prosecution by the Government, he fled to Brussels, where in 1891 he committed suicide. The Senate subsequently convicted him of malfeasance, and it was later definitely established that he was in the pay of the Royalists, the Duchesse d'Uzès having furnished him with a fund of three million francs.

At the time of the Dreyfus affair,[29] another attempt was made to overthrow the Republic by a motley coterie of nationalists such as André Buffet, Paul Déroulède and Jules Guérin. The stern action of the Senate likewise prevented or at least punished their attempt.[30]

[29] The Dreyfus case was that of a Jew, Captain Alfred Dreyfus, who in 1894 was tried and convicted of giving military information to Germany. On January 5, 1895, he was conducted to the courtyard of the Ecole Militaire in Paris and publicly degraded, and then exiled on the Ile du Diable, although he repeatedly declared his innocence. Finally, upon the suicide of Colonel Henry who confessed to have committed a forgery, upon which evidence Dreyfus was convicted, and on the agitation of the Socialists and Liberals against an obviously anti-Semitic and nationalist movement, the Court of Cassation ordered a retrial. Another court martial sat at Rennes in 1899; he was again convicted but pardoned by President Loubet. The question was again opened in 1906 by the Court of Appeal which declared the decision annulled. Dreyfus was reinstated in the army; and it is understood he served as a Colonel in the Great War and was decorated for bravery.

[30] The Senate has justified its existence in the Republic by the part it has played as a High Court of Justice. It has acted in this capacity on four occasions: (1) In 1889, for the first time, it adjudged Boulanger, Henri Rochefort and Count Dillon, his henchmen, (2) in 1899 it tried Déroulède, Marcel Habert, Buffet, Guérin, etc., and condemned them to banishment, (3) 1901, it condemned M. de Lur Saluces to 5 years' banishment, (4) August 1918, it banished M. Malvy, former Minister of the Interior, for

These various efforts made to overturn the Republic have led to the strengthening of the legislative side of the government as being the most difficult to overcome. The creation of a strong, independent executive would immediately lay the position open to seizure or usurpation by the Royalists. That this fear is still real may be shown by a motion, unanimously adopted by the National Congress of the Radical Socialist Party in 1903, condemning the Government for having appointed a former Boulangist as Consul-General to New Orleans.[31]

At the Congress of Tours in 1913 a motion for the abolition of the Senate was voted down by this same party, chiefly on the ground that as a High Court of Justice, the Senate is the bulwark of the Republic.

Now that the Republic is firmly established, it may be that these fears will subside. Naturally they will exist much longer than their cause. Until they are overcome, a government of the Separation of Powers is not likely to be established. If the defects of the present party régime are not remedied, if the right of dissolution is not recognized, and if Ministers are not chosen from the Parliament, it seems certain that French parliamentarism, with its defects as well as its virtues, will continue to exist.

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five years. It is now trying M. Caillaux in that capacity (April, 1920).

[31] See Armand Charpentier, *Le Parti Radical et Radical-Socialiste à travers ses Congrès*, 367.

CHAPTER VIII

SYNDICALISM: PROGRAM AND TACTICS

Un peu de désordre est profitable à la liberté; comme l'erreur, témoignage de l'activité inventive, est utile à la science.—
MAXIME LEROY.

I

The point of departure and the point of arrival of Syndicalism and Socialism are identical. Both demand the creation of a new society in which the capitalist is suppressed. To both Marxian formulas and conceptions are common property. The difference between the two appears to be in the means by which a Marxian society is to be erected. Socialism, at least of the old French school, demands its conquest by the acquisition of political power. Syndicalism, inspired by the philosophies of Georges Sorel, Lagardelle, and Berth, on the other hand, denies the worth of political means and asserts that direct action alone is powerful enough to introduce the new order. Direct action means, first, the general strike[1] so to disorganize means of production that capi-

[1] See Chapters IV and V, Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*. G. Sorel's distinction between Socialism and Syndicalism is of interest: "Parliamentary Socialists may be compared to the officials whom Napoleon made into a nobility and who labored to strengthen the State bequeathed by the Ancient Régime. Revolutionary Syndicalism corresponds well enough to the Napoleonic armies whose soldiers accomplished such heroic acts, knowing all the time they would remain poor. What remains of the Empire? Nothing but the epic of the Grand Armée. What will remain

tal will be obliged to capitulate. It means also the boycott; and although the Syndicalists are not loud in proclaiming the doctrine in France now, it means sabotage, —the destruction of instruments of production. To the out-and-out anarchists who form the left wing of the French Syndicalist movement, it may mean assassination and destruction by bombs.

The labor union, according to the Syndicalists, is the natural organ for carrying on the class struggle. In fact, outside of the union,—the organized force of labor, —there can be no class struggle. The Syndicalists, furthermore, plan the government of their new society upon the basis of the union and groups of unions. Although Socialism is satisfied with political democracy as it now is, for the political foundation of the communist state, Syndicalism, repudiating parliaments, governments and laws, places the complete direction of public and industrial affairs in its labor bodies. Unions in coöperation with each other will suffice for the needs of society. Syndicalism is sufficient unto itself.[2]

The French organization which includes the exponents of the theory of revolutionary Syndicalism, is the *Confédération Générale du Travail* (the General Confederation of Labor), popularly known as the C. G. T. It claims to have from 900,000 to 2,300,000 members affiliated with it, ranging from day-laborers to school

of the present Socialist movement will be the epic of the strikes." *Reflections*, 299.

M. Sorel also says: "Syndicalists do not propose to reform the State, as the men of the eighteenth century did; they want to destroy it, because they wish to realize this idea of Marx's that the Socialist revolution ought not to culminate in the replacement of one governing minority by another minority. . . ." *Reflections on Violence*, 123.

[2] For a detailed discussion of the differences between Socialism and Syndicalism, see Bertrand Russell's *Proposed Roads to Freedom*.

teachers and dramatists.[3] The Confederation itself is the product of a series of under-organizations which have the union as their fundamental basis. About two thousand of these unions are associated in the federation. They in turn are grouped into forty-three national federations of industry, each representing a separate industry, delegates from which compose the Confederation. The worker joins the union of his trade, the union joins the federation of its industry, and the federation adheres to the C.G.T. In addition to these federations of national industry, the C.G.T. is composed of the *Bourses du Travail,* which are local, regional or department groupings of unions of all industries. This grouping, therefore, is not by industry but by region. No labor union can become a part of the Confederation if it is not nationally federated or if it does not belong to a *Bourse du Travail* or to some other kind of union of department, regional or local groups. Each organization, whether national federation or *Bourse du Travail,* affiliated with the C. G. T., is represented by one delegate, the total number of these delegates forming the confederal committee.[4] The General Confederation of Labor is divided into two sections, corresponding to its composition, (1) the section of the federations of industry, and (2) the section of the federation of the *Bourses du Travail.* Each section has its own officers. The confederal committee, formed of the union of the officers of these two sections, directs the entire federation. The organization has three important committees, one on

[3] See pp. 352, 366.

[4] This is a very undemocratic provision as a local *Bourse du Travail* is given the same representation as a national federation containing many times as many members.

strikes, one on control, and one on the supervision of *La Voix du Peuple,* the official paper of the federation.[5]

Ever since the complete independence of the C. G. T. was announced at the Congress at Havre in 1912, it has remained aloof from the Socialist party, although Socialist candidates have received thousands of votes from Syndicalist members. The Syndicalists, despite their theoretical opposition to political Socialism, nevertheless vote for Socialist candidates in preference to the bourgeoisie. The C. G. T. prided itself, before the war, upon its abstention from political affairs. Three different factions, however, were to be recognized in the organization: First, the revolutionary element which saw in Syndicalism an entire sufficiency for labor's needs, and which therefore demanded an immediate revolution and the erection of a labor State. Second, the Guesdists, who believed in the use of legislative as well as direct action and favored collaboration with the Socialists. Third, the reformists, who did not believe that the Syndicalist movement should go beyond the urging of purely economic demands.

The Syndicalist organizations rallied, as did the Socialists, to the support of the war.[6] M. Jouhaux, the secretary-general of the C. G. T., served on a government committee of "national relief," along with an archbishop, a rabbi, a Protestant minister, a Royalist,

[5] For a history of syndical organization in France, of the different tendencies in the syndicalist movement, and of the extent of syndical organization among agricultural workers, see M. Martin Saint-Léon, *Syndicalisme Ouvrier et Syndicalisme Agricole,* Paris, Payot Co., 1920.

[6] Before the war the Government kept a list of the names of revolutionary workmen, known as "Le Carnet B," who were to be arrested on the outbreak of war. When the war came these men were not arrested, but were trusted. For two years France went without a strike.

and a Radical. A representative of the C. G. T. served on a government committee for war factory personnel; a representative likewise was on the committees of Economic Action and the National Coöperative Federation. As proof of its entrance in the field of political action, the C. G. T. repeatedly demanded the repression of the censorship, the granting of an amnesty, non-intervention in Russia, and the raising of the state of siege. It joined the Socialists in a manifesto addressed to President Wilson upon his first arrival in Paris in December, 1918. It also joined a Socialist and Radical protest against the condemnation of Malvy. Its official existence was recognized by the Government in the appointment of M. Jouhaux as the representative of French Labor at the Peace Conference. Moreover, the C. G. T. was officially frank in its denunciation of the Peace Conference. Thus, in a multitude of ways, it has definitely entered the political world.[7]

During the five years of the war, the C. G. T. was controlled by such moderates as M. Jouhaux. But toward the end of the war a strong minority movement arose under the leadership of Pierre Monatte, editor of *La Vie Ouvrière*, which drew its chief support from the International Woodworkers' Union and the Metal Workers.

II

The moderates and the extremists of the C. G. T. compromised upon a program of Minimum Demands which were published by the confederal committee in December, 1918. After asserting that the solution of

[7] See an article on French labor by Albert Thomas, in the London *Times* (French number) of September 6, 1919.

the present crisis rests exclusively upon the laboring class, it admits that it will not "be sufficient to change the political order by making the revolution," for the development of production must be increased. But to realize immediate reforms "is not to abdicate the ideal of the revolution; on the contrary, it is to prepare for the new order toward which we are guided."[8] This is certainly a moderate statement compared with those which the advocates of the general strike and sabotage were making.

The program asked for the creation of a league of nations, the abolition of protective tariffs, the end of economic wars, the creation of an office of international transportation to divide raw materials among nations, and general disarmament.

It asked that the individual liberties, suspended during the war, be reëstablished.

Under the caption of "the Rights of Labor," it demanded that labor no longer be treated as a commodity, that the equality of the two sexes be recognized, that functionaries be given the right to organize, and that collective bargaining regulate wages and conditions of labor. It asked for an eight-hour day in commerce, industry and agriculture, and for the prohibition of night-work in bakeries, etc., and in any industry in which women, or children of less than eighteen years, are employed. It asked that the compulsory school period be prolonged to fourteen years.

It demanded the creation of a national economic council, upon which unions should have responsible representatives, to draw up the general principles of demobilization and economic reconstruction.

[8] Brochure distributed by the confederal committee.

It asked that the devastated regions be reconstructed, not by private contractors, but by collective organizations of producers, consumers, and government officials. Workers' lodgings and public playgrounds should be created by municipalities.

The program insisted that property is a trust, held by individuals for the good of society, and that the nation should watch over the exercise of property rights which owe their value to the protection of society. If it is not desirable that the State directly produce everything, the program asserted that the production of necessities should be minutely regulated (i. e., the conditions of labor and the division of profits) by the State. Such a control should be exercised in industries which still permit the play of initiative and competition.

But whenever a private monopoly gains control of raw materials, products, or organizations, the program says that the State should appropriate it for society. The State must "establish its social right to collective wealth and to the means of producing or exchanging it." Public monopolies should not be operated by the old centralized statism, but by decentralized and autonomous groupings of producers, consumers and government officials.

The C. G. T. also demanded measures against alcoholism, poor-housing, unemployment, and disability.

The program declared that a foreign worker is entitled to all the privileges of French union organizations and should receive the same salary as a French laborer for the same work. The recruiting of foreign labor should be controlled by the labor organizations of the country of emigration.

It also asked that social insurance be extended to cover the total amount of the salary of a victim of a

labor accident during his incapacity. Industrial disease should be considered in the same category as accidents.

As measures to combat the cost of living, it asked the abolition of tariffs and the *octroi*, and the creation of a public service of alimentation upon which there should be Labor representatives.

As will be noted at once, the program of the C. G. T. is very much more moderate and practical than that of the Socialist party. The C. G. T. offers some very definite functions for the Society of Nations to perform; the Socialists condemn the League as an organ of capitalism. The C. G. T. engages in no defense or justification of Marxian theories as do the Socialists. It makes no sweeping accusations; it speaks neither of the revolution nor of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It affirms the supremacy of the State and asserts the doctrine that private property is but a trust from the State to be exercised for the good of collectivity. Although this program was doubtless framed with many *arrière-pensées,* it was a serious effort toward French reconstruction which others outside of the labor world, such as the Radical party, could have endorsed. A victory for the moderates, the program was naturally an object of scorn for the extremists who believed that the revolution by direct action was the sole legitimate object of the C. G. T. At any rate, the realization of these Minimum Demands now became the official aim of the C. G. T. by the First of May, the Labor Day of Europe. If the country by that time did not see fit to grant these demands, the C. G. T. insinuated that it would not return to work until compliance had been secured.

III

Labor agitation was stimulated by the unrest following the armistice, an unrest which grew steadily because of the uncertainty of the peace negotiations. The cost of living, *la vie chère,* and the consequent inadequacy of salaries were even a greater force in provoking discontent.

French wages are inconceivably low. According to the publications of the Ministry of Labor,[9] the average salaries of agricultural workers are 800 francs a year. Journeymen printers receive a daily wage of 4 fr. 06; tanners, 3 fr. 35; saddlers, 3 fr. 50; shoemakers, 3 fr. 24; tailors, 3 fr. 73; wheelwrights, 3 fr. 37; coopers, 3 fr. 68; cabinet makers, 3 fr. 99; upholsterers, 4 fr. 15; carpenters, 4 fr. 15; joiners, 3 fr. 86; coppersmiths, 4 fr. 46; tinworkers, 3 fr. 89; plumbers, 4 fr. 04; blacksmiths, 4 fr. 20; locksmiths, 3 fr. 82; masons, 3 fr. 94; day-laborers, 2 fr. 67. Mine workers receive an average of 1,300 francs ($260) a year; employees in commerce, about 1,200 francs ($240); railway labor received 4 or 5 francs a day.

The Government paid its laborers even less; thus the roadkeepers received from 500 to 1,000 francs a year; foresters, 975 francs; prison-keepers in the provinces, 1,365 francs; mail-carriers, 800 to 1,200 francs in the country; canal-keepers, 500 to 700 francs; customs collectors, 1,100 to 1,200 francs. Such a salary was virtually a starvation wage, even before the war.

It was little wonder, consequently, that repeated demands were made for increases to keep up with the tremendous bounds which the cost of living made during

[9] Quoted in Lysis, *Vers la Démocratie Nouvelle,* 65.

the five years of the war as elsewhere. This cost rose out of all proportion to the rise in wages. If one considers wholesale prices in France in 1914 as 100, this increase would be denoted as follows:

December, 1914	113.	June, 1917	271.8
June, 1915	140.3	January, 1918	279.
January, 1916	166.7	June, 1918	380.
June, 1916	192.4	September, 1918	410.6
January, 1917	207.8		

Retail prices likewise increased, but not to the same extent. Thus, the retail price of food products increased in towns of more than 100,000, 233 per cent between July, 1914, and April, 1918. In other words, it would take $233 to buy at the latter date what $100 bought before the war. According to figures published in *Le Petit Journal*[10] the price of beef, mutton, pork, and veal increased nearly six times between 1914 and March, 1919; eggs, cheese and butter increased four times. Eggs were selling in the spring of 1919 at nine cents a piece; and butter rose from forty cents in 1914 to two dollars a pound in 1919. According to the statistics of the C. G. T., it would take 9,000 francs ($1,800) a year for a family of two to live upon decently—an amount far greater than the average laborer or even professional salaried man received. In comparison with other countries, it would take sixty-two cents in Paris to buy what forty cents purchased in New York or thirty-five cents bought in London; making the cost of living in Paris from fifty to seventy-five per cent higher than in New York or in London.

Despite the efforts of the Government through the establishment of the so-called Vilgrain booths, in which the Government sold goods directly to the consumer,

[10] Issue of March 13, 1919.

succeeding months did not diminish the cost of living, itself partly caused by a stupid Government control.[11] This factor led to much discontent which took the form of repeated strikes. The strikes upon the transportation lines in Paris in the latter part of January, 1919, were among the first. The men asked for a wage increase of two francs a day, shorter hours and other reforms; but the strike came to an abrupt end on the 25th of January by the Government requisition and operation of the "metros" on a military basis, it being understood that the demands would be settled favorably later. At the same time and later the electricians, the street-sweepers, who before the war received twenty dollars a month, the employees in the great banking firms, such as the Crédit Lyonnais and the Bourse, whose salary at the end of four years' service was only ninety cents a day, the women employees in the department stores, who demanded a salary of at least forty dollars a month, stopped work in what appeared to be thoroughly just demands for a living wage.

IV

It was perhaps of some significance that the C. G. T., instead of directing its energies toward the increase of wages during the early months of the armistice, occupied itself with securing the "eight-hour day"[12] one of the most important of its Minimum Demands. On March 5th, the Secretary-General of the Railway Federation wrote to M. Clemenceau, saying that the men

[11] See pp. 314-332. Also Appendix B.

[12] For an excellent treatise upon French labor legislation, see Paul Pic, *Traité de Législation Industrielle.*

were absolutely determined upon the immediate realization of this reform. At a session of the Confederal Committee of the C. G. T., from March 22nd to 25th, the matter of the application of the eight-hour day was taken up. The committee resolved that the "efforts of all organizations must be coördinated to assure a demonstration of power and of will on the first of May, 1919. After the warning which the manifestation of the first of May will express, it will fall upon the Federations . . . to limit the period of negotiations and to fix a date for the application of the demand." Thus if Parliament refused to pass a law to that effect or if the employers refused to install the eight-hour day, the C. G. T. was determined to force it upon them.

During the month of April, a propagandist campaign for the eight-hour day was very effectively carried on throughout France. Graphic appeals, in writing and by cartoon, were made to laborers everywhere to support the demands of the C. G. T., and especially to coöperate in the May Day celebration. About the first of April, seven of the principal national federations belonging to the C. G. T. organized a "cartel" to promote the agitation of the eight-hour reform and to lay plans for the first of May. This "cartel" was formed of representatives of the federations of the railway workers, the miners, the dock employees, the marine workers, the firemen, the transport workers, and the metal workers. They pledged their own organizations to a complete cessation of work on the first of May, and persuaded other organizations not represented in the "cartel," such as the clothing workers, the butchers and the men in the building trades, to cease work also.

Hastened by the threatening attitude of different labor organizations and the disturbance which featured

the Jaurès manifestation of Sunday, April 6, 1919, the Government laid a project before the Chamber granting the eight-hour day. The text of this law provided that the duration of work for laborers of either sex or of any age in industry and commerce should not exceed eight hours a day or forty-eight hours a week. Administrative regulations were to determine what delays and under what conditions this day would be installed in each industry. These regulations were to be drawn up only after both employers' and employees' organizations had been consulted.

On the 17th of April, 1919, discussion upon this project was opened by Albert Thomas who asserted that labor would produce as much in eight as in ten hours. M. Thomas moved an amendment to the bill providing that the salary of the reduced day remain the same as formerly. Upon the assurance of M. Colliard that the law carried such guarantees, the amendment was defeated by a vote of 253 to 233. But M. Briand again showed his magnetic power by reintroducing the identical amendment and vigorously asserting its necessity. After a lively debate with the Minister of Labor, his amendment was finally carried by a show of hands. Immediately afterward the whole bill was passed. On the 23rd of April the Senate voted the law without modification. Thus one of the chief points in the Minimum Demands of the C. G. T. had been won without direct action, but by a sort of threatening persuasion.

The conservative element, although timorous in expressing its opinion, felt that the adoption of this law at such a time was harmful. Despite whatever logic there was in the theory that men would do as much in eight as in ten hours, it was certain that they would not do so until after a period of readjustment. But it was

just at this time that France needed to devote all its energy to reconstruction problems. A shortened working day would exaggerate the cost of living, give Labor more leisure to be exploited by unscrupulous leaders, and, on the whole, retard the requickening of French life.[13] Labor, however, assumed that the strategic time to force this reform—that is, the time when its force was the strongest and the Government's the weakest—had come. Unquestionably it was a great measure in Labor's amelioration; but it had issued out of a purely class struggle in which Labor had proved its superior force.

V

The passage of the law did not lessen preparations for the fête of the First of May. Although the principle

[13] For a very fair statement of this point of view and for a general discussion of the effects of the eight-hour law, see an article in *La Revue Bleue* October 11, 1919, entitled "*La Journée de huit heures,*" by Paul Pic, professor of law in the University of Lyons.

In February, 1920 (*Temps*, Feb. 14), the Lille Chamber of Commerce passed a resolution asking for the modification of the eight-hour day law. It stated that this law had disorganized branches of production, decreased activity in the mines, industry, and transportation, that it had led to increased prices in manufactures, and of foremost importance, it had led to a coal shortage.

The output of the French mines in 1919, excluding the mines of Lorraine, was only about 19,500,000 tons compared with 26,322,000 tons produced in 1918, and 28,929,000 in 1917. At a conference of the Ministry of Public Works on January 25, 1920, it was estimated that the requirements of coal exceed the present possibilities by 40 per cent.

It is difficult to explain the decrease in coal production except by the lessened productivity of labor. It would naturally be supposed that with the demobilization of troops and the advent of peace, coal production would be increased. It is but natural, therefore, for the belief to arise that the diminution of coal production has been largely caused by the reduction of the hours of labor. The hours of labor in mines, however, were not regulated by the ordinary eight-hour law, but by the Dufaure mining law.

of the eight-hour day had been secured, doubled efforts were still necessary to secure its application to industry.

Curiously enough, the fête of the First of May had its origin in the United States. In 1886 a Federation of Trades Unions decided at a convention held in Chicago to fight for the eight-hour day, not by appeal to Congress or legislatures, but by refusing to work after May 1st until it was granted. The First arrived and with it, 5,000 strikes; by the end of the month the eight-hour day had been granted to nearly 250,000 workmen. The labor organizations in France followed this American example at the third Congress of the National Federation of Syndicates in 1888 where a resolution was adopted deciding that on Sunday, February 10, 1889, every labor union in France should petition the prefecture for an eight-hour day and a minimum wage. On the 24th, they were to return for a response, accompanied by as much of a manifestation as possible. The manifestation occurred and was so successful that the International Labor Congress at Paris decided to organize an international manifestation in every country and of all laborers. The date of May 1, 1890, was decided upon by the French Socialists. But the Paris unions, under the influence of conservative elements, declared themselves against the demonstration. Despite this opposition, however, the manifestation was held. It was chiefly marked by the presentation to M. Floquet, President of the Chamber of Deputies, of a petition requesting the eight-hour day, by a delegation of workmen, while troops kept the boulevards cleared of those who wished to parade. The First of May, 1891, was more disquieting and it resulted in many arrests. But successive celebrations lost their belligerent features and more and more tended to become purely a holiday

in nature. The pacific character of these fêtes was overcome by the organization of the C. G. T. in 1900, which immediately commenced agitation for direct action. *La Voix du Peuple* in its number of May 1, 1903, advocated the American theory of strikes to bring about the eight-hour day. Adopting this point of view, the Confederated Congress at Bourges in 1904 decided that after May 1, 1906, no worker should consent to work more than eight hours a day. Since that time every May Day has been used to present forcibly labor's demands to the public and to the employers. The Congress at Havre in 1912 advocated the eight-hour day and the forty-four hour, or English, week. The eight-hour day, as noted, was again advocated in the Minimum Demands of 1918. Despite the passage of the law incorporating this reform, May Day, 1919, was more than ever calculated to impress the French public with the strength and the unity of the working classes.

The specific demands which the C. G. T. asked its organizations to urge on the First of May, were arranged as follows:

To demand:

The eight-hour day.
An amnesty for all.
Rapid and complete demobilization.
A just peace and disarmament.

To protest against:

Intervention in Russia.
The form of the present tax on wages.
The state of siege.
The censorship.

It is interesting to note that nearly all of these demands were purely political. They definitely marked

the evolution of the C. G. T. toward the attainment of political ends by direct action. But now that the chief economic demand (the eight-hour day) had been met, Labor leaders cautioned against violence. Thus the Railway Federation, upon the 17th of April, resolved that "the first of May should not be . . . a cause of economic disorder." On the 18th, the C. G. T. published an appeal, defining the nature of the manifestation: "The demonstration will be made with calm and dignity. To show thoroughly what the force of Labor can do when it is disciplined, work will be resumed the second of May in order that the value of our efforts may be judged."

When April 30th arrived, the "cartel" had done its work well. Preparations had been made for the almost complete cessation of work upon the following day in every district of France. Trains were to stop for only three minutes, commencing at 10 o'clock; but city transportation facilities, even taxicabs, were to stop for the entire day. The post-office employees were to go to work two hours late and stop two hours early. No newspapers were to be published except *La Voix du Peuple*, the official organ of the C. G. T. The Paris Stock Exchange was to close. No hotels or restaurants were to serve meals; guests were not even to be given hot water to shave with. In Paris it was estimated that 750,000 would have to go hungry. Barber shops were to do no business; theaters, music halls,—all places of entertainment,—were to be dark. Even the electric plant workers were to stop for two hours. The Central Markets were also to be closed. In short, a nation-wide, silent but impressive strike had been arranged for, to prove that labor was the essential factor in the industrial world. As *La Vague* said, "If Labor stops, life

stops. . . . But is Gold, the king of the earth, then nothing? Yes, it is nothing. . . . And whoever has gold by privilege or by birth, and does not earn it by labor, is supported by us who work. They eat our corn, inhabit our houses, wear our clothes, ride in our automobiles, smoke our cigars. . . . Then are they parasites? Yes, they are parasites like the mistletoe on the apple tree."

In addition to the general strike throughout France, a great manifestation or parade through the streets of Paris had been planned. The direction of these manifestations was obscure from the first, and it did not fully appear until after the fête had occurred. But the Government upon the 29th of April did what many labor leaders and Socialists suspected it would do, namely, it issued a note forbidding any attempt at a Labor parade on May 1st. Consequently it was with many fears that the Parisian population saw the light of this eventful day.

In the provinces the day passed like a New England Sabbath. There was little activity of any kind—even the street cars refused to run. In the afternoon mass meetings were held at which resolutions were adopted, asking for amnesty and the raising of the state of siege, and protesting against intervention in Russia. At the close of the meetings, processions formed in the streets headed by the "Red" Flag, while the crowds sang the "Internationale."[14] There were no attempts

[14] The words of the "Internationale" are as follows:

Il n'est pas de sauveur suprême,
Ni Dieu, ni César, ni tribun.
Producteurs, sauvons-nous nous-mêmes!
Decrétons le salut commun!

on the part of the authorities to break up these provincial manifestations, to capture the "Red" Flag, or to muffle the communist hymn. Throughout the provinces the First of May passed without disorder or expressed ill-will.

Things were different in Paris. A steady, drizzling rain, lasting nearly the whole day, came as a providential help to the French police. Their task was to stop the great demonstration from the Place de la Concorde to the Place de la République, which the C. G. T. insisted should be carried on, in defiance of the Government's prohibition. The morning passed quietly; work everywhere had ceased. Except for meals served out of rear doors and many drinks surreptitiously secured through temporary "blind pigs," idleness reigned supreme. But early in the afternoon, every street leading to the Place de la Concorde had been barred by a cordon of police, the Republican Guard and detachments of cavalry and infantry. Unable to get through,

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Les rois nous saoûlaient de fumées,
Paix entre nous, guerre aux tyrans!
Appliquons la grève aux armées,
Crosse en l'air et rompons les rangs!
S'ils s'obstinent, ces cannibales,
A faire de nous des héros,
Ils sauront bientôt que nos balles
Sont pour nos propres généraux!

Refrain

Debout! les damnés de la terre!
Debout! les forçats de la faim!
La raison tonne en son cratère,
C'est l'éruption de la fin.
Du passé faisons table rase,
Foule esclave, debout, debout!
Le monde va changer de base:
Nous ne sommes rien, soyons tout!

Quoted in W. Morton Fullerton, *Problems of Power*, 197, footnote.

groups of workingmen finally gathered in the Rue Royale in front of the Church of the Madeleine, where they succeeded in forcing their way beyond the first line of the troops and the police. Cheering the poilus who allowed them to pass, they succeeded in getting into the Place de la Concorde. But here the cavalry charged and the parade was dispersed into groups, each one of which became the object of a police attack. The manifestants rushed to get out of the place, and the poilus again let them pass. A number of injuries resulted. Whenever a "Red" Flag was shown it was captured, and the "Internationale" was squelched with the aid of a fire-hose.

Labor leaders now attempted to reorganize the crowd at the Gare du Nord and the Gare de l'Est. The crowds succeeded in breaking through the police cordons and in barricading themselves behind the station's gates. On the arrival of new crowds the police began to attack; blood flowed freely and Red Cross ambulances found much to do. With the attacks of the police, the mobs became more violent, breaking windows and tearing up tile for ammunition. The police, it was charged by the Socialists, drew their revolvers and fired steadily for four minutes. Seventy-five minor casualties resulted from the fracas, and one boy, Charles Lorne, was killed. The fusillade eventually succeeded in breaking up the mob. Meanwhile, three Socialist Deputies, MM. Marcel Cachin, Paul Poncet, and Mayéras, together with M. Jouhaux, the secretary of the C. G. T., were trying to restore order among the workingmen and to parley with the police. But they were all caught in one of the assaults, and the three Deputies were slightly injured in body and mortally ruffled in dignity.

The First of May in Paris ended with a total casualty list, according to the Prefect of Police, of 428 wounded police, nearly as many wounded civilians, and one boy killed; 118 arrests had been made. The Socialist argument was that the Government had hopelessly antagonized the laboring classes by its refusal to tolerate the manifestation, a right which the Declaration of the Rights of Man gave to them. If the Government had followed the policy in Paris which it had followed in the departments, peace and order would have been maintained.

However, there was widespread criticism from the public directed toward Labor. Thus *La Démocratie Nouvelle* wrote:

> The holders of public authority no longer give orders to the citizens in the name of the law, but it is the C. G. T. In the name of whom? In what capacity? Can such a condition, in a free democracy, be tolerated? This is a nameless tyranny![15]

The Socialist press was naturally jubilant at the outlawry of the mobs,—this was a precursor of the Revolution. Marcel Cachin wrote in *L'Humanité:*

> At no moment in no country has the First of May been observed with such fullness and with such unanimity. Labor for the first time has given the spectacle of its all-powerful discipline and of its decisive importance. As for the bloodshed, it falls entirely upon the head of the Government who has taken it upon himself to oppose a peaceful workers' movement by a formidable preparation of troops and of police.[16]

In the same number Daniel Renoult more bitterly attacked M. Clemenceau as follows:

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[15] Issue of May 3, 1919.
[16] Issue of May 2, 1919.

This most incoherent and incapable of all men, . . . has one domain in which he rules: the police. At attacking women and children in the streets, M. Georges Clemenceau is a master.

VI

The subsequent action of the Labor and Socialist leaders largely destroyed whatever sympathy they originally had with the French people. The explanations given by the Government for its action before the Chamber were also illuminating.

The Socialist group at the Chamber, on May 2nd, protested against the Government's interference with the parade, and decided to interpellate it upon its actions. The administrative commission of the party, on May 3rd, took similar action, congratulating Labor for its disciplined conduct, and placing entire responsibility for the riots upon the Government. Of greater importance was the resignation of M. Jouhaux, secretary-general of the C. G. T., from his position as labor delegate of the French Peace Delegation. In a letter to M. Clemenceau, condemning the Government for suppressing the manifestation, he said:

The principles of right and liberty are not only valuable in diplomacy. The people have a right to them. . . . In forbidding a demonstration which you knew would be entirely pacific, in setting your police and the army against the Parisian workers, in maltreating with an unforgettable brutality, men and women who only made use of an essential liberty granted to their comrades in every other country, you have disregarded the devotion and the sacrifice which the working class exhibited during the war.

The resignation of M. Jouhaux was followed by that of two others,—two Socialist Deputies from the positions

of general commissioners in the Government,—M. Bouisson, commissioner for the merchant marine, and M. Compère-Morel, commissioner for agriculture. It will be recalled that at the last Congress the Socialist party voted to cease immediately all participation in a bourgeois ministry. The delays which had prevented such a cessation were now overcome, but the incident of the First accelerated this separation from the Government. Consequently the administrative commission of the Socialist party "decided as a result of the incidents of the First of May in Paris," to ask the two Deputies to resign without delay. The Socialists thus completed the policy which their Congress had adopted of declaring war on the Government. They crowned their unreasonableness on May 6th by an interpellation which was opened by Marcel Cachin, who criticized the concentration of troops in Paris and again asserted the peaceful intent of the manifestation. After considerable debate, M. Pams, Minister of the Interior, rose to respond to the interpellation for the Government. But before he could say a word, M. Ernest Lafont demanded, in the name of the Socialists, if the Minister's declaration was to be the only one which the Government would make and if the President of the Council, M. Clemenceau, was not to explain his policy. M. Pams replied that according to parliamentary custom, and as the police were under his control, he had come to respond. The Socialists would not even permit him to finish; but, with the exception of three, rising in a group, they all left the Chamber in silence. The Socialists had talked a great deal about liberty, but as M. Delahaye remarked in the debate, they did not care to grant liberty to others, even the liberty of explanation. There seemed to be little justification for their ill-reasoned action.

M. Pams then very calmly proceeded to explain the Government's position. It was the Government's desire to permit the manifestation upon the First of May, but it felt that it was its duty to take precautions in certain questionable centers. It had authorized the prefects throughout the departments to permit manifestations on condition that the labor organizations promise to maintain order. At Paris, however, things were different. Certain sections were inhabited by dangerous and foreign elements, zealous to overturn order. The Government had awaited propositions from the C. G. T., as to means of safeguarding such a manifestation. The C. G. T. manifested no desire whatever to talk the matter over. But upon the 17th of April, the Minister said, the C. G. T. itself warned its members of the dangers of a manifestation; and it was not until the 28th that it announced its decision to hold one. This decision appeared to have been taken against the will of the majority. A man by the name of Bertho, an anarchist, freed from a prison term of two years, urged the Syndicalists to hold the parade. The measure was passed by a majority of only nine, with many members absent. After this decision, the promoters still refused to ask the Government for the authorization necessary under the state of siege. With such conditions, the Government could only guard the public security. It had tried to conciliate the mobs; it had ordered the troops not to be armed. The crowds had wounded one fifth of the police force. After asserting the sincere desire of the Government for social reform, M. Pams said, "No reform and no progress can be accomplished in a civilized nation except with order and public peace."

Although the statements of the Minister and the as-

sertions of the C. G. T. were contradictory on some points, the Chamber completely vindicated the former by a vote of confidence of 338 to 1. The Socialists and the C. G. T. were again on the defensive; and they were in a doubly embarrassing position on account of their rather humorous withdrawal from the Chamber.

VII

Rumors were afloat to the effect that the C. G. T. would soon hold another manifestation, as a protest against the First of May. But nothing came of it immediately, and no unusual disturbances in the Labor world occurred during the month of May. Beginning with the last days of May, however, and continuing through June, France experienced widespread and persistent strikes. The first cause of these strikes was the failure of the Government to apply the eight-hour day. Although June 1st had been the date set for its application, employers and employees could not agree on its details. Wage increases were another demand; the composition of so-called discipline councils upon which laborers were to be represented, was yet another. The metallurgists and the subway employees were among those who threatened to stagnate French industry completely. Space does not permit the discussion of the economic demands and results of these strikes. An attempt will be made, however, to show the political aspirations of some of them and why they failed.

Although originally all of these strikes were for direct, economic purposes, indications of a change in objective were soon apparent. On June 5th it was announced that the iron-workers of Ivry had adopted the following purely political resolution:

The iron workers of Ivry, 15,000 in number, protest energetically against intervention in Russia; they demand immediate demobilization and the immediate liberation of political and military prisoners. They place the realization of these demands along with their others; and *they are thoroughly decided not to go back into the shops until all of these questions have been settled.*

This was the supreme extension of the Syndicalist plan,—the control of the government by direct action. If successful, there was a hope that from such a control, possession of the government might eventually be secured, a possession which was the incarnate desire of both Socialists and Syndicalists. Similar expressions came out of St. Denis, where on June 4th the following motion was voted:

The Inter-syndical committee of St. Denis, transformed into a strike committee, decides to enter into relations with the regional inter-syndical committees to examine . . . if it is not time to ask the C. G. T. to make the necessary moves upon the *government to oblige it to leave to the proletariat the care of the destinies of the country.*

This was one more advance toward the desire for proletariat control.

The strikers on the Paris subways, however, resisted this revolutionary movement, for on June 5th they "affirmed on their honor that the strike . . . is exclusively economic. . . ." Likewise the Administrative Commission of the C. G. T., recognizing the hopelessness of concerted action for any other than material purposes, on June 7th declared that "these strikes have their origin in the resistance encountered to the application of the eight-hour day. . . . No one can deny the economic character of these movements. . . . The work-

ing class intends to conserve the original character of these strikes." Thus the anarchist and syndicalist agitators at work in divers federations received a direct check from the supreme Labor body.

But even this did not silence the revolutionary movement, for the Union of the Syndicates of the Seine at the same time published a note registering "with satisfaction, the new spirit of the working classes which no longer limits their aspirations to ends of a uniquely material order." And the Railway Federation passed a defiant resolution which read: "Considering that the Russian, Hungarian, and German revolutions have the only governments which apply the principles which we have always defended; and that capitalist expropriation remains the principal object of our propaganda and our action, . . . we favor immediate action to stop the circulation of all trains carrying troops and war supplies, except leave trains, in order to prevent the enterprises of the Government against the strikes in course, against the peoples in revolution, and against refractory soldiers."

If the railwaymen had been successful in carrying out this policy, their complete victory over the Government and Labor's assumption of power would have been assured.

At the same time agitation for a general and sympathetic strike grew up; at a meeting of the "cartel," on June 10th, it was decided to "apply measures of solidarity which will rapidly assure the victory of the professional demands of the miners and the marines." Meanwhile, the C. G. T. had been won over to the idea of a political strike, internationally organized, and was conferring with labor delegates from England and Italy. On the 24th of June the metal workers asked

the "cartel" to support their demands by a general strike also. But after a long and vigorous debate, the idea of a sympathetic strike was given up. The "cartel" refused to support such a strike in the case of the metal workers, but it declared itself in favor of an international demonstration, which was already being organized.

This international strike was decided upon at Southport, England, upon the 27th of June. In agreement with British and Italian Labor leaders, the C. G. T. decided to hold a twenty-four hour demonstration against (1) the imperialism of the Peace Treaty, (2) Allied intervention in Russia, and for (3) immediate demobilization, (4) full amnesty, and (5) the reëstablishment of constitutional liberties. The only economic demand, one which the strike could not hope to settle but rather to attenuate, was for (6) the reduction of *la vie chère.*

In accordance with this agreement, the C. G. T. organized elaborate plans for a nation-wide strike, surpassing in extent that of the First of May. No demands were to be made for the improvement of Labor conditions; it was not a question of using the bargaining power of Labor to force Capital to terms possible for it to make. On the other hand, it was another political demonstration, a protest against so-called bourgeois oppression and stupidity. If it succeeded it would prove the tremendous political power of the proletariat and would be of fundamental importance to the Syndicalists and the Socialists, being the first step in organizing Labor for the purpose of completely assuming the direction of society by force.

The strike, however, did not occur, or rather it was "postponed,"—again proving the impossibility of or-

ganizing Labor in a demonstration from which it would receive no direct value. The reasons for the failure of this strike, which had been set for the 21st of July, were three. The first was the firm attitude of the Government. As members of the C. G. T., the railway men, the members of the postal and telegraph service, and other Government officials were planning to obey the orders of the Supreme Labor Body to strike on the 21st. This would have resulted in the disruption of vital public services which the Government decided it could not tolerate. Consequently, on the 10th of July, after a special meeting of the Council of Ministers, M. Claveille, Minister of Transportation, addressed a note to the federation of railway men, which stated that the stoppage of transportation, especially during the time of reconstruction and of demobilization, "would constitute a veritable crime against the nation." Those who hindered the operation of the public services upon the 21st, were threatened with prosecution before the Councils of War. A similar note was sent by other Ministers to functionaries in their services. This firm attitude of the Government, although defied by the C. G. T. authorities, was somewhat disquieting to the rank and file of their following, who did not relish the manhandling which the Council of War usually gave offenders brought before it. This perhaps was one of the greatest causes for the strike's failure.

A second reason, and one arising from the first, was the attitude which many of the organizations of the C. G. T. took toward the strike. Like the Socialist party, the C. G. T. was divided, rather indistinctly, into Conservative and Radical factions. The Conservatives, led by M. Jouhaux and including most of the functionaries lately adherent to the C. G. T., were for the

strike in a lukewarm fashion, or not at all. The Radicals, who now were getting the supremacy, were completely for the strike; while the extreme Radicals were dissatisfied with a mere strike of twenty-four hours. They advocated a strike of unlimited duration, to end only when the workers should have appropriated the goods and control of society. Beginning with the First of May and through tactics familiar to unscrupulous minorities, it seemed as if the Radicals were going to force their hand.

However, the demand for another strike on the 21st of July, made for no apparent economic purpose, and in defiance of the Government's prohibition, was resented by many of the semi-bourgeois elements of the C. G. T., who had joined it because of its great bargaining power, merely to secure salary ameliorations. On the 8th of July, the men on the Paris-Etat railway declared that they were firmly attached to the pursuit of professional demands, but that they opposed with all their force the commands of the C. G. T. to engage in a political strike. Despite a renewed appeal from the C. G. T. on the 14th of July, the P. L. M. railway men who met in Dijon the next day, made a similar declaration. The employees of the Midi line, in a meeting at Toulouse, likewise decided not to strike. At a gathering in Strassburg, the delegates of sixteen labor organizations, representing 78,000 to 80,000 members in Alsace and Lorraine, highly disapproved of this strike, which was "inspired by purely political reasons." The agricultural syndicates of Montpellier unanimously revolted against the strike; on the 16th the dramatic artists decided not to join it; while different organizations of functionaries sent in protests daily.

The third reason for calling off the strike, and that

which the C. G. T. leaders named as the principal one, was the assurances given by the Clemenceau Government. The President of the Council called the leaders of the C. G. T. into conference with him on the 18th of July. He assured them that the Government would take every means to prevent the strike, but that it would also speed up demobilization, introduce a project of amnesty, freeing 150,000 prisoners, and immediately solve the cost of living. During the interview, M. Jouhaux received a note stating that M. Boret, Minister of Agriculture, had just fallen at the Chamber by a vote of 227 to 213,[17] upon a motion condemning the economic policy of the Government. He did not open the note until after the session, and labor leaders asserted that the outcome of the conference would have been different if he had. The press, however, stated that M. Jouhaux was already aware of the Minister's defeat from a delegate arriving late.

At any rate, on the evening of the 18th, after a long session, the Administrative Commission of the C. G. T. adopted a resolution which stated:

> After studying the situation, it rejects the measures taken by the Government concerning the cost of living, but recognizes the new situation created by the vote of the Chamber of Deputies which has heard the voice of the working class condemning the economic policy of the Government;
>
> It recognizes, on the other hand, the dispositions drawn up under the menace of the projected strike, concerning amnesty and demobilization;
>
> It therefore deems that a new examination of the situation has become necessary, . . . and that the demonstration of July 21 shall be postponed.

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[17] See p. 326.

In this manner the greatest effort made in France to bring about an exclusively political strike, failed. Along with those previously cited, this attempt showed the improbability of securing the adherence of workmen to a movement in which no other than political demands are to be made. Proudhon's words, "Jamais au grand jamais, il ne satisfera les appétits de la multitude, procédât-il à un partage général. . . . L'Ouvrier, l'ignorant, l'insolent, l'intraitable, têtu, veut être le maître des fabriques, maître de l'Etat, qu'il prétend gouverner; il a pris au pied de la lettre sa souveraineté," may be true so far as the desires of Labor are concerned. But when it comes to realizing them, the cost is too much.

The failure of these strikes which had been attempted for other than purely economic reasons, is perhaps the most convincing answer to the whole argument of Syndicalism which Georges Sorel so effectively advances in his interesting book, entitled, *Reflections on Violence.* M. Sorel believes that the enthusiasm of revolution, brought about by the burning conviction that existing conditions are unrighteous, is the only force which can stimulate workingmen to that high plane of sacrifice necessary to introduce the Marxian order. Conflict is the very essence of faith, even in religion, he asserts; whenever Catholicism succeeds in stamping out Protestantism and has no other enemies to conquer, its followers soon lose the holy zeal which once inspired them. If Labor is to be content with purely economic gains, it will never be aroused to the consciousness of its full grandeur and the potentiality of its own strength. "When working-class circles are *reasonable,* as the professional sociologists wish them to be, when conflicts are confined to disputes about material in-

terests, there is no more opportunity for heroism than when agricultural syndicates discuss the subject of the price of guano with manure merchants. . . ."[18]

The recent efforts of the French syndicalists to carry out this theory must be disappointing to the *doctrinaires* who have furnished them with their principles. Perhaps the working classes are as incapable of real "heroism" to-day as the capitalists. Perhaps the very comfort which they derive from a period of inflated wages and from the benefits of concerted action has dulled their souls to the essential "injustice" of the place which they now hold in the existing social order.

Whatever be the reason, French experience seems to establish the fact that direct action has its limitations. The strike is a powerful weapon when it is used for the accomplishment of immediate and "reasonable" ends (despite M. Sorel). But when its purpose lies beyond this point and attempts to secure the fulfillment of some political end—of benefit to working people *generally*, but not affecting them *intimately* and *individually* as does a wage increase—the strike is likely to fail.[19] The very materialism of the doctrines of the Marxian order permits of no martyrs except when the end to be achieved is immediately at hand.

Furthermore, society is demanding that direct action

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[18] *Reflections on Violence*, 246.

[19] The amount of wages lost by the strikes in June, 1919, was:

	Francs
Metal workers' strike	125,000,000
Chemical workers	29,000,000
18,000 transport workers	58,500,000
26-day strike in mines	58,500,000
	270,000,000

The knowledge of these tremendous losses is an ample deterrent to strikes without an economic purpose.

for the accomplishment of political ends give way to political action. It demands that it be spared the constant interruptions which industrial disorders enforce. For this reason, and because of the limitations of direct action, the creation of political parties by Labor seems to be inevitable. In fact, if Labor will give up its frequently muttered threat of direct and open revolution, the development of political organizations among workingmen is to be welcomed.

CHAPTER IX

THE PRESS AND THE CENSORSHIP

Il faut que l'écrivain puisse tout dire, mais il ne saurait lui être permis de tout dire, de toute manière, en toutes circonstances et à toutes sortes de personnes.—ANATOLE FRANCE.

I

Occupying a very large part in political life, French newspapers are quite as important as parties. In fact, they constitute one of the most unique characteristics of French politics, while they reflect in an illuminating manner the qualities of Gallic temperament. Unlike American newspapers which at least feign an aloofness from party groupings and an independence in opinion, more fictitious than real, French papers are frankly partisan; they openly ally themselves with party doctrines if not with party groupings. They serve some cause with the greatest intensity; they turn every political news item to their own profit, regardless of content. Thus the Royalist press does not confine itself to a discussion of the justice or the injustice of some particular Labor demand. But after playing the trouble up to complete hopelessness, it cries for the return of the King as the only solution. Similarly, the Socialist press will never discuss a matter such as foreign policy upon its merits. Instead of weighing the respective claims of the Czechs and the Poles to Teschen, for ex-

ample, it dispatches the whole matter as another instance of Allied imperialism which the bourgeoisie can never eradicate.

There is nothing lukewarm about French newspapers,—they have no half-way opinions. Instead of being swayed by political thought, they attempt to direct it. Editors are chosen, when they do not choose themselves, chiefly because of their ability for pungent criticism. The advantage of this stimulating feature of the French paper is that it arouses a vigorous, healthy public opinion upon political subjects. But at the same time, it is very difficult actually to judge French opinion from these printed utterances. Their effusiveness, the fact that they are always in the service of some cause, necessitates their being discounted as authoritative representatives of French thought. To judge French people by their newspapers would be like judging the American people by several dozen *Appeals to Reason,* or *Menaces.* Representing a small element of thought, perhaps, each paper more often is an excrescence rather than the substance itself.

A French paper is not an institution; it is a personality. Ordinarily much smaller than the most diminutive rural weekly in America, the war cut its size down to four pages four times a week and two pages three times a week. The small proportions of a French newspaper, coupled with the predominant position the editorial plays, make it a purely individualistic affair. The editorial always appears on the first page, and often in larger type than the articles surrounding it. There are usually two or three of the editorials occupying the greater part of the sheet, while the news is crowded off to the side or on the back. There is absolutely no anonymity about a French paper. If editorials are not

signed, as they usually are, every one knows who writes them, and the editor's name must always appear on the top of the sheet. The editorial is very personal; it accepts full responsibility for everything it says; but this is no deterring factor, for it pounds everything and everybody. It has life, it is important, and consequently it is read.

The small dimensions of the French paper have several advantages. First, it allows men and movements of limited means to start a journal and give public expression to their ideas. Liberty of opinion in America, so far as its printed expression is concerned, is largely a constitutional fiction, because of the tremendous cost of a newspaper establishment. In France, however, any one can go to Paris and put a paper into every *kiosque*, competing with the wealthiest sheets in town. News does not matter so much, so long as the editor is able to write. As for printing, there are any number of plants ready to run his stuff off. The more startling and the more original his paper is, the more it will sell. From among the present diversity of French opinion, he is practically certain of finding enough readers at least to pay expenses.

At the same time, the small size of the French newspaper makes it liable to ready purchase. On all sides one hears of this and that edition being bought over,—either to stop attacks or to commence them. The secret funds of the Ministry of the Interior are liberally spent in subsidizing pro-Government newspapers.[1] In fact, many Frenchmen accuse *Le Temps* of receiving such support. Gustave Hervé and *La Victoire* arouses much more suspicion. His transformation has been remark-

[1] In peace times they amount to 1,000,000 francs a year; during the war this sum was increased to an annual figure of 25,000,000.

able. Originally one who urged the peasantry to plant their "country's flag in the dung-heaps" (which won for him the appellation of "Sans-Patrie" Hervé), he became so thoroughly nationalistic shortly after the war that he was expelled from the Socialist party. He has even appeared to desert liberal principles, for in the Fiume trouble, *La Victoire* urged the settlement of the question, not upon principle, but with the sole view of maintaining Italian friendship, whatever the cost. The friends of M. Hervé say he has undergone a real change of heart. His enemies, with a sly wink, say it is money that has done it. Although Americans are rather incredulous at believing such accusations, to Frenchmen they offer a very logical explanation for an otherwise inexplicable somersault.

The case of *Le Journal,* which Senator Humbert, MM. Lenoir, Desouches, and Ladoux were accused of trying to purchase with German funds for defeatist purposes, was a better founded example of corruption. The case came to trial in the early spring of 1919. Although the Senator was acquitted, the other gentlemen were convicted of dealing with the enemy. As the Senator now owns *Le Journal,* and as it is one of the most widely read papers in France, its reputation does not seem to have been harmed by the accusations made against it.

Le Bonnet Rouge case was a still more notorious example. Although its editor, M. Almereyda, was mysteriously killed in prison, another gentleman connected with it, M. Duval, was convicted of receiving several hundred thousand francs in May, 1917, from Germany, as a reward for defeatist propaganda. After a long trial before the Council of War, he was sentenced to

death and shot at Vincennes; seven of his accomplices were likewise convicted.

The case of *Le Populaire,* Jean Longuet's *minoritaire* Socialist paper, is perhaps the most scandalous of all. It has been repeatedly accused of being financed by German funds, an accusation made plausible by Longuet's German connections, he being a grandson of Karl Marx. Throughout the war it led an insistent campaign against the war and against the Government in power. Some Frenchmen explain why *Le Populaire* was never suspended from publication by a very choice piece of scandal: That Clemenceau is Longuet's godfather! an explanation made the more interesting because both gentlemen are now professed atheists. Whether such an accusation is true or not, it is an interesting side light upon the workings of French politics. At any rate, during the Socialist Congress at Easter, Socialist opponents were delighted at the insinuation which Pierre Renaudel, the former editor of *L'Humanité,* the official paper of the party, made upon April 21 when Longuet was taunting Renaudel as to the decline of its circulation under his management. At this, in the midst of a tremendous uproar, Renaudel angrily replied: "Where does *Le Populaire* get its money from?" M. Longuet denounced the implication as villainous; the Congress appointed a committee of inquiry; while *L'Action Française,* which at one time or another during the war had accused most of its contemporaries of treason, gloated over the acknowledgment of another of its accusations.

These examples will show how surcharged the atmosphere of Paris journalism is with recrimination and accusation. The charges are seldom established and less frequently repudiated. A paper's reputation, instead

of being injured by them, seems to be improved. At any rate, it appears that they flourish under it.

The small size of the French press contributes to multiplicity in number. New York City may have a dozen morning papers; Paris, on the other hand, has at least fifty. Not only in newspapers, but in every class of periodical, there is the greatest fecundity.

Although the predominance given to editorials may be the greatest strength of the French paper, it is also in many instances the chief source of its weakness. In fact, the papers which are the most partisan in editorial policies are least informed as to news. They prefer to occupy space with editorials; news which they do print is colored to suit their partisanship. The Socialist press is perhaps the most at fault in this respect. Although a large part of the laboring class loyally support *L'Humanité,* they are forced to buy another paper if they want to know what is going on. At the Socialist Congress in April, Jean Longuet, editor of *Le Populaire,* said he would never print any news against the Bolsheviki because that task is being ably performed by the bourgeois press. Other papers, such as *L'Action Française,* for the Royalists, and *La Démocratie Nouvelle,* for the new party of that name, have the same fault to a less extent.

A different angle of the French conception of news is illustrated by the celebrated Landru case. Landru was a modern Bluebeard, accused of seducing and murdering a large number of beautiful women in a country villa. Investigations were excitedly carried on for months, resulting principally in the exhuming of cats and other pets of the departed women. The case filled enormous amounts of space in all the Paris papers, and it became a prominent subject of conversation. But

according to some French newspapermen, the case was a newspaper fiction, solely created to keep the public interest from moping upon the stupidity of the Peace Conference![2] Although this story was somewhat belied by the fact that accusations were being made after the Peace Conference had closed, they may prove to be a consummating touch to a masterful work in human psychology.

The inadequacy of the news service of the purely political press is overcome by a number of very reliable papers in Paris which simply denominate themselves as Republican.[3] Nominally, they are non-partisan and independent; and they follow no fixed editorial policy. *Le Matin, Le Journal, Le Petit Journal,* and *Le Petit Parisien* are journals of this type. Their news service is usually accurate and complete; and although some Frenchmen scoff at them as "shopkeepers' papers," it is surprising to note that they have a larger circulation than the purely political papers. Their popularity justifies their existence. Frenchmen crave news as a necessity; the expression of political opinion is more of a *délicatesse.*

II

The chief representative of the Monarchist and Catholic press is *L'Action Française,* one of the unique papers in France despite the fact that it possesses but little influence. This paper was originally founded by

[2] The Landru case reminds one of Anatole France's story, *Putois.*

[3] These papers are often known as *La Grande Presse,* for they maintain large newspaper establishments. The more political papers are known as *La Presse d'Opinion.*

Henri Vaugeois, and its political direction is now in the militant hands of Charles Maurras and Léon Daudet. The latter is the son of Alphonse Daudet, the well-known author of the *Lettres de Mon Moulin, Tartarin de Tarascon,* and other widely read productions. Daudet, the younger, daily occupies the two left-hand columns of the *L'Action* with an article usually full of scathing invective. Intensely personal in his accusations, he heaps scalding abuse upon every public man from Clemenceau down to Briand. He brings the most inclusive charges and makes the most sweeping statements; the only wonder is that he has not been subject to an endless stream of libel suits. These he has probably escaped because of his skill in indefiniteness and because there is practically no libel law in France. He defied "Viviani to remain in power forty-eight hours without the protection of the censor"; last April he accused Briand of intriguing to overthrow the Clemenceau Ministry; he even went so far as to name the cabinet Briand had selected. In his treason accusations,—and he takes the credit for the conviction of Malvy and *Le Bonnet Rouge,* he has used his powers to the greatest advantage. "Squint-eyed crooks, traitors, liars, and bandit-fiends," quail under his mighty assaults.

Charles Maurras is the exact opposite in style and in temperament. A very learned man, he exhibits little bitterness in his editorials, although he expounds monarchist doctrines with the greatest firmness. Under the title of *La Politique,* he daily occupies two columns with a discussion of everything from the canonization of Joan of Arc at Rome to the defects of the League of Nations. A keen and clever writer, he is widely read by his political opponents.

Jacques Bainville, an accomplished diplomatic writer, Maurice Pujo, who is usually attacking the Socialists, and Louis Dimier, are other members of this remarkable editorial staff. Between the five of them, mere news is completely submerged.

An interesting story is told of *L'Action Française* activities during the war. A French priest, acting as censor for a certain military unit (and in that capacity), obtained some very damaging information against the Government which he illegally transmitted to the royalist paper. The information concerned a German, living in France, who fraudulently obtained American naturalization papers. He then bribed Government officials so that several of his relatives were taken out of the trenches and sent to the rear. Naturally the publication of this scandal would be a great triumph for Léon Daudet, and undoubtedly result in the fall of the Ministry. But the Government, in turn, held two pieces of evidence incriminating *L'Action Française*. The first was that the priest in question had, while a censor, revealed confidential information from which the Government could stir up another anticlerical struggle; the second was that the Government had obtained a list which *L'Action Française* had compiled of army officers who at the time of a revolution had promised to bring their troops under the banner of Philippe VIII. By a mutual agreement, both parties kept quiet.

La Vieille-France is not a newspaper and it can scarcely be called a magazine. But withal, it is one of the most interesting and most unreasonable publications in France. It appears once a week, and the reader is always assured of getting his eight cents' worth. Its editorial policy is fixed only upon two points—it is uproariously anti-Semitic, and as far as

the censor permitted it, it is insistently anti-American. It contains absolutely no advertising, yet it consists of thirty pages an issue. How it is financed is a popular mystery. It is generally supposed that Urbain Gohier, its irrepressible editor, gladly foots the bills in order to appear so prominently in the public light. M. Gohier is a very eccentric gentleman, and if hearsay is reliable, he also exhibits the common journalistic propensity to change political faiths as frequently, almost, as a suit of clothes. Ten or fifteen years ago he edited a Socialist paper in Grenoble. Now, however, the Socialists and the Bolsheviki are his principal objects of attack.

His unholy hatred of the Jews is illustrated by the following gleanings:

The French will not enter Frankfort. But the people of Frankfort have never left Paris.

Reinach at the Figaro,
Gruenbaum at the Government,
Stern at the Chamber,
Cahen, Kahn, Weill, Basch, Bernstein, Rappoport, Passim.
Rothschild everywhere.

Paris is a suburb of Frankfort.

In its advocacy of the annexation of the left bank of the Rhine, *La Vieille-France* said:

The Jews will not allow the left bank of the Rhine to be returned to Gaul because the populations of these provinces are followers of the Catholic religion and their incorporation with France would perhaps bring about an awakening of our enervated Catholics against Semitism. It is consequently necessary to choose again between the vital interests of France and the will of Jewry. . . . . .

There is an abyss between the French and the German. But there are twenty abysses between the Jew and the Frenchman.

He proclaims his weekly as "the rallying point for honest and courageous men," and he is so convinced that his strength is the only protection of France that he announced that *La Vieille-France* is the last obstacle which hinders the complete conquest of France by the Hebrews."[4]

M. Klotz, Minister of Finance; M. Rothschild, the great financier; Joseph Reinach, the prominent writer; M. Mandel, Clemenceau's secretary, are all mercilessly berated merely on account of their origin. This extreme position would be humorous unless it were for the fact that it represents a serious anti-Semitic feeling in France.[5]

The most conservative paper in Paris next to *L'Action Française,* if judged from its Peace Conference editorials, is *L'Echo de Paris.* At present directed by Henry and Paul Simond, it is the official mouthpiece of the *Action Libérale Populaire* party. It is strongly nationalistic in opinion, as shown by the frequent editorials by Maurice Barrès. The pseudonyms of *L'Echo de Paris* are its distinction; Custos is a regular contributor upon domestic policies; and Pertinax, a writer on foreign affairs, has perhaps attracted wider attention in Paris and abroad than any other commentator on the Peace negotiations. His name and French chauvinism are synonymous. As a sturdy reënforcement of his conservative philosophy, he possesses an accurate knowledge of foreign history and politics.

Le Temps, founded in 1860 and which *L'Action Française* calls the "greatest paper in the Republic," is

[4] For Gohier's anti-Americanism see Chapter XV; various newspaper opinions on foreign affairs are given there also.

[5] It is a remarkable paradox that one of the most bitter anti-Semitic as well as pro-clerical papers in Paris, *Le Gaulois,* is edited by a German Jew, Arthur Meyer!

without question the leading journal in France; strangely, it is also the least influential. Larger in size than its competitors, using a better grade of paper, very subdued in make-up, it presents a real literary appearance. Its *Bulletins du Jour*, which occupy its left-hand column, are known the world over for their scholarly treatment of diplomatic affairs. They are also regarded as being the mouthpiece of the French Foreign Affairs office. It was by his writing of this column that André Tardieu first won his recognition as a diplomatic authority. M. Jean Herbette is said to write them now. *Le Temps* is the organ of the great bourgeoisie. Consequently it is quite conservative in policy; but it has always stood for certain reforms. Though it is supposed to be partly subsidized by the Government, it does not hesitate to criticize it caustically. It was an ardent critic of the Government's State Socialist policies, it was particularly urgent for electoral reform, and the chief feature of its foreign policy was the destruction of German unity. Its foreign correspondence is excellent and authentic. Its editorial policy is vigorous. It is indeed strange that it is not more widely read for it is a credit to France and to French journalism. Can it be that the chief reason for its neglect is that it is a two-penny paper while the more popular journals sell at one?[6]

[6] Among other members of the conservative press may be mentioned *Le Gaulois*, an organ of the old nobility; *La Croix*, a clerical paper with 104 provincial editions, which carried on a vigorous campaign against the Republic at the time of the Dreyfus affair; *L'Intransigeant, La Liberté, Le Figaro*, edited formerly by the ill-fated Gaston Calmette; *L'Ordre Public*, just started in 1919; and *Lé Journal des Débats* edited by Auguste Gauvain, a distinguished diplomatic authority. All of these papers are of some influence; but they are more moderate than their contemporaries discussed above.

III

A paper of the "milieu"—conservative, as shown by its anti-Wilson attitude and its attacks on the Socialists, radical, in its demands for internal reform, *La Démocratie Nouvelle* is rapidly attracting a wide reading. This paper is a mere child in the curious family of Parisian papers, but its husky cries for domestic reform assure it a vigorous growth. It was founded in 1917 by M. Letailleur, who writes under the pseudonym of Lysis, whose books upon the reorganization of France are widely circulated. As a leader of the party of the "New Democracy," this paper attacks the anti-Semitic movement as a reopening of religious struggles; it insists upon the union of classes and consequently it berates the Socialists; and it is continually offering suggestions for the improvement of French commerce and government. André Chéradame, whose books on Pan-Germanism are well known, contributed frequent articles commenting upon the diplomatic situation during the Peace Conference. As will be noted in another chapter, M. Chéradame has a good grasp of diplomatic problems, but like many authorities upon military strategy, he shows a complete lack of sympathy with any other than strictly military principles.

The Radical Press is not very strong. In the supplement of the brochure giving the account of the Thirteenth Congress of the Radical and Radical Socialist party at Pau, 1913, a list of about thirty-five journals is found of "adherents of the party." Of these but about half a dozen are Parisian papers, of which only two or three in 1919 were to be found in the news stands. *La Lanterne,* bitterly anticlerical, was founded forty-

three years ago; *Le Rappel* is another Radical paper of limited circulation. *Le Pays,* scarcely three years old, and edited by Gaston Vidal, is a paper of the Radical Socialists. *L'Homme Libre,* formerly *L'Homme Enchainé,* until it had to change its name to continue publication, is a Radical paper only in so far as it supports Clemenceau, its former editor. Doubtless because of its enforced neutrality, it does not appear to be as widely read as in the early days of its belligerency. *L'Œuvre* has radical tendencies, but is a completely independent paper. It is also a child of the war; Gustave Tery is its editor; his particular hobbies are regionalism and the defects in the French bureaucracy. An insistent opponent of secrecy at the Peace Table, it declared as early as November 15, 1918, "Le grand jour et le franc jeu, voilà désormais les deux premières conditions d'un gouvernement de la République française." Tery later wrote, "The peace of the world cannot be assured by a few men whispering in a salon at the Palais d'Orsay, outside of which neither the peoples nor their representatives know anything except from distorted information which filters through the cracks in the doors or through half-split walls."

The chief weakness of Paris journalism is that there is no great Radical paper, standing for the liberal, democratic principles in which the greater part of the French people believe. The strong papers are extremist; that is, they are either too conservative or too radical. Although in the past a policy of democratic moderateness has been pursued by provincial papers, no outstanding journal in Paris now has such a program, and the creation of such a journal is a great need.

The case of Gustave Hervé and *La Victoire* has already been mentioned. In politics, *La Victoire* is now

supposed to support national socialism, but no difference between it and the Radical press can be seen. In addition to Hervé, André Lichtenberger is a regular contributor to this widely read sheet. His characteristic style may be judged from the following squib comparing Germany to a restive cow:

> What shall we do with her? Deprive her of food . . . and let her perish of want for our revenge? What! Take revenge on a brute? No, this is what we shall do. After having passed a strong iron ring through her nose to insure against surprise, we shall feed and take care of her just so far as it is necessary to keep her in a fit state to work for us and to supply us with milk. . . . Her horrid calf—the German people—will be permitted, at stated times, to approach his mother. For it won't do for him to perish, either. But it goes without saying that we shall not let him enjoy himself. He will be endowed with a good muzzle ornamented with nails. It will be removed long enough for him to suck just as much as is necessary. It will then be replaced in order that all the milk which is not indispensable to him will go to feed our own children. . . . It will be seen that my reasons for treating Germany with care do not arise from an excess of humanitarianism, but rather, I think, from a most concrete and prosaic regard for our own interests. . . . In other words, let us not kill the goose which lays the golden egg.

IV

A product of a very effective organization, the Socialist newspapers are the most numerous and the strongest in Paris. It is remarkable how so large and varied number of sheets, representing not only the party, but different sections of it, can be financed. The Nationalists accuse them all of having Jewish or German support; but perhaps the real source of their success is in party organization and in the contributions, how-

ever small, from a large class which feels that its interests are vitally aided by sympathetic newspapers.

L'Humanité is the most unique and the most successful attempt at a newspaper solely and officially devoted to and supported by a political party. This paper was founded by Jean Jaurès sixteen years ago. Under his direction, until his death at the eve of the war, it experienced few difficulties and little criticism. The outbreak of the war and its progress, as we have seen, brought about serious divisions in the party which placed *L'Humanité* in a difficult position. Pierre Renaudel had succeeded Jaurès as the political director of the paper. Although he was a supporter of the Government and in sympathy with the old *majoritaire* element, he did not openly ally himself with any division because of his responsibility to the paper which should at least attempt neutrality. In *L'Humanité,* however, he loyally supported the prosecution of the war. As long as the *majoritaires* kept their majority, Renaudel's position was maintained. But he was subject to repeated attacks from the *minoritaires;* and because of the cautious policy the paper was compelled to adopt, and because of the rise of journals supporting the different sections of the party, the circulation of *L'Humanité* dropped from about 150,000 in July, 1914, to 39,163 in August, 1918. The blame for this decrease was fastened upon Renaudel by the *minoritaires* who, after the meeting of the National Council in the summer of 1918, were strong enough to cause him to resign. A special committee of fifteen was then appointed to supervise the paper, and its immediate direction was confided to Marcel Cachin. Culminating events such as the Villain trial, the Easter Congress, and the demobilization of many Socialists, made Cachin's direction a success. Its

daily sales in October, 1918, amounted to 56,700; but this number on April 17, 1919, increased to 140,800, or nearly the average maintained under Jaurès' editorship.

La France Libre was born with the division of the Socialist party, it being only two years of age in 1919. It represents the elements who were once the *majoritaires,* the moderate Socialists who gave the war their support. It opposes the extreme socialism of Loriot; and when the other members of the Socialist family were cheering the Bolsheviki, *La France Libre* was vigorously criticizing them. Like *L'Humanité,* its editorials are usually written by sympathetic deputies. It is edited by Compère-Morel, Arthur Rozier, and Adrien Veber.

Le Populaire, edited by Jean Longuet, is the organ of the new majority of the Socialist party. Although it is only four years old, this journal presents some remarkable features. Its reports of labor and Socialist movements throughout the world are very instructive. Openly sympathetic with the Bolsheviki, it was through the columns of *Le Populaire* that their response to the Prinkipo proposal was given to the Peace Conference. M. Chicherin, the Foreign Minister of the Bolsheviki Government, on January 24, 1919, sent a telegraphic response to *Le Populaire* while the official reply was being transmitted to their representative in Sweden. This was a novel way of carrying on diplomatic correspondence and it raised a storm of criticism against *Le Populaire.* The editorial staff of this paper is notable. Although the editor-in-chief is Paul Faure, Longuet completely dominates it. Phedon, another pseudonym, is the direct opposite of Pertinax, but he equals him in condemning the Peace Conference. Possessing a remark-

able knowledge of international affairs, his logic frequently nettled the more conscientious supporters of the Conference; but his destructive and propagandist purposes weighed heavily against the influence of his articles. Finally, Henri Barbusse, one of the best known literary writers in France, is the literary editor of *Le Populaire.* Usually his novels are printed in daily installments before their publication in book form.

Still further "advanced," as the revolutionary Socialists prefer to call themselves, is *Le Journal du Peuple,*[7] edited by Henri Fabre. It now for four years has brought sympathy to the revolutionists, terror to the worshipers of order, and hatred to Léon Daudet. *Le Journal du Peuple* does not trouble itself a great deal about news or even diplomatic discussions. It directs its tirades against the rich, American jazz bands, and other matters of grave politics. Its text is the Revolution. "We are not responsible for it—it is you, the culpables, who are forcing us into another revolt which will win what 1789 left undone." With what sarcasm, it writes *en manchette,* "Once more Clemenceau has been assassinated—but it is the worker Lorne who is dead!"

The most violent of the Socialist papers is *La Vague,* a little four-page weekly. It is edited by M. Brizon, one of the delegates to the Kienthal conference, and a compatriot of Loriot. It is now in the second year of its existence. *La Vague* announces itself as "Pacifistic, Feministic, Socialistic," while above all of these characteristics, it very contradictorily declares itself as a

[7] A *Journal du Peuple* existed as early as 1841; in 1843, however, it changed its name to *La Réforme,* forsaking its socialistic sympathies for the democracy of the Ledru-Rollin type. *Cambridge Modern History,* xi, 24.

"*Journal du Combat.*" Its editorials are the most violent. They range from the "Fourth Republic," "The Sabotage of Liberty," and "The Beast," to the "Old World Condemned." After this, the "Greatest of all Wars will come," the war of the proletariat, and "the greatest of all Revolutions." "The Worker's Springtime is here, the springtime of new Republics. . . . It is the springtime of the new world. Down with the wicked beasts who rove" and who devour the fruits which Labor should itself procure.

Notre Voix is a new representative of the Socialist press.[8] As a typically "intellectual" journal it devotes itself chiefly to literary subjects. The series of cartoons, running as cover pages, and strongly reflecting upon the so-called justice of the last war, is remarkable. Some of them have been so severe that they have been suppressed by the censor. The following poem illustrates the spirit of *Notre Voix:*

L'APPEL

Nous sommes les cerveaux, les âmes et les torses,
Manquerions-nous de volonté,
Pourquoi n'osons-nous pas le beau geste de force
De libérer la Liberté?

Nous vivons aujourd'hui comme vivent entr'eux
Les cloîtrés dans les monastères,
Nous semblons accepter, avec un coeur heureux,
La loi qui dit: "Il faut se taire."

Le peuple n'est-il donc qu'un Océan qui porte
Les orgueilleux steamers riches de cargaisons?
Pourquoi ses flots dressés en des tempêtes fortes
Ne menacent-ils pas les ports à l'horizon?

[8] *La Politique, L'Heure,* and *La Verité* are three other Socialist papers.

Etre le nombre et n'être rien. Mais les blés lèvent
Car c'est la loi du Temps et le droit de la Sève,
Qu'importe les vieillards qui serrent le Pouvoir,
Fébrilement ainsi qu'un avare un sac d'or.
Qu'importe les peureux dont le coeur bat moins fort
Que le très lent tic tac d'une horloge.—L'Espoir
Avec ses poings tendus ou ses mains qui travaillent
Est le bon général qui gagne la Bataille
Sans enrégimenter les hommes en troupeau,
Nous voulons un pays plus large qu'un drapeau,
Et s'il faut pour bâtir des lendemains de joie
Abattre les Prisons, les Banques, les Palais
Ou l'Accusé, coupable ou non, est une proie
Si l'avenir le veut, eh bien abattons-les.

Mais si vous n'osez pas ce geste nécessaire,
Peuples, résignez-vous,
Portez le lourd fardeau des impôts et des guerres,
Aimez le bâton et les coups,
Et taisez-vous! . . .

Such is the French press. It now may be seen why the newspapers of France are not representative of opinion. Many of them are read for curiosity and amusement. The Monarchist will try to buy *La Vague* every Thursday just as the Socialist will do. He counts himself lucky to get one before the issue is sold out. Likewise people of all classes will read *L'Action Française;* and even though they may agree with Daudet's and Maurras' indictments, they may not accept their solutions. The remarkable thing about the French press is that the least representative paper is the best edited. This naturally attracts readers unsympathetic with the cause for which the paper stands. Consequently when the *L'Action Française* says it has more than doubled its circulation within the last four years, it does not necessarily mean that the number of French

Royalists has increased to that extent. It means that the war has provided an extraordinarily interesting theme for the Orleanist journal to write upon. *La Vague* claims to have a hundred thousand readers. Yet by no means are there a hundred thousand workers in France who desire an immediate revolution. Frenchmen, as much as, if not more than, Americans, read for pleasure. Nevertheless they do not take their newspapers seriously. The extremeness of the press reacts upon its influence. It contributes to its saleability, which, from the standpoint of the newspaper, perhaps is of the chief importance.

V

In normal times the legal restrictions upon the French press are very limited. Any newspaper may be published without authorization or without the deposit of security. It is only necessary to place a declaration with the proper authority before publication, giving the title of the publication, the name and the residence of the editor, and the name of the establishment printing it. Every journal must have a director who is a French citizen in full enjoyment of his civil rights. Every publication must bear the name and the address of the printer. It is not necessary that articles be signed, as they usually are; but at the time of publication of each issue, two copies signed by the director must be delivered to a court of first instance. Another deposit must be made for Paris with the Ministry of the Interior. As to individual responsibility the director of a paper is obliged to print a reply of any person whom he has named or designated in his paper. Furthermore, if a libelous statement is printed, both the director and

the author of the article can be brought before a correctional court. Journals published in foreign countries and those printed in France in a foreign language are subject to police control.[9]

The outbreak of the war naturally placed restrictions upon the freedom of the press. On August 5, 1914, a law was passed "suppressing the indiscretions of the press in time of war," which prohibited under the severest penalties, the publication of information and of intelligence upon everything directly relating to the national defense, except what the Government or the military authorities should communicate to it. The law specified particularly mobilization operations, the transportation of troops and of material, the strength of the army, nomination and changes in the high command, the disposition, location and movement of armies and of the fleet. The law finally broadened the scope of the censorship by including "any information or article concerning military or diplomatic operations of such a nature as to favor the enemy and to exercise a vexatious influence on the spirit of the army and of the population." The law was to become invalid after the cessation of hostilities at a date to be fixed by a Governmental decree.

Although this law was very broad, giving the Government considerable liberty of interpretation, it did not establish a preliminary censorship, but simply provided a penalty for the violation of the law. This penalty was from one to five years' imprisonment and from two hundred to a thousand dollars' fine. Although the law did not determine the authority to interpret

[9] For the press law of July 29, 1881, embodying these provisions see A. Carpentier, *Codes et Lois pour la France, l'Algérie et les Colonies,* ii, 881.

and enforce the censorship, it was generally recognized that such a task would fall on the judiciary. However, as those familiar with the French censorship know, there existed a preliminary censorship—and of matter not included in the law of August 5, and it was the military, not the judicial authorities, which interpreted and enforced it. Because of this, it was natural that many newspapers should attack the censorship administration as illegal; but as a matter of fact, the censorship did not rest upon the law of August 5, but upon the declaration of the State of Siege, made August 2, and later confirmed by a law of August 5.[10] The effects of the State of Siege are laid down by a law passed on August 9, 1849, the chief result of which is to substitute the military for the civil authority.[11] Normal guarantees of individuals are suppressed by it; military tribunals are given cognizance of crimes against the safety of the Republic, against the Constitution, against order and the public peace. The military is also given the right of perquisition and the right to prohibit publications and meetings which it judges of a nature to excite disorder. By this latter authority the French Government maintained, from the declaration of the State of Siege to October 13, 1919, a censorship limited in power solely to its own judgment.

The establishment of the censorship was announced to the newspapers in a note, August 4, which said: "The Government counts on the good and patriotic will of the

[10] In case of the adjournment of the Chambers, the President of the Republic may declare the State of Siege with the consent of the Council of Ministers, but the Chambers must be assembled two days afterward and either confirm or reject the President's action.

[11] The law of the State of Siege, of August 9, 1849, may be found in *Codes et Lois pour la France, l'Algérie et les Colonies*, compiled by A. Carpentier, ii, 431.

press of all parties, at Paris and in the provinces, not to publish any information concerning the war, whatever may be its source, its origin or nature, without having it viséed by the press bureau established at the Ministry of War."

The composition of this bureau varied, but it was always of an exclusively military character in membership and in policy. In the provinces, it was usually directed by commissions created by the Prefects, subject to control by the press bureau of the War Ministry at Paris. As penalties, the Government decreed that if a paper published an article which the censor refused to visé, it was warned for the first offense; for the second, it might be suspended for a period arbitrarily set. Suspension from publication, which was ordered by a decision of the "President of the Council of Ministers" was accompanied by the seizure of all the copies of the journal suspended.

In three respects, then, the French censorship exceeded that established by Parliament in 1914. It was administered by military authorities, it was preventative (preliminary to the publication of an article) and universal, and it extended to matters not included in the law of August 5.

The censorship, thus constituted, knew no bounds; it censored subject matter for which there appeared to be no justification, news which was given complete publicity in other countries. Furthermore, it repeatedly discriminated in its applications; news and opinions of an identical nature were denied to some papers, while their publication was allowed to others.

L'Europe Nouvelle, an outspoken, liberal weekly, felt the censor's lash as frequently as any. Often whole columns of foreign news would appear blank except for

a line explaining that "230 lines had been censored." On November 9, the censor prevented it from saying that certain clauses in the Austrian armistice caused considerable emotion among the Croats and Slavs, when the entire English and Italian press was full of controversies over it. It was even prohibited from speaking of the movement in Spain for a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, it could not comment upon the November electoral campaign in the United States when *L'Echo de Paris* was allowed to publish unfair dispatches from its New York correspondent about it. It was forbidden to cite certain articles in the program of the Revolutionary Socialists in Switzerland, when that program had appeared *in extenso* in *Le Temps*, the day before. It was forbidden in its Polish dispatches of November 16 to show how the *coup d'état* of the nationalists in Poland harmed the democratic movement, when *L'Humanité* was authorized to publish violent attacks against its chief nationalist leader, Dmowsky. It could not print the irredentist demands of Greece, two days after they had appeared in full in the *New Europe* in London. Finally, it was not allowed to point out to its readers that the products of the Saar valley were of an inferior quality when industrial groups, such as the Committee of Forges, were publicly expressing such opinions.

French papers were not allowed to print dispatches containing news of the rice riots in Japan, or even of the United States Senate Aircraft Report when the entire Allied press was giving both events the fullest publicity. The military authorities gave no reasons for the censorship of such articles or for allowing some papers to print reports denied to others. Charges were even insinuated that papers, which were refused the

right to publish an article, would turn around and sell it to another where the censorship had no objection to its publication. Whether it was graft or customary military stupidity that caused this situation, it justly aroused a tremendous opposition.

La Vieille-France was a frequent, though a deserved victim of the censor's knife. Consequently it was violent in the denunciation of the Government's repressive policy. President Wilson could say that European cabinets were without valor, prudence or foresight, but Urbain Gohier could not say what he thought about the American President. Although the whole world accused France of imperialism and although everybody defended Germany, patriots like Gohier "cannot reply a word to them. We cannot risk ruffling a German (censored)!"

A newspaper was started recently in Paris, called *La République Russe,* whose purpose was to combat Bolshevism and Czarism at the same time. The censor naturally allowed its articles against Bolshevism to pass, but it refused to allow the publication of an editorial which denounced "the open or disguised attempts of monarchist restoration." The League of the Rights of Man vigorously denounced such an abuse of the censor in the service of any party, especially a party of reaction.

As has been seen, the censorship did not cease with hostilities. Some of its greatest flagrancies occurred during the armistice. The case of *L'Information,* an independent paper, edited by Léon Chavenon, with the reputation of being one of the most sincere and liberal papers in Paris, attracted a great deal of attention. On March 2, 1919, it published an article upon the "Essential Clauses of the Peace Preliminaries." The article

apparently was not viséed by the censor for upon its publication the editor and the writer of the article, Charles Omessa, were charged with violation of the law of August 5, 1914, and *L'Information* was suspended for eight days. M. Chavenon asserted that the censor had only informed him of its decision at a very late hour on Saturday, at a time when the printing had already commenced. When the censor finally did send his disapproval the article was immediately removed. The few copies already distributed it was impossible to recall. Furthermore, the very same information had appeared in another paper the day before.

Other similar instances were frequent. On the 8th of May, *Le Temps* published, apparently with the permission of the censor, a long and detailed summary of the restitutions, reparations and guarantees contained in the Treaty of Versailles. It published this information in the face of a statement that no evening paper would receive this news upon that day. But *Le Bonsoir,* the evening edition of the *L'Œuvre,* edited by Gustave Tery, had also arranged for the publication of an identical article; but the censor formally forbade its printing, threatening seizure in case of disobedience. Aroused by this discrimination, M. Tery took the matter to the courts, and entered a "double complaint in forfeiture," one of the most serious charges in French law, with the Military Governor of Paris against the chief censor, Major Nusillard, and against M. Mandel, M. Clemenceau's Chef de Cabinet. Mandel has often been referred to in the Chamber of Deputies as Clemenceau's "Grey Eminence," many claiming that while M. Clemenceau was busy with the Peace Conference, Mandel was the real Prime Minister. After the filing of

this complaint Major Nusillard was reported to have resigned, but to have subsequently withdrawn his resignation. Tery made it clear that he thought Mandel was the real offender. Regardless of the outcome of the case, it increased the demand for the censorship's removal.

During the last week of April, 1919, the censor was especially stern. Marshal Foch had given out another of his interviews to the London papers urging the annexation of the left bank of the Rhine. As a result of trying to reproduce the article from the British papers, *Le Bonsoir, La Patrie* and *La Démocratie Nouvelle* all went down under the censor's swoop. To obtain this interesting news, Parisian readers had to wait for the London mail! In fact, *Le Bonsoir* was seized three times during this week.

On May 15, the Paris edition of the New York *Herald* attempted to print the measures which the Allies were going to take in the event that the Treaty was not signed by Germany. The information merely told of Foch being ordered to the Rhine to make all preparations for immediate military operations. In the very same number of the Chicago *Tribune,* exactly the same information was given in a little different phraseology. The censor had either forgotten his decision in the one case when he came to the other; or he had decided to change his mind, the possession of which many papers were beginning to doubt. For the *Herald* article was suppressed and the *Tribune's* was passed.

The fact that the censorship exceeded considerably the provisions of the law which the Parliament passed on August 5, 1914, joined with its onerous policy, led to early attempts to put it upon a legislative basis. In

March, 1915, M. Paul Meunier [12] introduced a bill into the Chamber declaring the State of Siege lifted in Paris and in all the non-invaded departments. As it finally failed of passage, M. Meunier in October, 1915, introduced a bill which the Commission on Civil Legislation adopted whose object was to provide for a legal, preliminary censorship in time of war, placing it under the control of the civil authority—the prefect of police in Paris, and the prefects in the departments, and to limit strictly its application to articles of a military and diplomatic character which would be of a nature to injure the national defense. Articles upon interior politics would be excluded from the censorial scissors. The bill did not come up for discussion until January, 1916. The debate upon it occupied all the sessions from the 21st to the 25th. Finally, M. Briand, the Premier, admitted that some errors had been made by the censor, but he insisted that the national defense exacted its maintenance; consequently the proposition was returned to the Commission.

After the armistice, the Socialist and Radical parties, the C. G. T., and many newspaper organizations demanded that the State of Siege be raised and that the censorship be removed. Because of the peace negotiations, the Government did not believe it wise to allow freedom of discussion. But after the German signature of the Treaty, the editor of *Le Matin* (June 25, 1919) wrote to the President of the Press Syndicate, asking it to demand the raising of the censorship, now that the conference was virtually closed, in order that the French public be informed as equally as the public of other nations. Inspired by this letter, M. Jean Dupuy, Presi-

[12] It is an interesting coincidence that Meunier was arrested in the fall of 1919 for having had communications with the enemy.

dent of the Syndicate, addressed a letter to M. Clemenceau, upon July 2, asking that the censorship be removed. On July 8, another bill sponsored by M. Paul Meunier, demanding the abolition of the State of Siege and the censorship, came up in the Chamber for discussion. M. Stephen Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affaires, declared that the same reasons demanded the continuance of the State of Siege and the censorship until the French ratification of the Treaty as existed during the peace negotiations. As a result of his speech and his assurance that the censorship would be repealed immediately upon ratification and before the time of the elections, the Meunier proposition was defeated by a vote of 256 to 202. It was only upon the 12th of October, 1919, a few days after the Chamber ratified the Treaty, that presidential decrees were issued raising the State of Siege and abolishing the censorship.

Thus it appears that the French censorship was of longer duration and of much greater unreasoned severity than that of the other Allied countries. Yet it should not be judged too harshly. During the war, France, unlike most of her Allies, was the field of operations, where the greatest precautions had to be taken. During the Peace Conference, she was the host of the world; the bitterness apparent everywhere at times, it was a considerable task to suppress. The discriminations, of course, cannot be justified. They appear to be faults inherent in the French bureaucracy and magnified by the military part of it. In comparison with the American censorship, the French censorship may seem unduly severe and dictatorial. But as a matter of fact the expression of opinion is much more free in France than it is in America to-day. No efforts were made to suppress the mutterings of the *minoritaire* Socialists dur-

ing the war. In America every one of them would have been jailed for violating the sedition acts.

Has the French Chamber ever expelled its Socialist members as the New York Assembly has just done? *Jamais.* Raffin-Dugens and Brizon almost daily breathed out "seditious" utterances, to which the Chamber replied with laughter,—after all, the most effective answer. Frenchmen realized what American legislators apparently cannot realize, that to make martyrs of men is merely to increase their following. Consequently, the French policy was to await the commission of overt acts before taking measures to deny Socialist elements a right to be heard. In so doing, France has probably avoided the very end which New York legislators and American Congressmen, if they persist in their suppressive actions—will invite,—namely, a revolution by force. If the French Chamber had expelled its hundred Socialist members during the war, it would have had a revolution on its hands in ten minutes. Why? Because so long as these gentlemen were open-lungedly venting their opinions at the tribune of the Chamber, there was nothing to revolt about. They were not being suppressed; they could work in the open and they could be repelled in the open. The Government believed that the people of France had sufficient good sense not to succumb to the "terrifying" doctrines of Socialism, without the self-asserted guardianship of legislatures and Government officials who, by force, might attempt to conceal from them doctrines which, on account of their very nature, cannot be concealed. It was far better to have the arguments for proletariat dictatorship debated in the forums of public assemblies, where they could be analyzed and where their errors could be readily pointed out, than to have

those arguments bottled up in a caldron of discontent, whose seething waters were sooner or later bound to scald those who fed the fires which kept them hot.

The tolerance of the "seditious" elements in France during the war—repulsive as the tactics of those elements were—was essential to the winning of the war. If they had been "stamped out" by the "iron force of the law," France would have been so weakened internally that she would have had to sue for a humiliating peace.

It may be an irritation to the *amour propre* of America to say it, but it nevertheless remains true that republican France, whose attempts at self-government we have too often ridiculed, can teach us some badly needed lessons in the basic principles of democracy.

CHAPTER X

THE BUREAUCRACY AND STATE SOCIALISM

Si les Français mangeaient le papier, ils seraient le peuple le mieux nourri de la terre.—EDOUARD HERRIOT.

I

The French bureaucracy is noted for its magnitude, its centralization and as a Paris editor has said, "its honest sloth." Not only does it completely monopolize the management of many services left to private enterprise in other countries, but it exercises this management inefficiently from the standpoint of public accommodation, and unprofitably from the budgetary point of view. Its condition has led to the most insistent demand for administrative reform. This demand, which calls for both the decentralization of public services and the surrender of present industrial prerogatives of the Government to individuals, is more urgently advanced than the demand for purely political regeneration.

Upon the general weaknesses of this administrative system Professor Villey has written:

> The central authority, charged with deciding every affair of the country, is overwhelmed by an inextricable task. The heads of the ministerial departments themselves cannot have a personal knowledge of even the most important affairs and they have to unload them upon an irresponsible bureau-

cracy. The questions which arise in one district, in a determined center, often at the extreme ends of the country, are treated without competence, often even settled without discussion. More frequently it is the deputies of the place who decide, and usually they are men of parties. Politics is mixed up with every question, and favoritism is given a free course.

The multiple formalities which centralization brings with it, lead to interminable delays, very prejudicial to the public interest.[1]

A complete description of the French bureaucracy cannot be given, but a few instances of its method of functioning may be cited.

The French railway system perhaps offers one of the best instances of the inefficiency of public industry. The State line, and the Western line, having a mileage of about 5,600 miles, are owned and operated by the French Government; while the greater lines in France, such as the Paris and Orleans, the Paris, Lyons and Mediterranean, the Northern, the Eastern, and the Midi roads are privately operated under Government leases. According to the figures of the Ministry of Public Works, the State line in 1913 was the least profitable of the roads in France, in spite of the fact that it runs through one of the most richly developed parts of the country. Its gross earnings were $10,560 per mile compared with $26,800 per mile earned by the Northern road. The net earnings would doubtless have made the comparison worse. As for service, the State line is notoriously inferior to the private roads. At the time of the purchase of the Western line by the Government in 1908 it had a deficit of $5,260,000. In the operations of 1913, the Government reached a deficit

[1] Edmond Villey, *Les Vices de la Constitution Française,* 138.

upon this line of $15,280,000, an increase in one year of $10,000,000, and during the five years of Government operation the total deficit reached was nearly $47,000,000. In technical terms, the coefficient of exploitation (ratio of operating expense to income) of the State road, Government operated, in 1918 was 120 per cent, in comparison with that of the Midi, which was 87 per cent; of the Orleans, which was 85 per cent, and of the P. L. & M. road, which was 90 per cent. The coefficient for the State road even exceeded that of the private companies operating in the devastated regions—96 per cent for the Eastern and 112 per cent for the Northern.[2]

During the war all of the private roads were requisitioned and placed under a military régime by authority of the law of 1889; at first they were under the direction of the Ministry of War, and later, of the Ministry of Public Works. The great majority of the military commissioners who took over the operation of these railways knew little of their organization and functioning. Although the roads eventually responded to the military needs of the country, it was at nearly a doubled operating expense. Perhaps this was to be expected under war conditions; but in addition, the economic needs of the nation were sacrificed by what appeared to be unintelligent management. After the close of hostilities, France experienced a transportation crisis which was one of the great causes of the height of prices; cars could not be obtained to meet the demands of the

[2] *Journal des Débats,* June 7, 1919.

A very good account of the operation of the French railways during the war (although it does not touch directly on the effect of Government operation) will be found in *La Revue Politique et Parlementaire,* February 10, 1920, in an article by Marcel Peschaud entitled *"La Crise des Transports."*

devastated regions. Meanwhile, there were hundreds of cars lying idle in the American military yards, such as at Gièvres, which the French Government refused to take over. Government control and operation of railways may have other justifications than mere economy; but the State-owned and the State-controlled roads in France conclusively show that so far as efficiency is concerned, private roads are unquestionably superior.

Not only is the post-office in France operated by the Government, but under the same service come the telegraphs and telephones. France has some 13,000 post-offices, 16,000 public telegraphs, and 219,000 telephones, all controlled from Paris. Such a control is so centralized that even the setting up of a letter-box, the creation of a substation, or the extension of a telegraph line must have the consent of the Central Ministry. This absoluteness of direction doubtless prevents the extension of these facilities. According to a statement of Lazare Weiller in a report to the Chamber of Deputies in February, 1915, two thirds of the 36,536 communes in France do not have post-offices; half of them do not have telephone service, and a great number of them have no official communication with the outside world except through a daily rural postman. Telegraph offices, situated in the mountains, have their lines blockaded during the winter and their wires cut; and the Government service is satisfied to leave them for months in a useless condition.

On the 29th of March, 1919, the Paris papers published the details of a "Telegraph Scandal" which an investigating committee of the Chamber of Deputies had unearthed. It charged the Telegraphic Control Section, of which M. Tannery was the head, with scandalous abuses. M. Tannery, during the investigation,

admitted that 40,000 dispatches had been held back by his section daily. The majority of them were never delivered, being thrown into the basket, and upon accumulation, destroyed. The senders and those to whom they were addressed were never informed. On the occasion of the last national loan, for some inconceivable reason this Section stopped and suppressed large stock exchange orders and dispatches of funds for the loan. During the war, it even destroyed telegrams from munition factories at Le Creusot and Firminy with the result that some of them had to close down for want of supplies. Telegrams from or to foreign sovereigns received no privileged treatment, and even the correspondence of the French Foreign Office became lost in the maze of treasonable stupidity or intrigue of this Section. At first unknown to the French Foreign Office, diplomatic telegrams sent by the French Ambassadors in Rome and London to Spain, were pigeonholed, as were telegrams to the Paris office from M. Bapst, the French Minister at Copenhagen. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a complaint, said that, "under its present head, the Telegraphic Control Section is an organ of confusion and of disorder which has engendered extraordinary abuses and risked compromising the Government seriously and hampering its general policy." As a result of these revelations, M. Tannery was relieved as head of the Section. But he retained his post at the *Cour des Comptes*, and in addition, he was appointed to the exchange commission sent by the Minister of Finances to Alsace and Lorraine! It was only after the Chamber had given publicity to its investigation that he was finally dismissed from this post.

The French Government operates monopolies in

matches, gun powder, and tobacco. During the war it increased the prices of some of these articles in the hope of additional revenue; but it disguised its real purpose by informing the public that the supply was nearing exhaustion. Although the provinces went smokeless, the Government saw to it that members of Parliament were amply supplied. As a reason for the tobacco shortage, the Government also contended that consumption during the war had greatly increased. Yet in a report made to the Chamber upon the 27th of February, 1918,[3] by M. Grodet, figures were quoted, showing that consumption had diminished 3 per cent and 4 per cent during 1915 and 1916, in comparison with 1914; and that consumption in 1917 was exactly the same as that of 1914. The little Republic of Andorra was manufacturing cigarettes, paying customs duties on them, and selling them in the French Pyrenees for fifteen and thirty centimes a package, while the French Government was selling identical cigarettes for eighty centimes and a franc. Although this tobacco incident is comparatively insignificant, it illustrates the extravagant, if not extortionate, character of a Government monopoly.

One of the noticeable failures of Government operation during the war was the Arsenal at Roanne. This was a project of Albert Thomas, a former Minister of Armament, who decided to erect this arsenal in October, 1915. The buildings covered an area of about seventy-five acres and the plant employed workmen, varying in number from 11,500 to 40,000. By December 31, 1918, the expenditures upon the plant had surpassed $56,000,000, while the total value of

[3] Quoted in *L'Etatisme*, brochure of "Union des Intérêts Economiques," 35.

the shells produced up to this time scarcely came to $4,000,000.[4] The Roanne Chamber of Commerce, in a report made on the 7th of December, 1918, protested against the manner in which this establishment was being operated. It accused the Government of having no idea of continuity in its development, of employing irresponsible and incompetent employees, of exercising no intelligent control, and of inexcusably squandering public funds. As an example of the deception under which the arsenal was operated, the Chamber cited an instance when M. Thomas, wishing to determine the arsenal's capacity, examined certain machinery for turning shells. With this as a criterion of the arsenal's productive power, he pronounced himself completely satisfied. But as a matter of fact, according to the Chamber, the machinery had been purposely erected that morning, and upon the Minister's departure, again dismantled. In regard to salaries, a carpenter, paid three dollars a day in a private concern, made a hundred and twenty dollars in four weeks at the arsenal. A laborer, paid fifteen cents an hour in a steel plant at Roanne, was able by piece work to make five dollars in three hours at the arsenal. In regard to comparative costs of production, 155 mm. shells at the arsenal cost more than a hundred dollars; while the Government paid private firms a maximum of ten dollars for exactly the same product.

The control and development of ports is another affair directed by the Central Government. The port of Havre was recognized forty years ago as being insufficient for the needs of French commerce. Five years of agitation were necessary to secure the voting of a

[4] *L'Etatisme*, 38.

project providing for its development by the Chamber, which was finally achieved in 1882. Nine years were then necessary for the Senate to examine the bill. Finally in 1891 it rejected it to the extent of refusing the greater part of its provisions. So the agitation had to start over again and a still more modest project was placed on foot. Four more years were this time necessary for Parliament to adopt the latter project, which was done in 1895. Thus nineteen years were taken to reach a decision upon a necessary public work which it required seven years more to carry out. Twenty-six years elapsed between the conception and the achievement of this project. In the meantime business interests languished. Apparently the administration is not moved by their protests; when it is, it votes supplementary budgets and makes patchwork additions to calm them; but in the years of delay, the productive capacities of France are unutilized. As a result, France has few harbors, a feeble merchant marine and an inadequate system of transportation; costs of production are high and other countries easily outdistance her in commercial fields.

In addition to the incident of the port of Havre, the development of the port of Marseille necessitated a list of formalities which filled two columns in the *Journal Officiel,* a publication of about the same size as, and corresponding to our *Congressional Record.* The port administration is itself dependent upon six different ministries.

The Saigon bamboo case is another celebrated instance of the workings of the French bureaucracy. The French arsenal at Saigon in the Orient was in need of bamboo, a need which was communicated to Paris. It happened that Saigon was the center of one of the most

prolific bamboo districts in the world. The technical services in Paris knew this; but because of an ancient ruling that colonial arsenals should be supplied from home arsenals, they ordered that bamboo be secured and shipped from Toulon to the Orient. Six months of time were lost in the transaction as well as several hundred dollars. But that was immaterial to the bureaucracy. It had acted according to regulations and its own "responsibility" was clear.

Instances of Government inefficiency in the national printing establishment, where expenditures exceeded by twenty-three times the original estimates; in the fountains of Versailles, which take an immense amount of water; in the Gobelin manufactures; in the mint; in the management of the *Journal Officiel;* in the scandal of the Rodin forgeries; and in the reconstruction of the devastated regions, do not need citing to establish a fact which Frenchmen have almost come to tolerate as an inevitable necessity.

According to *L'Œuvre,* a vigorous opponent of the bureaucracy, the American army officials were constantly interfered with in the erection of a stadium at Joinville which the United States was to give to France. Arrangements were made with the National Committee of Physical Education as to its erection, which was to be completed by June 1, 1919. But subordinate Government officials deliberately delayed construction by petty persecution of contractors and even by summonses against American drivers. *L'Œuvre* wondered whether French bureaucrats were deaf, blind, or criminal.

The French Diplomatic Service, from the standpoint of training, is supposed to be the most skilled in the world. But according to a report to the Chamber by

Louis Marin,[5] in 1912 over a hundred diplomatic agents were removed from their posts and transferred to others either before they were, or when they were just upon the point of being, acquainted with the conditions of their posts. Out of thirty-two legations, only eleven were directed by the same head between 1912 and 1914. Even during the war, thirty-seven diplomatic agents were displaced and transferred to other offices. The constant replacing of agents, rendering them incapable of acquiring full knowledge of their posts and authority sufficient to regulate affairs to the satisfaction of both countries, could not but be prejudicial to France.

French administrative methods in Alsace-Lorraine have caused considerable discontent among the inhabitants of these recovered provinces. Contradictory orders, complete destruction of German organization and the substitution for it of French disorder, have received not only the criticism of such conservative papers as the *L'Echo de Paris,*[6] but of the Socialist papers such as *L'Heure.*[7]

In addition to these governmental activities, the French administrative system practically controls every phase of local government, the educational system of the country, and a large army and navy. The number of Government employees engaged in these enterprises is as follows:

Functionaries belonging wholly or in part to the State	665,023
Functionaries belonging to departments, communes, colonies, or public establishments	330,226
Total	995,249[8]

[5] Quoted in *Le Correspondant,* January 10, 1919.
[6] Number of February 26, 1919.
[7] Number of March 1, 1919.
[8] Estimate of budget project for 1913.

Furthermore, the number of civil employees increases each year; in 1906 they numbered 702,596; in 1907, 727,792; 1908, 740,290, and 1909, 778,565. This great number of citizens—it is generally estimated that one out of every eleven voters is a Government official—in the employ of the Government creates a vast political problem. The evils arising from such a condition are plainly apparent.

The French bureaucracy not only reaches into fields ordinarily left to private enterprise, it not only commits the most costly blunders in its activities, it not only is an enormous political machine; but it habitually interferes with the exercise of private initiative in the realm theoretically left to it.

Even to fence a field along a public road or to change the sign-plate upon a street car in a small town, the approval of the central authorities is necessary. Authorization is required also to build a shack upon waste land for which a tax of seven cents must be paid, and which requires going through twenty-four formalities. If one wishes to place a rowboat upon a river, sixteen different negotiations with the central authorities must be gone through. To fence a field, nineteen negotiations are required. It takes two years of bargaining to get the consent of the Government to build even a shed upon a wharf.[9] These complications, and this endless red tape could be done away with if local authorities were empowered to handle these affairs. There seems to be no reason why consent of any nature should be required for such purely personal and insignificant activities.

Speaking of the interminable delays of French functionaries, a French critic writes:

[9] See Lysis, *Vers la Démocratie Nouvelle*, 19

> Those interested can petition, intrigue, or vituperate against the Government, either in conference or through newspapers . . . but they are vigorously forbidden to do anything themselves and to carry out the work which their own districts need, and their advice has no effect on functionaries, in the matter of industrial development.
>
> There is no liberty for citizens to act; it is impossible for them to make a move without being entangled in the network of authorization, of paper-work, and of formalities, ending in an omnipotent, incompetent, inert and incoherent State, which has reserved to itself the initiative in every question interesting national or regional life, while it is capable of solving nothing by its very constitution. Forty years of this treatment have killed initiative and originality in our provinces. Tied down, held in leash, our population leads a languishing life and its faculties little by little are atrophied.[10]

According to this writer, the excessive number of Government officials is due to the fact that Statism almost completely prevents the exercise of independent occupations whose development is so hopelessly curtailed by restrictions. In desperation business men give up and accept a starvation but certain wage in Government employment. "Because of these precarious conditions every Frenchman is more or less a candidate for public employment, toward which he is attracted by the law of least resistance, because under our centralized administration, the poorly remunerated functionary leads a miserable life, but exempt from anxiety; far from his employer, the State, who does not know him and for whom he is only a register, he works automatically, without taking any responsibility; he is even forbidden to take any initiative and his advancement is made by seniority, whatever may be his merit and his application. . . ."

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[10] *Ibid.*, 23.

II

In every belligerent country the war necessitated an increased State control over private activities. Particularly was this so in France, where the Government not only assumed supervision of, but the direct participation in, industrial processes. Food control naturally became imperative; and by a law of October 16, 1915, the Ministry of Food Supply was organized and entrusted with supplying the civilian population with wheat and flour. A credit of 120,000,000 francs was placed at its disposal and the Ministry was instructed to make an annual statement of profit and loss. In the first year of operation, it had a deficit of 142,156,000 francs, to which should be added customs duties and registry fees. Later, this deficit rose to 400,000,000 francs, to which should be added 225,000,000 francs in customs duties, etc. The policy of maximum prices, which has generally proved futile, was adopted early in the war; at first, it was applied to wheat, oats, rye, barley, bran, grain offals; later, it was extended to sugar, coffee, potatoes, milk, margarine, aliment fats, edible oils, dried legumes, paraffin and petrol, commercial fertilizer, copper, sulphate, and sulphur. In 1917, coal, bread and sugar cards were instituted which allowed each family a limited ration of each of these commodities. This rationing was not entirely done away with until the summer of 1919. Its ineffectiveness may be illustrated by the sugar famine which Paris and the provinces underwent in April and May, 1919. Sugar was unobtainable and the sugar cards were useless; although they entitled the holder to purchase 750 grams of sugar a month, no sugar could be found to

bag. But in the midst of this famine, the Government in an "official explanation" asserted that it had amply supplied the city of Paris with sugar for a period of two months, but that certain grocery were deliberately hoarding it for speculation purposes. This the latter hotly denied, at the same time pointing out that the Government was allowing confectioners an unlimited amount for candies and pastries. Finally, B. Vilgrain, Undersecretary of State for Food Supply, offered another "solution" of the problem by securing a thousand tons of American granulated sugar, which he placed in the shops and in his own creation, the Vilgrain booths, which were really Government stores, supplied by Government-purchased supplies, transported by Government carriers. Even this did not appear to relieve the situation, especially not in Paris and certainly not in the provinces. The shortage became so noticeably due to Government inconsistency that the municipal council of Lyons, in its session of June 12, 1911, passed a resolution, asking the Government why it was that industries of pure luxury, such as pastry-makers and brewers, were given sugar when it was refused for family consumption.

One of the food-control measures, also prompted by the necessity for economy in ocean tonnage, was the Government regulation of the Merchant Marine. Under authority of a law passed February 11, 1916, a Government decree, issued five days later, requisitioned the entire merchant fleet. According to the commission charged by the Chamber to examine the Government operation of this fleet, it was found that under it importations dropped off [illegible] tons or 5 per cent; this figure would have amounted to [illegible] tons or 15 per cent if it had not been for the increased assistance from

the English and American fleets. Examples of boats with half-filled cargoes, docks loaded down with goods awaiting shipment for weeks, ships sent to ports too small for their draught, are multiple. M. Lavoinne in the Chamber recited an instance of the Government landing 22,500 quintaux[11] of wheat at Havre (May 23, 1918), and shipping them by rail up to Rouen. This involved another handling of the cargo and the utilization of railway transportation sorely needed elsewhere, when the cargo could just as easily have been taken by ship to Rouen. In an article on the obstruction of the Port of Marseille, in *Le Petit Parisien*,[12] it was pointed out that under private operation of shipping a merchant asked three days to unload a ship of 3,000 tons at Marseille; but now under State control the same task, in some cases, had taken from the 14th of November to the middle of February. Instances are known of cargoes of eggs making the voyage three times from Philippeville to Marseille, before being finally unloaded; while at the time of writing the article, 100,000 tons of perishable material were slowly deteriorating at the port because of lack of attention.[13]

III

One of the most important features of the control of food and of industry during the war was the interministerial committees and "Consortiums" established

[11] Quintal—a hundredweight.

[12] Number of February 13, 1919.

[13] As to the general extent of Statism during the war, Maxime Leroy says, "Salaries, length of work, prices, the purchase, sale and circulation of goods, travel, thought itself, everything, is regulated and controlled by the State. France has lost its former economic physiognomy." *Pour Gouverner*, 172.

by the Government to monopolize and distribute importations completely. Unrestricted importations were prohibited by a law passed May 6, 1916,[14] which at the same time raised tariff rates and gave the Government complete control of the contingencies of foreign materials to be brought to France. This action was part of the inter-Allied plan of apportionment of resources. It arose from the difficulty of foreign payments, from the necessity of giving the military needs of the country priority, and of utilizing to the best advantage the merchant marine. Finally, the most powerful and diligent manufacturers could not be allowed to import freely under disrupted war conditions, because they would have exhausted the market for weaker or later competitors. The Government believed it would be better to divide or ration supplies methodically, giving to each according to his production capacity. With this principle established, the State itself became judge of tonnage availabilities and purchaser and negotiator for foreign importations and payments. Despite the necessity of evading industrial anarchy, the French Government could have acted as a controlling agency, as did the British Government; but it chose the most extreme alternative of State Socialism, and precipitated perhaps as great a danger as the one it avoided.

By virtue of the law of May, 1916, a Government decree of March 22, 1917, created a Committee of Derogations and Prohibitions, charged with determining quarterly contingents of importations for determined products and forming a plan for the apportionment of these contingents.[15] By a strange parliamentary procedure, a law passed January 20, 1919, ratified this decree. The

[14] See *Journal des Economistes*, March 15, 1919.
[15] *Ibid.*, April, 1917, 105.

first State institutions arising from these decrees were inter-ministerial committees, organized for each industry. Their method of operation was illustrated by the Inter-ministerial Committee on Wool. This committee, as disclosed in the Chamber's interpellation of the Government upon June 28, 1918,[16] was charged with the enactment of measures destined to assure the supply of wool under the best possible conditions to the different branches of the French textile industry, so as to satisfy the general needs of the country for goods manufactured in wool (being certain that the needs of the army . . . have priority over all others). Specifically this committee was (1) to centralize needs of all kinds; (2) to establish (the needs of the army first being attended to) the order of priority for the other national needs; (3) to determine, by limitation, if necessary, the nature of products to be manufactured from raw materials, and the labor and the materials to be used; (4) to fix, in agreement with unions or industrial groups constituted under authority of the Ministry of Commerce, the maximum prices of transformation for important parts in manufacture, such as combing, spinning, dyeing, etc.; to fix the maximum selling prices of products obtained from these transformations and delivered, either to industry or to consumers; (5) to determine quantities and classes of the different materials for manufactured products to be imported for all purposes; (6) to study the order of urgency for the introduction of diverse products, under the reservation that the materials necessary to the army always be given priority; (7) to give advice on the kinds of consortiums or groups which it will be necessary to form

[16] *Ibid.*, March 15, 1919.

between agents or manufacturers, to regularize industrial production and to facilitate relations between producers and consumers, under the control of the Minister of Commerce; (8) to make any proposition to regulate the sale of materials of products of wool eventually, and, if necessary, to restrain consumption; (9) to give advice on questions of exportation concerning wool or objects manufactured from it; (10) finally, to examine all other questions relating to this textile and which they judge useful to submit to the different ministries interested.

As will be seen from these powers, such a committee, composed only of Cabinet Ministers with no technical members upon it, was empowered to control completely the amount of raw materials given to private industry, the amount and price of output, and the wages of labor engaged upon it. This was perhaps the most extensive task a modern State has undertaken.[17]

Subjected to the control of these inter-ministerial committees, the "Consortium" was created with the object of grouping together manufacturers who deal in a certain raw material. With a few exceptions, it was only by belonging to such a group that manufacturers could obtain raw materials. "The consortium . . . is a species of joint-stock company, a kind of coöperative association which has as its shareholders the members of a determined industry and which enters into a contract with the State with a view to obtaining from it, upon certain conditions, the materials needed by this industry to function."[18]

The contract between the State and the consortium

[17] An excellent article on the French importation policy is "*La politique française en matière d'importations,*" in *La Revue d'Economie Politique,* March-April, 1919, 164-189.

[18] *Europe Nouvelle,* May 4, 1918.

specified that the manufacturers lost the right of buying, individually or collectively, the raw materials necessary to their business. The State alone could make these purchases, that is, if they must be imported. The consortium therefore received its raw materials from the hands of the State, and these it was obliged to receive in whatever amounts the State should wish to dole out, and to reimburse the State for all expenditures made by it in securing the material. This lot received from the hands of the State was then divided among the members of the consortium according to determined rules of apportionment and at a price which the State fixed in a manner to assure a certain profit to the consortium, to remunerate the capital invested in it. Finally, the State also fixed the price at which the products obtained by the manufacturers by means of this raw material, should be sold to the consumer.

An example of the composition and the operation of such an organism, was that of the French Oil Companies. This consortium was constituted in the form of a joint-stock company with an initial capital of 5,000,000 francs, divided into 10,000 shares of 500 francs each. These shares were purchased and held by all the manufacturers of oil arising from foreign grains, such as cottonseed, flaxseed, and castor oil plants, in determined proportions, according to the extent of the business of each. Each member's share of the seeds imported by the Government was irrevocably fixed by the respective stock subscriptions. Upon notice of the consortium, the State bought the seed, passed it on to the consortium, and was reimbursed for the purchase. The consortium, in turn, sold the material to its members according to the amount of stock each held in the consortium, with the understanding that the State

would fix the selling price of the seed delivered by the consortium to its members and also the price at which the products manufactured from the seed should be sold. By this means, a business which before the war aggregated a figure of more than a billion francs, found itself subjected to the rigid control of the French bureaucracy.

This system of consortiums it was only logical to extend to as many raw materials as possible; and the Ministries of Commerce, of Blockade, of National Reconstruction, and of Armament organized consortium after consortium, extending even to such articles as glassware, jute, leather and hides, oils, pit-coal, petroleum, lead and cotton.

The grave feature of this policy was that it held private industry in the absolute grip of the State, it substituted State action, incompetent and dishearteningly slow, for the action of those interested—the bureaucratic buyer, for the industrial buyer. The French Government did not wish a simple understanding between manufacturers and the State (as the British Government had with the British Association of Oil Brokers), limiting their activities to the national welfare but at the same time allowing the exercise of intelligence and energetic business ability. But on the contrary, the French administration took everything into its own hands. Although nominally receiving advice from the consortiums as to business needs, it made the purchases itself and enforced them upon industry.

Whether or not the Government admitted it, the result of this policy was the total monopoly of control over those French industries which utilized imported raw materials. The State completely held the raw material. It therefore became the absolute master of in-

dustries dependent on it. A merchant not a member of a consortium, either because of his own unwillingness to come under the dictatorship of the State or because of his inability to buy the stock when it is offered to him, is practically shut out of raw material, and if his business is dependent upon it, he is obliged to close down. "Outside of the consortium," M. Emmanuel Brousse said in the Chamber upon the 28th of June, 1918, "there are neither raw materials, labor, orders nor the possibility of transportation." At the same time, M. René Germond, one of the important members of the Syndicate of Iron Merchants, illustrated a similar result in these words:

> The consortium régime absolutely prevents retail merchants from procuring merchandise, because they cannot belong to a consortium. Formalities must be gone through which are impossible for them; they do not possess the office help necessary for all the paper-work needed to make out the orders. The merchant is therefore obliged to purchase his goods from an important member of the consortium. But the latter prefers to sell them to his large clients. . . . No longer being supplied, the retailer finds himself prevented from carrying on his rôle, so indispensable, of supplying a small patronage.[19]

The partial destruction of French retail trade by the suppression of freedom of purchase, was one of the results of the consortium system; the result was the more serious because this trade paid more taxes than the wholesalers did, and it was the foundation of French industry.

In sum, the French consortium system did its best to monopolize and to control in every particular the major portion of French industry. It almost meant the total

[19] Quoted in *L'Etatisme*, 43.

suppression of freedom of industry and of industrial competition. It was probably a larger attempt at an all-inclusive State Socialism than even the demagogic advocates of the theory had contemplated. That a group of inexperienced Government officials, unstimulated by business interests, should attempt intelligently to determine the vast needs of national industry, upon which the minds of thousands of the most intelligent men have been occupied, was an absurdity, a few of the results of which may now be pointed out.

This inability of the State to determine industrial needs was partly recognized in the summer of 1918 by M. Clémentel, the Minister of Commerce. He consented to allow the consortium in American cotton to make its purchases direct; but for some unknown reason, he reserved the preliminary sanction of these purchases. This approval took so much time that when his signature finally was obtained, usually ten or twelve days after its request, the market had changed, prices had mounted. and the consortium had to pay tens of millions more for the product because of the intervention of the Government.

The State rationing of industry also had another effect. According to the rules of the consortium, materials were divided among its members according to the amount of stock originally procured by each. This provision absolutely overlooked the varying needs of different manufacturers. Contraction or extension of industry had no influence upon the amount of raw material each would receive. Consequently, those manufacturers wishing to develop and extend production were handicapped for want of supplies; those who for one cause or another diminished output had a surplus of supplies on hand. In the one instance, progress was discouraged

and in the other, extravagance and waste stimulated.

The result of the consortium policy upon general price levels was another indication of Government inefficiency. Before the war there was practically no difference in the price of cotton in France and England. The first restriction in French importations raised the price of cotton in France until it was twenty-four dollars higher per hundred kilograms than in England. In 1918 this difference increased as follows:[20]

	Francs
January	136.50
February	131.
March	150.50
April	151.
May	145.
June	173.50
July	180.50
August	221.
September	223.
October	171.

Consequently, in the month of September the French cotton mill had to pay 223 francs ($44) more for cotton than the English mill, and for a material which in both instances came from the United States. This difference upon a free market, subject to speculation, might have been explained; but under a State régime especially designed to avoid such a condition, it had no justification.[21]

Other instances of a like effect upon prices are cited in a report issued by the Marseille Chamber of Commerce upon November 26, 1918.[22] In one instance the

[20] For the average of the ten months the French mills paid 168 francs more per hundred kilograms than the England mills. Multiplied by the 700,000 bales imported, this represents a difference of more than $51,700,000.

[21] Quoted from *L'Europe Nouvelle*, May 4, 1918.

[22] *Ibid.*, December 14, 1918.

French Government bought rice, a food necessity, from England and resold it in France at an increase of 140 per cent upon the purchase price. Many such occurrences offer a ready explanation for the extreme cost of living. In another case the State imposed a price upon requisitioned distilleries for a liter of alcohol, of one franc (.20), which was 100 per cent above the usual price. It then forced the distilleries to sell this alcohol, on the State's account, to the manufacturers of colors and varnishes, to perfume makers, and to vinegar manufacturers for three francs and a half. In the meantime, Switzerland was selling exactly the same alcohol for forty-two centimes; the French price was over eight times greater than the Swiss price.

Newsprint paper, six months after the armistice, was selling for 45 francs per 100 kilograms in England and 200 francs in France, a difference of over 400 per cent. During the war, the Ministry of Armament by an inter-Allied agreement obtained a monopoly of the American market on linters. This made the French Government the sole purchaser, which should have permitted it to operate under extremely favorable circumstances. Private manufacturers, given such an opportunity, certainly would have profited by the monopoly. On the contrary, it happened that each time the French Government decided to make a purchase, the price of linters went up one or two hundred, to fall again as soon as the Government had finished its buying.

In another instance the French Government was offered Plata tallow by private firms at fifty-eight dollars a ton. Asserting that the price was too dear, the Government itself negotiated for the tallows at a supposed price of fifty-six dollars a ton. Despite this appearance that the State was a better buyer than free com-

merce, its price amounted to a great deal more, for the fifty-six dollar quotation did not include expenses of purchase operations, such as cablegrams, and of administration which a broker includes in his prices. These the Government can write off into general budget expenses, falling upon the taxpayer. Furthermore, this State purchase included wastes which the brokers eliminated; moreover it was of frozen fats, lacking the qualities of standard tallow.

These instances demonstrate the effect of the consortium policy upon French industry and upon the French consumer. In drying up the wells of private enterprise the French consortium policy seemed to be on the verge of causing an economic drought. This, at any rate, appeared to be the opinion of the Chamber of Deputies, when it voted M. Victor Boret, the Minister of Agriculture, out of office because of the height to which prices were continuing to rise. On the 18th of July, 1919, the Chamber voted the following order of the day:

> The Chamber, believing that the price of living has diminished one-half in Belgium since the month of January, 1919,
>
> That the price of living has diminished one-quarter in England since the armistice,
>
> That it has not ceased to increase in France since the same date,
>
> Judging this result to be due to the economic policy of the Government,
>
> Passes to the order of the day.

Immediately after the passage of this resolution, the Minister resigned.[23]

[23] Some of the other features in this policy, namely, the general prohibition of importations, which caused the Minister's resignation, will be discussed in the following pages.

Of the most serious importance was the evident intention of the State to continue this consortium policy as a permanent basis of industry after the war. Suspicions to this effect were aroused by the stipulations inserted in consortium contracts which provided for their renewals after the signature of peace. M. Clémentel, Minister of Commerce, was accused by many of conceiving of the methodical and administrative reorganization of French industry in which individual industrial enterprise would be completely suppressed.

Moved by this prospect, the Bordeaux Chamber of Commerce, in a session upon March 20, 1918, adopted this resolution:

Whereas, declarations publicly made by persons in touch with the Ministry of Commerce give the impression that the consortium system is to be considered . . . as the basis of economic organization after the war;

Whereas, if it is legitimate and in certain cases necessary that, during hostilities, the public powers, . . . control importations, and the apportionment and the sale of certain products, it cannot be admitted that the Government may profit from the patriotic self-denial with which the French producers have inclined themselves before the necessities of the hour, to prepare an even partial dispossession of enterprises which their capital and their labor have successfully established;

Whereas, the régime of consortiums, represented as a pact between the State and those interested, is in fact imposed upon the latter by an administrative measure and without any possibility of discussing the solutions presented to them, since any firm which does not adhere to the combination finds itself immediately deprived of raw materials;

Whereas, this régime, which completely overthrows the conditions of national economic life and which places those upon which it is imposed in a situation of inadmissible inferiority toward other French producers, has been adopted without Parliament's having been called to deliberate upon it, and without its having thought best to consult preliminarily the

qualified representatives of the great economic interests of the country such as the Chambers of Commerce and the professional groups;

Whereas, it would be easy to show by precise and suggestive examples, that the results obtained up to the present by the consortiums in functioning are far from encouraging, that, on the contrary, they bring to light the insufficiency and the errors of State management, the excessive expenses which it involves for a feeble return, its absence of elasticity, and its incapacity to adapt itself to the changing exigencies of a troubled period;

Resolved, that it protest energetically against every measure tending to give as its basis, for the economic organization after the war, an industrial "corporalism," which would certainly be a costly and sterile régime of incompetence and indolence.[24]

IV

After the signing of the armistice, reconstruction needs added another aspect to the commercial policy of the Government. Attention now became centered upon the general prohibition of importation and exportation, a restriction which the Government was forced by public opinion to raise in the spring and summer of 1919. This policy was followed for two reasons: First, a flood of importations would completely unsettle the state of exchange, already so unfavorable to France; second, the protectionist argument carried to the extreme,—namely, French industry must be allowed to reconstitute itself, unhindered (as well as unaided) by foreign competitors. The unrestricted entrance of foreign products into France would overwhelm French manufacturers. The solution of the first of these arguments, which had some weight, appeared

[24] Quoted in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, May 4, 1918.

to rest in the arrangement of credit in foreign countries for French importers, instead of in the total exclusion of foreign products. The second argument had little foundation. France needed foreign products to rebuild her devastated regions; she needed foreign machinery if she was to manufacture products for exportation. To create the tools herself for her rebuilding would be fatal to the success of reconstruction and of foreign trade. A few examples of the wŏrking of this protectionist policy will demonstrate its weakness.

Occasions were numerous during the armistice of French manufacturers whose factories had been ruined in the war, who wished to reëstablish their industries immediately. Machinery formerly purchased in Germany now could only be obtained in the United States where, largely in sympathy for France, the orders were filled. But to import it, permission from the French Government became necessary. At the manufacturers' request, the Government replied that such an importation was impossible without the payment of a seventy-five per cent ad valorem tariff. In addition, a certain number of French manufacturers must declare to the Government that this machinery was not to be found in France and that it could not be manufactured. All this to encourage French production! It was useless for the French manufacturer to point out to the Government that machinery had to be obtained before his factory could be reopened; and that if he could not import it from the United States, it would take five years to build the outlay and to manufacture the machinery in France. If the importation were allowed, the machinery could immediately produce the materials which France sorely needed and which could not elsewhere be obtained. Furthermore, hundreds of work-

men would be given immediate employment. These arguments were vain, because the consortiums or the inter-ministerial committees had decided that French industry must be "protected." The Government was obdurate; for the sake of a theory French industry was forced to lose invaluable time and effort in manufacturing implements which foreign merchants already had on hand and at a cheaper figure than the French could hope to produce them. There was one other alternative—to do without; and in most cases, this was what French industry was obliged to do.

What appeared to be an inexcusable application of this theory, was the difficulty which the Ford Automobile Company had with the French Government. During the war the Government had purchased 4,500 commercial automobiles from this company which, on account of the armistice, were never used. They were stored in Bordeaux, new, and ready for use. According to the terms of the Ford Company's contract with the Government, the former had a privilege of repurchase, with the Government's consent, of all unused cars at half the original price. The company now offered the Government the full price for the cars, plus a profit of 10 per cent, the 70 per cent ad valorem customs duty, and the luxury tax. From the financial standpoint alone, the revenue resulting to the Government from such a transaction would have been nearly 9,000,000 francs ($1,800,000). The Government would have recuperated the sum of 8,437,000 francs which it had paid for the cars, and the French automobile dealers, who held the Ford agency, would have made a gross profit of 8,000,000 francs by the sale of the cars to French firms. The sale would have immediately resulted in the termination of warehouse and upkeep expense of the ma-

chines. It would have partially alleviated the great transportation crisis, then paralyzing French industry; it would have employed thousands of dealers, mechanics and repair-men, and in a number of other ways it would have contributed to the stimulation of French industry. But the Government did not see fit to accept the proposition, saying that French automobile manufacturers would soon fill all French needs. Incidentally, M. Loucheur, the Minister of Industrial Reconstruction, had considerable interests in the Citroën Company; but so far this company has not supplied automobile needs, although it enjoys considerable profits on those it does sell. Monopoly privileges apparently are enjoyed as much by Government officials as by mere business men. In any case, it was better to allow several thousand automobiles to continue in a state of forced idleness than to permit an American firm to profit by their utilization!

Another regrettable incident arising from this policy followed the Lyons Trade Fair, an annual event of national importance. Canada had had an important section at the Fair, and her merchants took a large number of orders upon samples exhibited. When they attempted to fill them, the French Government refused the permission to import the goods. Upon the intervention of Sir George Foster, the Canadian Minister of Commerce, the Government responded that the "Lyons Fair, being purely a local enterprise, the Government could not grant it special favors."

Le Temps,[25] always a vigorous opponent of the statist policies of the Government, commented as follows upon this instance:

[25] Issue of May 15, 1919.

As a result, it is no longer necessary for individuals, manufacturers, agriculturists or merchants to be aware of their needs and to supply them, at their own risk and perils, by exercising their knowledge, experience, and ambitions for the country; but following such and such resolutions, taken in such and such administrative bureaus, these needs are now catalogued, estimated, submitted to regulations; always changing, however, in a manner to dominate individual initiative which is too much given to boldness,—deemed unreasonable.

The Mayor of Lyons, M. Herriot, responded to the *Temps'* comment, in part as follows:

The Canadian incident is only an example. Merchants and manufacturers, highly qualified, eagerly attempt to obtain results; but a small anonymous bureaucracy completely annuls their efforts. The Minister of Commerce makes solemn engagements; he promises some liberties; but no engagement is kept. Clients whom we have gained with great difficulty are going away irritated and exasperated. . . . We want less talk and more action. We do not ask that they be interested in our work. That would be an indiscretion. But at least, they *can let us work!*[26]

Aside from the evil effect upon the internal welfare of the country of the Government control of importations, it was creating an international difficulty. Allied merchants were very glad to trade with France. They were not prompted solely by commercial motives —though the French Government seemed to believe this was their single preoccupation—but by sympathy. They desired to give French reconstruction needs every priority; but when the French Government, indiscreetly, it seemed to them, refused their coöperation, it was only natural that they should look for markets elsewhere, Germany included. Not only was France los-

[26] *Le Temps,* May 29, 1919.

ing Allied trade, but she was losing markets which she could have had in Roumania, Greece, South America and the Orient. If she would not import their offerings, she could not expect to export to them. Consequently, France was beginning to face an economic isolation.

V

As we have already seen, the commercial policy of the Government was by no means acquiesced in. Industrial sentiment, save that of a few large firms profiting from the benefits of a monopoly market, was wholly against it, and carried on a vigorous campaign for its repeal. Among political parties, only a few Radicals and Socialists upheld it. Moderate Republicans to Royalists were its strenuous opponents—opponents not only of this restrictive regulation but of statism in general.

The National Association of Economic Expansion, after an investigation of the consortium,[27] roundly condemned them as wastefully exhausting raw materials necessary to national industry. In regard to the effect upon reconstruction, the Federation of the Architects of Northern France, upon whom such a task would naturally fall, declared:

> Private initiative . . . is the only means for the rapid reconstruction of our cities and villages.[28]

Similarly, after hearing the report of its President, M. Maurice Charpentier, the Chartres Chamber of Commerce resolved that "the return to the commercial

[27] Quoted in *Le Temps,* January 24, 1919.
[28] *Ibid.*

and industrial life of before the war be effected with the briefest possible delay."[29] The French Society of Political Economy, an organization including many eminent economists, likewise accused the Government not only of violating the most fundamental economic principles, but of awkwardly and inefficiently controlling industry.

At a meeting of the Republican Committee of Commerce and Industry, attended by 500 delegates from all over France, upon May 14, 1919, its President, Senator Mascuraud, denounced Government Statism in these words:

> We have seen how the State buys, manufactures, and sells. We have seen, under its management, a deplorable discrepancy produced between the cost of production and that of the products, so much so that the cost of living and the level of salaries always increase without satisfying any one.
>
> The experience is conclusive. There is only too much of it. Enough of State socialism and of monopolies! If we wish to heal our wounds, to meet the needs of a formidable budget and to overcome our foreign indebtedness, we must have liberty in importations and in exportations, liberty in production and in circulation, and liberty in exchange.

The *Union of Economic Interests* also declared that "every one who wants to work for the resumption of economic life conflicts with the State. In place of encouraging good intentions and of aiding initiative, it discourages the one and paralyzes the other. The State wishes to regulate everything and to control everything: importations, exportations, production, distribution, and exchange."[30]

In addition to these business elements, Labor entered

[29] Meeting held on Dec. 17, 1916, *Le Temps*, Jan. 24, 1919.
[30] Quoted in *ibid.*.

the lists against one feature, at least, of this policy. At a meeting of the Confederal Committee of the General Confederation of Labor, held on July 22, a resolution in favor of Free Trade, the suppression of custom barriers, and the free entry of raw materials and manufacturers, was adopted by a vote of ninety-one to sixteen. This was a somewhat radical departure for this Labor organization; but it was strongly supported by the Socialists—all of the Socialist papers demanded the suppression of the exportation ban—and the city dwellers generally, who were sorely afflicted by high prices. For the public, *L'Œuvre* and *Le Progrès Civique* denounced the theory of Protection and demanded the institution of Free Trade. It seemed that only the extremity to which the Government had carried the theory could rouse France from its traditional belief in this doctrine.

Under the great pressure which the most divergent interests were bringing to bear upon the Government, it gradually removed some of the restrictions upon the liberty of commerce. On January 20, 1919, a decree was issued removing the bans on exportation from all but 140 articles of the 654 upon the tariff. Another measure placed all purchases for the public services under the supervision of the Minister of Finances, a move of economy. A further decree, announced in *Le Temps,* on May 14, 1919, removed the ban still more on exportations, only nineteen articles remaining subject to the prohibition. These included many important items such as live animals, chemicals, metals, and paper. These removals did not apply to importations and consequently did not allay public criticism. But upon the 17th of May, a letter was published written by M. Loucheur, Minister of Industrial Reconstruction,

to M. de La Trémoille, who had laid a resolution before the Chamber asking for freedom of importation of raw materials, manufactured articles necessary to French export trade, and agricultural machinery. In this letter, the Minister stated that the Ministers had decided to ask the President of the Republic to sign a decree almost completely restoring the liberty of importation so far as raw material was concerned; and after adjustments with the Allies, another decree would be issued, more nearly suppressing all restrictions on importations. The Minister, who had apparently forsaken the desire to fasten this policy upon peace-time industry, closed by saying: "We are thus completely in accord with you . . . upon the projected resolution which you have presented."

Perhaps to the surprise of the French public, the Government kept its word, for upon May 20, the *Journal Officiel* published a decree allowing the importation of principal raw materials necessary to the resumption of French production. Further decrees were announced on June 19, July 7, and 8, which suppressed nearly all prohibitions on importations, about a dozen articles remaining. The value of the decrees, however, was largely overcome by the fact that they increased certain tariff rates on needed commodities to an almost prohibitive height.[31] Thus it was about eight months after the close of hostilities before the French Government surrendered its control over private enterprise. There may have been some justification to its policy; but the dangers in which it resulted appear much greater than those it avoided.

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[31] See *L'Economiste Français*, July 19, 1920, 74, "*Le Régime commercial français.*"

VI

The defects in functioning and the defects in theory of the French bureaucracy have been vigorously attacked. In addition to those opposed to the war policies of the Government, there are many equally opposed to the ordinary extent and mode of operation of the Government administration. The remedy which the business interests, including the upper bourgeoisie, urge, is the return to private enterprise of activities now directed by the State. As it is extremely improbable that the State will ever surrender any of its present industrial prerogatives, the success of such a remedy seems slight. Realizing this unlikelihood, the anti-collectivist movement has limited its demands to the prevention of future State extensions into industry. The Union of Economic Interests, embracing about seventy-five commercial organizations, is the leader in this movement. It was organized in 1909 with 201 insurance syndicates as its basis. Its purpose is to combat State Socialism and to defeat any candidate for Parliament who does not promise to vote against measures increasing it. In the elections of 1910, the activities of the Union succeeded in pledging 366 Deputies to vote against the creation of new State monopolies. In 1910, *Le Réveil Economique* was founded; it has proved an energetic organ in carrying on the Union's campaigns. On the 15th of December, 1913, it assembled the presidents or delegates of forty great national groupings of commerce, industry, and agriculture, to inaugurate an anti-statism program for the 1914 elections. As a result of its activities, 270 Deputies declared themselves against the extension of Government activities in indus-

try, 127 opposed the program set up by the Union, 29 were for it with reservations, and 164 were doubtful. At a meeting held at Paris upon the 12th of May, 1919, the Union adopted another program which pledged itself to "formal opposition to the establishment of new monopolies, to any attempt at collectivist socialization, to any encroachment of the State upon services of a commercial and an industrial character, to the operation by the State of services at present leased to individuals, and, generally, to any interference of the State in the management of private enterprise." [32]

This program was submitted to the candidates for election to the Chamber of Deputies last November. Each candidate was asked to subscribe to its principles. As a result of this canvass and of the election, it was found that 377 of the elected Deputies approved the program; 35 made reservations to it; 96 were doubtful, and 81 were opposed to it.

Despite the activities of the business interests, the statist movement seems to be growing and the evils of the bureaucracy remain unchecked. The Government has decided to convert all of its munition plants into industrial factories, operated upon a peace-time basis. It is not apparent why these plants were not sold to private firms. Bills have been introduced into the Chamber for the Government monopoly of insurance [33] and for the monopoly of petrol; the Chamber has voted a bill providing for Government participation in the profits and eventually in the operation of mines; likewise, a bill monopolizing industrial alcohol has been

[32] Article II of the program, printed in brochure, *Union des Intérêts Economiques.*

[33] See article on *"La question du monopole des assurances"* in *Le Parlement et l'Opinion,* March, 1919.

passed. Agitation for Government ownership of hydraulic power is strong. In the latter part of June, 1919, M. Albert Thomas, supported by the railway men's federations, introduced a project for the nationalization of the railways.

Despite the distinction which some Socialists attempt to create between Statism and Socialism,[34] the French Socialists with the left wing of the Radical-Socialists are the supporters of statist policies and projects. The statist activities of Parliament are being strenuously objected to by moderate elements because of the fact that the powers of Parliament should have expired in 1918, if the war had not prevented it. It has no right, according to them, to impose its will upon an unconsulted country.

This issue doubtlessly was one of the most important in the elections of 1919. Anti-statism is always certain to be the rallying cry of moderate Republicans. They will be supported by many collectivists because of the antipatriotism and Bolshevism with which the chief supporters of Statism, the Unified Socialists, are associated.[35]

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[34] See Emile Vandervelde, *Le Socialisme contre l'Etat.*

[35] Two other solutions suggested for the defects of the French bureaucracy will be considered in the next two chapters: (1) decentralization by service and professional government, and (2) decentralization by regions, or the extension of local governing powers.

CHAPTER XI

GOVERNMENT BY INTERESTS AND EXPERTS

Aux lois politiques vont de plus en plus succéder des lois économiques ou administratives.—POUR GOUVERNER.

I

The increase of State control over industry, of which the period of the war has given an illuminating example, is regarded by many Frenchmen as an inevitable if not a welcome evolution. Unlike the interests which desire a return to the old freedom and to the policy of *laissez faire,* this new school after reorganizing the basis of the present State, wishes to extend its functions. It offers one of the two real suggestions for remedying the defects of French administration—decentralization by service as opposed to decentralization by geographic regions.[1] Finally, it goes much farther and suggests an entirely new political framework for the State.

French administration, as previously noted, owes many of its faults to the concentration of power at the head of its various departments. Thus the Cabinet Ministers are not only part of the political government responsible to Parliament, but they are chiefs of all the public services belonging to their departments. Dependent upon them, a great number of directors, under-directors, chief of services and inspectors exist, whose

[1] See Chapter XII.

powers are more or less extensive according to the Ministry; and who, under the authority of the Ministers, act as agents of the Government, exercising, as a French legal authority[2] has stated, the three powers of command, surveillance and control.

In other words, these officials are directly controlled by, and at the absolute mercy of, the Government; they have no other than a political status. The Government exercises complete freedom in choosing or removing them. Beneath these political agents are several hundred thousand ordinary employees performing the most diverse functions, many of whom, on account of their organization, already enjoy a relative permanency of position.

Decentralization of service means that Government officials, particularly Government agents, will no longer be placed under the *command* of department Ministers, but only under their *control.* The increase of public services is forcing this evolution, for it has become an impossible task for the head of the department to command what should be done in every case where a decision is necessary. In the interest of the good management of the public services, initiative in decisions must be left with under-officials. With a decentralized administration,[3] the heads of departments will only refuse to approve measures taken by subordinates when they are in violation of law, and not when they are ill-judged. The power of surveillance accompanied by a power of revocation will still rest with the central authority but it will be strictly limited to the above purposes. Thus the decentralized agent will have an initia-

[2] Léon Duguit, *Traité de Droit Constitutionnel,* i, 447-457.

[3] For an impartial discussion of administrative decentralization, see Hauriou, *Précis de Droit Administratif,* 143-154.

tive, as well as a comparative freedom from officious interference of department heads now frequently exercised for political or other reasons.[4] As a necessary complement to the granting of initiative must go the personal responsibility of the agent. Otherwise his freedom would be unrestricted. At present the Minister, as head of the department, is alone responsible to Parliament, a responsibility which often amounts to nothing at all. Under a thoroughly decentralized administration, every negligent or careless service would imply a personal responsibility of the official concerned for which he could be held pecuniarily liable. The creation of a common fund by the organizations of the functionaries, supplied with a share in the profits which the French public services make, would furnish a source

[4] Professor Jèze classifies public services into two categories: (1) those who interest the inhabitants *in general*, i.e., the national defense, posts and telegraphs, etc.; and (2) those who, while interesting the nation as a whole, more particularly concern individuals residing in each locality, i.e., tramways, street lighting, paving etc. The second class of public services may become decentralized to a certain point. M. Jèze states the argument as follows:

"Centralization seems to have the advantage of a more impartial administration because the centralized agents are less engaged in local quarrels; but this is not always the case. On the contrary, a centralized administration is very slow, since it is necessary, for the most insignificant things, to await the decision of distant authorities. Centralization places an enormous responsibility upon the Government, since it not only must take account of national considerations, but also of the smallest details of local administration. Finally centralization does not interest the inhabitants in the management of public affairs and does not accustom them to govern themselves.

"This, on the other hand, is the great advantage of decentralization. The dominant idea of modern political science is that *individuals must govern . . . themselves.* The time seems to have passed when families or social classes were charged with governing or administering others. Individuals more and more desire themselves to direct their affairs and to escape from the selfish rule of so-called directing families and classes and their agents. . . ." *Droit Public et Administratif*, 132-33.

from which their joint responsibility could be met. According to Professor Duguit, the supporter of this system, some such reorganization must be effected if the growth of the public services and the protection of the individual against the omnipotence of Government authorities is to be reconciled.

This theory further implies the supplanting, by technicians and experts, of those officials in the Government service who are incompetent and who owe their appointments solely to political influence. The greater number of public services are technical; and, to be efficiently operated, they require skilled direction. If initiative and responsibility are to be placed on subordinate officials, they must be granted to those who, by training and aptitude, are able to exercise them intelligently. This applies likewise to officials at the head of administrative departments. Hence this is a movement to place the expert in the Government, and to place it upon a scientific basis.

II

The participation of subordinate functionaries and of experts in the control of the public services already exists to a very limited extent. By a law of 1896 the national service of education, through councils elected largely by teachers themselves, became partially decentralized. The University Councils are composed of the deans and two delegates elected from each faculty of the same university. Although the deliberations of this Council must be submitted to ministerial approval, nevertheless they practically control the direction of the university concerned.

By decrees issued in January, 1910, M. Millerand,

then Minister of Public Works, provided for the representation of the employees of the Posts, Telephones and Telegraphs in the regional councils of discipline, in the central council of discipline, and in the central promotions council. The personnel also choose delegates to serve with the Minister, the department directors, and the chief of the service.

As members of M. Clemenceau's last Cabinet, M. Claveille, the Minister of Transportation, was a railroad man; M. Victor Boret, Minister of Agriculture, was a grain merchant; M. Loucheur, Minister of Reconstruction, was a financier and manufacturer; M. Vilgrain, Undersecretary of State to the Food Ministry, was a miller. Thus even a few heads of departments have been selected because of their technical knowledge and experience.

The Chambers of Commerce have a few governmental powers delegated to them. According to a law of April 9, 1898,[5] the Government is obliged to consult their national assembly, which meets every two months in Paris, upon all matters or changes considered in commercial, tariff, or economic legislation. The Government, however, is not compelled to follow its advice. Of more importance, the Chambers may themselves operate certain public works and services, especially those involving ports and navigable ways; and they may conduct technical education. They may also issue certain denominations and quantities of paper money for local circulation. A special Chamber of Commerce

[5] *Parlement et l'Opinion*, March, 1919, Du Rôle des Chambres de Commerce. Unlike the American Chamber of Commerce, the French Chamber is a public institution; it is established by a Government decree. There is one for every department. See Chamber of Commerce organization law, April 9, 1898, *Codes et Lois*, ii, 1441.

tax,[6] granted them by the Government, insures their financial support. Except for one other, the President of the National Assembly of the Chambers, was the only technician appointed on the Committee of Importations, a body in general charge of war importations. The Chambers are also represented in the Regional Committees of Economic Action and in local committees charged with adjusting terms for ships requisitioned by the Government. On April 7, 1919, *Le Journal Officiel* announced that 136 of the Chambers of Commerce were authorized to organize themselves into seventeen groups, according to economic regions. M. Clémentel, the Minister of Commerce, was responsible for this grouping. It was his idea[7] to associate these Chambers in a common action, giving them general power to supervise the economic reconstruction of the different regions of France. A regional committee was to be formed in which the Chambers were to be represented according to their numbers. This committee was to "receive from the Ministry of Commerce a letter of service accrediting it to the different public administrations," implying that the committees would be given a part in the administration of the regions and departments in which they were located. The powers which were to be accorded to these purely professional bodies were left vague; and although the idea is received with favor in regionalist circles, it remains a question whether the Government will ever willingly give these bodies any amount of effective authority.

Aside from the Chambers of Commerce, other profes-

[6] M. Leroy, "*Les Producteurs au pouvoir*," *La Grande Revue*, March, 1919.

[7] "*L'Opinion Régionaliste*," *L'Opinion*, April 26, 1919.

sional bodies are supposed to be consulted by the Government. According to a law of 1852,[8] Consultative Chambers of Agriculture were created to give advice upon subjects of agricultural development and coördination. This function, when now carried out, is left to the smaller unions of agriculturists. During the war, they have been represented upon many committees such as those of Economic Action and of Agricultural Labor. They were likewise charged with distributing fertilizer to wine growers.

An old law further created the Consultative Chambers of Arts and Manufactures, but it is lifeless. According to a decree of 1894 a Superior Council of Commerce and Industry comprised of appointed members was established, which the Minister of Commerce was obliged to consult upon tariff laws and treaties of commerce. A similar function was delegated to a Superior Labor Council, composed of seventy-two members, twenty-nine of whom were to be elected by labor unions, twenty-nine by employers' organization, one by coöperative societies, one by the Chamber of Commerce of Paris, one by the *Bourse du Travail* of Paris; there were also to be three Senators and five Deputies upon it. This Council has only a consultative rôle, but it has done a great service in supplying the Ministries of Labor and Commerce with invaluable Labor information, and in penetrating them with a new social spirit.

A Consultative Committee of Railways is also in existence, which now has seventeen representatives of the Railway Unions upon it. During the war the Ministry of Armament constituted permanent committees

[8] For the law creating the Consultative Chambers of Agriculture, March 25, 1852, see *Codes et Lois*, ii, 477.

of conciliation and arbitration, composed equally of employers and workers.

In the Government committee of Chemical Products, there were four specialists who were chemical manufacturers, and two merchant specialists in chemical products. In the Central Committee on steam-engines, there were five business men; on the Inter-ministerial Committee charged with determining the national machinery needs, there were five representatives of employers' organizations using machinery, three machinery dealers and two manufacturers, as well as other representatives of the business world.[9]

Presumably in response to the demand for competence in Government, the President of the Council announced on July 16, 1919, the formation of an "Economic Council charged with assuring the preparation and the execution of general measures concerning the supply and distribution of products and supplies of any nature, the diminution of the cost of living, the repression of speculation, the development of economic life and the reconstruction of the liberated regions." This council was to meet at least once a week. It was presided over by the President of the Council. It included the Ministers of Public Works, Commerce, Industrial Reconstruction, Agriculture, Colonies, Labor of the Liberated Regions. Its resolutions are submitted to the Council of Ministers.

To this Economic Council (which, as will be noted, is nothing but a division of the Cabinet) is to be added a commission charged with framing propositions to present to it. This commission is partially of professional

[9] For discussion of these War Committees and for other examples of experts in French administration, see M. Leroy's article quoted above.

composition, for it contains: (1) the Undersecretaries of State of the President of the Council, and of the Ministries of Public Works, Finance, Interior, Food Supply; (2) the commissioner of maritime transports; (3) the president of the Section of Economic Studies of the Presidency of the Council; (4) the president of the inter-ministerial commission in the Liberated regions; (5) three representatives of employers' organizations; (6) three representatives of labor organizations.

This commission will receive opinions from municipalities, agricultural, industrial or commercial groups, workingmen's and employers' organizations, and cooperative societies.

The experts thus delegated to a share in the administration have been too few, according to the reformists; their powers, when exercised at all, have been merely consultative and of no binding force; and they have always been outweighed by non-expert officials, actuated largely by political motives. The decentralization movement must permeate the regular Government services with this professional element which the Government has been in a partial degree forced to take into its war administration. It must increase their numbers and their power, and ultimately, it must place the complete control of these services in their hands.

In the spring of 1919 the *Ligue des Gouvernés* was organized by Maxime Leroy, Henri Dumay, and others to agitate this development. The purpose of the organization is declaredly non-partisan, and is solely directed toward the improvement of the administrative system.

One of its brochures says: "We (the public) are never consulted upon the organization or the improvement of services which at every instant and in a serious manner affect our interests and our welfare. Arbitrary

power, negligence, and carelessness, blind and injure us. It is to reform this state of things that the *Ligue des Gouvernés* is founded. By its specialists of every order, it will study . . . the improvements whose need is revealed on every side, and will pursue their immediate application by every legal means."

The League announced that it would concern itself with all of the public services which the State now exercises; and its definite purpose is to improve the service of the railways, telegraphs, post offices, telephones, omnibuses, street cars, taxis, water, gas, electricity, ports, navigation, State and other monopolies, bridges and roads, tariffs and octrois, tax collection, municipalities, burials, ministerial offices, police, insurance, recruiting, public assistance, public hygiene, and education.

The more comprehensive purpose of the League is to work out a plan of organized coöperation between the Government employees and the general public through great professional groupings. The organization of public employees is an essential element in the decentralization of administration and in the establishment of their responsibility. Of equal importance is the necessity for developing some relationship between the general public and the functionaries to insure the proper use of their decentralized power. As a matter of fact, this plan of administration is founded on syndicalism or guildism, that is, upon numerous autonomous groupings, coöperating with each other, independent of a continued Government intervention. According to the proponents of this theory, this is really taking authority away from the State and conferring it upon experts, responsibly and efficiently organized.

III

The organization of Government functionaries has met the same resistance in France which it has experienced in other countries. France has two laws upon professional organizations: One, the law of 1884, which permitted the organization of professional associations, such as labor unions, for the urging of professional demands and which stated "that professional syndicates have as an exclusive object the study and defense of economic, industrial, commercial and agricultural interests"; the other, the law of 1901, which permitted the general organization of "associations" among those excluded from the benefits of the law of 1884. These associations were intended to be of a social and cultural nature rather than for the furtherance of strictly economic improvement.[10]

The Government has repeatedly refused to interpret the law of 1884 to include Government officials. By circulars issued in 1892, 1895, 1897, and 1904, different ministries denied all requests of their functionaries to organize themselves into syndicates. In 1910 the tribunal of the Seine declared that Government officials could not form professional syndicates such as were provided for in the law of 1884.[11] The case was upon the legality of a syndicate formed by post office employees. But the Council of State in 1909 had ruled

[10] The Organization law of March 21, 1884, is given in *Codes et Lois*, ii, 954. The Association law of July 1, 1901, is found in the same volume, 1483-84.

[11] The Government has always allowed mere workers holding no authority to organize into syndicates of the 1884 type. Thus the arsenal workers and those engaged in labor on State monopolies are legally syndicalized.

that functionaries might form associations under the law of 1901. The chief practical difference between the two was that a syndicate formed under the law of 1884 would probably adhere to the General Confederation of Labor, in order to increase its bargaining power. The Government did not relish demands for increased wages nor, in case of their refusal, strikes and the disruption of public services essential to the nation. A functionary, in accepting public employment, entered into a special status carrying with it the obligation to insure the continuance of governmental activities. The functionaries' retort has always been that if theirs is a special status, which limits them in this respect, it should offer offsetting compensations in permanency of position and adequacy of income. Despite the illegality of syndicates among the postal employees, they persisted in maintaining their organizations and in 1909 they adhered to the C. G. T.

The school-teachers (*instituteurs*), a majority of whom it is said are Socialists, were pioneers in the functionaries' struggle for the privileges of the law of 1884. Their campaign was begun in 1887 when they first conceived the material advantages of organization. Upon Government intervention, organized labor in France was very quick in coming to their support. As a result of a motion voted in 1902 at a Congress of the *Bourses du Travail,* a committee on Syndical Education was appointed, composed of six teachers and five workmen. In 1905, upon the occasion of a great syndicalist movement in France, an open struggle began between the Government and the school-teachers for the possession and exercise of this right. In the same year, the leaders in the "Instituteurs'" organization in the Seine district were arrested by the Government for attempting

to enforce its recognition; a year later a project of amnesty was passed and the proceedings against them were dropped.

In the meantime a Central Committee for the Defense of the Syndical Right of the employees of the State, the Departments and the Communes, was organized; while on February 26, 1907, the National Federation of Teachers' Syndicates was created and its statutes were filed with the Government. A year later, the Central Committee addressed to M. Clemenceau, the President of the Council, an open letter exposing their conception of a new social organization and asking the benefit of the law of 1884 upon syndicates. M. Clemenceau denied this request, stating that the law was framed only for industrial workers, and that the Government would not countenance a movement antagonistic to it. The Government, however, was asked by Parliament to tolerate the syndicates of "instituteurs" already existing, while forbidding the creation of any new group. This *modus vivendi* existed for a number of years. But finally after the Congress of Chambéry in 1912, M. Briand ordered the syndicates dissolved, accusing them of being centers of political agitation and national disintegration. Some of the teachers obeyed; others did not, and the members of the Syndical Council of the Syndicate of the Seine were again prosecuted. Proceedings were soon dropped, but the teachers' organizations continued to develop.[12]

At present the functionaries, 300,000 of them, are grouped into a National Federation of Functionaries.

[12] At the "*Instituteurs*'" Congress at Marseille, June 8, 1919, thirty-three syndicates, eighteen "*amical*" associations, and forty-two groups of mobilized teachers (still in the army) were represented.

They are divided into so-called *Amicales,* associations of the 1901 type, and illegally constituted syndicates of the 1884 type which the Government has been powerless to suppress. Their organization has been accentuated by the almost pitiful salaries which French functionaries receive. By all odds they are the poorest paid Government officials in the world. An English official, corresponding to the French grade of *redacteur,* receives $1,000 a year, while the French employee receives $400. When he becomes chief of a bureau the English official receives $5,000; the similar position in France pays $2,400. The French Ministry of Marine presented some particular abuses. Candidates for positions are required to be university graduates, but such low salaries are paid (9,025 francs for the chief of the bureau down to a third-class *redacteur,* who receives only 2,375 francs ($475), that it is impossible to fill the positions, fifteen of them having been open since the beginning of the war.

On the 22nd of June, 1917, the Senate unanimously passed a law extending the civil capacity of professional syndicates by removing some of the restrictions as to property-holding, placed upon them by the law of 1884. No mention was made of extending the rights of the law of 1884 to functionaries. The bill did not come up for discussion in the Chamber until the winter of 1918. A Socialist prepared the report upon it, and when it appeared before the Deputies it contained some interesting additions, the chief one of which granted nearly all of the functionaries the right to organize. The Socialists had wished that this right be made universal in its extension to all employees of the state, departments, and communes. But the Chamber, reticent to extend a right which would even include the judges

of the country and other officials upon which the public welfare vitally depended, passed a law on February 21, 1919, granting the right to organize to the functionaries and employees of state, departments, and communes, except members of the military forces, the police, the magistrates, prefects and sub-prefects. The Government wished a provision inserted to prohibit definitely the right to strike among functionaries; but the Chamber, under Socialist impulsion, voted it down.

On the 19th of April the Senate voted the Chamber's law with two definite modifications. Firstly, it granted the right to organize to those functionaries holding no part of the "public power." This was an attempt to introduce a principle into the question which the Chamber had attempted to settle merely by a list of exemptions. The Senate feared that the Chamber's precedent would lead to the easy and gradual repeal of the exemptions until every class of Government official could legally organize. The Chamber, on the other hand, argued that it was impossible to draw a distinction between employees holding and those not holding public power. Secondly, the Senate included a provision to the effect that any Government employee, striking in a concerted effort to stop public services, by that act would become discharged. On the return of the bill to the Chamber, both of these provisions were stricken out; and on July 18, the bill was again voted with substantially the same exemptions.

The question of the legality of functionary syndicates, however, is largely an academic one. Not only did the organizations among the school-teachers and postal employees persist in spite of their formal prohibition; but other groups of Government officials organized in the spring of 1919, and became affiliated

with the General Confederation of Labor. Many accused the Government of a fatal weakness in allowing these wholesale violations of the law of 1884. The Government itself verbally protested; but by refusing to increase the unbelievably low salaries of its officials it allowed the greatest reason for organization to remain.

On the 8th of March what was known as the "Revolt of the Functionaries" occurred. Three great federations of the public services, the railway men, the functionaries, and workers of the State, took part at a meeting directed by the secretary-general of the C. G. T., and adhered to the *Bourse du Travail* at Paris.[13] On the 13th they voted "that all the administrative employees should adhere as quickly as possible to the C. G. T. so they might participate in the organization of a more humane and just society." The "revolt" aroused the fear among public and Government circles that these organizations would now resort to strikes in order to force their demands. This insinuation was vigorously denied by functionary leaders.[14]

This example was followed on April 5 by the General Association of Under-Agents of the Posts which changed itself into a national syndicate affiliated with the C. G. T. On June 9, 1919, the National Union of the secretaries and employees of the French Mayors, in its twelfth national congress, voted by 2,200 to 300 to affiliate with the C. G. T. At the same time, the French tax collectors at their tenth congress transformed their association into a syndicate; and although they did not adhere to the C. G. T., they opened negotiations with the Treasury employees to effect a union. On May 3,

[13] The *Bourses du Travail* are part of the C. G. T.
[14] See *Petit Journal*, March 13, 1919.

the National Federation of State, Department, and Commune employees expressed a desire to adhere to the C. G. T. On the 13th of May at their annual congress at Strassburg, the General Union of Customs Agents, representing twenty-seven regional groups, decided to change their association into a syndicate and to ask to be affiliated in the C. G. T.

On the 24th of September, the Congress of the Schoolteachers' "Amicales," or associations of the 1901 type, voted to join the C. G. T., and become syndicates by a vote of 170 against 43.

These examples suffice to show the universal organization of French Government employees. With the exception, of course, of soldiers and sailors, it seems that every class of functionary is compactly grouped. The professors in the *lycées*[15] are even associated through the Federation of *Lycée* and College Professors. The employees of every Government service, postal clerks to policemen, are organized, most of them in syndicates of the 1884 type. If the present evolution continues, they will all be in syndicates and members of the General Confederation of Labor.

So far, purely economic demands have occasioned this mania for organization. This the National Congress of Functionaries, meeting on July 6, 1919, illustrated. At that time the immediate realization of salary increases by July 20 and the recognition of the syndical right in every class of officials were demanded. The Congress also invited "all the federated associations to transform themselves into syndicates affiliated with the C. G. T. before October 1. . . ." Due to their insistent agitation, the Government, upon July 8, asked credits for

[15] *Lycée*, a school corresponding to our high school and first two years of college.

salary increases. Upon the 10th, the Chamber voted necessary credits so as to advance 200 francs to all functionaries, to apply on future salary increases.

To the Socialists and to the revolutionary Syndicalists, the organization of Government employees means quite another thing than the amelioration of living conditions. To them it is an essential step in the assumption of power by the proletariat. To the advocates of decentralization, on the other hand, this organization is welcomed as the basis of administrative reform. By no means going to the length of the Socialists, they would extend the powers of functionary organizations to a direct participation in the management of public services. For example, the secondary school-teachers, through their officials, would be empowered to decide the character of education, rather than accept policies dictated by the Ministry of Education. The Ministry might lay down a few general principles to be followed, but the teachers themselves would be given the initiative and independence in carrying on the work. Doubtless, such a system of decentralization would go to the extent where the heads of the Ministerial departments and even the Minister would be chosen from, if not elected by, the educators themselves. Competence and democracy, it is urged, would then be instilled into French administration.

The organization of French functionaries is an assured fact; the next step, and one of equal importance to the success of the decentralization movement, is to bring them into relationship with, and make them responsible to, the public, whose interest they must serve. So far no one has offered a practical way of bringing this about. If it is not solved, any amount of power granted to great organized bodies of public employees

risks serious abuse. The public services must always be administered by officials directly responsible to the electorate. The present elective method, or that of ministerial responsibility to Parliament, to a certain theoretical extent, supplies this need. Without the establishment of responsibility, it will be impossible to allow organizations of employees any considerable independence in the management of the public services.

IV

There are those who do not stop with the revision of French administration. They would install professional competence in the legislative as well as in the executive branch of the government. In other words, they advocate *professional representation* in Parliament. Their conception of the State is that of a mere "coöperation of public services, organized and controlled by"[16] the governing power. With the evolution of society these services are being continually diversified. The governing power which administers these services, has no legitimate basis and there is no such thing as sovereignty.[17] The *gouvernants* govern because they are the strongest, and the *gouvernés* are governed because they are weaker than the *gouvernants*. But

[16] Léon Duguit, *Manuel de Droit Constitutionnel*, 72.
Professor Duguit's doctrines may be found in greater detail in his *L'Etat, le Droit Objectif et la Loi Positive*, 229 *ff*. *Le Droit Social, le Droit Individuel et les Transformations de l'Etat*, 25 *ff*, seq.

[17] Professor Esmein is the most vigorous opponent of Professor Duguit, in France. He declares that it is anarchy to deny the existence of sovereignty. See Esmein, *Droit Constitutionnel* (4th ed.), 40. Professor Esmein also says that the Duguit theory of group control is a return to feudalism. See the 6th edition of his *Droit Constitutionnel*, 45.

the governing force is under the obligation of exercising itself through the liens of social solidarity and in the interests of all. Furthermore, the old political basis of the nation is passing away; social units such as the home and geographic political entities are being supplanted by groupings founded upon a community of professional interest and the promise of mutual assistance. This grouping of French professional interests is defined as "the movement by which all of the different social classes tend to organize themselves and to give themselves a definite juridicial structure for the defense of class interests and for the conciliation, by collective contracts, freely consented to, of divergent interests. . . . Thus two governing forces actually appear in France: the numerical majority of male citizens, and the professional syndicates."[18] As the function and the composition of the State have changed, the government must be directed by professional groupings, fitted for the task by strength and competence. In other words, the *homme de politique* must give way to the *homme des affaires*—the politician to the business man.

Maxime Leroy in his very remarkable book, *Pour Gouverner,* devoted to this new conception of government, says that the old State is based upon regalian conceptions; it is monarchical. Political philosophers have hitherto addressed their observations to it. Their arguments against State Socialism apply only to this old State based upon privilege and authority. Even our idea of democracy has been false. "The wisdom of number," he says, "the equality of individuals, the idea of the 'General Will' inspiring the rôle of citizens

[18] Esmein, *op. cit.,* 62.

by a sort of quasi-divine illumination, the infallibility of the people in its assemblies and of the Government deliberating in its councils . . . who still dares conscientiously to defend these democratic forms with a disinterested voice?"[19] The principles of the Revolution are unsound, but they still are retained in government; they must be supplanted by doctrines recognizing the fundamental factors in modern life.

"At our head, we ask fewer drivers of crowds, fewer professional leaders, fewer pontiffs; but more observers, endowed with an experimental sense; fewer masters of our spirit, but more stewards, capable of assuring the management of our common goods. . . ."[20]

According to M. Leroy, we must be skeptics in government, we must be penetrated with the experimental method, which is as necessary to politics as to science. Our *gouvernants* must be more eager to learn than impetuous to command.

What the State needs is the participation of productive forces in its control; and he firmly believes "that the association of producers, employers, employees, savants, artists, each of these groupings remaining in its original sphere, without a false confusion of interests, is destined to regulate the traditional antagonism between the *gouvernants* and the *gouvernés*, between workers and employers, between those administrating and those administered."[21]

Professional groupings are becoming stronger and are demanding an effective part in the Government. Both laborers and employers are insistent on the destruc-

[19] Maxime Leroy, *Pour Gouverner*, 342.
[20] *Ibid.*, 324.
[21] *Ibid.*, 52.

tion of the old centralizing unity which excluded them from Government.

The most scathing as well as the most unscientific attack against the system of political representation in France, has been made by Lysis, the head of the party of the New Democracy:

> Our method of understanding universal suffrage is an insult to good sense. We invite 20,000 citizens living in a certain area[22] to designate a person to represent their interests and their conceptions which they may have upon every economic, social and political question. It is easy to understand that this consultation must end in the nomination of a person who represents no one at all.
>
> From the first, he does not represent the interests of his electors since the latter exercise the most diverse and often the most antagonistic professions, and since they are employers and workers, producers and consumers, proprietors and lodgers, large merchants and small shopkeepers. All these interests neutralize and annul each other. There is no means of defending them all at the same time; to protect one is to destroy the other. . . . Thus a deputy inserts in his profession of faith words with a double meaning, able to make the most opposed interests believe that they are the object of the candidate's particular solicitude. . . . Our electoral system terminates in selecting and bringing into power, it may be said, mechanically, the most unfit and the most skeptical men, those the most destitute of beliefs and ideas; in a word, those who are morally and intellectually the least meritorious.[23]

As a solution Lysis advocates professional representation, or a legislature composed of delegates elected from and by economic interests, grouped in great categories.

The Orleanist party, as part of a Royalist régime, advocates an assembly based upon professional inter-

[22] Under the old system, an *arrondissement* was the electoral district.

[23] Lysis, *Vers la Démocratie Nouvelle.*

ests, entirely supplanting the present political Parliament. Its powers would be confined to purely professional subjects. Although it does not go to this extreme, the Liberal Action party includes professional representation in its platform. At its Congress in 1909 it expressed the belief that "the epoch of purely political Parliaments is closed,"[24] and that the Senate should be formed of professional elements. The party's advocacy of such a measure is suspected of being based upon a desire to secure recognition of Catholic interests in the Government.

Professor Léon Duguit also outlines a system of professional representation, applying it to the Senate, but leaving the composition of the Chamber of Deputies as it now is.[25] M. Charles Benoist, as far back as 1895, advocated the election of a Chamber of Deputies by voters grouped into seven classes according to their professions: (1) agriculture, (2) industry, (3) transports, posts and telegraphs, (4) commerce, (5) public administration, (6) liberal professions, (7) capitalists.[26]

Thus, according to M. Benoist, instead of having 300 lawyers, professors and journalists in the Chamber, under a system of professional representation their number would be reduced to 13, while the number of deputies representing agriculture, industry, commerce, transportation, workers and employers, would rise from 120 to 450!

A carefully worked-out plan of professional representation was devised by the League of Professional Representation and Regionalist Action, in a bill presented to the Chamber upon the 29th of April, 1915.

[24] Quoted in Jacques, *op. cit.*, 330.
[25] Duguit, *op. cit.*, 167.
[26] Villey, *Les Vices de la Constitution Française*, 94.

Its application was limited to the Government of the new regions which it wished to create.[27] Voters of each region were to be grouped into five classes, each of which would elect representatives to the regional assembly. Professions were to be divided into (1) agriculturists, (2) merchants, (3) manufacturers, (4) liberal professions, (5) Government employees. It was not compulsory to be inscribed upon any one of these lists; those not wishing to inscribe themselves upon a professional list and those not coming within the classification would be placed upon a general list. No one could be inscribed upon two lists nor could one be elected by electors of a list upon which he was not enrolled. For each of these professional electoral lists, whatever the number enrolled on each might be, there was always to be one representative. Before each election the number of seats in the Assembly was to be divided among the lists; the first half was to be apportioned equally; the second half was to be divided among the lists according to their numerical importance. To insure labor representation, it was provided that upon the petition of a quarter of the legally constituted labor unions in the region, half of the seats in the first half of those equally apportioned to each professional list would be reserved for employees, the other half for employers.

This proposition was not adopted by the Chamber in 1915; and it is interesting to note that in the last regionalist bill reported to Parliament this provision was omitted. The reason for such an omission was given by M. Jean Hennessy, the *rapporteur* for the Administration Commission, himself an enthusiastic advocate of the theory of professional representation, who said:

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[27] See p. 395.

It seemed desirable to many to enter upon a discussion of regional interests, that is, economic interests, representing economic groupings of the region. If an equitable solution would have been proposed, it would have been accepted by a great many of the members of your commission. But can one be found? How can the share of each association in the deliberations of the regional council be determined? The right of association . . . exists; but it is a right, not an obligation; in each profession an unlimited number of groups can be constituted, . . . many of them formed only of one or two persons. The practical difficulties in the proper representation of these interests appeared so insurmountable to the Commission that it was unanimous in deciding that the members of the Regional Council should hold their powers from the whole of the electoral body.[28]

V

Such is the theory of professional representation and such are the proposals for its application. The basis of the plan is that of the grouping tendency which for the past thirty years has swept over France. Professional organization, extending to every class of French tradesmen, to every form of laborer, even to the choir singers, who are organized in an Amical Association, is undoubtedly the most marked characteristic in modern French political life. Coöperation is now the dominant form of industry. On January 1, 1914, there were 16,713 syndicates in France, containing:

6,667 agricultural syndicates with 1,029,727 members.
4,967 industrial and commercial employers' syndicates with 403,143 members.
4,846 labor syndicates with 1,026,302 members.
233 mixed syndicates with 51,111 members.

[28] Jean Hennessy, *Réorganisation Administrative de la France*, 159.

These syndicates are in turn combined into 485 unions of syndicates:

98 agricultural unions of syndicates.
177 employers' unions of syndicates.
201 labor unions of syndicates.
9 mixed unions.

The employers' unions contained 4,092 syndicates.
The labor combinations contained 4,380 syndicates.

The organization of French labor has been discussed in another chapter.[30] The General Confederation of Labor (C. G. T.) is a powerful and an extensive organization; but it has two serious problems to face. The first is that of securing the organization and adhesion of the labor elements not yet included in it. There are 5,642,000 laborers in France (including woman and foreign labor), and the C. G. T. contains only 1,000,000 of them at the most. The larger part of this outside labor is doubtless unorganized; but a good share of it is grouped in organizations, such as the National Federation of Labor, the Christian Syndicates, containing about 55,000 laborers, and the Union of Free Workmen, —antagonistic toward the C. G. T. and its high-handed direction.

The C. G. T.'s second problem is that of securing the adherence of other than strictly proletariat elements, but which are necessary to the strength of the organization. We have already seen its success in winning over the functionaries. Going even farther, it has welcomed purely intellectual and bourgeois groupings to its bosom, surely horrifying to the shades of Karl Marx and Georges Sorel. These accessions have increased its

[29] Chéron report on syndical bill passed by Senate, June 22, 1917.

[30] See pp. 237-239.

membership to at least 2,000,000. It was announced on April 26, 1919, that certain university professors, because of discontent with salaries and the powerlessness of their present associations to bring pressure upon the Government, were to ask the National Federation of Professors to convert itself into a syndicate and join the C. G. T. On the same day the lyrical and dramatic artists, at a meeting at the Paris *Bourse du Travail*, organized a syndicate and adhered to the Labor Confederation; the journalists were reported to be considering the same thing. To disseminate "intellectual" propaganda, Parisian authors of radical tendencies organized a group called "Clarté"; its members included such notables as Anatole France, Charles Gide, Henri Barbusse, Romain Rolland, Victor Margueritte, Georges Duhamel, and Cyril Berger. This movement appeared to be spreading so rapidly that many Paris editors began to wonder facetiously if the French Academy was going to adhere to the C. G. T.! The stumblingblock in the way of the C. G. T. is the adherence of the peasant population. In imitation of the Socialists' effort, on May 17, it addressed a circular to all of its federations and departmental organizations asking them for opinions upon an agrarian program. At a meeting of the Confederal Committee on May 27, it was decided to create a *union fédérative terrienne*, which after January 1, 1920, is to have a place in the C. G. T. If the C. G. T. is successful in winning the adherence of these non-proletariat groups the failure of revolutionary syndicalism will be assured. The intellectual and the peasant classes of France are very jealous of their individualism; they will countenance no revolution; and their position in life makes the doctrine of the class struggle repugnant to them.

The Government has undertaken to organize groupings in order to offset the predominance of the C. G. T. In March, 1919, M. Clémentel, Minister of Commerce, organized a Federation of the Employers of Labor. M. Victor Boret, Minister of Agriculture, seemed to be responsible for the organization of a General Confederation of Agriculture, to include the peasant workers of France and to be independent of the General Confederation of Labor. Another organization among the peasants has been effected in the *Ligue des Paysans,* whose purpose is "the extension of individual property and the protection of the interests of all the producers of the soil."

Among the employers 149 Chambers of Commerce provide the most general organization. The French Association of Industry and Agriculture; the Society of Agriculturers; the Committee of Forges; the Committee of Forests; the National Confederation of Commerce and Industry, composed of 150 employers' syndicates; the General Association of Textile Commerce and Industry; the Syndical Alliance of Commerce and Industry; the Union of National Industries; the Union of Commerce and Industry; the Federation of French Manufacturers and Merchants; and the Central Committee of Coal Mines of France, are other examples of the extended organization among French business men.

The Union of Economic Interests, not solely a professional organization, but existing for propagandist purposes, is composed of the largest employers' organizations in France, containing about seventy-five Associations, Syndical Chambers, Federations, Alliances, and Committees, from the greatest diversity of industries. This organization represents one of the first attempts toward the representation of interests in Parliament.

In July, 1912, it organized the "Republican Group of Economic Interests," composed of over 100 members pledged against State Socialism. At the same time "The Republican Group of Economic and Social Studies" was formed with an identical program. Both of these groups later united in the French "Parliamentary Committee of Commerce."

Other groups have been formed in both the Senate and the Chamber, upon purely professional bases. In the Senate there are a half dozen of such groupings, including those based upon agriculture, insurance, commerce and industries. In the Chamber there have been thirty-six economic and social groups, ranging from the defense of Breton interests to those of physicians.

VI

From this review of economic organization in France it will be seen that the foundation for a government based on professional representation is now partly laid. Whether these organizations will ever be strong enough to bring about the creation of such a government is another question. The advantage of their existence is that they make collective bargaining between labor and capital a possibility. Restricted to purely economic activities, functioning outside the realm of government, the creation of great economic groupings bargaining with each other, offers an application of industrial democracy which may go far in curing social ills.

It is very unlikely, however, that the movement will go farther than this and take charge of the legislative and administrative functions of government. The expert has his place in government, but it is a limited one;

the fact that he is an expert handicaps him in the direction of large affairs or in the making of great decisions stretching beyond the field in which he is skilled. Men with a general knowledge of a great number of things, men with tact and an intimacy with human nature, men who can compromise means without compromising ends, must always be the *gouvernants*. Technicians, by all means, should be given a free field and full responsibility in the activity in which they are expert; but the coördination of politics must be left to men of larger capacity who are directly responsible to political bodies. As Professor Joseph Barthélemy has pointed out in his recent book on *Le Problème de la compétence dans la démocratie,* a strong democracy should be conducted by men of general culture, administered by specialists, and controlled by public opinion. But it is essential for a democracy, as for any régime, to possess an élite well prepared for the task of direction.

The professional man in legislation presents even stronger difficulties than in administration. However successful a porcelain merchant may be, he is probably ignorant of other economic affairs, such, for example, as the tariff on steel. A Chamber composed of professional men, elected purely for their business knowledge, would individually be competent in regard to everything; but collectively it would be competent in nothing.[31]

Furthermore, despite the assertions of such philosophers as Professor Duguit and Maxime Leroy, government has not only economic problems to solve; legislation is not wholly a matter of commerce, markets or stocks; representatives are not intended to be mere

[31] For an argument against professional representations, see Villey, *op. cit.,* 92-96.

lobbyists, securing appropriations or protection for their constituents. Especially in France, legislative problems are becoming increasingly economic; but they will never become entirely so and they must be approached from other than economic points of view. Questions of national education and of culture; questions determined purely by political philosophies, i.e., federalism versus centralization, have only an indirect bearing on economics. In regard to questions of foreign policy, daily becoming more important and requiring a general knowledge of history, geography, diplomacy and human nature, a glass-blower or even an iron merchant would doubtless be ignorant. On the other hand, questions considered from merely a productive standpoint will receive an entirely different solution when coördinated with other considerations; for example, the extension of the government into private enterprise, from the economic standpoint is wasteful, inefficient, and sometimes even corrupt. From the standpoint of labor, of industrial democracy and of the prevention of profiteering and private monopolies, such an extension may become desirable. What is necessary is a balancing of interests, involving a broad knowledge of them all and a capacity for fair judgment, in which a system of professional representation would fail.

From the standpoint of national unity the results of professional representation would again be highly questionable. The excessive number of French political parties, it is recognized, causes a great many of the defects in French government; but a system of professional representation, to include all the industrial categories of the country, would undoubtedly exaggerate the number of groupings in Parliament. Each grouping, having the material interests of its own pro-

fession at heart, would engage in barters and concessions fatally harmful to the national unity and welfare. There would not be the Three Estates of feudal assemblies but a countless number of equally harmful antagonisms.

As M. Jean Hennessy concluded, the practical difficulties in the way of professional representation are insurmountable. Groupings and professions are changing in composition and character. The proletariat is constantly merging into the *petit bourgeois*, and the latter merges into the *rentier*, making their accurate classification into professional categories impossible.

These objections many upholders of competence in government realize. The Liberal Action party, the Union of Economic Interests, the National Association for the Organization of Democracy restrict their professional bodies to purely consultative duties. Consultative bodies, composed of professional representatives, would doubtless improve legislation. As noted, the French Government is utilizing their services, but the very fact that they are merely consultative prevents the enforcement of their advice upon Parliament. That force can come only from a vigorous and an enlightened public opinion guided, as Parliament must be, by other than strictly economic motives.

There appears to be only one cause which will force the institution of professional representation upon France. That is the imminence of Socialist and Syndicalist success. The alarming growth of the C. G. T. has already caused the bourgeois interests, partly instigated by the Government, to group themselves in self-defense. If the Socialists and the C. G. T. become able seriously to threaten the overthrow of the present form of government, these other bourgeois organizations will

be willing and doubtless strong enough to substitute a government based upon *all* economic interests. Such a government of "guild" syndicalism, offered as a compromise, may appease the advocates of revolutionary syndicalism.

The defects in theory of such a "professional" government appear to be grave. Yet it is very doubtful if they will outweigh the defects in our present governmental systems. Democracy is still in its apprenticeship, and it contains many defects whose real cause of existence is public apathy. In France, especially, material considerations rather than political theories influence governments. This perhaps is due to the French tendency to appeal to the State for all personal as well as collective needs. This tendency itself appears to be both a cause and a result of French statism. At any rate, the present generation has no Montesquieus or Benjamin Constants to expound theories to it. If it had, perhaps the governments of all democracies would be improved. But it is more reasonable to believe that, however logical their doctrines, this age would not listen to them. Practical considerations and an economic opportunism seem to rule the political world.

CHAPTER XII

REGIONALISM[1]

Il y a en France trop d'influence centrale; je voudrais moins de force à Paris et plus dans chaque localité.—NAPOLÉON.

I

A product of long centuries, France has a centralized or "unitary" government, the direction of which is almost entirely vested in Paris.[2] Although the French Parliament now exercises immense power, this authority has often varied with an altered constitutional régime. But in matters of administration, especially of local affairs, there has been slight change since Napoleon I left France its present form of administrative organization. Powers of local bodies have been extended or contracted; but the fundamental principles of French departmental administration[3] have remained aloof from political battles.

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[1] This chapter, dealing with decentralization by the creation of regions, outlines the third remedy proposed for the defects of the French bureaucracy.

[2] "Paris is in the habit of governing France. For two centuries in this centralized country, the word of command has come from the capital. . . ." G. Hanotaux, *Contemporary France*, i, 15.

"France, inhabited by a population of different origins, subject on her frontiers to the attraction of neighboring Powers, can only preserve her power, and perhaps her existence, by making constant sacrifices to the cause of unity." Hanotaux, *op. cit.*, i, 239.

[3] For a discussion of French administrative law, see the different *Traités de Droit Administratif*, by Professors Berthélemy, Hauriou, Moreau, and Jèze.

France is divided into eighty-six departments,[4] each one of which is directed by a Prefect who is appointed and removed at will by the President of the Republic through the Minister of the Interior. The office is therefore a political one and the incumbent is usually displaced with a change in Ministry. Two principal duties fall to it—that of directing matters of general administration, applicable to the whole country, and that of the direction of the local department affairs. The Prefect is theoretically an immediate agent of the Ministry of the Interior, but really he carries out orders from all the Ministers. He is absolutely subject to them in the execution of general laws and decrees; but in such matters as the direction of the police and the supervision of local bodies, he has more freedom. In the greater number of cases, he can still be overruled by the Government and he can always be removed. Whatever independence he may have is largely lost by the pressure which the deputies of the department exert upon him. Consequently questions of policy usually are referred to Paris for decision. Thus the centralized control over department administration is nearly absolute, and the Government at Paris concentrates tremendous powers in its hands. In theory this power is not exercised irresponsibly, for the parliamentary responsibility of the Minister of the Interior prevents too flagrant abuses of administration. But at the same time, the vast centralization of power and the tremendous extent of governmental activity enables an enormous amount of patronage to be disposed of, for politi-

[4] Excluding the three new departments (Moselle, Haut-Rhin, and Bas-Rhin) formed out of Alsace-Lorraine.

cal purposes; and the actions of the Prefect are largely controlled by such considerations.[5]

The Prefect is assisted in matters of general administration by a Prefectoral Council, composed of three or four members appointed by the President of the Republic. But with the exception of its duties as an administrative tribunal, its powers are purely advisory.

The representative body of the Department is the General Council.[6] Each canton of the Department elects one member to this Council for a term of six years, one half of the members retiring every three years. The Council holds only two short sessions a year; and, as may be imagined, it has no important powers. It may adopt resolutions upon purely local matters not connected with general politics. It apportions direct taxes among the arrondissements. It may participate in the administration of highways and education, etc. But all of its acts are subject to the veto of the Government. The Prefect carefully guides its deliberations. He prepares the budget which it must vote. When the Council does vote a measure which it regards as a law, its execution is entirely dependent upon the Prefect; the Council cannot enforce it. The Prefect, on the other hand, can enforce his own decrees as law. The very existence of the Council is dependent upon the Central Government for the latter may dissolve it, except when Parliament is in session.

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[5] See Jean Hennessy, *Reorganisation Administrative de la France*, 12.

[6] For a detailed study of the powers of the governing bodies in France, particularly those of administration, see Gaston Jèze, *Eléments du Droit Public et Administratif*. The powers of the department, the arrondissement, and the commune are discussed, 138-160. See also Hauriou, *Précis de Droit Administratif*, 258-333.

Unfortunately, the powers of the general councils appear to be in the process of curtailment. Under a law passed August 10, 1871,[7] these bodies could definitely legislate upon the construction and the concession (lease) of local railways. But this power was taken away from them in a law passed July 31, 1913, which provided that thereafter departmental assemblies could not even enter into a formal inquiry of such projects without first securing the authorization of the Government. The State justified this law on the ground that it already subventioned local railways, and that General Councils had appeared too radical and too extravagant in the granting of privileges. But, nevertheless, another step was taken toward the decrease in local governing power.[8]

In the matter of public works, the Central Government has also intruded upon the Council's activity. Formerly, the highway service of every vicinity was controlled by the General Council of each department under the terms of the Organization law of 1871, a power which apparently had been exercised with profit and discretion. But the Government, wishing to unify the road services under the Board of Bridge and Road Engineers already in charge of national roads, recently deprived the General Council of another of the few prerogatives left it.

Similarly, the Central Government has taken over the service of social assistance and of public hygiene, an essentially departmental and local function. By a law passed on March 15, 1893, upon gratuitous medical as-

[7] For the General Council law of August 10, 1871, see *Codes et Lois*, 696.

[8] See Boucheron, "*La Réforme Administrative après la Guerre*" in the June, July, August, 1918, numbers of *La Revue Politique et Parlementaire*.

sistance, the right of individuals to medical aid was substituted for former optional assistance, limited to public resources. This law was of unquestionable social benefit; but it necessitated additional funds. However, instead of levying a special tax upon the departments or communes, Parliament preferred to subvention groups of departments directly; the departments, in turn, each receiving their share, were to subvention the communes within them. With the establishment of State financial aid, the Central Government in Paris laid down rigid rules, making for complete and unintelligent uniformity in the administration of medical assistance. The law virtually provided for the detailed operation of this charity, and under the guise of financial support, it passed wholly out of the competence of the Departments and the General Councils.

The law of February 15, 1902, on the Protection of Public Health contained the same financial and regulatory provisions. Likewise the law of 1905 upon Old Age Assistance, the law upon Numerous Families, and the law on Maternal Assistance provided for the indirect control of the Central Government over charities hitherto and more intelligently directed by local bodies. Localities no longer care for their poor as under the ecclesiastical laws and the laws of the Revolution. The result of the change, according to French students,[9] has been to create an undignified scramble among communes for department subventions, to overlook the needs of intelligently administered charities, and to impose upon the dignity of the poor. From the financial standpoint, extravagance in charity administration has greatly increased.

[9] See Louis Boucheron's article cited above.

By these means, the powers once exercised by the General Councils have gradually been taken away by the Central Government until, as representative bodies, they are inactive and uninfluential.

When the General Council is not in session, a Departmental Commission, usually composed of from four to seven members, sits as a permanent body; but like the Council, it has no power of control over the Prefect.

The arrondissement is an administrative subdivision of the department. There are 362 of them in France. Each is directed by a sub-prefect, a representative of the prefect and the Central Government, who usually amounts to nothing more than a political agent, relying for advancement upon winning the electoral support of the arrondissement for the Government. The people are represented in an Arrondissement Council, usually composed of nine members elected by manhood suffrage for a term of six years. But this Council has little power because the arrondissement has no property and no budget. Consequently, its activities are restrained to apportioning among the communes the quota of taxes allotted to the arrondissement by the General Council. The arrondissement is an artifical unit, and especially since the abolition of the *scrutin d'arrondissement* in the elections to Parliament,[10] there are few reasons for its existence.

The arrondissements, in turn, are divided into cantons, of which there are now about 3,000. The canton likewise has no personality although it is used as an electoral and a judicial unit. It serves as a district for the Justice of the Peace and for choosing members of

[10] See pp. 162 *ff.*

the General and the Arrondissement Councils. It has few, if any, administrative functions.

The commune, of which there are more than 36,000, is the basis of local government in France.[11] Its size varies from the smallest village to the largest city. With the exception of Paris, Lyons, and Marseille, every commune possesses the same form of government. The Mayor of the commune corresponds to the Prefect of the department. He is the agent of the Central Government and the administrator of local affairs. Although not directly appointed by the President of the Republic, he is not directly responsible to the people, for he is elected by the communal council of which he must be a member. He serves for a term of four years and is assisted by *adjoints* whose number varies with the size of the commune. The Mayor has considerable appointive power, and, with the exception of the police, he also may suspend or dismiss any municipal officer. The only authority able to review his acts in this regard is the Council of State, the highest administrative court in the Republic. He also has general charge of the financial affairs of the commune. But the Mayor's decisions upon matters such as communal policy and public health can usually be annulled by the Prefect, who in many instances can order him to carry out certain measures. Financial accounts must be submitted to the Prefect for approval. The Prefect may suspend the Mayor from office for a month; the Minister of Interior, for three months; and the President of the Republic may remove him altogether. Thus the Mayor is actually

[11] For an extended account of the powers of communes, communal councils, mayors and other municipal officials, see L. Morgand, *La Loi Municipale,* 2 vols.

subjected to the greatest restraint, and conformity with the desires of the Central Government is assured.

The Communal Council, the representative body of this unit, varies in size, according to the population, from ten to thirty-six members. It is elected by manhood suffrage for a term of four years. The powers of this body are much more extended than those of the General or Arrondissement Councils. Many of these powers, however, are subject to approval by higher officials, such as measures involving the disposal of municipal property, the control of streets, and the framing of the communal budget. In the latter, the Prefect may increase or diminish receipts; but with several exceptions, he can only reduce and not increase expenditures. In the matters of fire protection, municipal cemeteries, parks and other local services, however, the Council and Mayor exercise an independent control. But the Prefect can always suspend the Municipal Council for a month; while the President of the Republic may entirely dissolve it and appoint a commission with limited powers to direct the commune for a period not longer than two months, when a new council must be elected. Here again the Central Government weighs down with a firm hand.[12]

The extent of Government intervention in strictly communal affairs is shown by several incidents connected with the municipality of Lyons, the second largest city in France. During the war when the Central Government should have been completely occupied with problems of national defense and when the cities would naturally have been allowed to exercise their

[12] For a more extended description of the local system of government in France, see Munro, *The Government of European Cities*, Chapter I.

greatest initiative, the city of Lyons could not even revise a street-cleaning contract without securing the approval of the Government in the form of a regular decree. This case was in regard to an agreement with a Madame Monin relative to the collection of dirt upon the city streets; the decree was issued September 24, 1917. Another example occurred on the same day when the Government approved an agreement entered into by the Mayor of Lyons and a Blast Furnace Company at Pont-à-Mousson for the delivery of some water pipes.[13] By these means the Central Government at Paris definitely checks, or at least controls, local autonomy and independence.

Particularly as to the commune, a French student writes:

> Unfortunately, the French commune does not yet have its liberties. Placed under the nominal dependence of the prefect and his ministers . . . it can only act, develop and prosper with the permission of irresponsible bureaus; it can only reform with the consent of foreign scribes and be resigned to interminable delays. In order to make a local affair "emerge," as it is said, from a ministry . . . veritable exorcisms are necessary.[14]

Such is the present state of centralization in local government. It presents two vital objections: Firstly, it deprives the people of a direct participation in what should be purely communal activities. With the exception of a very few local officials, the only elected representatives are deputies, and the members of the general arrondissement, and communal councils. Elections do not come with the frequency necessary to inspire public interest in local affairs. In addition to the small num-

[13] Quoted in E. Herriot, *Créer*, ii, 187, note.
[14] *Ibid.*, ii, 186.

ber of officials popularly chosen, interest in their selection is further diminished by the complete subordination in which they are held. When representative bodies have their natural powers absorbed by a distant authority, the training of citizens in the responsibility of government—a training which they must have if a democratic régime is to be a success—is prevented. The success of American Government institutions has its roots in the New England town meetings, and in local governments everywhere carried on by citizens, independent of bureaucratic interference. In France, on the other hand, and for historic reasons previously discussed, the Republic is fed from above. This is perhaps its greatest weakness.

Secondly, the centralization of local governing powers in Paris makes for confusion and inefficiency. The testimony of Frenchmen offers the most conclusive evidence. M. Barthe, in introducing a resolution for decentralization, said to the Chamber:

> Conceived and developed by the administrative authority itself, our administrative system is too visibly inspired by the solicitude of hierarchical control and not enough by the solicitude of service. Formalistic to an excess, our administrations are increasingly clogged with red tape and routine. They create serious obstacles to the economic activity of the country by their systematic ignorance of the realities . . . of production and exchange.[15]

M. Jean Hennessy, one of the foremost advocates of decentralization by the increase of self-governing powers, has written:

> Before 1914 an over-centralized France adapted itself with difficulty to the great economic transformations of the century; it did not exploit all of its natural resources; it did not profit from its incomparable geographic position. Its

[15] Quoted in Hennessy, *op. cit.*, 134.

economic wealth was developed too slowly; the convergence of its railway system toward Paris did not sufficiently place its different regions in relation with each other and with foreign countries. The interior of the country was not connected by means of communication directed toward the ports, with foreign countries; river navigation was not organized; new waterways had not been developed; heavy merchandise could not reach the coast without being overburdened with enormous freight; lacking return freight and because they could not find well-equipped ports, the great ships of commerce turned away from our coasts; and our merchant marine, notwithstanding large subventions, did not, so to speak, exist.[16]

Senator Herriot expressed the opinion of perhaps the majority of Frenchmen when he wrote in regard to the accumulating ills of over-centralization, as follows:

Our administrative régime appears to-day as a mosaic. It borrows elements from all the former régimes. The conception of authority has prevailed over the tendency to liberty. The French communes lack liberties granted to similar units in foreign countries. The departments are administered by prefects whom usage has made sort of electoral *intendants*, displaced according to the caprices of central or local politics. The communes remain in wardship. The department no longer has the advantages of liberty nor the benefits of national administration. . . . The Republic has had eminent Prefects in general, entirely due to their own personality. But to what removals have they not been condemned? Hazard reduced them; hazard raised them. The political shoal has little by little corrupted the institution. Garrotted mayors, uncertain prefects; this is what our democracy retains to assure our future. It deserves better. A victorious France cannot, without essential injury, be content with such a régime—which is neither that of authority or that of liberty.[17]

The celebrated words of Lamennais epitomize these defects as follows: "With centralization, you have apoplexy at the center and paralysis in the extremities."

[16] *Ibid.*, 114.
[17] *Créer*, ii, 179.

To understand the movement, present and historical, for the restoration of local governing powers in France, a brief history of their development will first be given.

II

French centralization is a result of long centuries which worked for the creation of French unity and the French nation. From a country originally composed of feudal holdings, independent and antagonistic, in which the king was merely a baron upon his limited estates along the Seine and the Loire, a nation has emerged. The feudal domain was gradually absorbed into the royal domain; seigneuries were united and feudal power was transferred to the king. A continual series of foreign wars, of attacks by or upon enemies on every side—Spain, England, Austria, Prussia, Sweden, and the Netherlands—stimulated this process and brought the royalty greater power. War was always imminent and a strong central authority became a continuous necessity.

It was Louis XIV who crowned the work of French unity. At his accession France divided its legal jurisdiction between a written law and local custom. A majority of Frenchmen were ignorant of the national language. France was simply a federation of provinces, each of which used its own laws. The Chancellor used two seals, one for Dauphiné, the other for the rest of the kingdom. Cities were independent citadels. Regional States-Generals, established by financial necessity, cried for independence. But through the *intendants,* the predecessors of the modern prefects, the king overcame local independence and centralized adminis-

tration; armies, cities, provinces, judges, came under his direct control. Louis XIV traced the outlines which Napoleon was to fill.

The weakness of succeeding sovereigns postponed the completion of the work Louis had started. The Revolution found France still a divided and morcellated country. Lorraine was regarded as a foreign province; Béarn demanded a distinct sovereignty; Dauphiné pretended to be at the same time in and out of the kingdom; Boulogne and Navarre started separatist movements, declaring null the royal edicts joining them to France. The situation confronting the Revolution was a serious one and led to the appeal for unity without which the Revolution could not succeed. The Constituent Assembly of 1789 [18] relied upon a common devotion of the communes of France to the fatherland to enforce this unity. The institutions of local government which it established were marked, consequently, by local independence. The Assembly divided France into about eighty-five departments, which in turn were formed into districts. The *intendant,* a regalian office, was suppressed and elective officials held the executive control of the departments. The central power had no representatives in local assemblies. The communes or *paroisses,* of which there were about 44,000, were uniformly organized as self-governing units with a mayor and council elected by nearly universal suffrage. They also were practically independent of the central authority. The Revolution thus achieved a democratic and a decentralized system of self-government; but French unity had not become firmly enough established to prevent the

[18] A brief history of French administrative organization and decentralization since 1789 will be found in G. Jèze, *Eléments du Droit Public et Administratif,* 134-137.

abuses of such extensive liberty. Consequently in 1795, because of the excesses of the Reign of Terror which arose under local governing bodies uncontrolled by the central authorities, a reorganization became necessary. The Directory immediately upon coming into power suppressed the communes as a self-governing unit and substituted for them the canton, whose administration was placed in the hands of a directory of five to nine members popularly elected. As many small communes were grouped into a single canton, much of the local and unrestrained independence was destroyed. Although this cantonal system led to a more effective control of the country, it could not become the satisfactory basis of local government because the canton was an artificial division. The commune, by tradition and by natural boundaries, has been and always will be the natural unit of local administration.

Napoleon may have recognized this fact, for in February, 1800 (twenty-eight *pluviôse*, Year VIII), upon his advent to power, he reëstablished the commune as the governmental unit. Completely out of sympathy with popular demands for freedom in government, he did away with the election of officials. Henceforth mayors, adjoints and councilmen were to be appointed by the central régime. The department was retained, but at its head was placed an appointive prefect; the arrondissements appeared in place of the old districts, and were presided over by the sub-prefect, also appointed. These features the Third Republic still maintains. With the growth of the Empire, France little by little lost its local and regional liberties.

To these centralizing tendencies, men like Villèle and Corbière were not slow in objecting. But no fundamental change in the Napoleonic administration was

made even after the Restoration in 1815. Numerous projects appeared urging the extension of local self-government. In 1829 the Martignac project was introduced, substituting the election of the general and arrondissement councilors for their appointment by the central power; but it failed of passage and caused the fall of the cabinet. It was only after the Revolution of 1830, bringing Louis Philippe into power, that this movement bore fruit. By the laws of 1831 and 1837 municipal governments were reorganized so that councilors could be elected indirectly by a suffrage based on property and educational qualifications. The mayors and adjoints still were appointed, but were now to be taken from members of the council; the municipal councils were granted limited power in certain matters of local administration. In 1833 slight changes were also made in departmental organization.

The Revolution of 1848 gave a new impulse to the movement for decentralization. A project with that purpose was submitted to the Council of State, which provided for the substitution of commissions of the arrondissements, formed of the general councilors of each arrondissement, for the old arrondissement and canton councils. But the National Assembly did not approve the measure. However, municipal councils in communes of not more than 6,000 inhabitants were permitted to select their own mayors. But the larger cities continued under the old jurisdiction. The Second Empire in 1852 took away this privilege from the communes, and the Government also abolished the practice of choosing mayors from members of the municipal council. The entire spirit prevalent in the Government of Napoleon III was in complete agreement with that of

Napoleon Bonaparte.[19] The prefects exercised complete power not only over the departments but over communes. In 1866 and 1867 laws were passed somewhat enlarging the attributes of the general and municipal councils, but they were already so effectively controlled by the central authority that municipal life remained practically extinct.

This repressive policy naturally met with opposition. Demands for reform culminated in the program of Nancy in 1865, to which representatives of nearly every political faith adhered—Berryer, de Broglie, Casimir-Périer, d'Haussonville, J. Simon and Jules Favre.[20] This conference proved a landmark in the movement for self-government. It officially gave birth to the regional idea—the creation of a region of considerable powers, supplanting and greater than the department—although several writers had previously made the suggestion. Auguste Comte in 1854 urged the grouping of departments into seventeen regions; while Le Play, in his *Réforme Sociale en France* in 1864, urged the grouping of the departments into thirteen "provinces."

The Assembly of 1871, after bringing the war to a close, partly occupied itself with the administrative reorganization of France. As a temporary measure it decided, except for a few alterations, to return to the system used in 1848. One of these changes was that in all cities, except those having over 20,000 inhabitants, the mayors might be chosen by the municipal councils. The Assembly having retained the general features of the centralized government laid down by Napoleon I, op-

[19] See De la Gorce, *Histoire du Second Empire,* ii, 48 *et seq.* for Napoleon III and decentralization.

[20] For the Nancy program, as advocated before the National Assembly, see G. Hanotaux, *op. cit.*, i, 234, 235.

position in favor of increased local freedom arose in the Third Republic. In an effort to silence it by oppression, and to make its own position permanent, the MacMahon Government secured the passage of a law in 1874 which suppressed the right of communes to choose their own mayors. This law was repealed upon the accession of a new government in 1876; and in 1882 every commune, regardless of its size, was allowed to choose its own administrative officials. On April 5, 1884, a municipal code [21] was promulgated combining and organizing the many different laws upon municipal government which previous régimes had framed. With the exception of a few amendments, it provides the present basis of municipal organization in France, which has been outlined at the beginning of the chapter.

III

Throughout the history of this development two currents of reform may be discerned. The first limited itself to the extension of the powers of local assemblies and units at present in existence. Such a movement was successful enough to extend the financial powers of the general councils by a law passed in July, 1898, and also those of the municipal councils, in a law passed on April 7, 1902. More recent attempts for increasing the powers of local assemblies are too numerous to recount. Three propositions upon communal organization were introduced in Parliament about 1900; since then, at least thirteen propositions upon cantonal organization and eleven bills upon departmental organiza-

[21] For the Law of Municipal Organization of April 5, 1884, see *Codes et Lois,* ii, 955-967.

tion, including the suppression or the reduction of the under-prefect, have also been introduced. The reforms advocated place much of the present initiative of the prefect upon the general council, and free him from the constant interference of Paris authorities. A few even advocate the election of the prefect or of the under-prefect; many advocate the total suppression of the arrondissement. The extension of the powers of the commune receives the strongest supporters because it is the natural and traditional unit of government in France.[22] The increasing responsibilities of municipal-

[22] The most extensive effort toward decentralization in France was that attempted by the Paris Commune of 1871. According to the Official Journal of the Commune (April 20, 1871), it demanded:

"The absolute independence of the Commune and its extension to every locality in France; the assurance by this means to each person of his rights in their integrity. . . . The independence of the Commune will have but one limit—the equal right of independence to be enjoyed by the other Communes who shall adhere to the contract. It is the association of these Communes that must secure the unity of France.

"The inherent rights of the Commune are these: the right of voting the Communal budget of receipts and expenditure, of regulating and reforming the system of taxation, and of directing local services; the right to organize its own magistracy, the internal police and public education; to administer the property belonging to the Commune; the right of choosing by election or competition, with responsibility and a permanent right of control and revocation, the communal magistrates and officials of all sorts. . . .

"Paris desires no more than this, with the condition, of course, that she shall find in the Grand Central Administration, composed of delegates from the Federal Communes, the practical recognition and realization of the same principles. . . . The unity which has hitherto been imposed upon us by the Empire, the Monarchy, and the Parliamentary Government is nothing but a centralization, despotic, unintelligent, arbitrary, and burdensome. Political unity as desired by Paris is a voluntary association of each local initiative, a free and spontaneous coöperation of all individual energies with one common object—the well-being, liberty and security of all. . . ." Quoted by H. M. Hyndman in *Clemenceau, the Man and His Time*, 40.

See also G. Hanotaux, *op. cit.*, i, 168, 169.

ities makes an increased freedom imperative. As Senator Herriot says, "the cities of France are not only inert statues upon the Place de la Concorde. They are acting, living, growing beings, obliged to prosper under penalty of succumbing. They must, in spite of constraint and stupidity, defend their interests, create wealth, and improve by their efforts, the welfare of their citizens. . . . It is by the reorganization of the commune . . . that administrative reform can be suitably commenced." [23]

However, the efforts to increase the independence of bodies at present existing, as noted, have largely failed, and the tendency in France is toward a greater concentration of power in the State authority. In the belief that the present units of government, especially the departments, because of the strictures in which history and their composition hold them, will never be given any amount of autonomy, the movement of Regionalism has developed. This movement aims at the total suppression of the departments which it considers as artificial and over-numerous units of government. In their place it would erect a great region based upon natural economic and historic boundaries. [24] These regions would be much larger than the present departments and consequently there would be a smaller number of them. They would be governed by a regional assembly, endowed with autonomous powers which would extend to the development of regional interests, economic and po-

[23] *Créer*, ii, 189.

[24] For example, the region of Lille is characterized by its textile industries; the region of Dijon by its unique system of inland water transportation; the region of Grenoble by its electric power and manufacturing; the region of Marseille by its port facilities and by its Oriental and African trade. The regionalists wish to impose upon these economic delimitations a political delimitation.

litical. As a result trade would be stimulated and government administration be intelligently carried on.

The first argument, then, for the creation of such a unit of administration is that if new powers are to be actually exercised, it is necessary to wipe out old local organs of government and start with a clean slate. The second argument is that the department is artificial in its composition and that consequently it cannot intelligently direct the economic interests of the locality. Because of its small size and its lack of dignity, it does not attract men of ability to its public offices. The third argument is one of economy. A larger administrative unit will decrease the number of Government employees, reducing financial expenditures and political profiteering. According to the report upon the regional proposition, introduced by M. Rognon in 1916, the adoption of the region would result in suppressing:

53 prefects
275 sub-prefects
20 secretary-generals
159 councilors of the prefecture
53 general treasurers
362 financial receivers
53 registry directors
53 indirect tax directors
362 road overseers
and a great number of tax collectors
and justices of the peace.[25]

The fourth argument for the creation of a region, supplanting the department, has arisen out of the problem of reconstruction: First, in regard to the government of Alsace-Lorraine. Although the people of these provinces have welcomed their return to France, they

[25] Quoted in Hennessy, *op. cit.*, 133.

do not relish the restrictive, bureaucratic and inefficient control of the French Ministry of the Interior. Under German rule, and because of a desire to conciliate the Alsatians, they were given, at least so French regionalists assert, more administrative autonomy than that which the French department is accorded. Consequently only a regional organization, embracing these provinces in their entirety, with local administrative liberties, will assure the happy reabsorption of the lost provinces in *La Patrie*. Secondly, the devastated regions have asked for liberation from the binding restraints in which the Paris Government was holding them in their efforts at rehabilitation. The cities and the Chambers of Commerce of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing requested the Government to organize the devastated regions upon the regional principle. Through this type of organization, they believed the liberated area of France could best utilize its own energies in the tremendous task of reconstruction.

Sympathy with this argument was expressed by the Congress of the League of Professional Representation and Regionalist Action, held at Lyons, April 20 and 21, 1919, which adopted the following resolution:

> Whereas it is happily impossible to frustrate the people of Alsace and Lorraine from the benefits of their regional organization or to submit them to the narrow and tyrannical régime of our old, imperial administration;
>
> Whereas the populations of the liberated regions find themselves in many respects in the same situation as the people of Alsace and Lorraine, with this single difference, perhaps, that they have suffered more harm from the war and that they have fewer means of bringing a remedy to it;
>
> Whereas, they have therefore every reason to have their right realized to be admitted to all the benefits of regional, autonomous organization, alone capable of hastening, in a

larger and more flexible framework, their economic reconstruction;

Resolved, that the League of Regionalist Action would neglect its very principles if it did not express the wish that prompt satisfaction be given them and to the other regions of France at the same time;

And that for these reasons, the Regionalist Congress of Lyons ask Parliament to vote without delay the law upon regional organization.[26]

IV

Since the congress of Nancy in 1865, the regionalist movement has been effectively carried on by many different organizations. In 1895, the National League of Decentralization was formed, only to succumb shortly afterward. In the same year, MM. Paul Deschanel, the present President of the Republic, de Lucay, and de Marcère, produced books urging the reform. About this time, *La Nouvelle Revue* published a series of articles urging decentralization, to which the great Provençal poet, Frédéric Mistral, contributed. In 1898, a Breton Regionalist Union was organized, to be followed in the next twenty years by some ten other provincial organizations.

The French Regionalist Federation arose from the combination and the federation of smaller organizations. Founded in 1900 and constituted "outside and above all political parties," it proposed to coördinate the efforts of every society and individual interested in

[26] *Œuvre*, April 23, 1919.

Another unique argument for regionalism was advanced at this Congress by a Walloon from Liége; he urged the creation of regional autonomy to overcome the only obstacle in the way of Belgian union with France! That such a thing is contemplated is interesting, to say the least.

regional reform. It did not supplant existing organizations, it merely federated them. By means of press campaigns and conferences, it was able to arouse considerable interest in this new idea of government. Among its members were such prominent statesmen and politicians as Alexandre Ribot, Paul Deschanel, Jean Hennessy, and Louis Marin, and such literary men as Mistral, Barrès, and Ducrocq. In fact, the regional movement was as much directed toward the revival of regional art and literature as toward the institution of a purely political reform.

The League of Professional Representation and Regionalist Action was founded in April, 1913, by M. Jean Hennessy, who became and still is its President. Differing from previous organizations, it asked for the election of a Regional Assembly composed of representatives of economic and professional interests in addition to the mere creation of the regional unit.[27] A month after the organization of the League, in May, 1913, a bill upon regional reform, creating professional regional assemblies, was introduced in the Chamber of Deputies.[28] After its introduction, the League organized conferences in the principal cities of France to arouse popular interest in the reform. On February 1, 1914, a Congress was held in Toulouse to which the Federation of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry, and the Chambers of Commerce sent delegates. But despite the propagandist efforts of the League, all attempts at regional reform have so far failed to pass Parliament.

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[27] See pp. 362-364.

[28] Before this date, seven similar projects had been unsuccessfully urged before the Chamber. In 1910, M. Briand, then Premier, advocated the region as a necessity for electoral reform. He was unable to convince Parliament of his point of view.

During the following four years, four bills upon regionalism and decentralization were introduced.

The Administrative Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, of which M. Hennessy was the *rapporteur,* took these various measures and combined them into a compromised proposition which was a very poor substitute for the regionalist idea.

The first step in administrative reform, according to the report of this Commission, should be the creation of a region and the fixing of the powers of its representative assembly, its method of selection, and the establishment of a budget. With this step achieved, the reform of other local institutions may be brought about, as well as that of the public services.

The delimitation of the region was recognized by the Commission to be a difficult task. It finally decided to pass this responsibility on to the Council of Ministers who by decree should fix the limits and the capital of each region after having received the advice of the Council of State. This latter body, before emitting its advice, should consult the wishes of the local bodies, such as Chambers of Commerce, general, municipal, and arrondissement councils, and professional organizations. On the petition of at least one fourth of its voters each arrondissement might protest against the incorporation of the arrondissement in one region, in favor of another.

The administration of the region was to be vested in a representative of the central power. In theory the Commission believed it better for each region to elect such an official; but because of the presence of war conditions, it did not believe the State could safely relinquish its control. In addition to this prefect, a regional commission was to be erected. Its method of election, its powers and those of its president, were to

be the same as those of the present departmental organizations. Many members of the Commission believed that the region should be directed by a sur-prefect, underneath whom would be the department prefects. But this idea was also abandoned, and the direction of the region was confided in the Prefect of the department in which the capital (*chef-lieu*) of the region was to be located. The representative body of the region, known as the Regional Council, was to be elected by the department general councils. Each arrondissement was to have at least one representative in a Regional Council. The number of the regional councilors was to equal one fifth of the general councilors. The powers of this Council, naturally difficult to define, were left rather vague. The principle was laid down that the Council should control the administration of all public services extending beyond the department and not essentially of a national character, and those of a local nature which at present congest State administration. The three matters specifically intrusted to this Regional Council were education, to the extent of its adaptation to local needs; social assistance, such as aid to the blind, deaf and dumb and to tubercular patients, which extends beyond the needs of single departments; and public works, such as regional water transportation and local railways. In general, even if the regional councils were granted no more power than the present departmental councils, they could do immensely more in the development of industry because of the natural, economic delimitation of the region. The departments are organized so that they have competitive and conflicting economic interests which their general councils cannot effectively develop. The region, in combining departments of similar composition and interests, will immeasurably improve their

productiveness. In place of the conflicts and the antagonism which the present departments engender, the region, it is urged, will coördinate and confederate mutual interests.

The financial resources of the region, the Commission left to the determination of the Fiscal Legislation Commission, except to suggest that the regional budget be composed of additional *centimes*, levied upon the national taxes, and voted by the regional council. Furthermore, the region should be given the right to create new taxes, a right which the local assemblies of France do not now have. In this respect, they are denied a prerogative which nearly every local assembly in the world enjoys. The problem of a regional budget is of the most extreme importance, because without financial independence from the central power, local self-government will be almost impossible.

This, the last proposition upon regionalism, presents many serious defects. First, it does not suppress the department; maintaining it with its present powers, it merely superimposes another unit of government—that of the region. The executive power of this region is vested in an appointee of the State. So far the bill appears only to add an additional complication, through which the Ministry of the Interior will be able to increase its interferences. Secondly, the composition of the Regional Council is disappointing; the councilors are not elected, as are the members of the general, arrondissement, and communal councils; but they are chosen by the general councils themselves. A very valuable opportunity has here been lost to increase popular participation in government. The powers of this Council are also open to criticism. Education has become a national function; and unity of language has with too

much difficulty been imposed to renounce this national charge. Social assistance is an affair of the commune; while public works, as local quarrels over roads and the needs of national railways, have shown, is also largely a national affair.[29] Finally, according to the terms of the bill, the Council is given no authority to impose its decisions upon the departments and the communes within it. Its powers would therefore be advisory. In sum, this bill does not introduce any effective innovation in decentralization and in self-government. Because of its compromises, it does not receive the support of the regionalists,[30] and naturally it is opposed by the opponents of the theory.

V

The principal objection to the adoption of regionalism is the same *bête noire* which haunts French politics generally—the fear of the destruction of national unity. As noted, this fear arises from profound historical causes. To empower regional assemblies with any amount of independence would open the temptation to destroy this unity. Such an argument is disapproved, however, by the fact that the strongest nationalist elements in France, the Orleanists and the *Ligue des Patriotes,* through Maurice Barrès, are ardent advocates of regionalism.

The strongest opponent of any measure of decentralization and especially of regionalism, is the French Government. Despite its changing composition, succeeding

[29] This statement does not apply to purely local undertakings such as tramway lines, power plants, etc., which there is every reason to believe a regional assembly could efficiently administer.

[30] For a more detailed account of the Regionalist Plan, see Jean Hennessy, *Régions de France* (1911-1916).

Governments jealously guard and attempt, openly or by stealth, to extend their absorbing and penetrating arms. Any attempt to deprive the central power of its strength, therefore, is bound to be unwelcome and to be bitterly and effectively opposed by the wide organization which the Government can muster against it.[31] Finally, innovation, involving the complete change of one institution of government for another, is much more difficult to accomplish than the reform of existing institutions. For these reasons, it may be that the movement for self-government in France will be satisfied with the extension of the powers of existing bodies. From the politi-

[31] The most recent defense, written in the light of the lessons of the past war, of the French administrative system as it now exists, is that given in the preface to the ninth edition of Maurice Hauriou's *Précis de Droit Administratif* (Librairie de la Société du Recueil Sirey, 1919).

M. Hauriou maintains that the existence of a highly centralized and bureaucratic Germany demands that France support a system equally strong. He believes that it was the system of centralization in France, Russia, and Italy, which succeeded in rapidly mobilizing military preparations and therefore preventing Germany from winning the war. It was the French system of centralization, he says, which enabled the French army to stand the first shocks of the war until the slower processes of English decentralization came to her aid. "If civilization was saved, it was by centralization."

He believes that it is impossible to maintain a permanent and mobile army along with a decentralized political and administrative system.

From the standpoint of interior problems, Professor Hauriou says that a strong centralized government is needed to cope with the forces now endeavoring to overthrow it. To prevent the control of the State by labor syndicates or by capitalistic trusts, "a strong centralized executive is necessary which will exercise a preventive action, thanks to the omnipotence of its police, and if necessary, by the direct participation in the enterprises which may be of public interest."

The teaching of the war has shown that there has been too much lack of coördination between the different ministries, and that what is really necessary is a new centralization which will unite the different heads of the public services into one coördinating body.

cal standpoint such a reform would be satisfactory; from the economic point of view, because of the artificial structure of the departments retained, it would be valueless.

Whatever direction this movement may take in France, whether it be in the adoption of regionalism or in the mere enlargement of departmental or communal powers, it is very likely that France will soon achieve some sort of administrative reform. The present system is a remnant of the Empire, based upon authority, clothed with stupid inefficiency, and inconsistent with a Republican régime. It is only through vigorous, local institutions of government that citizens can be rigidly trained in civic responsibilities. It is such an education which French democracy appears to need. Now accustomed to regard the Government as something foreign to them, many Frenchmen have lost interest in the maintenance of its spiritual integrity. Dependent upon it, on the other hand, for almost all of their economic needs, they regard every means of influencing it as legitimate. The extension of local, decentralized power and responsibility will do much toward overcoming this attitude.

CHAPTER XIII

WHAT THE FRENCH PEACE TERMS MIGHT HAVE BEEN

Chaque puissance cherche à regagner au moins quelque chose de ce qu'elle a perdu en empêchant une troisième de s'agrandir: tous les éléments politiques sont en combustion; et le dénouement final n'est attendu par personne.—METTERNICH.

I

The one enduring thought in the French mind throughout hostilities and one which remained dominant through every phase of the peace negotiations, was that terms should be imposed at the end of the war which would forever wipe out the menace of another German attack. A fear of Germany was the controlling impulse in the French heart. When the armistice was signed (the 11th of November, 1918) French opinion was definitely obliged to formulate the terms or "guarantees" embodying this security. It was quite natural that strategic considerations should suggest themselves as alone capable of supplying these guarantees. The precedents of history and the past policies of the enemies of France, motived more by a desire for aggrandizement than French impotence, were certain to affect her present statesmanship.

France remembers her history. She remembers those years of the Napoleonic tribulation which flanked her on all sides with hostile powers—the Low Countries, the German Confederation, a neutralized Switzerland, a

Legitimist Spain. She remembers how the Count of Artois was forced to evacuate fifty-three of her fortresses, leaving France to treat with her enemies at the Congress of Vienna wholly disarmed; and after Waterloo, those three long years of foreign occupation in which the Austrians, the Prussians, the Spaniards, came pouring into her departments across the Alps, the Rhine and the Pyrenees—a million and a half soldiers swarming over an already war-ridden country. Pillaged villages, prefects replaced by Allied governors, savings banks confiscated, arbitrary requisitions appropriating not only communal but individual wealth—these things, generations do not forget.

The Duke of Wellington, writing to Lord Castlereagh, expounded these principles of diplomacy as follows:

> The coalition has no reason to favor the French people; its sensibility is only a wounded vanity. It is more desirable, from a number of points of view, that the people of France, if they do not yet know that Europe is too strong for them, may be warned of the fact and that the *day of retribution must come.* Thus, according to me, it would not only be unjust for the sovereigns to favor the people of France on this subject at the expense of their own people, but the sacrifice would be impolitic, seeing that it would deprive them of the occasion of giving to the people of France a grand lesson in morality.[1]

France remembers 1870 even more vividly—not only the brutal origin of the war, not only Alsace-Lorraine, but the four months' siege of Paris, the occupation, and the indemnity. The exactions of the victor first exhibited themselves in the feverish haste in which France

[1] Quoted from Debidour, *Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe,* i, 79.

was compelled to sign a peace. The peace preliminaries which France was compelled to sign upon the 26th of February included one of the largest indemnities in history (5,000,000,000 francs) and the cession of Alsace-Lorraine—about 5,600 square miles of territory and 1,600,000 inhabitants. She had already been the victim of the dispatch at Ems, of ravaged departments, and of a besieged Paris. The people of her country were starving, and among nations she had no friends—Switzerland alone brought aid to her.[2]

Smarting under past oppression, especially from that heaped on her by Germany, it was but natural that the people of France should now demand retaliation in the spirit of revenge. To their credit, it must be said that such a spirit was considerably repressed, and that their demands were limited to reparation and to security. President Poincaré, at the first plenary session of the Peace Conference, upon January 18, 1919, ably expressed the nation's desires in these words:

> You search only justice and a justice which has no favorites. Justice in territorial problems, justice in financial problems, justice in economic problems. But justice is not inert, it does not take the part of injustice. It demands from the first, when it has been violated, restitutions and reparations for

[2] M. Thiers vividly described the effects of the War of 1870 on France in a speech on the 19th of February, 1871:

> "France, hurled into a war without a serious motive, without sufficient preparation, has seen half her territory invaded, her army destroyed, her fine organization shattered, her ancient and powerful unity compromised, her finances shaken, the greater part of her children torn from their labors to go and die on the battlefield; public order profoundly disturbed by a sudden apparition of anarchy, and after the forced surrender of Paris, the war suspended for a few days only, ready to break out again, if a Government enjoying the esteem of Europe, courageously accepting power, assuming responsibility for painful negotiations, does not arise to put an end to terrible calamities!" Hanotaux, *op. cit.*, i, 70.

the peoples and the individuals who have been despoiled or maltreated. In formulating this legitimate claim, it is obedient, neither to hatred nor to an instinctive and a thoughtless desire for reprisals; it pursues a double object: to render to each his due and to discourage the recurrence of crime, by punishment.

Justice still demands under the influence of the same sentiment, sanctions against culprits and efficacious guarantees against an offensive return of the spirit which perverted them, and it is logical in demanding that these guarantees be given, first of all, to the nation which has been and who still may be the most exposed to aggression or menace, who has many times risked submersion under the periodic wave of the same invasion. Justice excludes dreams of conquest and of imperialism, the disdain of national desires, the arbitrary exchange of provinces between States, as if their peoples were only property or pawns in the game.

Forty-eight years ago, day for day, the 18th of January, 1871, the German Empire was proclaimed by an army of invasion in the château of Versailles. It demanded the rape of two French provinces as its first consecration. It was thus vitiated in its very origin and carried in itself the germ of death; born in injustice, it has ended in opprobrium. You are assembled to repair the wrong which it has done and to prevent its return.

It was also to be expected that France would prevent, so far as possible, the "return" by the methods which Germany and other enemies of France had always used to render her powerless—by the measures which the "old diplomacy" invariably took to insure the gains of victory. So far as they were limited to guarantees there was nothing directly immoral about these means compared with the ends they attempted to serve; but their defect lay, as the world was gradually coming to see, in their impotency to bring about and to insure their original intention.

Despite the burdensome cost of the "old diplomacy,"

and the smoldering flames which it failed eventually to extinguish, no considerable element in France, at least until the entrance of America into the war, thought of any other means of inaugurating a peace, provided, of course, that the war ended in an Allied victory. Throughout the peace negotiations, French public opinion, in regarding territorial "guarantees" as absolutely essential to national existence, looked askance upon substitutions based on future uncertainty and untried by experience. Despite the defects of the old methods, there was some assurance at least of their temporary success; realism was preferable to ideology.

II

The guarantees which French public opinion desired, as reflected by several war ministries and by the press, were of a strategic and territorial character. The most advanced of these demands was that which called for the total dismemberment of the German Empire and its disintegration into the States from which it was originally constituted in 1866. The most insistent supporters of this drastic exaction, mildly corresponding to the Roman treatment of Carthage, were the royalist journal, *L'Action Française*, through the pen of Charles Maurras, and *Le Temps*, a representative of the grand bourgeoisie of France.

L'Action Française proclaimed this doctrine in these words:

> We have often declared ourselves as moderate annexationists. Above all we are hostile to the unity of the German Empire. . . . Our guarantee is the Rhine. But the Rhine in its turn must be guaranteed by the partition of Germany. We have never concealed the apprehension which the pure and

simple annexation of the left bank of the Rhine would leave in us, if upon the right flank of our conquests the great Germany of Bismarck and of William is allowed to exist. It is too clear that the immense magnet of a unified Germany, agitated by a spirit of revenge, will exercise an influence and an attraction upon the Rhenish provinces which will profoundly impede the action of the French spirit.[3]

There is no equitable basis for the German Empire, the argument proceeds; it was founded upon force and through the means of three wars of aggression. To dissolve it now would not institute a new wrong but repair an old one. As a practical step to enforce this dissolution, M. Maurras writes:

The Allies must in every case refuse to treat with the Empire,—with a unified Germany. They must only invite or admit to their audiences the states which composed the former Empire or which were framed from its débris.[4]

And this idea he developed to the extent of levying the indemnity, not upon the Empire, but upon its several States—such as Saxony and Bavaria.

The attitude of Charles Maurras and *Le Temps* toward the destruction of the German Empire finds a curious precedent in 1815—the only difference being that the object of destruction was France and not Germany. After the return of Napoleon from Elba, the governor-general of the Prussian provinces of the Rhine issued a proclamation on the 15th of April, 1815, part of which read as follows:

A country (France) so delivered up to anarchy and disorder would menace Europe with complete dissolution if every brave Teuton did not arm himself against it. . . . We must arm ourselves to-day *to divide this unholy ground* and indemnify ourselves by a fair partition of its provinces for

[3] Issue of April 3, 1919.
[4] *Ibid.*, April 5, 1919.

all of the sacrifices which we have made for twenty-five years in resisting its disorders.

At the same time the *Rhenish Mercury* wrote:

War must be declared on the whole nation and this depraved people must be outlawed. . . . The world cannot remain in peace so long as a French people exists; therefore they must be changed into peoples of Burgundy, Neustria, Aquitania, etc.; they will tear each other up among themselves; but the world will remain tranquil for centuries.[5]

Another advocate of the dismemberment of the German Empire is M. Yves Guyot. In his book, *The Causes and Consequences of the War*, M. Guyot, advocated the total dismemberment of Prussia, the German Empire, and Austria-Hungary. He insists that Prussia must be reduced to the old frontiers which she had before the partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795. The Rhine province and Westphalia must be declared autonomous. Saxony must recover the two fifths of her kingdom lost in 1815. Frankfort must return to the status of a free city. The annexation of Hanover, Brunswick, Hesse and Nassau must be declared null and void, since from the point of view of law, the Prussian Diet had no right to sanction it. With the kingdom of Saxony as a nucleus, M. Guyot would form a Central German confederation. He would form a second union of the Southern States, Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse, with the severed Prussian provinces of the Rhineland and Westphalia. M. Guyot's suggestions surpass for severity any of the Prussian proposals in regard to the dismemberment of France, made in 1814 and 1815. Other writers such as Maurice Barrès, G. Hanotaux, and M. Etienne, have considerable difficulty in

[5] Quoted from Debidour, *Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe*, i, 52, footnote.

disguising the sentiment which M. Guyot so boldly expresses.

The reasons for the demand of the dismemberment of the German Empire are not altogether political. Perhaps the greatest one of them is found in the increasing numerical inferiority of France compared with Germany —or in other words, the depopulation question.

The followin gtable will show the birth rate, death rate, and rate of natural increase of France and Germany from 1901 to 1912:

Year	France			Germany		
	Birth Rate	Death Rate	Natural Increase	Birth Rate	Death Rate	Nat. Increase
1901.....	22.0	20.1	1.9	35.7	20.6	15.1
1902.....	21.6	19.5	2.1	35.1	19.5	15.6
1903.....	21.1	19.3	1.8	33.9	19.9	14.0
1904.....	20.9	19.4	1.5	34.1	19.5	14.6
1905.....	20.6	19.6	1.0	33.0	19.8	13.2
1906.....	20.5	19.9	0.6	33.1	18.2	14.8
1907.....	19.7	20.2	−0.5	33.2	18.0	15.2
1908.....	20.1	18.9	1.2	32.0	18.0	14.0
1909.....	19.5	19.1	0.4	31.0	17.1	13.9
1910.....	19.6	17.8	1.8	29.8	16.2	13.6
1911.....	18.7	19.6	−0.9	28.6	17.3	11.3
1912.....	19.0	17.5	1.5	28.3	15.6	12.7
Mean rates	20.3	19.3	1.0	32.3	18.3	14.0

The marriage rate between the two nations was almost identical—8 per cent. Just before the war with Prussia in 1870 the French birth rate was 26 per cent; in the five years between 1911 and 1915 it averaged only 18.2 per cent. After the war it dropped still further.[6]

[6] See p. 150.

If French population remains stationary or even decreases annually, and if German population increases 11 per cent or 12 per cent a year, France soon will be hopelessly outdistanced. Just before the war Germany had nearly 70,000,000 inhabitants to about 40,000,000 of Frenchmen. Hence the fear of a still greater increase on the part of Germany has led to the demand for the break-up of the Empire.

A second demand of the old diplomacy was for the annexation of the left bank of the Rhine. To a nation whose safety reposes solely upon military prowess, unassisted by the procedure and the sanction which a League of Nations would supposedly provide, the question of strategic security, of frontiers guarding certain gateways of invasion, assumes a preëminent position. Such a consideration was one of the German excuses, indeed a veiled one, for the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine in 1871. It has been urged with more justice lately by Belgium in Limburg, by Poland in Danzig, and by Italy in the German Tyrol. To France the Rhine is a natural frontier the possession of which is the only certain guarantee against a German attack which she believes will come again if effective measures are not taken to prevent it. For this reason the annexation of the Rhenish provinces was urged by Generals Foch and Gouraud, the Royalists, such Conservatives as Charles Benoist, and perhaps the majority of the so-called Radical elements. Maurice Barrès, writing in *L'Echo de Paris,* attempted to soften the annexationist feature by arguing that the Germans inhabiting the left bank were not of German ilk, that originally they were nurtured by French culture, and that now they were eager to return under its influence. In his literary style of argument, M. Barrès quoted Victor Hugo as the original advocate

of the "return" of these provinces to France. At the end of the War of 1870 Hugo announced that France would achieve *la revanche* only when she had retaken, not only Lorraine and Alsace, but Trèves, Mainz, Coblenz, and "all the left bank of the Rhine which the German States took from France in 1815." As far back as 1838 Hugo wrote in the "Rhine": "France will only return to its normal form and to its necessary proportions . . . [when] it will have its portion of the Rhine and its natural frontiers."[7]

In a brochure distributed by the Nantes Committee for the Left Bank of the Rhine, some interesting demands are found. This pamphlet, scarcely daring to ask for complete annexation, which it admits is inconsistent with the ideals for which the war was presumably fought, asks:

1. That all the cis-Rhenish country, as far as the Holland frontier be taken from Germany for political, military and economic reasons;

2. That the military hegemony of France be exercised, either by its or Belgian garrisons, upon the principal fortresses on the Rhine, extending as far as its entry into Holland;

3. That the economic zone of France and of Belgium be extended to all of the cis-Rhenish country where it will be substituted for the German Zollverein.

How such a system, involving the alienation of the territory from Germany and the surrender of its military and economic control to France, differs from outright annexation, it is difficult to see.

Other Frenchmen who realized the boldness of such projects and the difficulty in carrying them out, advo-

[7] *Echo de Paris*, March 5, 1919.

cated the formation of a Rhenish republic, under French hegemony, to serve as a buffer state on which a German attack would first have to spend itself. The French Catholics were supposed to be advocates of such a republic which was to include the German territory occupied by the Allied troops, extending from Cleves on the north to Saarbrück and Landau on the south. This territory, including Westphalia, has a population of about 15,000,000 people, of whom about 8,000,000 are Catholics. The ecclesiastical element in these provinces supported by Catholic opinion in France, believed that its influence would be more effectively exercised in an independent republic where it would be numerically strongest, than under the German Government, where its influence was now neutralized. This combination of the religious and the military motives brought the demand for a Rhenish republic into considerable prominence in France. The separatist movements throughout Germany were given an exaggerated publicity by the French press; attempts to form republics in Bavaria and in the Palatinate were portrayed as completely successful when in reality they were purely local manifestations. In fact, there seemed to be cause for suspicion that many of these attempts were instigated by the French military authorities themselves.

History, however, lent some support to the French suggestion of a Rhenish Republic. Although these disputed provinces are now German in race and in culture, in times past they have been French in feeling. The Armies of the Revolution in September, 1792, penetrated these provinces under the leadership of Custine, who inspired them with the following principles:

The weight of our arms in the future must only strike those who abuse a confided power—despots and their satel-

lites. When we will carry the firebrands of war into a country, we will respect the liberty of the peaceful inhabitant: let none of our arms be dishonored in shedding the blood of an innocent citizen.[8]

Under the infection of the principles of the Revolution, the armies of Custine rapidly conquered the country, winning over Speyer, Mainz and Strassburg by the last of October. At Mainz, Custine again announced with fervent sincerity, the principles which led to the conquest:

> The war which we wage to-day, so different from those which have preceded it, is directed against all those who have betrayed the usage of conferred powers, and not against peoples. Your magistrates alone must support the ransom which is imposed upon your city; such is the will of the French nation.[9]

Shortly after the French occupation of Mainz the liberal element, following the example of the French clubs, organized a "Society of German Friends of Liberty and Equality." With the impetus which such an organization gave to the insurgent peoples of the Rhenish territory, and with the stimulus of the French revolutionaries in their midst, a wave of liberalism swept over the country, carrying with it not only the demand for separation from German suzerainty, but, as in the case of Mainz, for incorporation with the French Republic. Custine, accepting this invitation, established a provisional government upon the 19th of November, which consisted of ten members and which sat at Mainz.[10] In

[8] Quoted in *L'Europe Nouvelle,* February 8, 1919.
[9] *Ibid.*
[10] See Albert Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution Française,* Part III., "*La Guerre aux Rois,*" 97-114; also Part IV., "*Les Limites Naturelles,*" 159, 270, 301.

the winter of 1793 a Rhenish convention was held which, on the 18th of March, declared the forfeiture of its former sovereigns and the erection of all the territory between Landau and Bingen into a free and independent state, "which will obey common laws and which is founded upon liberty and equality." Three days later, however, because of the fear that Prussia and Austria were determined to prevent their withdrawal from the German Federation, the Assembly decreed the incorporation of the Rhenish-Germanic peoples in the French Republic. In the summer of 1793 Germany retook Mainz and the outlying provinces, insufficiently protected by the Republic, and (although the French do not urge the point) inadequately convinced of French superiority. A year later, however, the armies of Hoche and Championnet retook the territory with the exception of Mainz. Thenceforth the Republic worked to establish order, commerce, and industry in the provinces. The peace signed at Basel, April 5, 1795, with Prussia, virtually recognized the conquests of the Revolution by stating that the troops of the French Republic would continue to occupy the part of the states of the King of Prussia situated upon the left bank of the Rhine. The task before the Convention was the disposition of this country, either by the erection of a cis-Rhenish republic or by its incorporation with France. The latter seemed to have prevailed, except for the intrigues of the King of Prussia who forestalled actual annexation. However, in August, 1796, he signed a secret convention by which he consented to the cession of these provinces in compensation for the incorporation of certain ecclesiastical principalities in his kingdom. The Directory, now at the head of the French Republic, inaugurated an autonomous government and divided the provinces into

six districts, each locally administered. Liberty of the press was reëstablished and the University of Bonn was reopened. Fear of losing the provinces altogether because of the increasing strength of Prussia caused General Hoche to create a cis-Rhenish republic, a move which aroused considerable opposition. After the *coup d'état* of the 4th of September, 1797, the Directory instructed the General not to form a Rhenish republic unable to sustain itself, but rather to secure its prompt reunion with the Republic. This task was accomplished by General Augereau, General Hoche's successor; and in the last of December, Mainz was taken from the Germans, their last hold across the Rhine. The entire Rhenish country was again in the bosom of France. From 1802 to 1814 France slowly overcame whatever opposition its inhabitants had to its new guardian; and thus for a period of eighteen years (1796-1814) the Rhenish provinces were virtually under French tutelage, either as a Republic or as a part of the Revolutionary conquests of France. When Napoleon was finally defeated and peace made, the Rhinelands were divided among Prussia, Hesse-Darmstadt and Bavaria. Despite the burdens which the Empire had imposed upon them, their separation from France, according to such men as Maurice Barrès, was accompanied with a lasting attachment to French institutions and culture which they still secretly cherish.

Whether or not this Gallophile sentiment in the Rhenish provinces can be revived to such an extent as to lead to the erection of a Rhenish republic or to the union of the provinces with France is a question. Its decision, however, involves a great deal more than the mere redrawing of maps by the Peace Conference. The people of the provinces themselves should be the judge

of their destinies, unaffected by French armies or propoganda.

The fourth strategic guarantee which the old diplomacy desired was the annexation of the valley of the Saar. This valley, lying north of Alsace and Lorraine, contains about seven hundred square miles of territory; two thirds of it lies in Rhenish Prussia, one third in German Lorraine, and a very small portion in the Palatinate. Saarlouis, on its eastern edge, and Saarbrück, on its western edge, delimit its extension along the Lorraine frontier.

The historical claim to this territory on the part of France goes back to 1552 when Henry II united the three bishopries of the region to his crown, the possession of which was confirmed in the treaty of Münster. In the treaty of Ryswick, Louis XIV surrendered a good portion of this territory to the German count of Nassau-Saarbrück; but in reality, the French assert, the entire territory was under French culture and was virtually a French fief until the Congress of Vienna. After 1789, the feudal attachments of the Saar district to Germany were broken, and it became a part of the Republic. Although agriculture was the chief occupation of the Saariens, the exploitation of its coal fields rapidly developed under the Republic. In 1796, 456 quintaux[11] were extracted; twelve years later, this production had tripled. Napoleon, realizing the vital importance of such an industry, distributed coal concessions in 1808 to sixty arrondissements, created a school of mines at Geislautern, and caused the compilation of a magnificent atlas of sixty-six maps, containing well-ordered plans of exploitation. The first treaty of Paris

[11] Quintal, a hundredweight.

of May 31, 1814, still included the cantons of Saarlouis and Saarbrück, until the Nied, within the frontiers of France. But after the Hundred Days and Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo, Prussia, with the determination to ruin France, demanded that it be deprived of one sixth of its territory and be forced to pay an indemnity of 600,000,000. Only a portion of its desires were carried out, and in the treaties of November 20, 1815, Saarlouis was given to Prussia while Landau and the former department of the Saar fell to the lot of Austria. The historic claim to this area, therefore, is largely based on a Revolutionary conquest, a claim which, if pressed, would extend to the Netherlands, Spain and Italy.

The economic arguments in favor of the annexation of the Saar were the most tenable of those advanced. The first of these arguments was the increased military and industrial strength the coal fields of the Saar would give to France. The second was that the Saar coal was necessary for the profitable exploitation of Alsatian industry and its iron mines. The third was that the indemnity could partly be paid by the cession of the district to France at its capitalized value.

One of the strongest elements in German military strength was its self-sufficiency in raw materials, especially in coal. Comparatively, its strength in terms of resources, was as follows:

	Tons
Germany	433,000,000,000
Great Britain	189,000,000,000
Russia	60,000,000,000
Austria-Hungary	59,000,000,000
France	18,000,000,000
Belgium	11,000,000,000

From the military standpoint, then, any measure depriving Germany of a portion of this immense supply of

coal, over twice that of Great Britain, was looked upon as legitimate by the old diplomacy. The weakening of German resources meant the weakening of her power to carry on a prolonged conflict.

Before the war France produced 40,800,000 tons and consumed 64,800,000 tons of coal, necessitating the annual importation of 24,000,000 tons. In 1915 this latter figure increased to 40,000,000; in 1916, to 42,000,000; and in 1917 to 47,000,000. On account of the destruction of the mines in the North of France and because of the demands of the industry of Alsace and Lorraine, it is estimated that the annual coal deficit in the future will be about 40,000,000 tons. At a price of ten dollars a ton this will burden the French balance of trade, to the extent of $400,000,000 a year. Soaked as it is with the protectionist idea, the French bureaucracy is alarmed at such a prospect.

As to the second point, Alsace and Lorraine had again become French provinces, dependent industrially and politically upon France. Their steel manufactures and their industries generally, which were of the greatest strength, had formerly been supplied with German coal,[12] coming largely from the basin of the Saar. Coal was necessary to the industrial life of these provinces; but if it now had to come from French mines, the industries of these provinces would become a drain upon the French coal supply and industry generally. If France did not get the source of the former Alsatian coal supply along with the provinces, the value of their return to the mother country would be frittered away. The sentimental feature of the Alsace-Lorraine ques-

[12] See articles by Louis de Launay in *La Revue des Deux Mondes*, July 15, 1919, and Nov. 1, 1919, on "*La valeur minière et industrielle de l'Alsace-Lorraine.*"

tion was of course predominant; but perhaps the economic factor was of as much elementary importance. To the French business man, Alsace-Lorraine was a poor investment without the Saar to make it profitable.

Finally, the annexation of this basin was urged as a restitution in kind, of material which Germany had destroyed. Annex the territory, capitalize its value, and deduct it from the sum total of the indemnity charge—such was the most reasonable argument urged for the annexation. Germany was a debtor, unable to meet her obligations. Like an individual in similar circumstances, why could not her property be attached to meet these obligations? National bankruptcy followed by national liquidation was the remedy proposed. The fact that the Prussian Government itself was the owner of most of the mines of the Saar lent color to the argument.

As to the resources of the Saar basin, estimates vary from 45,500,000,000 to 53,515,000,000 tons.[13]

In 1913 there were 80 shafts in operation in the basin from which the following amounts were produced:

	Tons.
In the Prussian part of the district	12,406,523
In the Lorraine part of the district	3,795,932
Bavarian (Palatinate)	810,546
Total production of district in 1913	17,013,001

Of the 17,000,000 tons of coal which the Saar valley annually produces, it itself consumes 7,850,000 tons; leaving about 9,000,000 tons for disposal elsewhere.

[13] Authorities differ on the amount of coal in the Saar. Although Deschen estimates the reserves as amounting to 45,500,000,000 tons (see the *American Review of Reviews*, March, 1919, 313), the German Peace Delegation in their comments on the Peace Treaty placed the amount at only 11,000,000,000 tons.

Considering solely these tonnage figures, this surplus would supply the 7,200,000 tons of coal which Alsace and Lorraine need in addition to what they themselves produce. It would constitute about a fifth of the amount which France would otherwise have to import.

On the other hand, the quality of the Saar coal is mediocre. It contains a great deal of volatile matter, it is lower in heating value than the coal in northern France, and it is not particularly adapted for use in the iron industry where its employment in Alsace-Lorraine is especially needed.[14] The Prussian Government operates twenty-seven mines in this district and it is barely able to make operating expenses. In the fiscal year of 1913-1914 its expenditures upon the mines amounted to 93,899,200 marks and its receipts 104,110,438. Under these conditions, whether or not these mines would be of distinct profit to French industry, is questionable; while the disjuncture of 50,000,000,000 tons of coal resources from the military standpoint would not affect materially the 433,000,000,000 tons which Germany possesses. However, the addition of such a resource to the 18,000,000,000 which France now has would bring its coal supply up to that of Russia and what was formerly Austria-Hungary. In other words, the coal basin of the Saar would increase by three times the present coal resources of France. The possibility of such an increase was naturally looked upon with covetous eyes, although the quality of the coal itself was of an inferior character, the mining of which, under the

[14] It is very significant that the French censor refused to allow the French editor of the New York *Herald*, Pierre Veber, or *L'Europe Nouvelle*, to print these facts about the inferiority of the Saar coal. It was only after their revelation in the Chamber of Deputies, near the close of the Peace Conference, that they became generally known.

French bureaucracy, would undoubtedly be a profitless enterprise.

The one outstanding argument against the annexation of the Saar, was that it would to a smaller extent repeat the German seizure of Alsace-Lorraine. The Saar basin is an integral part of the German Empire. The elections of the German Republic were held in this region in January, 1919, and such a large vote was cast for the Centrist, the Social Democratic, and Democratic parties, that there is no reason whatever to believe that the Saar wishes to be detached from Germany. Ordinarily, the old diplomacy would not attempt to protect the right of self-determination, if the higher principle of strategic or economic security stood in the way. But because of the nominal acceptance of this principle, French opinion tried to square it with their desires by alleging that the population, of the Trèves region at least, which contained only about 650,000 people in 1913, was too small to make the principle applicable. Of these, they said, only about 200,000 or 300,000 were German miners, while the greater part of the population was of a cosmopolitan character—Poles, Lorrainers and colonials. The directors and the engineers of the mines, being employed by the Prussian Government, would naturally withdraw upon French occupation; and within twenty years, so the argument goes, France would have the valley cleared of German sympathizers, and merged morally and economically into French Lorraine.[15] Although there is little question that France,

[15] The German answer to this French argument is given in the "Comments by the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace," under "Territorial Questions":

There is no industrial district in Germany whose population is as homogeneous, as purely German, and as little "complex" as that of the Saar district. Among the 650,000 inhabitants there

if given the opportunity, will soon rid this basin of its German tinge, the argument is certainly not to the point, so far as Germany's desire to win back the province is concerned.[16]

III

As to the immediate question of the disarmament of Germany, the old did not differ materially from the

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were in 1918 not even 100 French. For more than 1,000 years (since the treaty of Meersen, in the year 870) the Saar district has been German. Temporary occupations, brought about by enterprises of war on the part of France, always terminated at the conclusion of peace, after a short lapse of time, in the restitution of the country. In a period stretching over 1,048 years France has possessed the country no longer than sixty-eight years. When, in fixing the frontier in the first Peace of Paris, 1814, a small part of the territory now claimed was retained by France, the people rose in protest and demanded "reunion with their German Fatherland," with which they were "related" by bonds of "language, customs and religion." After an occupation of one and one-quarter years' duration, this demand was satisfied in the second Peace of Paris, 1815. Since then the country has been attached to Germany uninterruptedly and owes to this connection its economic prosperity.

[16] That the Allies had actually agreed upon the major features of the demands of the Old Diplomacy, above outlined, is shown by the following secret telegram from the Russian Foreign Minister to the Russian Ambassador in Paris, from the 30th of January to the 12th of February, 1917:

"At an Imperial audience M. Doumergue (French Ambassador in Petrograd) informed His Majesty the Emperor of France's wish to assure herself of the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine after the conclusion of the war, and also of a special position in the Saar valley, and to bring about the detachment from Germany of the territories west of the Rhine and their reorganization in such a way that in future the Rhine may form a permanent strategic obstacle to any German advance. . . ."

In a secret telegram of the Russian Foreign Minister to the Russian Ambassador in Paris, the 9th of March, 1916, Russia "agreed to leave to France and England full freedom to fix the western frontiers of Germany. . . ."

From the correspondence published by the Bolshevist Government, in November, 1917; reprinted by the *New Europe*, November 29, 1917, supplement.

new diplomacy. The disarmament of nations is an ideal to be striven for and is the essential element of peace. But the old idea was not universal disarmament; it was the complete reduction of German armament and the maintenance, if not the increase, of Allied armament; or, in other words, the permanent maintenance of German inferiority by Allied superiority. The French feeling upon this subject expressed itself in a resolution which was signed by 223 French Deputies. It was unanimously approved by the Chamber Committees on the Army and on Foreign Affairs, and presented by M. Raynaud after the Conference decision as to German disarmament, to the President of the Chamber upon the 4th of April. The resolution, expressing great discontent with the Conference decision, invited the Government to insist at the Peace Conference "that Germany must conserve neither army nor military organization, nor armaments of any sort, and that there ought only to be maintained in each of the German states, forces of police necessary to maintain internal order." This resolution was not voted upon, because M. Deschanel, the President of the Chamber, ruled it unconstitutional on the grounds that the President of the Republic alone carried on treaty negotiations. But it represented, except perhaps for the Socialists, the unanimous opinion of the Chamber.[17]

The French apprehension as to the spirit and intent of the new German Republic was aroused by the voting,

[17] During the ratification debate on the Treaty in the French Chamber, in September, 1919, André Lefèvre introduced a motion, to be attached as a rider to the Treaty of Versailles, calling for the complete disarmament of Germany, in view of its present intentions to evade Allied orders and to rebuild her military system. The day after the Treaty was ratified, his motion was withdrawn (October 3d) for one "inviting the Government to

in the latter part of April, 1919, of a law by the Weimar Assembly, reorganizing the German army. The preamble of this law read as follows: "The organization of the future army in time of peace depends upon the conditions of peace and the Constitution of the German State. Because of technical difficulties, the incorporation of conscripts cannot be constituted with certainty. This is why it is necessary to recur to volunteers in a period of transition." This preamble apparently indicated the German desire to restore its army eventually, and it gave French opinion greater cause than ever to demand the complete destruction of the German military system.

Finally, the Older Diplomats demanded an alliance between the present Allies to enforce these and other terms imposed upon Germany with the simple intent of keeping it in a state of subjection. Through this alliance Germany would be kept perpetually impotent, forever unable to threaten the peace and liberties of the world. If it should be bold enough to cross the Rhine again, even to win back the cis-Rhenish provinces, this alliance would immediately, through armaments increased by the past war and maintained since it, force it back to the confines which the Peace Treaty had delimited. To insure the economic subjection of Germany, this alliance would do everything possible, by discriminating tariffs and boycotts, to keep it out of the markets of

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reach an understanding with the Allied and Associated powers with a view of the execution of the measures rendering the disarmament of Germany and her Allies effective by the interdiction of certain manufactures of war and other necessary measures." Nominal reconciliation of this motion with the plan for universal disarmament was secured by the adoption of an amendment, inserted after the word "powers," "in agreement with President Wilson who should convoke a conference under the provisions of the covenant of the League of Nations."

the world. This determination, the Inter-Allied Economic Conference in Paris, 1916, very forcibly exposed.

These conceptions of a peace were part of what the French called the *Victoire Intégrale*. To sum them up, they included, on the part of the extremists, the disintegration of the German Empire; on the part of the more moderate, the annexation of the left bank of the Rhine, or the creation of a cis-Rhenish republic, and if both of these did not materialize, at least, the annexation of the valley of the Saar; the total reduction of German armament; and finally, the erection of a permanent alliance among the present Allies.

There was very little of imperialism or aggression about such a peace. France is not imperialistic; she desires no conquests for the sake of conquest. But the principle of reparation and of security is superior, in her mind, to that of self-determination. Even the matter of the Saar cannot be looked upon as a mere desire to increase resources at the ruthless expense of the defeated. When considered in the light of the terrible suffering and material ruin which France was compelled by Germany to undergo, the mines of this basin, from the standpoint of reparation, belong to France. In justice to her, it must be said that she does not dream of "Mitteleuropa."

A peace of the Old Diplomacy might not have been reprehensible. In fact, its purpose was commendable, the difficulty being that the means did not always bring the desired result. Such a peace, embodying strategic and economic superiority of the Allies over Germany, was the only one to expect from European powers. Backed by generations of the bitterest rivalry and schooled in realist philosophies, they still cherish its thought even after their nominal acceptance of the

League of Nations idea, occasioned by America's entry into the war. The European code was of distant origin, and tradition was with it. Europe was not convinced, and it is still unconvinced many months after the 28th of June, 1919, that an American settlement is superior. Time may prove that Europe is right. But at any rate the Old Diplomacy had centuries of failures behind it; and the League of Nations idea remained the only untried surcease of international conflict.

IV

Generally speaking, the Old Diplomacy is based on the assumption of national antagonism—the antithesis of national interests. To guard against the effects of this conflict of desires, national security has become the principal object of diplomacy. To insure it, the principles of protected markets, strategic frontiers, military power and alliances—all swallowed up in that obscurism of the Balance of Power, have been assiduously practiced.

Unfortunately, national antagonisms are always bound to exist. However, to irritate them, to assume their continual predominance, to fan them into war whenever one nation feels strong enough to wage it, was the result, if not the intent, of the Old Diplomacy.

Furthermore, the means which it employed of protecting national security not only proved ineffective but violated certain definite principles. The attempt to secure economic superiority through protected markets, when carried to the point of discriminating against one nation in favor of another, led to the worst form of economic exploitation of subject peoples and to the exaggeration of national rivalries. Although it resulted in

quasi-complete economic independence, so dear to the Elder Statesmen in time of war, the theory was false so far as commercial advantage was concerned and its practice led to the grossest form of economic imperialism. Strategic frontiers justified the annexation of any territory, especially if supported by historic and economic arguments. Historic arguments, particularly their present abuses, have been used to justify the worst robberies. Most of them have their source in epochs where possession was to the strongest and people were pawns, moved upon a board of forced treaties and balanced armaments. Economic demands were absolutely unjustifiable when they violated the will of peoples and when they could only be executed by forced appropriation. Furthermore, and of more practical importance, strategic frontiers were ineffective and relative. Their acquisition by the nation against whom they were directed was a natural desire. Their maintenance, as well as that of national superiority, involved armaments, conscription and fortifications, the weight of which was overwhelming.

Military power was also a comparative power, subject to international competition, and thus bound to become increasingly burdensome. Alliances and the Balance of Power idea arose from the combined advantages which a number of friendly nations gave against a common enemy. Alliances arose for a definite protection or a definite aggression. But when one alliance became strong enough to subjugate another, the misuse or the fear of the misuse of its power, subsequent to disagreement among its members, led to its regrouping, and the composition of an opposing alliance able, either potentially or directly, to control the first. Every alliance in the

world's history has been marked by this changing, shifting process. Its formation was to guarantee static things; but the forces of the world and the interests of nations were, and are, dynamic. They changed; interests which were mutual became conflicting; and an alliance offered no means of adjusting the evolution. When this disintegration, these "diplomatic revolutions," occurred, they were usually followed, sometimes very distantly, by war. If the change itself did not thus result, the new organisms—two sets of comparative strengths—inevitably clashed. Their reason for existence was not only the opposition but the superiority of the one over the other. In the feverish race for supremacy all of their members were engulfed in this hopeless circle. The security resulting from it was at the most relative; its uncertainty and its temporariness made it no security at all. And despite this offsetting of national strengths in which the Balance of Power resulted, somebody was sure sooner or later to tip the scales and to throw the world into another mêlée of disaster.

The German Empire was the supreme embodiment of these principles. But in addition to the mere desire for security, it had designs of aggression for its own sake. The Old Diplomacy could be exercised for the one purpose as well as for the other. But at the same time, it so hopelessly interwove the maintenance of security with measures of aggression that the two motives were scarcely distinguishable. In the great number of cases, under the Balance of Power régime, security meant aggression. As such it not only was morally objectionable but physically unable to endure.

In the particular case of the French demands for the disintegration of the German Empire, and the annexa-

tion of the left bank of the Rhine, including the Saar, morally they would have violated the clearly recognized right of peoples to govern themselves. With the French installed on the Rhine, Germany would have exactly the same motive of antagonism against France as France has had against Germany since 1870. To overcome the fear of a German attack, would have involved the maintenance of armies which no people was in the mood of sustaining and which France, unsupported, was incapable of sustaining. The same competitive basis—that of keeping Germany in a state of inferiority and France in a state of superiority—would have been reverted to. Perhaps it could be done; but without the help of the Allies, it was impossible. This made an alliance a necessity. But to an alliance framed especially in the face of the legitimate desire of Germany to unite to herself purely Germanic peoples, the United States certainly would not have been a party. Such an alliance would have been a Holy Alliance to maintain an unholy *status quo.* Although the French Peace Delegation came to see that the help of England and the United States was more to be desired than the left bank of the Rhine, it is very strange that French opinion should still prefer the latter to the former.

In regard to German disarmament, it may be said that history teaches a sad lesson as to the attempts of one nation to enforce disarmament upon another. On the 8th of September, 1808, Prince William of Prussia signed at Paris the famous "Articles Séparés," the first of which read as follows: "His Majesty the King of Prussia, wishing to avoid everything that may give umbrage to France, undertakes the engagement of maintaining for ten years, beginning January 1, 1809, only

the number of troops specified below."[18] This specification comprised 22,000 infantrymen, 8,000 cavalry, 6,000 artillerymen, sappers, etc., 6,000 of the King's guardsmen—a total of 42,000 men. This provision was overcome by Prussia through the creation, under the clever supervision of Scharnhorst, of a militia deprived of all visible connection with the permanent army, and maintained supposedly for interior order, but which, by repeated military exercise, was capable of serving as a reserve army in case of the outbreak of war.[19] Although Napoleon interfered with the training of such a militia, Prussia again evaded the law by instructing soldiers for a few months, then returning them to their homes, after which others came to take their places in the ranks of the permanent army. Thus a large body of reserves was built up. To deceive French inspectors, regiments would leave part of their men in the barracks when the inspectors went on the drill field. As a result of this deception, instead of the 42,000 men Prussia was supposed to have, she had a trained body of 150,000, the worth of which the armies of Blücher upon the fields of Waterloo ably demonstrated.

Although armaments in modern warfare are singularly more difficult to conceal than those of the Napoleonic epoch, what is gained in national superiority from this fact is more than overcome by the rapidity with which armies at present act, and with which munitions can be produced. The disarmament of Germany presents the same problem to-day as it did in the Napo-

[18] Quoted in *Le Temps*, March 2, 1919.

[19] For the evasions of this agreement by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, see Treitschke's *History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century* (English translation), i, 336-347.

leonic era. It means the establishment of an Allied espionage in Germany which she will bitterly resent and assiduously deceive, especially when she knows that the Allies are increasing their own armaments.

The difficulty of enforcement of disarmament was apparent within six months after the signature of the Treaty of Versailles,[20] and it constituted the first, practical difficulty in the way of the Old Diplomacy's solution. A second objection against the continued maintenance of French and Allied armaments in the face of a supposedly prostrate Germany, was a moral one. For the maintenance of such a force is quite likely to arouse a desire of conquest on the part of the occupying troops, even though masked under another name. As a practical example, French opinion ardently desires the left bank of the Rhine. If the Old Diplomacy has its way, inspired as it is by the example of the Roumanians in Budapest and the Italians in Fiume, it is very probable that France will annex the Rhenish provinces which her troops already hold, and even take over other parts of Germany. The probability of such a move is increased by the helplessness which the Allies have attempted to enforce upon Germany. It is also increased by America's reaction against participation in European affairs. France, no doubt, is not consciously plotting this annexation; she has no official desires of imperialism; but the arousal of such a spirit is always to be feared when one nation becomes predominantly powerful and especially when hitherto what it regards as "legitimate" desires have been thwarted.

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[20] See an article, entitled "*Le Désarmement de l'Allemagne,*" by André Tardieu, in *L'Illustration*, for February 28, 1920, for the extent to which the Allies have thus far succeeded in disarming Germany.

IV

Such were the dangers which the devices of the Old Diplomacy involved. They not only were morally questionable but, and because of it, they were eventually ineffective. The League of Nations idea theoretically induced the European powers to consider the guarantees which it substituted. It promised France reparation and security; it, however, rejected in theory the annexation of territory in distinct violation of the will of the people inhabiting it. It desired partial German disarmament; but after the Treaty had been complied with, it demanded the disarmament of all nations as the only sure means of removing the pretense for any one nation to arm. In place of war as a settlement of international disputes, it substituted compulsory arbitration. To compel the enforcement of the decision of such an arbitration and to prevent attacks of one nation upon another, it offered an international military force.

To what extent the League of Nations idea was incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles, how far it was successful in defeating the demands of the Old Diplomacy, and why French opinion was dissatisfied with the character of the League as established, will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XIV

THE FRENCH CONCEPTION OF A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Pendant longtemps encore, l'idéal aura besoin de gros canons.—JOSEPH BARTHÉLEMY.

I

French opinion upon the League of Nations—official as well as popular—underwent a remarkable evolution during the war. M. Clemenceau's blunt characterization of the idea as "a myth" was later repudiated by his open support of a commission of French publicists, charged with designing a draft of League organization.[1] Political parties, notably the Unified Radicals and the

[1] Senator Léon Bourgeois, the French representative at The Hague Conferences, and a former Prime Minister, was chairman of this commission.

The sincerity of M. Clemenceau's change of heart may be judged from the following extract of one of his early speeches as Prime Minister:

"I have been asked to explain myself in regard to war aims, and as to the idea of a League of Nations. I have replied in my declaration, 'We must conquer for the sake of justice.' That is clear. We live in a time when words have great power, but they have not the power to set free. The word 'justice' is as old as mankind. Do you imagine that the formula of a League of Nations is going to solve everything?

"There is a committee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs even now preparing a scheme for a League of Nations. Among its members are the most authoritative exponents of international law. I undertake that immediately their labors are finished I will table the outcome of it in this Chamber, if I am still Prime Minister—which does not seem likely." Quoted in Hyndman, *Clemenceau, the Man and his Time*, 325.

Unified Socialists, urged the League's creation; entirely unofficial societies sprang up to propagate the idea; finally the press, although without any great enthusiasm, it is true, came to acknowledge its inevitability. The great force behind these outward manifestations was the inchoate belief of the French common people that the old policy of Balance of Power had egregiously failed and that in a League of Nations lay the only hope for future peace.

The extent to which public opinion had forced M. Clemenceau from his original position was illustrated by his remarks at the second plenary session of the Peace Conference, on January 25th, 1919. At that time, he said:

> At the time of the armistice the five powers had altogether 12,000,000 men under arms on the battlefield. Their dead can be counted by millions. If the idea, that great notion of the League of Nations, was not above the whole of our work here, it would have been possible for us, the five great powers, to consult only ourselves in the settlement. That would have been, after all, our right. Well, that has never been our thought. We have asked the nations interested in the settlement to meet us. We have asked them to give us their co-operation and their help.
>
> As for myself, I have come here ready to sacrifice many of my opinions in order to conciliate, in order to reach the conclusions we all wish for, and I have already made sacrifices, and I have done it with joy, for the great common cause which unites us here. I hope we will all be inspired by the same spirit.

It was in accordance indeed with this spirit that the Conference adopted a resolution setting forth the principles which were to govern its debates: (1) It is essential to the maintenance of the world settlement, which the Associated Nations are now met to establish, that

a League of Nations be created to promote international coöperation, to insure the fulfillment of accepted international obligations, and to provide safeguards against war. (2) The League should be treated as an integral part of the general Treaty and should be open to every civilized nation which can be relied upon to promote its objects. (3) The members of the League should meet periodically and they should have a permanent organization and secretariat to carry on the business of the League.

Thus, at the outset, the Conference pledged itself to the creation of a treaty based upon principle. It decided, further, that the League and such a treaty were absolutely inseparable; without the one the other could not exist. If peace alone were made—omitting the guarantee of the League—it would necessarily assume the forms of the Old Diplomacy. There were only two choices: Security by means of the League, or security through the discredited policy of Balance of Power. To postpone the creation of the first would have been to institute a peace dependent on the latter.

As in the United States, a strong element in France clamored for an immediate treaty with Germany, leaving the formation of the League of Nations until later. But most of those who took this stand appeared to be enemies of the principle of the League, either because of their imperialism, their avowed hatred for Germany, or a natural lack of confidence in the League guarantees. They did not dare to demand openly the rejection of the League; so they argued for its postponement. It is noteworthy that those who believed whole-heartedly in the League, were in favor of its integral inclusion in the Treaty.

II

The French conception of the League of Nations, as revealed by the press and public utterances during the peace negotiations, was on the whole a very practical one. It was not so much concerned with the methods of organization of the League as with what it desired to see it accomplish. The first test of the League's reality was a financial one. Originally, in the hot enthusiasm of victory, French opinion demanded the exaction of an indemnity from Germany which should compensate not only for the damage done to civilian life and property, but also for the entire expense to which France had been put in waging the war. In some instances, demands were heard for the return of the indemnity of 1871. But gradually it dawned upon French economists that these sums represented a figure so enormous that, even if Germany could conceivably pay, a century or more of annuities would be required. To place such a burden upon the old Empire would probably force her into total insolvency. Moreover, to maintain a threatening trusteeship over the German people for an indefinite period, from the standpoint of a return to normal international relations, threatened a further political disaster.[2]

In addition to Germany's inability to pay, the indemnity was limited for a theoretical reason—a principle

[2] The Treaty of Versailles, Part VIII, Art. 232, recognized Germany's inability to pay, as follows: "The Allied and Associated Governments recognize that the resources of Germany are not adequate, after taking into account permanent diminutions of such resources which will result from other provisions of the present treaty, to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage."

which favored remitting the direct cost of carrying on a war, because such exactions, if fastened on a defeated power, would but encourage nations to aggression, their people being given the hope that victory would compensate for every sacrifice. In other words, it was felt that the formula must be laid down that war profits no nation. In the case of France, the demand for the payment of war charges was thoroughly legitimate because she had not been the aggressor. But the Conference obviously feared to establish a precedent which might encourage future aggressions.[3]

Principle, and Germany's ability to pay, therefore, limited the amount of the French indemnity to the reparation of civilian damage. With the recognition of this fact, only one conclusion could be reached—Germany could be counted on to pay France only a fraction of the damages she had inflicted. In plain figures, this meant that France had to face with her own resources, a national debt of $30,000,000,000, and a budgetary deficit for 1919 of at least $4,000,000,000.[4] During the four years of the war the French Government had expended $34,000,000,000 in military expense alone, i. e., munitions and army supplies. The damage to the dev-

[3] The exclusion of an indemnity covering direct war charges was implied in the note of Secretary of State Lansing to the German Government, of November 4, 1918: "In the conditions of peace laid down in his address to Congress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed. The Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian populations of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air."

[4] The precarious financial situation in France was partly occasioned by the questionable policy followed of raising funds by loans instead of by taxation. See Appendix B, "French Taxation During the War."

astated regions amounted to $15,000,000,000 at least. For the latter sum, France could expect indemnification; for the former, more than twice as large, she must renounce all hopes of compensation.

The realization of this precarious situation came not without a natural bitterness. Must this great burden whose payment it is impossible to exact from Germany be borne by France alone? Or will the Allies jointly assume it? Will the League of Nations prove its worth by taking the debt over? To the practical-minded Frenchmen, this question was the first test of the genuineness and the efficacy of the new Society of States. It was also a test of the sincerity of the assertion repeatedly made by her Allies that France had "saved the world."

This point of view was expressed in an editorial in *Le Petit Parisien:*

> The world has placed its hope, it may be said, its faith, in the League of Nations. . . . But it does not suffice that a League of Nations shall superimpose upon its component States a permanent Arbitral Court, that it control their armaments and even certain of their productions. The war has set forth problems which each country, taken alone, will be practically powerless to solve but which the world collectively may settle with relative ease. . . . One of the grave questions of the present and the future is the financial question. It rose suddenly before us and our Allies on the morning of the armistice. Every one foresaw its difficulties, and realized that the liquidation of the charges contracted during the years of struggle could not be dealt with by transitory expedients. . . . No one seriously contests that Germany and her allies must pay the most possible . . . but it is recognized that Germany and her allies, whatever measures they may take, will be unable to bear the whole burden. It is for the liquidation of the balance that the League of Nations must intervene.
>
> What will this balance be? We do not know. But the

principle which must inevitably be followed is clear: The nations which have united around Belgium, Serbia, and France, have contracted themselves in a life-long pact. If one of them had defaulted during the first or in the last six months of the war, the Central Powers would have attained their ends. If in the future, one of them (the Allies) should be financially or economically wiped out, the League of Nations must lose in prestige as a protecting remedy. Men, ships, food, and railways have been put in common usage. It is essential that the charges shall also be placed in a joint account; otherwise the people who have consented to the greatest sacrifice in the common cause will be the ones most surely destined in the future to a definite collapse. By economic disaster they would atone for the heroism which they have displayed in the service of universal liberty.[5]

Similarly, M. Antonin Dubost, President of the Senate, said:

The League of Nations can alone become the basis of an international financial organization capable of meeting the burdensome charges (of the war). By any other means, the task appears hardly surmountable.[6]

In the course of a remarkable speech before the Senate, M. Ribot, former President of the Council, declared:

We have suffered more than any one else. . . . But because our country has been the theater of the war, because this struggle has been fought upon our soil, must they (the Allies) leave us alone to support all the consequences of the war, and to face the uncertainty of German payment? No, I say that this is an injustice! My conclusion is that the expenses of reparations and the expenses of pensions as well must be placed in common. . . . The debt must be supported not by ourselves alone, nor yet in proportion to our sufferings and

[5] Issue of March 7, 1919.
[6] At a meeting of the General Council of the Isère, held at Grenoble, April 28, 1919.

our sacrifices, but in proportion to the resources of each. That is what justice demands.[7]

An interesting plan for a financial section of the League of Nations was laid before the Chamber of Deputies in February. This called for the creation among the Allied powers of a Financial League of Nations which would divide among them, proportionately to their populations and to their respective contributing power, the fiscal charges necessary to cover the expenses caused by the war. These charges, which amounted, according to the Deputy, M. Jacques Stern, who introduced the measure, to over $100,000,000,000 would be cared for by a common fund, underwritten by the members of the League. To assume this debt, international bonds would be issued, upon which each member of the League would be obliged to pay his share of interest and amortization charges. Subscribers to national war loans, etc., would exchange their bonds for this new, international security, collectively guaranteed. The share of each nation would have to be determined by its ability to pay and not by its share in the debt. If a nation should fail to meet its payments upon this international debt, it would have to surrender to the League of Nations a pledge—such as its tariff receipts or railways—to be internationally operated until the debt be paid.

The Stern project was not received with a great deal of favor in France, first, because it did not provide for the exaction of an indemnity from Germany; second, because it made no provision for the division of debts according to war losses.

A more detailed project was carefully worked out

[7] Upon May 30, 1919, several weeks after the Treaty had been presented to Germany.

in a brochure by M. Marcel Bouilloux-Lafont, entitled: "An Essay upon the Economic and Financial Rôle of the Society of Nations." The settlement of the indemnity, according to him, should follow these principles:

1. Distribute the payment over a period long enough so that the operation may be materially possible.
2. In addition to payments in gold and restitutions in kind, place an indemnity, of say 300,000,000,000, upon the enemy nations, for the payment of damages caused to civilians.
3. Place the surplus of the war expenses upon the League of Nations, to be paid in the form of annuities.
4. Create an international bank of issue which should be created to issue the financial instruments necessary to the work of liquidation, to make the necessary advances to participant countries, and to be supplied with resources allowing it to pay off the debt in from fifty to seventy years.
5. Create a tariff union among nations, which, by the application of a minimum, an ordinary, and a "penalty" tariff upon goods of a defaulting nation, may enforce international obligations.

As an example of the method of operation of such a system, France, whose war expenses the writer estimated at $30,000,000,000, would receive:

1. Nine billion dollars in international bills from the international bank, six billion of which would be paid to the Bank of France, as security for French paper issues.
2. Nine billions in international bonds, seven billions of which would offset the bonds of the "National Defense" and consequently lighten the annual interest charge.
3. Twelve billions would be paid by the international bank in the form of annuities, with 4½ per cent interest, plus the amortization rate, to run for a maximum period of seventy years.

In this way, the $30,000,000,000 which France could not exact from Germany, would be paid in seventy years through her own and international aid.

To supply the resources for this novel bank, the writer would institute a series of international taxes: (1) a tax on land, sea or air transportation of .01 franc or its equivalent, upon each kilometric ton of merchandise transported upon any railway among the associated nations; (2) a tax on passenger travel of 1 per cent; (3) a tax of half a franc (10 cents) upon each ton of shipping entering a port of one of the associated nations; (4) a special surtax on importation or exportation of 1 per cent ad valorem; (5) a special tax on the production of alcohol, sugar, opium, iron, wheat, cotton, petroleum, rice, coffee, copper, wines, wool, coal, tobacco, tea, beer, and silk; (6) a special surtax upon telegraphic, telephone, and radio communications of 1 per cent; (7) a tax of .001 franc per kilowatt hour produced in every electrical establishment.

The intended effect of the assumption of the war debt by the League of Nations would be to relieve France of a burden which she felt was disproportionately large and to place a share of this load upon nations who had not suffered to the same extent but who had profited as greatly from her sacrifice. This meant that the share of the United States would be greatly increased. Such a result and that of the general apportionment of war debts was worked out by Professor Charles Gide, the eminent economist. According to the table given such a division would relieve France of a yearly charge of over 4,000,000 francs or 63 per cent of her present burden; it would relieve Italy of over half, or 57 per cent, and Great Britain of 21 per cent. On the other hand, it would increase the United States' annual charges from 7,500,000,000 to 16,000,000,000 francs ($3,000,000,000), an increase of over 100 per cent.[8]

[8] *Revue d'Economie Politique*, January-February, 1918.

GIDE'S APPORTIONMENT OF WAR DEBTS

	War Expenses	Annual Interest Charges	Yearly Income	Proportional Share of Interest Charge
	milliards frs.	milliards frs.	milliards frs.	milliards frs.
France.....	130	7.8	33	2.9
British Empire	180	9	80	7.1
Italy.....	50	3	15	1.3
United States..	150	7.5	180	16
	510	27.3	308	27.3

Although it is certain that the French Peace Delegation urged some such plan of division of war indebtedness, the Peace Treaty omitted all reference to it. Consequently, the general financial provisions of the Treaty were disappointing to the French.

Although the principle was laid down that compensation might be exacted from Germany for damage to persons injured from acts of war, cruelty, and violence; for the capitalized cost of pensions, for allowances paid by the Allied Governments to families of soldiers during the war, and for damage to property, excepting naval and military works and materials, it did not definitely state what the amount of the indemnity would be or when it would be paid. The Treaty merely said that the amount of this damage for which compensation was to be paid by Germany should be determined by an Inter-Allied commission, to be called the Reparation Commission.[9] This Commission on or before May 1, 1921, should notify the German Government of the extent of its obligations; and payments were to be made in the form of annuities for a period of thirty years, beginning

[9] Treaty of Versailles, Article 233.

with the 1st of May, 1921. In other words, France was obliged to wait until 1921 before receiving anything definite in the way of reparation, while her territories must, necessarily to her very existence, be immediately restored. It is true that the Treaty provided for a payment of 20,000,000,000 marks during 1919, 1920, and the first four months of 1921. But out of this sum the expenses of the armies of occupation subsequent to the armistice of the 11th of November, 1918, must first be met,[10] in addition to that of the supplies of food and raw materials advanced by the Allies to Germany. It was quite apparent that this deduction would largely consume the 20,000,000,000 marks. To the French public, this priority even appeared to be little more than a guarantee that the British and American merchants, indirectly supplying the armies of occupation and the material advanced to Germany, would receive first payment. They could not understand why their own devastated regions had not been given first consideration.

Another inconsistency concerned the German annuities. Starting in 1921, they were to run for thirty years; but the Allied Army of Occupation, the only guarantee of payment, was to be withdrawn in fifteen years (except upon the express decision of the League of Nations to the contrary) when probably not more than half of the indemnity would have been paid.

These financial defects might have been pardoned if

[10] *Ibid*, Article 235. Twenty billion marks gold bearer bonds, payable not later than May 1, 1921, without interest, were also to be issued, toward the amortization of which the above sum of 20,000,000,000 marks was to be applied after deduction had been made for the reimbursement of the expenses of the armies of occupation and for payment of foodstuffs, etc., advanced by the Allies to Germany. See Treaty of Versailles, Article 244, Annex II, 12, c (1).

the Conference had granted what the French considered the most important of all their financial requests: the assumption of the actual war expenses of the Allies by the League of Nations. Of these charges,—the most formidable item in the French debt,—the Treaty made no mention whatsoever; while absolving Germany from its payment, it substituted no other policy of liquidation in its place. The brunt of this overwhelming debt now lay upon France alone. The world had praised her for the heroic sacrifices she had made, yet now refused to help heal her wounds. *Qui payera? La France!* This was the mournfully reiterated commentary upon the whole Treaty document.[11]

The request of France for financial help—according to newspaper announcements made during the first week of March, 1919—was definitely refused by the American Peace Delegation. It is not yet publicly known why and in what form this refusal was made. To acquiesce in this burden, which assuredly would fall the heaviest on the United States, was a grave measure of policy. The American delegates took their stand probably because the proposed measure would increase hostility to

[11] *L'Europe Nouvelle,* May 17, 1919, thus protested against the financial provisions of the Treaty: "The financial stipulations of the Treaty will cause . . . an immense deception throughout the whole of France. They place the entire country before a formidable uncertainty. They constitute, in our opinion, the most flagrant injustice. . . . The stupid error, the unpardonable error, of our negotiators has been not to lay down as the basis of all negotiations, the financial settlement of the war, the distribution of the expenses of the war by a pro rata of efforts, of human capital sacrificed and of effective capacities of production. . . . The adoption of this equitable and fair principle alone . . . can permit the establishment of a just and durable peace. . . . Victorious by its arms, radiant in glory and set in the purest halo made from sacrifice and from the obscure devotion of millions of heroes, France will be controlled in the future by the markets of London and New York. Is it for this that we have fought?"

the League in the United States to such an extent that the whole idea would be defeated. Whatever the reason, the refusal to reimburse France for what she considered a common sacrifice aroused the first suspicion among League supporters of the impotency of the League as created and of the insincerity of the Allies. It was this suspicion, growing into a firm conviction, which caused the obstinate exaggeration of other demands by France.

III

In addition to the financial test, the French public weighed the value of the League of Nations by the guarantees it offered for future peace as compared with those furnished by the policies of the so-called "Old Diplomacy." French hatred of Germany naturally affected its conception of a League of Nations. France believes that Germany will always be her enemy and that she will always meditate a fresh attack. Even M. Clemenceau was indiscreet enough to declare publicly last February that the armistice was "only a lull in the storm." The French attitude, the intensity of which cannot be overemphasized, was completely justified by the past conduct of its adversary, by the hideous conduct of the war and by German breaches of faith during the armistice. The establishment of a republic did not appear to alter German character. The sinking of the German fleet at Scapa Flow, the destruction of the French flags taken in 1870, and the brutal attacks upon Poland at the very time of the signing of the peace, all reënforced the French belief that something more than a treaty must be drawn up. Sure and positive means of enforcing its provisions must be provided.

It was this instinctive fear of Germany and the open distrust of its word which led France to insist upon its exclusion from the League, at least until such a time (as Article VII of the Covenant draft expressed it) when Germany "is able to give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations." From the French standpoint, this policy of exclusion, and the belief that Germany must be kept in a state of constant surveillance, was perhaps justified. From the standpoint of the success of a League of Nations, it is more difficult to defend. Several times during the course of the war, the creation of a League among the Allied belligerents had been urged. President Wilson demonstrated the error of this argument when he said: "The League of Nations . . . cannot be formed now [during the progress of the war]. If formed now, it would be merely a new alliance confined to the nations associated against a common enemy." [12] To succeed, a League must be composed of the entire world and be designed as an instrument of peace.

But although the formation of the League was deferred for this very reason until after the war, the logic of the argument was not carried out. Germany and the other enemy powers were excluded—only temporarily, it is true.

But when they are eventually taken in, they will always resent the League and suspect it of being a combination of the present Allies to keep them in permanent subjection. In short, the League as established, was little more than an alliance—which if stronger than any predecessor, possessed little more than the essential elements of an alliance, i.e., one group of nations joined

[12] Speech at New York, September 27, 1918.

together against another.[13] With this entering wedge, the way was opened for the perpetuation of the old system of partial alliances and the Balance of Power. These principles were implicitly recognized in the Treaty, although subject to certain limitations.[14] The alliance between England, America and France was an example of this inconsistency.[15] The League may work without Germany, but it cannot hope to be successful so long as it maintains an unofficially hostile attitude toward a considerable portion of Europe.

In addition to excluding Germany from the League, the French attitude insisted upon her disarmament and military subjection. In general terms, the French demanded that a compulsory sanction reënforce the desire of the League to maintain the peace of the world. Although the Treaty provided for the disarmament of all nations, no certain assurance was given of this policy being carried out. Article VIII of the Treaty spoke only of "the full and frank exchange of information" as to military and naval programs. Article IX specified that a permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council upon the execution of the provision of Article VIII and on military and naval questions generally. This commission was given no adequate powers of investigation or of enforcement. Although for a period of fifteen years the Allies are to maintain an army in Germany enforcing disarmament, thereafter no means

[13] In the same speech the President said, "There can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations. . . . Special alliances and economic rivalries and hostilities have been the prolific source in the modern world of the plans and passions that produce war."

[14] See Articles 18, 19, and 20, Treaty of Versailles.

[15] See discussion of this alliance, pp. 462, 463.

of knowing whether or not Germany is re-arming or not, is provided. A nation's word, especially Germany's word, France did not regard as sufficient. Upon the matter of disarmament, she urged the creation of a commission vested with inquisitorial powers to determine whether the leagued nations were keeping their promises. An amendment to this effect was unsuccessfully urged before the Commission on the League of Nations by the French delegation. At the second plenary session of the Conference, at which the draft was presented, M. Bourgeois, the French member of the commission, said:

> In order to assure the execution of international sentences, there must be a limitation of armaments. . . . The nations who are the contracting parties of the covenant pledge themselves mutually to communicate to each other full information about their armaments and their means of production. This is a very good plan, with which I am particularly satisfied. At the same time, I proposed an amendment which I think I ought to mention; I thought that it would be necessary to institute a permanent organization for purposes of inspection, but this amendment was not embodied in the text. We have accepted the text, as it is before you, and if we now mention the amendment, it is because, as the whole scheme is going to be discussed by the world, it is better that all the points that have given occasion to important observations should be mentioned.

The rejection of this amendment was another indication to the French of the weakness of the League as created. A more vital weakness was the total absence from the Covenant of provisions for a military force of international composition to give a sanction to the League's decision or in plain terms, capable of preventing immediately or even anticipating the attack of one nation upon another. Article XII of the Treaty provided that disputes between members of the League should be

submitted to arbitration before resorting to war, or to inquiry by the Executive Council; and that any disputant should not go to war until three months after the award of the arbitrator or until a recommendation by the Council had been made; and (Article XIII) that not even then would the disputants resort to war against a member of the League which complied with the decision. Article XVI provided that violation of these provisions would be considered as an act of war against all other members of the League, who would immediately sever all trade and financial relations with the offending State, thus placing it in a state of economic isolation. The article further said:

> It shall be the duty of the council in such a case to recommend to the several Governments what effective military, naval or air force the members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

This word "recommend"—in the light of French experience—was not very reassuring. Moreover, the article did not even state whether or not the member-States were obliged to accept the Council's recommendation. It even implied that they were not. There was nothing certain laid down concerning contributions. In fact, this article, the most important in the whole covenant, from the French standpoint—one which was supposed to substitute the securities of the League for those of the Old Diplomacy—was quite unsatisfactory. French security from the German menace was an affair of vital importance, yet what did the proposed League put forward to meet this concrete situation? Even if the nations were obliged to make contributions to an armed force, who would enforce this obligation? It obviously

reposed on international good faith. But nations have broken faith; not only Germany, but others. If it were not a matter of abiding faith, it might become one of "interpretation." And while nations were deciding whether or not to send quotas, or even while they were engaged in raising and sending them, the damage would be done. France did not wish again to stand waiting through two desperate years until England made ready, or three years until America joined the lists. To relieve this uncertainty the French delegation wanted to endow the League with an international military force, directed independently of national quotas and policies, suppressing aggression as quickly as a fire department extinguishes a local blaze. Moreover, it was only the assurance of such a force which would convince France of the League's reality.

Senator Bourgeois stated the French view on this subject at the session of the Conference, on February 14th, in these words:

> Here is a point. Take a State which violates the International Covenant. That State is supposed to be in a state of war against all the members of the League, and all are prepared to execute its obligations. But war is not something that can proceed at once, especially when the question is how to bring together forces belonging to States which are very different from each other and may be at the four corners of the world. Each people will have to wait in order to act, in order that the procedure has been gone through, in order that for each particular nation a vote may be taken by its parliament, and so on. This means time and delay.
>
> And supposing that there is on the part of the aggressor a will of precipitating a situation, then we must provide for the possibility. For this purpose it would be desirable to have all the means of resistance studied, and concerted action prepared before the occasion arises. This would be the best check against all ill designs. If the would-be aggressor knows that

the resistance is fully prepared against any action like the one he anticipates, then he will be constrained.

On the contrary, if he knows that no such preparation exists and that a sudden action on his part would encounter no prepared and well-thought-out resistance, perhaps he would not be restrained and it would be extremely dangerous. If we do not wish to see the terrible ordeal that the world has passed through renewed in the future, we ought to have a permanent organization to prepare the military and naval means of execution, and make them ready in case of emergency.

This has been objected to by some members of the Committee because it involved some difficult constitutional problems. This is why we agreed to the text without that amendment, but we think the principle of that proposed amendment ought to be put before public opinion at the same time as the scheme that we have agreed to.

The rejection of this amendment was the greatest blow of all to the French confidence in the guarantees of the League.[16] It gave the conservatives fresh ammunition for their attack on its principle and on the Fourteen Points; while those who believed in the ideal had their faith in the form of its application considerably weakened.

Thus Jacques Bainville, after the publication of the draft, wrote:

There can be no real League of Nations without a firm engagement to come to the help of an attacked adherent. There can be no engagement of this kind without the principle of obligatory intervention being solemnly established. There can be no possible intervention without armies ready to make it effective. But under the proposed plan, each in case of appeal will remain free to discuss its military participation. Thus through concessions made in order to assure its

[16] See an article on "French Ideals and the Covenant," by Léon Bourgeois, *London Times* (French number) of September 6, 1919.

existence, the League of Nations has to deprive itself of its most essential element.

L'Echo de Paris, commenting in a similar manner, wrote as follows:

We are thus forced to conclude that the twenty-six articles do not bring us real security. As long as they are not changed, we can by no means sacrifice to them our means of defense.

Upon another occasion this same paper wrote:

All the amendments capable of giving to the League bone, muscles, and nerves, especially the French amendments, have found little mercy in the eyes of those two great doctrinaires, Wilson and Robert Cecil. The control of armaments? Useless. An Inter-Allied Staff? Superfluous. . . . Truly, the constitution of the League is in harmony with its program, the spectacle of which we have admired for three months. The theory is worth the practice.

La France Libre, a Socialist paper, also said:

To constitute the Society or League of Nations—the word matters little provided we have the thing—to impose compulsory arbitration and to create an international police force strong enough to make Law and Justice prevail,—such ought to be the program of reason and of humanity inspiring the peace plenipotentiaries.

It must be admitted that there was some merit in the French conception. If the League of Nations was to be anything more than another Hague Tribunal, it must necessarily contain some elements of force. If its purpose is to establish compulsory arbitration, it is obliged to include the means of making arbitral decisions compulsory. The French amendments gave life and blood to the League; they aimed at establishing definite sanctions and ones to be respected.

It is generally believed that the American Peace Delegation was responsible for the defeat of all the French suggestions, financial as well as military. Although the members of the delegation itself were doubtless in favor of them with certain modifications, it appeared that the Republican opposition in America would completely kill the entire League if it embodied such definite and precise responsibilities. This seems to be one of the explanations for the creation of a vague and unorganized Covenant.

This Republican opposition to the League of Nations was the final factor in the French suspicion of its value. The results of the November elections, returning Republican majorities, naturally led many Frenchmen to believe that a treaty of peace embodying a League would be rejected by the American Senate. Consequently a reliance upon the guarantees of a League, whose very existence was in question, as a substitute for the security which the territorial exactions of the Old Diplomacy offered was something which no Frenchman could countenance.

IV

Reverting now to the effect the principles of the League of Nations had on the French peace demands, it may be said that they resulted in the rejection of the Rhenish frontier; they compromised the Saar question and German disarmament; but they met defeat almost completely in the matter of the Anglo-French-American Alliance.

As a temporary substitute for the Rhine frontier, the Treaty provided that Germany would not "maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of

the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn fifty kilometers to the east of the Rhine."[17] This provision the League Council was to enforce. The execution of the Treaty was further assured by the Allied occupation of the German territory west of the Rhine, together with its bridge-heads, for a period of fifteen years.

The temporary occupation of the Rhine has been vigorously attacked by so-called "liberals" as being as inconsistent with the Fourteen Points and the League of Nations idea as the annexation of the Rhenish provinces to France would be. It is said that this policy means the physical subjection of Germany to the Allies, resulting not in the restoration of international friendship but in the continuance of a hostility which sooner or later must again violently express itself. Although this may be the result, it is difficult to see how it could be otherwise, even under the ægis of a vigorously constituted League of Nations. Germany has been the immediate cause of an international conflagration, the damage of which she was under the deepest retributive obligation to repair. Like any other culprit, there was no reason to believe that she would voluntarily, or without the fear of compulsion, submit to her sentence. The maintenance of a police force upon the Rhine, under the direction of a League of Nations or of a given number of Allied powers, until the obligations of Germany had been complied with, was a practical necessity, despite its moral objections. It has been urged that the duration of this occupation and the charges placed upon Germany which the occupation was to enforce, were both onerous and impossible. But this can hardly be

[17] Treaty of Versailles, Article 42.

said of the indemnity feature, the amount of which was left to the determination of the Reparations Commission, and whose provisions in fact completely relieved Germany of the Allied war expense. Although the economic clauses of the Treaty seemed to impose great hardships, it must be remembered that France, especially, has suffered hardships which Germany can never repair. To pervert the Fourteen Points so as to absolve Germany completely from the criminal responsibility of starting and of continuing the war, and even to prevent all retribution for such a responsibility is an error which can only encourage future aggressions. The punishing of wrong-doing is no injustice; in fact, the absolution of impenitent wrong-doers is a perversion of justice. The League of Nations indeed aims at the prevention of international crime, but it would fall short of this purpose if it neglected to punish severely its commission.

Although the occupation of the Rhenish provinces does not necessarily conflict with the principles of the League of Nations, the solution of the Saar controversy is more difficult to defend. According to the Treaty, and "as compensation for the destruction of the coal mines in the north of France and as part payment toward the total reparation."[18] Germany ceded to France the full ownership of the coal mines of the Saar basin. To avoid the appearance of violating the will of the population of the district, it is to be governed by a Commission of the League of Nations, consisting of five members, one French, one a native of the Saar, and three others representing different countries other than France and Germany. After fifteen years a plebiscite will be held by communes to determine whether the

[18] Treaty of Versailles, Article 45.

population wishes to continue under the régime of the League of Nations, or to unite with either France or Germany. In any portion of the district which may be restored to Germany, the latter Government must buy out the French mines at an appraised valuation. And if Germany does buy back the mines, the League will decide how much of the coal shall be annually sold to France.

Although the French demand for annexation of the Saar was rejected—as a violation of the principle of self-determination—the compromise appeared so fictitiously veiled to *L'Humanité,* the Socialist organ, that it was moved to write:

> The partisans of a peace of violence and of rape must be satisfied by the proceedings of the last session of the Council of Four. Only economic advantages are to be conceded to the French capitalists for the exploitation of the basin of the Saar. Some "administrative rights" will permit the French Government to exercise a "control" over the basin which is to become a "State analogous to Luxemburg." And it is already announced that the French military authorities have arrested in this region, Germans accused of being at the same time Nationals and Bolsheviki. The French army takes up the rôle played by the Prussian soldiery in their treatment of the people of Alsace-Lorraine, this time against a German population. What an infamy! The bourgeois press pretends that M. Clemenceau has French opinion behind him. We are certain that (censored)[19] will not be deceived by this impudent falsehood. They know, on the contrary, that the real French people, those who work and those who have fought, protest with indignation against a policy unworthy of our great country. The "khaki" deputies of Lloyd George are exerting pressure on the English Government to obtain a peace entirely opposed to Wilsonian principles. The Franklin Bouillons of our Palais Bourbon lead the same campaign in France and Clemenceau serves them at his best.

[19] Probably the Americans.

These gentlemen may triumph at the Quai d'Orsay. But we will again tell them that their peace will not be ratified by the people,—that the representatives of the working class will not vote for it.[20]

A friendly neutral, whose opinion carries more weight than that of *L'Humanité*, likewise wrote:

France at present offers the spectacle of a man who loses his prey for its shadow. In order to have the Saar, it has given up the help of President Wilson and its intimacy with England; it follows a policy whose ultimate consequences will be to throw Austria and Italy back into the arms of Germany and at the same time it prepares for itself a splendid isolation in Europe. It is again committing, in another manner, the disastrous fault of the Napoleons.[21]

The possession of the Saar, from the standpoint of security, did not appear necessary. The seizure of its coal, from the standpoint of reparation, was perhaps justified; but there seemed to be scant reason why the Treaty did not stipulate that Germany annually deliver to France the amount and the quality of coal which the latter herself wanted to take from the Saar.[22]

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[20] Issue of April 11, 1919.

[21] William Martin, in *Le Journal de Genève*, Switzerland, March 19, 1919.

[22] The principle of restitution of coal, directly by Germany and irrespective of French ownership of the mines from which it is to come, is recognized in two places of the Treaty. Chapter III, section 37, of the Annex of Part III, of the Treaty (the provisions governing the Saar), states that if the inhabitants of the Saar at the end of fifteen years vote to return to Germany, and after Germany buys back the mines from France, "the French State and French nationals shall have the right to purchase such amount of coal of the Saar Basin as their industrial and domestic needs are found at that time to require."

The principle is more directly admitted in Article II, Annex V of Part VIII, on Reparation which states that "Germany undertakes to deliver to France 7,000,000 tons of coal per year for ten years. In addition, Germany undertakes to deliver to France annually for a period not exceeding ten years an amount

Such a solution would satisfy the French claim for indemnity, but leave inviolate the principle involved. An Inter-Allied Commission to govern the district is certainly a poor sop to the self-determination theory. It will be noted that a German representative upon the Commission is carefully excluded, except the one "native of the Saar" whose vote is hopelessly outweighed by four foreign delegates. There is little assurance that the district will be governed any differently than if it had been annexed outright by France. Germany, at least for fifteen years, will be inspired by the same desire, although perhaps of less intensity, to win back this district, which so strongly animated France from 1871 to 1918 with respect to Alsace-Lorraine. The irritation remains, and with it an always threatened peace.[23].

The compromises upon the question of German disarmament, as affected by the League theory, followed two lines: First, the treaty did not provide for the complete disarmament of Germany; and second, it pro-

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of coal equal to the difference between the annual production before the war of the coal mines of the Nord and Pas de Calais, destroyed as a result of the war, and the production of the mines of the same area during the years in question." If Germany is to make such a restitution, it is not apparent why the amount of coal which France is to derive from the Saar by way of reparation could not be delivered to her in a similar manner, freed from the questionable foreign ownership of the Saar mines which the Treaty imposes.

[23] The justification of the Saar settlement, considered in the light of other Treaty provisions, was that other nations were urging and virtually obtaining territory to which they did not have as much claim as France. France felt that her interests alone, among the Allies, were being sacrificed to the principle of self-determination. Although one wrong does not justify another, there was much to be said on this point. The chief thing against it, made while France was urging the point, particularly before the settlement of other territorial questions, was that the establishment of such a precedent would lead other nations to increase unjustified demands.

vided for the disarmament of all nations after Germany had been partially disarmed. But even so, the provisions as to disarmament went farther than the French General Staff estimate of an army of 200,000 or the American estimate of an army of 400,000, advised. The Treaty provided for: (1) the reduction of the German army to 100,000 men; (2) the dispersal of the German General Staff, the number of its officers being limited to 4,000; (3) the recruiting of the German army (conscription being abolished) in terms of twelve consecutive years, the number of discharges before the expiration of that term not to exceed in any year five per cent of the total effectives, an arrangement designed to prevent the accumulation of reserves; (4) the dismantling of all of Germany's fortifications within a fifty-kilometer zone on the east bank of the Rhine, as well as on the west, within three months; (5) the closing of its munitions factories, with some specific exceptions, and the dismissal of their personnel.[24]

The purpose of the policy of limited disarmament was to make possible its more rigid enforcement, for as the experience of history had taught, this could not be accomplished if the complete elimination of armed forces was attempted. It was believed that Germany would have less incentive to avoid the stipulation of the Treaty if she was allowed an army large enough for police purposes.

The second principle foreshadowed by the Treaty and the League theory was the eventual disarmament of *all* nations. But this could not be contemplated until Germany had made amends and indicated an earnest intention never again to upset the world's peace. But

[24] Treaty of Versailles, Section I, Part V, Articles 159-213.

at the same time, the theory implied that the world never could return to a normal basis so long as the Allies kept Germany in a state of disarmament while they themselves kept up great establishments purposely to subdue Germany. Such was the policy of Pertinax and *L'Action Française*. The disarmament of all nations was not only essential to the peace of the world, but it was the only thing which would lead Germany to disarm willingly. The immediate fear of Germany, however, predominated in the Treaty over the desire for eventual peace. Instead of working out a definite scheme for universal disarmament, the Treaty aims were again compromised by the old idea of a necessary German inferiority. Thus the following article reads:

> The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.
>
> The Council, taking account of the geographical situations and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for effecting such a reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments. . . . After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limit of armaments then fixed shall not be exceeded without the occurrence of the council.[25]

Disarmament therefore became a matter for each Government to decide; and no obligation was imposed on the respective members. It is certain that if one power refuses, other powers, however fervently they may desire and believe in universal disarmament, will hardly dare to subject themselves to the military predominance of the objecting power.[26]

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[25] Treaty of Versailles, Article 8.

[26] Although France particularly has cause to object to disarmament before Germany has fulfilled her Treaty obligations, there are

The final compromise of the difficult questions arising at the Peace Conference was found in an alliance between England, France, and the United States, the purpose of which was the immediate support of France in case of an unprovoked German attack. From the standpoint of the League theory, as President Wilson pointed out in his speech at the Metropolitan Opera House, such an alliance could not be justified. The alliance was based on perpetuated international suspicion. In fact, its preamble stated: "The United States of America and the Government of the French Republic apprehend that the stipulations concerning the left bank of the Rhine cannot assure immediately to France, on the one hand, and to the United States, on the other, as signatory powers to the Treaty of Versailles, appropriate security and protection."

This certainly implied the probability of attack, if the alliance were not created to deter it. From one standpoint, this alliance might be placed in the same category of necessity as the military occupation of the Rhine; that is, if it were temporary and if it were terminated with the fulfillment of the Treaty obligations. But on consideration it becomes evident that this alliance vitally differed from the military occupation. First, its existence was not limited—as was the occupation—to fifteen years; and secondly, it definitely reëstablished

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at least two indications that certain elements demand relief from the burdens of militarism. Thus the Radical Congress, July 26, 1919, voted for the abolition of the three-year military service law and the gradual reduction of disarmament in view of the securities offered by the League of Nations. But the Radical party before the war opposed the three-year law, and this decision may not indicate any changed opinion. But the military bill introduced in the Senate, and discussed in September, 1919, called for the substitution of a one-year period in place of the present three-year period, in view of the League securities.

the old idea of a Concert of Nations and the Balance of Power. As noted previously, the French insistence upon Germany's exclusion from the League provided a precedent which was logically followed by an alliance, though a defensive one, against Germany. There seemed to be no reason why the protection offered by the alliance did not extend to Belgium; or why Italy and Japan were excluded from its membership, that is, if it was to exist at all. But why indeed did it not become a universal alliance against universal offenders? Why should it not include every member of the League of Nations, each bound to move against every member or non-member of the League who insisted upon upsetting the peace of the world?

The answer to all of these inconsistencies within the League of Nations Covenant and the Treaty is quite evident.[27] It lay in the French skepticism with respect to the guarantees offered by the League. In other words, France might have been willing to surrender the guarantees, economic and military, which the Saar settlement and the Alliance gave her, if a League of Nations had been constituted with real force and sanction, compelling the arbitration of disputes, and preventing un-

[27] The real inconsistencies of the Peace Treaty and the Fourteen Points did not so much come with the terms arising from the French demands for territory and the Alliance. They came in the Central and Eastern European settlement, where the self-determination principle was frequently violated, to prevent the future growth of a strong Germany. These latter terms, as seen in the prevention of German Austria's union with Germany, were inspired by the French peace delegation, to enact a strategic substitute for that which the League failed to provide. Incidentally, it may be said that the Conference, by pitifully reducing Austria to nearly an economic and political nonentity, gave it the strongest possible incentive for union with Germany, an event which though it temporarily may have thwarted, will eventually and inevitably assert itself. At least, that is the teaching of Alsace-Lorraine and of Poland.

warranted attacks by means of an international police force. If a League policy had been adopted which would have assumed, to a partial extent, France's war indebtedness, she doubtless would have easily relented in the matter of the Saar. This is not to absolve France from a hopeless attachment to a "European" settlement, but it is merely to point out that the construction of a vigorous League of Nations, invested with a sanction to enforce its will, would have gone a long way toward loosing that attachment. The failure to establish such a League led to the insistence upon the old devices of frontiers and alliances.[28]

The success of the League idea in securing the repudiation of the Rhine frontier and the outright annexation of the Saar was bitterly resented by the French public. The Alliance might be an equivalent security, it was argued; but there was no assurance that England or America, through their legislative bodies, would support such an arrangement. Frenchmen had no reason to believe that the United States Senate would ratify the Alliance, which imposes so many more definite obligations than the League upon America, any more than it would ratify a League of Nations.[29] Furthermore, if the Alliance did become effective, what would insure British or American adherence to it fifty years hence? Good faith, they argued, was not as satisfying a security as the incorporation and garrisoning of the Rhinelands by France. This idea was repeatedly expressed during the debate on ratification, not only by the Royalists, but by

[28] On January 19, 1919, *L'Echo de Paris* wrote: "For us French, there is only one means of appreciating the worth of the Leagues of Nations which are proposed to us. In what ways do they assure our security on the Rhine, the most exposed region in the world?"

[29] See pp. 173, 174.

such conservatives as Charles Benoist. Even after the ratification of the Treaty by the French Chamber on October 2, Maurice Barrès explained, to a carefully attentive audience (October 3), a plan for the French colonization of the Rhinelands, virtually amounting to annexation.[30]

It is easy to maintain that even if the French idea of a League of Nations had been incorporated in the Covenant, there would have been a demand for the guarantees of the Old Diplomacy. But it is equally reasonable, however, to believe that they would neither have been so insistent nor so universal. The League of Nations, as finally constituted, was considered by French opinion as lacking the most essential elements of strength. It came not as a substitution for, but in addition to, the old principles of the Balance of Power. The important thing to be noted, however, is that the theory of the League was finally accepted—along with the principles embodied in the Fourteen Points. The League was born. If it is properly protected during its infancy, the jealous guardians of the Balance of Power may not be successful in killing it off, as they are now bent on doing. The critical stage is already at hand.

The responsibility for the failure to provide the League of Nations with the security upon which France justly insisted was largely due to the American Peace Delegation. Although doubtless favorable to a structure of the French design (as pointed out), fear of op-

[30] In the course of his address he said: "We ask that every measure be taken to associate more intimately the Rhinelands with France through commerce, through ways of communication, through coördination of railway tariffs, through a program of public works, through banking and coöperative institutions, and through the coördination of labor and social laws. To this end there should be created without delay, mixed commissions composed of Rhinelanders and Frenchmen."

position at home compelled the vetoing of any project placing definite burdens upon the United States. Consequently, every Frenchman conscious of the German menace, every one upon whom fell the responsibility of the national defense, would have been recreant to his country's cause if he did not urge, at least, the Alliance to supplement the hazy guarantees of a League, whose whole principle the American Senate might reject. Looking at it in this light, M. Clemenceau pursued as a patriot the only policy possible, and Mr. Wilson, in the face of a fast-developing home opposition to a "genuine" league, found himself obliged to acquiesce.

Mr. Wilson has been bitterly attacked for acceding to many compromises respecting his avowed principles. He has been accused of frivolously and recklessly condoning the violation of all of his Fourteen Points, except the fourteenth, which called for the creation of the League. But had it not been for the idea of the League of Nations, overshadowing the proceedings of the Peace Conference, one shudders to consider what the settlement might have resulted in. It seems certain that the "secret treaties" would not only have been enforced, but they would also have been exaggerated. When viewed from the standpoint of "how much worse the Treaty might have been," it may be considered remarkable that Mr. Wilson achieved so much.

France, perhaps, has been too insistent upon her own security, for it appears unlikely that Germany will soon be in a position again to attempt to conquer the world. But there has been something very much larger involved in the Peace Settlement than the mere "fixing" of Germany. A "peace" erected on such a basis cannot, by its very nature, endure. Europe is large enough for a strong Germany and a strong France. In fact, the

happy future of Europe depends upon the existence of these two nations—not antagonistic toward each other, but coöperating with each other. It was the Marquis de Gabriac, the first chargé d'affaires that France sent to Berlin after the War of 1870, who said: "The two nations (France and Germany) are not predestined to mutual extermination. They are two strong races, of different aptitudes, but they ought to live side by side in good understanding united by the ties of a common civilization. . . ." It is the hope of such an understanding, and this hope alone, which makes the success of a true League of Nations an enduring possibility.

CHAPTER XV

WHAT FRANCE THOUGHT OF AMERICAN "IDEALISM"

Intellectuel: individu qui ne persuade que la société doit se fonder sur la logique et qui méconnaît qu'elle repose en fait sur des nécessités antérieures et peut-être étrangères à la raison individuelle.—MAURICE BARRÈS.

I

One of the greatest tributes that Paris ever paid to a visiting statesman was its reception of President Wilson in December, 1918. The *Etoile* has presided over many such triumphal entries; it has seen the royalty of Europe greeted with enthusiasm; it has seen its own men of valor welcomed with pride. But that beautiful arch, now looming more proudly than ever at the far end of the *Champs Elysées*, never witnessed an ovation of more cordiality than that which the President received. In him the people of Paris and the people of France at last beheld the true symbol of peace. The embodiment of the spirit of America, he stood forth as the spokesman of a new international order, destined definitely to prevent the recurrence of the miseries and privations which Europe had suffered during five apocalyptic years.

Not only did the unorganized masses show the most spontaneous enthusiasm, but every organized political element in France was more than generous in its recep-

tion and in its acclamation. *L'Humanité,* the official journal of the Socialist party, issued a special edition in the President's honor on the day of his arrival; in its columns such writers as Anatole France and Romain Rolland praised him in the highest panegyrics. Many of the newspapers printed the President's biography. They recalled with what "skill" the President led America into the war. They characterized and praised him both as an idealist and a realist; and they pointed to his share in the raising of an army of 3,000,000 men from among an "inherently pacifist people" as a remarkable achievement. Journals of the Right as well as of the Left united in this common admiration; each found in the President an interpreter of their own philosophies. *L'Action Française,* the monarchist mouthpiece, saw in Mr. Wilson "one of the three political directors, who, with Lloyd George and Clemenceau, was able to crown the glorious decision of the war." *La Croix,* a clerical paper, called him *l'ami de la justice,* who at the same time would surely recognize the necessity of an American alliance with France to insure the freedom of democracy. Auguste Gauvain in *Le Journal des Débats* assured his readers that the legitimate interests of France would not encounter any resistance from the President; while *Le Temps* asserted that the President would surely sympathize with French insistence upon real guarantees of future peace.

The Socialist press, represented by the *L'Heure,* expressed Labor sentiment in an article by Marcel Sembat, entitled, "From What He Saves Us; Whither He Leads Us":

He has saved us from a German peace which, as we know from the text furnished by Count Bernstorff, would have been

enforced upon us. He leads us to ends opposite from those which our diplomats have in view. For these, as well as for a great number of other Frenchmen, Bismarck remains the model and the guide. They would prepare for us a Bismarckian peace, a peace of oppression, an armed-to-the-teeth peace. . . . Upon this ideal Wilson turns his back. He has another plan. . . . His ideal is the disarmament of the world within the Society of Nations.

Upon the day of the President's arrival in Paris, the General Confederation of Labor and the Unified Socialist party joined in a declaration which they presented to Mr. Wilson. In this document they asserted Labor's sympathy with the President's idealism; they warned him of the overwhelming forces arrayed against him, and of the designs he would have to thwart. They had planned an immense manifestation of working men in his honor, apart from the general welcome which Paris had prepared. But the Government refused its authorization to this ceremony as the only effect of it would have been to antagonize public opinion and to inject into the President's reception a spirit of class consciousness.

L'Europe Nouvelle, liberal in opinion, said in its number of December 14, 1918:

At the very hour when these lines appear, President Wilson will have made his solemn entry into the capital of the Entente.

All the people of Paris, all the true sons of French democracy will be there, present in body, their hands stretched forth to their Apostle. With enthusiasm and also with respect, they will greet this Messiah of Peace, of the Just Peace.

No king, no emperor, ever received a similar welcome.

He is not yet here, but we already seem to breathe a purer air.

With his presence, a new era of justice, of reason and of understanding will open. . . .

The democracies of the Entente have the insecure feeling that certain diplomatic circles have not completely renounced the spirit which guided the negotiations of the Treaty of Vienna in their selfish work.

And it is because they have learned the rude lesson of actual conflict, because they well know that the words "social reconstruction," "political regeneration," or "durable peace," are not vain words to-day—dust thrown in their faces by the diplomats of the Paris Conference, that they look with confidence, that they greet with an intense and a profound joy, this new man in whom they have placed all their hopes in a better future for mankind. . . .

The hounds bay; the caravan passes. Mr. Wilson is a man of wisdom. And we who have never ceased in these columns to bespeak the confidence with which this just and righteous man inspires us, we, convinced democrats, who have always regarded him as the leader of modern democracies, greet his coming to-day as the dawn of a new era toward which, though displeasing to the timid, to the greedy or to the sluggard, an irresistible force impels the peoples of the world.

II

Underlying all the cordiality expressed toward the President, there was, however, from the outset, a certain distrust—even fear. To certain circles this amounted to open suspicion; to others it bordered upon bitter dislike. The imperialists,—and to the credit of France, they were few,—saw in the Fourteen Points a definite *impasse* checking their ambitions. They felt that they were to be unjustly robbed of spoils which Germany would have taken had she won the war. The conservatives (including many of the so-called Radicals) felt that the security of France was to be sacrificed for some vague ideal—perhaps sound in theory, but certainly

incapable of execution. As for the liberals—but there are no liberals in France as far as the new internationalism is concerned! To all Frenchmen alike the German menace is too real. Four times it has crossed the Rhine; four times it has been driven back again. With the exception of the last, its coming has been followed by the loss of French territory—living parts of France. The unspeakable miseries of the last four years of fighting—though the end was won—can never be forgotten. The terrible foreboding of a future German victory was never more firmly imbedded in the French mind. Security against future attacks and guarantees against a German *revanche,* are the principles which must dominate French foreign policy. The means by which this security is obtained is immaterial—it may or may not sacrifice "principles." Certainty is the thing. To the French nation liberal principles applied internationally, meant uncertainty. Hence they questioned them. Apart from the Socialist press, which made of internationalism a purely class issue, no newspaper in Paris sincerely and whole-heartedly supported the full application of the principles of which the President had become the champion.

Open opposition to the things for which the American Peace Delegation stood was preceded by a readjustment of personal estimates. The American army had come to France filled with enthusiasm and with somewhat of an appreciation of the French. Yet, because of difference in language, the disparity of social customs, and countless "little things" there were many misunderstandings. French shopkeepers were repeatedly accused of overcharging Americans. It was alleged that there was one price for them and one for the French. Generosity and considerateness were not to be found among French com-

mercial virtues. As a matter of fact, as Americans found on returning to the United States, overcharging was no more prevalent in France than in America. In both countries, profiteers appeared anxious to drain the soldiery. Morality is not delimitated by lines of nationality; but the average doughboy in France made of it a diplomatic issue. A still greater prejudice was aroused by the thousands of prostitutes who thronged the streets of practically every town where soldiers were stationed. Perhaps this was an inevitable accompaniment of war, but the French authorities appeared to be clearly negligent in controlling the situation. As a result, too many Americans drew their opinions of French women from those they saw on the streets; consequently, to most of them, France was the most immoral nation in the world. They failed, through no fault of their own, to meet the real France, to know the essential piety of the French family, to understand, in short, the French point of view. The French, on the other hand, gained a similar opinion of the Americans. The conduct of many members of the A. E. F. was discreditable. From the irrepressible action of many *permissionaires,* coming to leave areas for a week, with no expenses to meet and perhaps several months' pay to spend, many Frenchmen came to believe seriously that the chief social interests of Americans were limited to the *demi-monde* and cognac. *Le Matin,* upon January 27, 1919, printed the following significant statement:

> Official statistics give for the month of December just past, a total of 34 murders, 220 day or night attacks, and nearly 500 bloody encounters, caused by American soldiers in the single department of the Seine.

It is needless to say that these figures were carelessly and tactlessly exaggerated. The bases of these mutual prejudices were completely and equally unsound. But their existence could not help but prejudice America's position at the Peace Table.

III

America's entrance into the war had been accompanied, in France, by a sort of halo. Her assistance had been invaluable; yet both Americans and Frenchmen had perhaps overprized it. When the war ended a reaction naturally set in. The average Frenchman could not fail to compare the casualty lists of the two nations. It was only natural for him then to believe that America had been given too much credit. America had derived great profits from the war. America had been in the war a year—France, five. Yet now it came before the Peace Conference to dictate peace. Indeed the surprising thing about this changing attitude lay in the fact that it was not expressed more forcibly. Frenchmen were very courteous in repressing what they surely must have thought, and they were equally tolerant in listening to repeated boastings of American superiority. Those who did give vent to their feeling appeared to be dominated more by desires which the presence of America thwarted than by a wish to secure France a just part in the peace deliberations.

An interesting article appeared in *Le Rire de Paris,* a popular weekly, shortly after the armistice had been signed, upon the value of American participation in the war. It stated that up to April 6, 1918, the United States only manufactured 880,000 .75 shells, a number

which at the time of the signature of the armistice had increased to 2,400,000. In August, the daily production did not reach 50,000. The production of shells of a larger caliber was even less. France, on the other hand, turned out 300,000 shells a day. In ten days it produced all the shells which the United States manufactured in twenty months. Of course, American production would have increased had the war lasted, but it is upon actualities, not surmises, that judgment should be passed. The United States sent 109 cannon to France up to September, 1918. But no American .75's came from American factories up to the time of the armistice, and the first tubes for the 155 mm. guns were not expected until March, 1919. As a result, France furnished the United States armies with its field artillery, amounting to 22,000 .75's—enough to equip eighty divisions. Out of the 4,000 aëroplanes used by the Americans, 2,700 were furnished by the French.

La Vieille-France, perhaps the most anti-American paper in France, likewise said that America and President Wilson aspired to regulate the affairs, the constitution, and the frontiers of the nations of Europe, all for having brought over 109 cannon and lost 36,154 men in the war![1]

IV

The next line of attack had as its result the attempt to discredit the President as misrepresenting the will of the American people. As far back as October, 1918, *L'Echo de Paris,* through its American correspondent, Welliver, gave great prominence to the Republican opposition to the President. There was scarcely a criticism

[1] Issue of February 13, 1919.

which this journal did not repeat. Such papers as *Le Matin* and *Le Petit Parisien*, on the other hand, attempted to interpret American opinion more sympathetically. Instead of quoting entirely from the anti-Wilson press in America, especially with respect to the significance of the November elections, they quoted organs like the *New York Times*, which did not consider their results so much a criticism of the President's foreign policy, as determined by purely domestic issues. This attitude *L'Europe Nouvelle* also maintained. In regard to the opposition of such men as Roosevelt, Lodge, and Penrose, this journal very boldly said that "they support as a domestic policy, the maintenance of the trust régime and an impassable tariff wall; as a foreign policy they desire the creation of a permanent army and a powerful navy, the one and the other for the service of imperialist aims"!

La Vieille-France, with its customary exaggeration, was still more naïvely critical:

> It has been observed that Mr. Wilson is surrounded nearly exclusively by politicians from the southern states. This is natural since Mr. Wilson was elected by the Democratic party and since the southern states are Democratic against the Republican North, slave holders against abolitionists. Thus we understand why our Bolsheviki, our Thomas-Renaudels . . . who lead their following of stupefied proletariats around as slaves, acclaim the American slave-owning party!

This was certainly a remarkable explanation of the Socialist support of the President!

André Chéradame, in numerous, outspoken articles in *La Démocratie Nouvelle*, continued an attempt to show the existence of a breach between Mr. Wilson and the American people. He endeavored to prove that the President directly contradicted his mandates and ex-

ceeded his powers by not consulting the Senate during the peace negotiations. According to him, for more than six months, the most important Senators at Washington, Senator Lodge at their head, declared, with increasing insistence, "We wish a complete victory over Germany—that is, a dictated peace. Consequently we are opposed to any negotiated peace which the Hun criminals would be permitted to discuss. We entered the war with two well-determined and definite ends: to save France and to put an end to the Pan-German peril by imposing on Germany conditions of peace so radical that she can never commence again. But now, before realizing these objects, it is said to us: 'First form a League of Nations, then we will settle the war.' But such a general League of Nations constitutes an entirely different aim from that which determined our exceptional intervention in Europe. A League of Nations would engulf us in obligations much heavier than those which we wish to assume. We cannot with any exactitude determine what would be its consequences. We Americans desire then first to settle the war in conformity with the principles which determined our intervention." According to M. Chéradame, this was the opinion which the American electorate emitted during the election of November 6. Consequently, the President, in pursuing his intention to incorporate the League in the Treaty, was violating the expressed wish of the American people. In another editorial, he spoke of Senator Lodge as the most representative man in the United States Senate charged with ratifying the Treaty, and that "the Senate at Washington reflects American opinion," and that, "it will not consent to ratify a Treaty resulting in the assassination of the France of Lafayette and of Rochambeau." The author of the above now is prob-

ably aware that he somewhat misinterpreted American opinion; but such editorials had an unsettling effect upon French political thought.[2]

Personal attacks against the President went to even greater lengths. Thus the irrepressible Urbain Gohier, returning to the charge, spread across the entire cover of *La Vieille-France* the following:

RESTITUTIONS————DROIT DES PEUPLES

Hurrah

pour le President Wilson

qui va rendre

à la France

(coupé—[censored])

Encore un lapin!

* * * * * * *

Nous supplions M. Wilson

d'arrêter les inondations

* * * * * * *

Nous supplions M. Wilson

de nous donner

notre charbon quotidien.

In the same issue M. Gohier assailed Mr. Henry White, one of the members of the American Peace Delegation. He charged him with the grievous crime of having married his daughter to Count Von Scherr-Thoss, a German officer, of visiting the Kaiser upon numerous occasions, and a month after the declaration of war, of writing the following to the *Kreuzzeitung* of Berlin:

Every American who knows Germany will be a friend of the Germans. Everybody who has seen the holy earnestness

[2] In one issue, M. Chéradame expressed the belief that the American censor was keeping from the French public the division of opinion in the United States as to the Treaty, etc.

and the iron-like will-power which every German shows in fulfilling his duty toward the Fatherland . . . cannot believe that Germany's defeat is possible.

M. Gohier then inquires, "Just how well does Mr. Henry White fit in as an *American* delegate?"

La Vieille-France certainly possesses, with all of its defects, what the French term the "virtue of indiscretion."

Charles Maurras was also critical:

A magistrate foreign to France and even to our continent, escapes all responsibility. . . . We are not a herd of sheep with whose pasturage and protection he is charged.[3]

After the President's New York March address in which he charged European statesmen with having neither valor, foresight, nor prudence, M. Maurras wrote:

If the sentence is not explained or denied, what will prevent the statesmen of the old Europe from calling the President's attention to the example afforded by the Italian Cabinet, which from the tenth month of the war, entered it for principles of morality and the welfare of man; the English Cabinet, who joined this holy cause fully armed from the second day; and the Belgian Cabinet, which was ready under arms from the first?

Valor, Prudence, Foresight; O cardinal virtues of the American moralist, where were you then? In the cabinets of Albert I, George V, and Victor Emmanuel III, hereditary sovereigns of the old continent, or in the cabinet of the autocrat of the new world, to whom more than two years and a half of hesitation were necessary to make up his mind to take the terrible step? O Valor, O Prudence, O Foresight, remove our doubts. Foresight, Prudence, Valor, respond![4]

M. Maurras wields at least a trenchant pen.

[3] *L'Action Française*, February 11, 1919.
[4] *Ibid.*, March 8, 1919.

V

Yet another charge—more sincere and reasonable—brought against American idealism, was its impracticability. "It is very well for you Americans to have such lofty principles," these critics would say, "but you live far from the neighborhood of a traditional enemy whose temper is eternally hostile, one who will seize every opportunity to attack. You have no frontiers to guard or to dispute. Finally, the full application of your ideals will only result in the liberation of dozens of minor nationalities, totally unable to defend themselves! Europe will become Balkanized and if any one profits by the situation it will be Germany."

In such a tone, *L'Action Française* wrote:

> Too often and over-ambitiously it has been declared that a new Europe is about to be constructed. What sort of Europe are they going to build for us? A simple heap of rubbish, from which a Germany has already emerged, the only state in this chaos to possess a form. . . .
>
> The policy founded on the principle of nationalities and the right of peoples has failed before even receiving its integral application or the consecration of treaties. The other policy—that of the balance of power, has been held up to contempt. It is always easy to make light of physical laws—or those of experience. This conceit never fails to bring its own punishment. But the pity of it all is that France will be the first to feel the revenge of realities. . . .[5]

It was the American doctrine of the rights of nationalities which led to the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, many Frenchmen said. This dissolution led to the Italian-Jugo-Slav conflict over Fiume, to the Roumanian-Serbian conflict over the Banat, and

[5] Issue of February 14, 1919.

to the Czecho-Polish imbroglio over Teschen. This same doctrine threatened the dissolution of Russia, and led to disputes in Turkey, in Asia Minor, and in the Dodecanese. Finally, it was quoted in support of disturbing revolts in the British protectorate of Egypt and in the Empire of India. It lent fire to the Irish movement. In sum, American principles, the President's principles, shook the old fabric of Europe to its foundation; they were destructive, for they were not strong enough to be constructive. In the opinion of many Frenchmen they wreaked a damage which will keep Europe in constant turmoil for years, a turmoil from which will arise a new, a more powerful Germany. Such was the belief of those Frenchmen to whom order seemed more important than national ideals. They failed to realize that the absence of the second would eventually upset the first.

L'Echo de Paris, through the violent pen of Pertinax, voiced its exasperation at such a state of affairs in these words: "Is it possible that mere idealism should longer obstruct the achievement of a victory so dearly won?"[6]

Le Figaro said, "His (the President's) philosophy to-day causes our vanquished enemies to rely upon his ideas to contest the reality of our victory; and they will invoke his name to-morrow in refusing us its fruits."[7] Jacques Bainville, likewise said that these principles, "put into articles of a treaty, will engender catastrophes."

But while the conservative element in France was thus loudly insistent upon the uselessness of American idealism, the Socialist press, of course, resented such a contention. It maintained that only the application of

[6] March 11, 1919.
[7] March 11, 1919.

a wholly new set of principles would restore Europe to a stable basis. They also believed that no bourgeois society would carry these principles into effect. Thus the belief was strengthened that French Labor must fall in behind the President's attempts. This was the opinion of L. Jouhaux, who wrote in *La Bataille,* a syndicalist journal:

> While Wilson has opposing him a handful of intriguers or of simpletons who in good faith believe that folly is the supreme retrenchment of wisdom, he also has behind him the profound masses of the people who march beneath his banner crying, *Vive la franchise et vive la liberté!*

The radical and democratic journals, such as *L'Œuvre, Le Pays, La Victoire,* and *La Lanterne,* although not so eloquently, showed open sympathy for the Fourteen Points. Thus Gustave Hervé wrote:

> Our acclamations of the speeches made by the President of the United States are only disgusting hypocrisies if we do not decide to demand that our representatives resolutely exert themselves toward the realization of a "Wilsonian Peace."

Le Temps and *Le Journal des Débats,* conservative and critical, yet scholarly and fair, realized that the basis of the organization of Europe must be changed. The American suggestions, they were ready to believe, offered the solution.

VI

Another charge soon became current, directly reflecting upon American sincerity. This was to the effect that her ideals directly affected none of the vital interests of America—that, in fact, they benefited them. As M. Bainville wrote, these "Fourteen Points, a hundred

less than Mohamet's Koran, have in no manner the appearance of contradicting the interests of America. They may even coincide with some of her immediate interests, above all with the commercial interests of an Anglo-Saxon association. . . ." The conservatives seemed thoroughly to believe that the United States has imperialist designs upon the western hemisphere. One would not see it so much in print as he would hear it in conversation. "Oh," they would declare, "you Americans are inevitably going to annex Mexico and Canada; look how even now you are holding on to Cuba and Porto Rico! And have you not your own designs on our possessions in the Indies, or upon Guiana? You wish to monopolize the trade of South America. Why else did you start the Spanish War? And you are really going to give the Philippines their independence? If you really believe in self-determination, why did you fight the Civil War? And, you lovers of democracy, you believers in the equalities of men, why do you lynch negroes and deny them their civil rights? Or why do you discriminate against the Japanese?" These opinions, frequently heard in Royalist circles, emanated from those who believed that nations can only be inspired by self-interest and the desire of aggrandizement. They did not represent, it is true, any considerable portion of French thought; but they paved the way to a much more serious line of criticism: American insistence upon the Monroe Doctrine, and its inconsistency with the principles governing the proposed League of Nations.

President Wilson's classic position was that the League should extend the application of the Monroe Doctrine to the world. This was entirely acceptable to the French. But, as is so well known, it did not satisfy a very considerable element in America who insisted upon the spe-

cific incorporation of this historic principle in the Covenant. This attitude was interpreted by many members of the French press to mean that the Americans would tolerate no intervention of European States in western disputes, but, on the other hand, that the Monroe Doctrine would permit the eventual political or commercial absorption of other American nations by the United States. That the doctrine had never given rise to the latter interpretation made no difference to the French critics who rested their theories upon future possibilities rather than on precedents.

Professor Scelle, of the University of Dijon, moderately expressed this view as follows:

> What is the principal cause of the opposition which has arisen in the American Senate to the text of the League Covenant? It is the fear of seeing the United States pledge itself to intervene in all the quarrels of Europe and of the world, and the reluctance to guarantee the status of nations outlined by the Conference; the fear also of seeing the Society of Nations control American policy on the American continent, contrary to the Monroe Doctrine. The Republican party wishes to retain for the United States the right of being neutral in certain cases, in others of playing the rôle of arbiter. . . .
>
> We do not hesitate to say that if these reservations are admitted they will become generalized; and such a course will bring to an end the League of Nations as a guarantee of the permanence of peace. They are incompatible with the high duties of membership in the League of Nations. If they earnestly desire the advantages of this membership, if they wish to enjoy its security, they must be ready to accept its eventual obligations, and in particular, to fulfill the duties it involves. Surely the most onerous but the most essential, is of concentrating, if necessary, all of the national energies, against the enterprises or the menaces of any disturber of public order.[8]

[8] *L'Europe Nouvelle*, April 5, 1919.

The Italian trouble over Fiume, aroused Jacques Bainville to criticize America on this score, though from a different angle. He wrote:

> In these latter days America has again proclaimed her attachment to the Monroe Doctrine. She is right and we are not desirous of seeing France meddle in America, sending, it may be, at the account of the Society of Nations, another expedition to Mexico. But if America is to be closed to Europeans, why should Europe, at this time which is to determine, it may be, its future for centuries, submit to the arbitrariness of a single American? What titles can Mr. Wilson invoke to overthrow, even in the name of Right, the maxim: "Do not do unto others that which you do not wish them to do unto you?" He speaks of "the services which the United States rendered the Allies." We do not forget these services and we value them. But has France ever protested against the Monroe Doctrine? Has she ever pretended to control American policies in the name of the aid she once brought (and before the eleventh hour) to the Americans in their struggle for independence? [9]

France saw England insisting upon her supremacy on the high seas, a supremacy tacitly admitted by the Conference. She allowed England to enforce a protectorate upon Egypt, struggling for independence. She saw her traditional guardianship in the Near East threatened by the British armies in Constantinople. She saw Shantung succumb to Japanese control. She admitted the full validity of the Monroe Doctrine. Helpless to prevent the huge trade interests Anglo-Saxon business men were building up on the wreckage of Germany's commercial empire, she knew that the control of the trade and money markets had definitely passed to London and New York. The United States had talked a great deal about disarmament, of reducing armies to

[9] *L'Action Française,* April 24, 1919.

a "police force" intended to guard domestic order or to furnish a quota to the new international army. Yet during the peace negotiations, congressmen, the General Staff, even military authorities directing the A. E. F. University at Beaune, were urging universal service. At the very time Lloyd George was talking about the abolition of conscription and the French Senate was considering a bill reducing the period of military service in France, the United States War Department announced a plan of universal military training! A French paper, printing the requests of Secretary of the Navy Daniels before the House Naval Committee for extraordinary appropriations of three and a half billion francs and for the increase of the fleet personnel from 143,335 to 260,000 men, very dryly asks, "Is this the disarmament which America is commencing?"

These were the glaring and apparent inconsistencies which French opinion found difficulty in understanding. Little wonder that France felt her own vital interests sacrificed for ideals which the Allies were hypocritically violating!

Even the Socialists, usually eager in their defense of American principles, were quick to point out what they considered defects. Thus *La Vague*, in a paragraph entitled "800 Years in Prison," pointed out that the total convictions in the trial at Chicago of ninety-three members of the I. W. W. were as follows: Fifteen of the accused, each twenty years in prison and $20,000 fine; thirty-three of the accused, ten years and $30,000; seven of the accused, five years and $20,000; twenty-six of the accused, seven years and $30,000; twelve of the accused, one year and $30,000. Total: 859 years in prison and some millions indemnity. It dryly adds that this is an

indemnity for a class war. "All this in Wilson's country!"

At the Easter Congress of the Socialist party at Paris, an order of the day was adopted which expressed sympathy with all laborers who have been "victims" in every country of capitalist repression. It energetically protested against the imprisonment of Eugene Debs and all other Syndicalists and Socialists in America, as persecutions "which can only enfeeble the fight of the American delegates against the imperialists and the reaction of the Peace Conference."

One of the most spectacular criticisms directed against the consistency of American principles, charging us with what virtually amounted to economic imperialism, came from the pen of André Chéradame in an article entitled "Ne Cherchons Plus Midi à Quatorze Heures." He charged American financiers with receiving concessions from the Bolshevist government in Russia in order to develop Russian railways, forests and mines. M. Chéradame charged that as passports were necessary to have effected such a negotiation, the American Government must have been fully aware of its responsibility and given its tacit consent. Matters had gone to the extent, he claimed, where the French Legation at Stockholm was obliged to declare that the concessions accorded by the Soviet government in Russia to foreign financiers for the construction and exploitation of railways in Russia were not recognized by the French Government in whose opinion the Bolshevist government was only a *de facto* government, maintained by the aid of terror; as such it had no right to grant concessions and dispose of national property.

M. Chéradame then indignantly comments:

We must reach this formidable conclusion. The Wilsonian principles are applicable to the West of Europe, but not to the East. For three months, in the name of his principles, Mr. Wilson has sharply questioned France, whose sacrifices have saved the world, respecting her rights to reparations and to guarantees. Mr. Wilson is very much preoccupied by French imperialism in the matter of the mines of the Saar. But this same Mr. Wilson sees no inconsistency in coming to an understanding with the Russian Bolsheviki, whose atrocities surpass all those recorded in history.

He then cites the instance, reported in *Le Matin* of April 14, of "two strange decisions," secretly arrived at in the conference, under the Presidency of Mr. Wilson. One vote designated Geneva—in preference to Brussels—as the seat of the League of Nations. This vote conformed to the wishes of Mr. Wilson, who declared, "The majority has passed judgment. Geneva is adopted." Then came the vote on the Japanese amendment proclaiming the equality of nations. This time the majority voted for Japan against the United States. "A majority is not enough," Mr. Wilson then declared. "A unanimous vote is necessary; therefore the Japanese amendment is not adopted."

Thus *Le Matin* concludes, "In the sessions of the League of Nations commission, there are majorities which count and majorities which do not count. They count when they are for us. They do not count when they are against us!"

M. Chéradame asks: What sort of peace can be established under such auspices? Can we accept such a method of "making the world safe for democracy"?

The wind was taken out of the sails of Mr. Chéradame's article, the next day, when the American State Department issued a statement denying that any Russian concessions had been granted. But even this did not

alter the opinion of many Frenchmen—that Americans were liberal only when they profited thereby.

During certain periods of the negotiations, the French press, despite the rigorous restraint imposed by the censorship, made it very uncomfortable for the American delegates. Many Parisian journalists appeared to think that articles in the French language remained a sealed book to the Americans in France. The humorous weeklies, such as *Le Sourire* and others of similar bacchanalian propensities, ridiculed Americans and their idealism in rather indecent cartoons. The Socialist *Humanité* seemed to be the only organ which consistently resented this storm of criticism. Toward the end of the conference it wrote, in an article entitled "Ingratitude":

> In imitation of the conservative and jingoist journals from across the Channel, our French press with shocking unanimity—indirectly or directly—leads the campaign against President Wilson.
>
> Stupid ironies, and sarcasms, wounding and injurious attacks, what a spectacle of ignominy!
>
> A year ago, when the German armies directly menaced Paris and when the hearts of all were moved with somber anxiety, this same press implored the Americans to hasten to our aid. With what disinterestedness and how completely they obeyed these agonized appeals! We ought never to lose the thought of it. They sent us 3,000,000 soldiers and consolation; to the enemy, terror. What thanks our journalists then offered them and what panegyrics in honor of the noble nation which turned the balance of destiny in our favor!
>
> At this hour what a difference in tone! We will not take up all the insinuations: the insolence of Pertinax and of *Le Temps,* of the great organs of Paris or their provincial understudies. In plain terms, this is disgraceful. . . .
>
> And all this because the President has wished to remain faithful to his ideas of universal peace, of moderation in victory, of solicitude for international justice. Mr. Wilson en-

deavors to foresee the future and to conclude a clean and just peace so that it may be durable. He resists—as much as lies within his power—the imperialistic conceptions and the designs of territorial conquests advanced by his Allies. He appeals to reason, and the necessity of calming inexpiable hatreds,—the psychosis of collective follies to which humanity at this time is a prey. These are the reasons for the blind wrath of a press which, with an indelicacy wholly unworthy of our traditions, has so quickly forgotten the service rendered us.

Because he stands alone in resisting certain sinister forces, the President must be outflanked. And what will be the result gained by the nationalistic bourgeoisie of all the belligerent countries? It is not difficult to perceive. A peace based on the Fourteen Points, a League of Nations involving universal disarmament, would be admittedly able to bring to exhausted men a relative consolation and to leave them some hope for the future. Now that these "illusions" are thrust aside and that the "chimeras" and other Wilsonian ideologies have been exorcised, peoples no longer have confidence in themselves. The last great bourgeois will be unable to prevent the inevitable.

L'Humanité was in part right. Much of the criticism directed against America and the President came from those who found in our representatives the chief obstacle to their own illegitimate ambitions. On the other hand, it must be admitted that many of the charges which France brought against us were true. America is not perfect; her nature is essentially human. But the ideals which she has asked Europe to adopt are not wholly new, they have not arisen from her inherent moral superiority. Their origin may be traced to Europe and their most fertile growth was fostered by the minds of French philosophers: Abbé Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, Bergasse—even that pseudo-idealist Napoleon III. On the other hand, a peculiar set of circumstances has made America their appropriate mouthpiece. Her optim-

ism, the optimism of youth, born of the serenity which national isolation has given us, carried these ideals, renewed and reënforced, to a Europe in turmoil. It was the moral force of America arising from this hope, which to a limited extent fastened these principles upon European politics. The misunderstandings were mutual; the best way to smooth them out was by a frank interchange of ideas, even of mutual criticism.

VII

The rejection of the Treaty of Versailles by the United States Senate in November, 1919, was viewed with natural alarm in France. The first expressions of opinion were to the effect that the United States wished to repudiate the obligations to which it had pledged itself. The French press reiterated its former position that the assurance of American participation in the League of Nations had led France to give up her demands for a strategic frontier. Now if American coöperation was not forthcoming, France, deprived of the guarantees it had demanded, would find itself defenseless whenever Germany wished to renew hostilities. Under these conditions, it was natural that France should charge America with bad faith. The French press, notably *Le Matin* and *L'Action Française,* was full of such recriminations. Those who did realize that the Treaty debate was a struggle between the executive and the legislative powers, believed that even that could not excuse the endangering of the peace of the world. Those who believed that the President was supported by American opinion, charged the Senate with playing politics. Those, like *L'Echo de Paris* and André Chéradame, who be-

lieved that the President had acted in contradiction to the will of the American people, continued their attacks on Mr. Wilson.

The real cause of the Treaty delay, however, the French press did not realize: American opinion, keyed to the highest pitch of idealism during the war, had suffered a reaction. The American Senate perhaps never had been imbued with that idealism; but there is little question but that in his original appeals to international morality, the President had been followed by the people, heart and soul. At the close of the war, however, with the succeeding months of a monotonous armistice, with the return of American troops from France, and with the growing evidence of Allied imperialism, American idealism commenced to wane. Public opinion did not repudiate the President's ideals—it simply forgot about them. Its enthusiasm had been burnt out by the war, and it was natural that upon the return to peace, a shortsighted and a languid opinion should occupy itself with domestic pursuits and internal problems. During the war, importunate realities had stimulated an interest in European affairs; the dangers of German imperialism public opinion had been forced to realize. With Germany's defeat, however, probably the majority of the American people felt that the menace was over. They speedily forgot about the causes of the menace. And their powers of thought were too exhausted to think of means of preventing its recurrence. Furthermore, the agencies of public opinion which the Government had created during the war, now passed out of existence. A propagandized opinion which had had facts and ideas literally jammed down its throat, heaved a sigh of relief when the supply of medicine was exhausted. Public opinion demanded a vacation; most of

the people who really thought, realized that America had certain definite and immediate obligations to Europe. But numbers of people, perhaps, cared little more about the Treaty debate in the Senate than they did about the Einstein theory. And although the Senate was accused for its ineptitude and although it doubtlessly misrepresented public opinion, there is every reason to believe that, had the public been inspired with the same interest and feeling which dominated it during the war, the Senate would have been literally forced into a decision against its own will.

Although America had an innocent conscience, in lapsing back into an isolation made easy as well as comfortable because it required no thought—and thinking was a hard task for most people—France was wide awake to the seriousness of the prospect of America's withdrawal from Europe. If the Senate had ratified the Peace Treaty immediately, not only would France's fear have been allayed, but her subsequent efforts to revive the system of alliances which has caused so much harm in Europe, would have never been made necessary. The Senate's reticence and the bitter hostility which a minority within it showed toward Europe, increased French insistence, however, upon the guarantees of the Old Diplomacy.[10] Although America had condemned the

[10] The notification by Premier Millerand, on February 10, 1920, to Germany that the time of occupation of the Rhenish provinces would be extended indefinitely because of the failure of Germany to comply with some parts of the Treaty, may be looked upon as a disguised annexation of the left bank of the Rhine by France. It marks the first step in the erection of the guarantees which France unsuccessfully urged at the Conference. Now that American participation is uncertain, France is bending every effort to restore the peace which would have been negotiated originally, if America had not participated in the Conference. Millerand's announcement and the efforts being made to negotiate alliances indicate the results of American hesitation. If America had acted promptly, the

tactics of the Elder Statesmen, she was now driving Europe again to resort to them. In fact, to many Frenchmen, America presented the piteous spectacle of a nation which had given birth to a new idea and now refused to make the sacrifices necessary to keep it alive. During the drearisome months which the Senate listlessly consumed, France and the whole of Europe came to believe that although the foremost republic in the world has its virtues, it is perhaps controlled as much by self-interest and as little by altruism as any other nation in the world.

But even so, France realized that a system of European alliances, necessarily unstable because of changing and conflicting national interests, would not supply her with the protection against a German attack which a League of Nations, even with limited American help, would do. Consequently, France was willing to have America enter the League with reservations. France was not satisfied with these reservations. But it finally came to believe that they were better than nothing at all. This led to a direct volte-face. *Le Temps*, which had originally attacked the reservations as destructive of the Treaty of Versailles, now came to the conclusion that they did not vitiate it in any respect. This diplomatic attitude was held by France generally. It was disappointed in American hesitation; yet it accepted the inevitable and tried to make the best of a bad situation.

However, a radical revision of the system upon which the world for a century had operated, was too much to expect. Reaction was sure to set in; the pendulum was bound to swing back. But at least one step in advance

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old régime perhaps would have been given a death blow. Now it is speedily reviving, and it is forcing the League of Nations into a state of innocuous obscurity.

has been made. There will be more wars and there will be more peace conferences. With each succeeding one, however, the world may hope for some betterment and for some progress. Just as the Treaty of Versailles is a vast moral improvement over the Treaty of Vienna, each succeeding treaty may bring to the world hopes for a brighter future. Real peace, however, is not an inert thing. It does not consist in the adjustment of boundary lines nor in the disposition of groups of peoples. It lies in the hearts of men and it will be realized only when the character of humankind has been changed.

APPENDIX A

GEORGES CLEMENCEAU

M. Clemenceau was born in La Vendée, September 28, 1841. At the age of nineteen he went to Paris to study medicine, where three years later he received his degree. In 1866 he went to the United States, and for a time taught French at a girls' school at Stamford, Connecticut. He fell in love and later married one of his students, Miss Mary Plummer. M. Clemenceau then returned to Paris and devoted himself to the practice of medicine, chiefly among the poor of the Montmartre district.

After the proclamation of the French Republic on September 4, 1870, Clemenceau was elected mayor of the Montmartre district. It was this district which sent him to the National Assembly at Bordeaux as its representative. Clemenceau voted with Louis Blanc and the other "irreconcilables," against the peace preliminaries with Germany, because of the cession of Alsace and Lorraine.

The urgency of his mayoral duties called M. Clemenceau back to Paris on the 5th of March, 1871. On the 18th, the ill-fated Commune was established. Because he struggled to prevent the murder of Generals Lecomte and Thomas, Clemenceau became a "suspect" of the Central Committee which removed him from his position. Shortly afterward, M. Pyat ordered his arrest. Fortunately for M. Clemenceau, a Brazilian who resembled him was seized instead; and as he was about to be shot, the mistake was discovered.

After the fall of the Commune, Clemenceau withdrew from active politics. For five years he engaged in the practice of medicine. During this period he also served as a municipal councilor, finally becoming President of the Paris municipal council.

In 1876 he was again elected to the Assembly, where he

made himself both unpopular and prominent by advocating the passage of an amnesty bill freeing the participants in the Commune, notably A. Blanqui. Although he was but thirty-five years of age at this time, he was already advocating the program which later carried him into national prominence: freedom of speech, of belief, and of the press; the separation of church and state; the expulsion of the Jesuits. He urged the inauguration of social reforms of a collective nature. He was bitterly opposed to colonization because he believed it would dissipate the strength of the nation which should be continually prepared to avenge the cruel losses of 1871. Consequently he opposed the penetration of Tunis, Tonkin, Annam and Madagascar by France. It was he who was largely responsible for the French withdrawal from Egypt in 1882. M. Clemenceau deserves some of the credit for unearthing the decoration scandal in which Daniel Wilson, the son-in-law of President Grévy, was involved.

Perhaps the greatest service of M. Clemenceau to the Republic is that between 1876 and 1893 he kept alive the spirit of the French Revolution within Parliament—during a period in which the Government was almost daily on the verge of succumbing to the Royalists.

M. Clemenceau was Boulanger's cousin; this doubtless was one reason why the Old Tiger at first supported this militant troubadour in his escapades of 1887-1889. But he soon saw his mistake and later repudiated his connections with him.

Clemenceau's enemies attempted to entangle him in the Panama Canal affair (1892-1893) in which wholesale embezzlements consumed great sums originally intended for the construction of the canal. At this time Clemenceau was editor of *La Justice*. One of the ringleaders in the Panama scandal had subscribed $5,000 to this newspaper in its early days. With this evidence, M. Clemenceau's opponents, of whom he had many, urged that his paper had been deliberately "bought" over by the Panama crowd. The charges were never proved; and Clemenceau ably defended himself against them in the Chamber.

In 1893, however, his opponents had become too strong for him. He was bitterly accused of atheism, of opposing the alliance with Russia, even of being pro-English; and as a result, he was defeated for election to the Assembly from

the district of Draguignan. Thus after seventeen years of active parliamentary life, he returned to journalism, at the age of fifty-two.

But he did not lose interest in public affairs, for through the columns of *L'Aurore* he preached the doctrines of social reform and hatred for Germany. He led the struggle for the defense of Dreyfus; in fact, it was he who suggested that Zola write that terrible indictment of the army, *J'Accuse,* which appeared in Clemenceau's own paper.

In 1902, Clemenceau again entered active political life, for he was elected to the Senate from the Var. For the first time in his career he accepted a Government position in March, 1906, when he was appointed Minister of the Interior in the Sarrien Cabinet. He was immediately called upon to solve the terrible colliery disaster in Courrières, the wine growers' revolt in Southern France, and the electrician and other strikes in Paris. In October, 1906, Clemenceau himself became head of the cabinet.

Despite the fact that his uncle is a priest, Clemenceau is a bitter anti-Catholic; and the first task confronting his ministry was the enforcement of the anticlerical legislation of 1905. At this he was unsuccessful, as the supplementary law of 1907 amply demonstrated. The Clemenceau Ministry was responsible for the first step in the nationalization of the French railways, the Government taking over the Western road. Although the Prime Minister was an ardent believer in the right of labor to organize and to strike, he was opposed to the unionization of Government employees because of the unique status which they occupied. Clemenceau was finally driven out of office in July, 1909, by Delcassé, whom Clemenceau had bitterly attacked for his Moroccan policy. Now it was Delcassé who accused the Prime Minister first for failing to overcome weaknesses in the navy which Clemenceau himself had criticized, and finally for pursuing a contradictory policy in Morocco. M. Clemenceau was at that time even more impatient than he proved to be in later years; for in the debate he deliberately flaunted the Chamber. As a result he failed to win a vote of confidence; and retired from the ministry at the age of sixty-eight.

In 1913 and 1914 he continually preached the danger of a German invasion through the columns of *L'Homme Libre.*

When war came, he gave it his sturdiest support. At the same time he was courageous enough to point out in no delicate terms the defects in the administration of the French army. So strongly did he condemn the defeatist movement which was rapidly undermining the morale of France, that in November, 1917, the country turned to him as the one man who could rally every Frenchman to the support of *La Patrie*. At the age of seventy-six, this "grand old man of France" assumed the direction of the French Government, himself taking the arduous position of Minister of War. He made quick work of the traitors, as *Le Bonnet Rouge* and other trials proved; —he reorganized and reinvigorated the whole war machine. To him, more than to any other statesman, France owes her victory.

M. Clemenceau is a teetotaller; he does not smoke. He rises every morning at three o'clock. His chief hobby is animals, and of these, dogs hold the first place in his heart. He is the most dangerous duelist in France—the President of the Republic, Paul Deschanel and the former Nationalist, M. Déroulède, can attest to that from experience. M. Clemenceau is an enraptured collector of Japanese art; and he is a devoted student of John Stuart Mill. He is an orator who despises the conventions of oratory. He speaks evenly, and his one gesture is that of a weighty index finger with which he drives home point after point upon unwilling and willing audiences alike.

The strength of M. Clemenceau rests in his courage—in his fearless denunciation of injustice and of inefficiency. His weakness lies in the fact that he too often is destructive without being constructive, that he is intransigent to the point of stubbornness, and that he is cynically unimaginative so far as a conception of amicable relations between European nations is concerned. Time only will judge him aright. But it is not too much to say that despite his faults he is one of the great men of the Third Republic, and that his name may properly be enshrined among those of the Immortals.

APPENDIX B

FRENCH TAXATION DURING THE WAR

It is not the purpose of this appendix to give a complete account of the French system of taxation or even to mention all of the taxes employed during the war, but merely to point out the change in the basis of the system from "real" to "personal" taxes and the fact that the change has not been successful.

The former system of taxation was based on what were called the "four direct contributions." These taxes were: (1) *A tax on land.* As no change in the assessment of property values had been made since 1850, this tax was naturally subject to the grossest discriminations. Lands which at the time of their evaluation in 1850 were productive, might have become unproductive since then; but they were subject to the same tax as before. There was also a *tax on landed property.* This tax was somewhat fairer for it was based on the annual rent of houses and factories,—estimated every ten years. (2) The so-called *patents tax*—nominally a tax on incomes and professional earnings. This tax was also based on the rental value of the premises upon which the business of the taxpayer was being conducted. Consequently it was upon apparent rather than actual earnings, and open to the greatest discriminations. (3) *The tax on doors and windows.* This tax, long recognized as utterly unsocial because it really imposed a tax on light and air, was in theory repealed by a law passed July 18, 1892; but successive financial bills postponed its actual demise until the financial law of July 31, 1917 finally provided that it should not be levied after January 1, 1918. (4) *Taxes on personal property.* This tax was also levied on the signs of wealth rather than on the wealth itself; instead of attempting to assess the amount of personal property actually held, it was levied on ostensible tokens, such as the amount of rent paid, etc.

The objections to these "real" as opposed to "personal" taxes—the fact that they were not in any true sense based on the faculty theory of taxation—led to insistent demands for reform. For the last twenty years the advanced parties in the Chamber of Deputies have demanded the enactment of an income tax, but it was not until 1914 that the Senate finally gave its consent. The law passed July 15, 1914, levied a tax upon incomes greater than 5,000 francs, an amount which by the law of December 30, 1916, was lowered to 3,000 francs ($600, normal rate of exchange). Those having an income less than 3,000 francs are exempt from the tax, a sum which is increased 2,000 francs in the case of a married man having one or more children. Taxpayers having dependents more than seventy years old or who are infirm, and children of less than twenty-one, receive a further exemption of 1,000 francs for each in case the total number of dependents does not exceed five; if it does, the exemption increases for each person beyond the fifth, to 1,500 francs.

The rate of this tax is (law of June 30, 1918):

1. Taxable incomes up to 5,000 francs — $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

2. Taxable incomes between 5,000 and 150,000 francs — $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent to 16 per cent, with a progression of one centime per hundred francs.

3. Taxable incomes between 150,000 and 550,000 francs — 16 per cent to 20 per cent, with a progression of one centime per thousand francs or fraction thereof.

4. Taxable incomes greater than 550,000 francs — 20 per cent.

Of the several other direct personal taxes levied during the war the most important was the "extraordinary or supplementary war-profits" tax, or in other words, an excess profits tax. This tax, which was first passed July 1, 1916, was supposed to be levied on all business and commercial enterprises, including mining operations, whose profits came within the terms of the law. The profit to be taxed is determined by subtracting from the total net profit of the current year, the *normal* profit. The latter is based on an average of the profits of the three years preceding August 1, 1914. The normal profit in no case can be estimated at a sum lower than 5,000 francs or less than 6 per cent of the invested capital. The rate of this tax (by the law of December 31, 1917) is 50

per cent of the excess profits less than 100,000 francs; 60 per cent of the excess profits between 100,000 and 250,000 francs; 70 per cent of the excess profits between 250,000 and 500,000 francs; 80 per cent of the excess profits greater than 500,000 francs.

The point which should be noted is that, unlike the experience of other countries, the inauguration of income taxes in France has succeeded neither in equalizing the burden of taxation nor in securing the necessary revenue. When the income tax law of July 15, 1914, was passed, it was estimated that the tax would return about 80,000,000 francs annually. For the year 1916, however, it only produced 40.000,000. As a result of a reduced exemption, etc., the tax in 1918 produced about 200,000,000; in England, having a population but slightly larger than France's, on the other hand, the same kind of a tax produced over five times as much. Similarly the Excess Profits Tax in France annually realized but 800,000,000 francs, while in England the same tax produced between 7,000,000,000 and 8,000,000,000—ten times as much. In comparing these two countries, it must be remembered that before the war per capita taxation in both were about the same. Taking into consideration all the different taxes, it has been estimated that taxes increased in England 2.77 times during the war, but in France only 1.14 times, and that England raised about six times the amount of money during the war by means of taxation that France raised. For the financial year ending December 31, 1919, the direct taxes in France yielded 733,970.000 francs; claims, however, had been issued for 1,135,578,400 francs. Thus the Government failed to collect nearly 400,000,000 francs.

The reason for the failure of personal as opposed to real taxation in France is found partly in the character of the French business man. He resents bitterly any interference with his accounts, especially by the Government. Few Frenchmen, it must be admitted, were scrupulously honest in compiling their returns. Many laborers refused outright to pay the tax, saying it was an outrage to tax men with an income as low as $600 when the wealthy were getting off almost for nothing.

The evasions of the excess-profits tax were as numerous as those of the income tax,—perhaps more so, because evasion

was easier. Companies might invest their profits in lands and other property, thus escaping the tax. This caused considerable speculation and several subsequent failures. It was notorious that many large munition firms, notably the Hotchkiss company, escaped their share of the burden.

Furthermore, the income tax had been enacted just at the outbreak of the war. There was no organized administration for its collection. Mobilization and concentration on war activities prevented the Government from establishing such a system. The war also upset the incomes of perhaps the majority of the people so that it was an impossibility accurately to estimate what these incomes would be.

The failure of these taxes led the Government to resort to credits, bond issues and indirect taxes for the greater part of its revenue. Only about one fifth of the financial resources of the French Government were raised by taxation. As a result of this loan and credit policy, the note issues of the Bank of France increased from 6,000,000,000 in 1914 to 33,000,000,000 in 1918; and the amount was increasing even in 1919. This naturally inflated values and was the main cause of the high cost of living. It should be added in defense of the French policy that the war was being fought on French soil. England was not being invaded and its industries were not being destroyed: it could resort to direct taxes. But in France one tenth of the country was actually being devastated and the whole nation was living in momentary fear of attack. Consequently, the Government felt justified in alleviating the immediate financial burdens which burdensome direct taxes would impose.

The failure of the personal taxes led many elements in France, among them *Le Temps*, at the close of the war, to demand the abolition of the income tax and the return to the Four Direct Contributions. François Marsal, in numerous articles (see *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, January 10, 1920), advocated a similar program. Upon his appointment as Minister of Finance in the Millerand Cabinet, it is interesting to note that he at once became indefinite in his plans to return to the old system whose injustice had been recognized in every country which had tried it. In one of his first speeches to the Chamber, M. Marsal said that for the present he would continue the financial policy of M. Klotz,

M. Clemenceau's Finance Minister. Although Klotz had planned to retain the old taxes as well as to institute some new ones, such as a tax on business figures, he relied for the greater part of the 1920 budget upon loans.

His estimate, made in January, 1920, follows:

	Francs
Ordinary expenditures	17,861,140,000
Expenditures arising from hostilities, etc.	7,508,083,055
Expenses for reconstruction, pensions, etc., but which are recoverable from Germany	22,089,597,500
Total in round numbers	47,500,000,000

M. Klotz planned to meet only the ordinary expenditures of 17,861,140,000, by taxation. M. Marsal indeed will do well if he can come up to his standard, for the ordinary revenue assured for 1920 amounts but to 9,368,000,000 francs, leaving a deficit of 8,493,000,000 francs which must be met by taxation. It was M. Klotz's idea to raise the amounts necessary for the extraordinary expenditures from loans, in the hope of eventually recouping the sums from Germany by the payment of the indemnity. Even if this hope is realized eventually, France still has a tremendous problem on its hands in meeting the deficit in the *ordinary* expenditures, amounting, as we have seen, to over 8,000,000,000 francs. The 1914 budget was only 5,000,000,000; the 1920 ordinary budget is 17,000,000,000; and although the depreciation of values will account for part of this difference, the conclusion seems inevitable that the French Government, accustomed to the huge expenditures of war, has become extravagant in financing its ordinary activities.

The reticence—it may be the impossibility—of France to adopt a plan of taxation which would place a greater burden upon its taxpayers, was one of the reasons that the Allied Governments would not consider the proportional division of war indebtedness among themselves. They believed it would be grossly unfair to level additional taxes upon their own citizens who already were being taxed more heavily than Frenchmen,—to relieve the latter of their burdens. Although this argument was of weight as far as the ordinary govern-

mental expenditures were concerned, it had less bearing when the matter of strictly war expenses was considered. But the fact still remains that, not only from the standpoint of international support, but from that of her own internal economy, France must soon bend every effort to free herself from the vicious policy of loans which at the present time merely accentuates, if it does postpone, financial difficulties.

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